20 years later:
Problems and prospects of countries
of former Yugoslavia
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20 years later: Problems and prospects of countries of former Yugoslavia

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Preface

During the existence of Yugoslavia many scholars worldwide considered a challenging topic to study and to write about; the amount of scholarship on this topic was remarkable, for example on the post-World War II economic system. The dissolution of Yugoslavia proved to be a subject attracting even greater international scholarly attention. The literature is so vast that attempts to classify ‘theories’ on the dissolution have sprung up.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia gave life to new societies, states, which had previously existed as one. Although many comparative analyses are conducted today, specific studies focusing on the former Yugoslav state – i.e. its successors as subjects of comparative analysis – are lacking. In this regard, it is evident that Kosovo, in a scientific analysis, cannot be considered part of Serbia; moreover it is doubtful whether Bosnia and Herzegovina should be considered as a single entity, owing to the many substantial differences and ‘frontiers’ between the 2 constitutive entities.

Our major task, undertaken at the University of Maribor by members of the Department of Sociology and one member from the Department of Psychology, was one less frequently undertaken in scholarship on Yugoslavia. We attempted to depict the in-depth processes of evolution of these social systems, in terms of their major dimensions, for the period 1991–2011, via reliable analysis of the available quantitative data. Many publicly available data sets, such as the EVS/WVS, supplemented by our own data set of university students from 7 post-Yugoslav entities, formed the empirical basis of this study. Thus, we did not take the more popular route of scholarly analysis, which is to collect and analyse what particular individuals involved in political, economic, cultural and other relevant processes stated, where quantitative data would be presented in a merely illustrative way.

Such an approach was aimed at facilitating comparative analysis, including the possibility of experimental insight, since these states departed from some points in their value orientations, political culture and family structure at the time of dissolution, and many more of these changes could be attributed to the change
in environment and circumstances. Of course, modernization continued in all these countries, and this is a relatively universal finding. This is most clearly discernible from the chapter on family, many other issues bearing a less clear relation to modernization; this is to be expected within such a short span and within the turmoil of dissolution. As one could anticipate, in some areas modernization was halted, while in others it received a specific imprint. For example, it seems that the family did evolve to a modernized pattern, although certain values and attitudes did not.

Our study covers the period 1991–2011. In fact, the last EVS data pertain to 2008, thus making it almost impossible for the analysis to cover the impact of the world economic crisis, which hit these countries hard. It is questionable how this crisis did affect and how it will continue to affect these societies with respect to these issues. Some impacts may emerge later, possibly in the exit stage. This may hold for political culture as well as value change, as historical instances confirm.

The main topics covered in the book are the following:

– Although not questioning the imminence of failure of Yugoslavia as a state, the introductory chapter is devoted to the subjective facet of the phenomenon: whether there was a long term yearning on the part of nationalities within Yugoslavia to establish their own states (this paper has already been published, authored by R. Klanjšek and S. Flere),

– Chapter 2, authored by S. Flere, is devoted to analysis of how social scholars from these states analysed social change during this period, finding great discrepancies in the amount and quality of scholarship;

– Chapter 3, authored by R. Klanjšek, is devoted to economic growth in the new entities and thus to the direct ‘exit costs’ (apart from war), indicating a variable but general economic slowdown and negative growth, which has mostly yet to be remedied. These analyses are original and generally innovative in their quantitative dimensions;

– In Chapter 4, by S. Flere, the family is analysed; this is a particularly salient feature of social life from the point of view of social structure in general. Changes in the family, as a Durkheimian ‘social fact’, indicate changes in the entire environment;

– In Chapter 5, gender role attitudes, an important facet of modernisation and of everyday life, otherwise lacking in the literature, are analysed. The chapter is authored by A. Kirbiš and M. Tavčar Krajnc. It shows both variety and certain discordance with what is indicated in the previous chapter, probably indicative of inconsistencies within gender role attitudes themselves.
In Chapter 6 by A. Kirbiš, political participation and political culture are analyzed in their numerous components, with a view to whether and how much these are conducive to stable democratic political life. Thus, this quantitative analysis could be understood as an infrastructure for political institution analysis, which is otherwise not covered in our analysis.

Chapter 7, authored by B. Musil, is devoted to comparative analysis of values in the environments at issue. Self-expressive values and traditionalism are pointed out as indicative, and the basic picture is one of retraditionalization, although some states do not fit well into such a diagnosis.

In the last chapter issues of religiosity are analyzed by M. Lavrič. Again, the method is not one dealing with statements by religious dignitaries or ordinary believers; instead in-depth quantitative survey analysis of religiosity is carried out, also considering the formation of new states as well as the concomitant conflicts. Lavrič finds a possibly surprising emergent religious dimension: the growth of private religion. This forms a contrast to the confessionalization that is stressed in the immediate period after the dissolution.

Thus, all major dimensions of social life are covered within this analysis, with the exception of analysis of their institutional features, to which some lesser social issues may be added.

It is by now evident that the drawbacks of the study pursue from the limitation of the study itself, since the researchers were limited by their research conditions. They were not able to conduct direct research (with the exception of the university student survey), nor were they able to devote their energies to the study, for example, of the press of the countries involved. They strove to attain in-depth insight into societal levels and into fundamental processes and structures. It remains to the reader to assess whether they did achieve this level of insight, and it remains to the future to determine whether the trends diagnosed will continue or are reversible.

It would be valuable to determine whether the developmental trends or fluctuations will prove to be in line with other cases of dissolving states and of post-Communist transition.

Sergej Flere
Maribor, February 2013
Exit Yugoslavia:
Longing for
Mononational States
or Entrepreneurial
Manipulation?

(R. Klanjšek & S. Flere)

Abstract

The study analyzed whether the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of succeeding mono-national states was the expression of “longing” of mass proportions on the part of the nationalities within respective federal units. Using the data from two pan-Yugoslav surveys from the period preceding the dissolution, results were obtained that indicated a very limited support for this hypothesis. More specifically, results indicated that support for emancipation was rather weak, among youth in 1986 and even among the adult population in 1990, although some significant mean differences between the federal units and between major nationalities within them were evident. Specifically, opinions favoring independence were detected among Kosovo Albanians and later among Slovenians in Slovenia. In addition, findings also indicated that those with higher socioeconomic status were not more inclined toward independence. Results thus pointed more towards the idea that the dissolution was indeed instigated by a small group of “political entrepreneurs”, not captured by the survey data.

Key words: Dissolution, National Independence, Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Identity, Collapse, Political Entrepreneurship.
1.1 Introduction

The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has attracted much scholarly attention, consequently spawning numerous theoretical debates about why the dissolution came about. Initially, the blame for Yugoslavia’s disintegration was attributed to historic animosities that were seen as something intrinsic to the Balkans (Connor, 1993; Judah, 1997; Kaplan, 1993). A similar argument was made by Meštrović and colleagues (Meštrović, Letica, & Goreta, 1993) and Cohen (1995). While former stressed the importance of the “social character of the Balkan Heart” (indicating that the dissolution came about mainly because of cultural incompatibility, particularly between Serbs and Croats), Cohen (1995) noted that a basis for this hatred could be traced to “transgenerational socialization of negative stereotypes” (246). Explanations that built on ethnic essentialism/primordialism were quickly criticized as being too narrow minded and simplistic (see, e.g., Flere, 2003a; Gagnon, 2004; Jovic, 2001, 2009; Sekulić, Massey, & Hodson, 2006). As summarized by Jovic (2001) “ethnic hatred was not ancient and ever existent, but had to be created…” (103).

Alternative views stressed the importance not only of internal factors (including those not mentioned by the ethnic essentialists/primordialists), but also of external factors (Adler, 1998; Gow, 1997) which, as indicated by Herman and Peterson (2007) were often overlooked, since the majority of studies focused entirely on the alleged resurgence of Serbian nationalism and the drive for a “Greater Serbia” (Herman & Peterson, 2007, 2). Specifically, Herman and Peterson (2007) argued that the geopolitical context (see also Flere, 2003b), marked by the decline and eventual dissolution of the Soviet bloc, as well as German, Austrian, Vatican, EU, and eventual U.S. interest, played an important role in the dismantlement. That international factors played a significant part was also acknowledged in the meta-analytic work of Jovic (2001), although he did note that those factors should not be seen as paramount, because “Yugoslav leaders and citizens concluded that with the collapse of the Brezhnev doctrine the most serious threat to Yugoslavia’s security was eliminated” (111), and also because “the West did not want Yugoslavia to disintegrate” (ibid.).

Support for Jovic’s assertion that Yugoslavia was primarily “defeated from within, not from outside” (Djilas & Kalezic, 1993, 109) could also be found in a plethora of views that move away from ethnic essentialism/primordialism but still focus on the role of internal factors. One of the more frequent approaches stressed the importance of the erosion of Communist legitimacy (Veljak, 1997), which was often related to the increasing political paralysis (that could be seen as a result “of anti-statist ideology”; Jovic, 2001, 105; see also Allcock, 2000; Pavlowitch, 1999) and to the economic turbulence within
Yugoslavia’s highly indebted, unevenly developed federal units (for a review of the “economic factor” theories, see, e.g., Ramet, 2005, 55–60; for critical assessment of those views, see Jovic, 2009, 15–17). According to Allcock (2000), this mixture of economic and political crisis led to a situation where elites “fell into mutually destructive competition in the attempt to rescue their own positions and authority” (427), often using nationalist rhetoric to gain popular support (ibid.). Support for Allcock’s conclusion can be found in the work published by Goati (1997) who, by analyzing results from an empirical study of the participants at the 1st League of Communist of Yugoslavia (held in 1988), showed how two competing political groups (“centralists-monists” and the “decentralists-pluralists”)1 (459) fought for power and how those two groups later used similar tactics (nationalist rhetoric, fear mongering etc.) to win over nationalists in their respective federal units. A rather different explanation was given by Wachtel (1998) who, by relying more on cultural factors, argued, that the conditions for the collapse were created when elites (through administrative decentralization), started to abandon attempts to build a “robust vision of Yugoslav nation” (229). In essence this argument is similar to what Jovic (2009) described under the “nationalism argument” (19). He indicated that the nationalism of constitutive nations was getting stronger as the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav nationalism weakened. According to Jovic (2009), this happened primarily because of the Kardelj’s anti-statist (and anti-nationalist) ideology that manifested itself in the 1974 constitution (which treated the republics as a sovereign states)2. Yet others argued that rising nationalism and the conse-

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1 As indicated by Goati (1997, 459–460), the first group, led by Slovenia, argued for decentralization and pluralization. The second group, led by Serbia, favored and argued for a centralist organization of society. According to the author, the formation of these two groups later led to the formation of another two opposing groups: federalist (under Serbian and Montenegrin leadership) and confederalist (led by Slovenia and Croatia). While the first group tried to preserve Yugoslavia as a strong federation, the second “preferred the transformation of its republics into independent states” (Goati, 1997, 461). However, it should be noted that Goati argued that later developments indicated that “the true goal of federalist” was not the preservation of Yugoslavia, but its breakup along ethnic (not republican) lines (462–464).

2 As indicated by the author, this fragmented Yugoslavia politically and economically, which also prevented “fast and decisive responses to political and economic crises” (Jovic, 2009, 20). The role of Kardelj’s ideology (and the 1974 constitution) is also central to Jovic’s main argument – that the collapse of Yugoslavia cannot be properly understood “without including the perceptions of political elite...without an analysis of its ideological beliefs and of the mechanisms by which these beliefs were transformed into political action” (Jovic, 2009, 3). Consequently, he suggested that an important part of Yugoslavia’s problems leading to its demise could be traced to the elites’ loss of ideological consensus “which was based primarily (but not exclusively) on Kardelj’s interpretation of Marx” (ibid.), i.e., on the withering away of the state, as operationalized by a degrading of the competences of the
sequent conflict and collapse should be seen in the light of the crucial absence of democracy and liberal-democratic political forces (Sekelj, 1996), in the light of the role that Slobodan Milosevic played (Haller, 1996; Lukic, Lynch, & Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1996), and in the light of Tito’s death in 1980 (Godina, 1998, 2009; Sekelj, 1996; Somer, 2001). The importance of the latter was vividly demonstrated by Sekelj (1996, 263):

The federal order created by the 1974 Constitution could function only with the existence of a charismatic leader who is above the constitution. At the moment of that man’s death in 1980, the normative philosophy of the Constitution – eight sided consensus as a substitute for a democratic political process – ceased to function… the alternative was either democratization or the disintegration of the political community on the ethnic principle.

Similarly, Somer (2001) argued that Tito’s death led to a power vacuum that was (after unsuccessful attempts by Tito’s heirs to maintain the status quo) exploited by the country’s old and aspiring elites. More specifically, when the principal symbol and defender of Yugoslav “supra-ethnic (pseudo)identity” (Godina, 2009, 77) passed away and when it became evident that the central Communist state (and its federal government) was dissolving, elites started to undertake rational and instrumental action in the direction of retaining or strengthening their existing position. These actions often included the exploitation of ethnic sensitivities among the general public through the use of ethnic nationalism, particularly instigating ethnic fears and hatreds (Cigar, 1995; Denitch, 1994; Gagnon, 1994, 2004; Glenny, 1996; Goati, 1997).

The view presented indicates that such elite activism was one of the major factors in the breakup process. This is not surprising, as it has been often alleged (see, e.g., Banac, 1992; Gagnon, 2004; Goati, 1997; Haller, 1996; Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994; Malesevic, 2002; Sekelj, 1993, 1996; Sekulic, 1997; Sekulic, et al., 2006), that movements that brought about the downfall of Yugoslavia, were (at least initially) movements limited to a small number of original adherents. For example, Sekulic and his colleagues (2006) recognized that elitist manipulation of the public was a fundamental contributor to the process “of the rise of intolerance” (Sekulic, et al., 2006, 822; see also Hodson et al. 1994; Goati, 1997); that “cultural and political entrepreneurs” (Sekulic, et al., 2006, 803) packaged an image of the enemy that coalesced with incidents of ethnic conflict. Similarly, Gagnon asserts that (the conservative) segment of the ruling elites used their power to “demobilize population” (Gagnon, 2004, 180), i.e., they used their power “to bring an end to political federal state. According to the author, this led to a situation where the “ideological vision of objectives and shared interpretation of reality” (3) among elites became more and more blurred. Similar argument was also made by Crawford (1998).
mobilizations that represented an immediate threat to the existing structures of power” (181), by shifting “the focus away from the issues around which challenger (elites) were mobilizing their populace...” (8). On a larger scale, the decisive role of national elites in leading the process of dissolution (and the ensuing war) was also affirmed by Banac (1992), who maintained on this basis that the these phenomena should be approached from the point where “one should begin with the continuity of individual South Slavic elites...not with modernization...” (141).

In spite of the prevalence of the view outlined above, the idea that Yugoslavia collapsed primarily because of conflict within the Yugoslav elite, into which ordinary citizens were drawn through elite manipulation (Goati, 1997, 453, 457), could be countered by the idea that the collapse and the establishment of post-Yugoslav “national states” represented the “longing” of respective peoples (where it could be argued that this longing was then materialized through the actions carried out by the national(ist) elites)\(^3\). Thus, following Smith’s (1986) theory, all ethnic groups have an inherent tendency to develop into politically established groups, i.e., states. Within such a perspective, nationalities are “primordial,” and their longing for political independence is omnipresent and easily traceable. This theory rests on a romanticist position, which can be traced as far back as Fichte, who wrote of “nationalities being individualities with special talents” (quoted in Calhoun, 1993, 397).

Examples supporting this perspective can be traced in almost all political entities which comprised the federal state of Yugoslavia. Slovenian longing towards a national selfhood/statehood can be traced all the way back to the March Revolution in 1848 (Dedijer, 1974; Koralka, 2001; Melik, 1998). At roughly the same time (1848), Serb movement for a “Vojvodina” (duchy) erupted in South Hungarian lands (Dedijer, 1974). Another Serbian movement sprang up in the Ottoman lands, where they first achieved autonomy early in the 19th century and statehood in 1878, which was also the year that Montenegro achieved statehood (Dedijer, 1974). In addition, the “strategic longing” of the Serbs could also be traced the “Garašanin Plan” of 1844 (Batakovic, 1991) where the idea of a Great Serbia was outlined.

A Croatian national movement also sprang up in 1848, demanding the unification of Croats from Croatia (proper), Dalmatia, Slavonia and other regions into a single state, and emancipation from Hungary. The demand for an independent Albanian state, including Kosovo, possibly with Kosovo as its center,

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\(^3\) As indicated by Allcock (2000), the majority of authors believe that the collapse of Yugoslavia was “a process driven from the top” (418).
was expressed in 1878 by the Prizren League, an assembly of Albanian elders (Dedijer, 1974; see also Pavković, 1997, 428–429). Macedonians expressed their national longings in the Ilinden Uprising 1903, with the declaration of the Kruševo Republic and the Kruševo Manifesto for an independent Macedonia (at the time within the Ottoman Empire) (Dedijer, 1974). Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks were somewhat distinct as they did not explicitly express strivings for their own national state. One possible reason could be that Bosnia was a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional entity that already enjoyed an undisputed dominant position during the Ottoman period and that had difficulty in expressing themselves as a modern nationality different from the Serbs, Croats and Turks. However, by the beginning of the 20th century they did evolve into an entity, that may be considered as a nationality (they had their own newspapers, a language name and political parties; for more, see Imamović, 1998) and which was officially recognized as such during the Tito period (for more information about the nationalist movements from 1950 onwards, see, e.g., Pavković, 1997).

From this perspective, the “Yugoslavia period” could be seen as a transitory phase that ended as soon as internal and external (i.e., geopolitical) factors allowed age-old longings to be materialized in the form of a nation-state. As indicated by (Jovic, 2001, 105), the probability of collapse greatly increased when “Yugoslav nationalism and the Yugoslav state were being weakened” (this process principally started with the 1974 constitution, which, by treating republics as sovereign states, signaled “the abandonment of attempts at cultural nation building on the part of both political and cultural elites” [Wachtel, 1998, 229]). This resulted in the strengthening of the nationalism of constitutive nations, which, as indicated by Gellner (2006), rests on the belief that “the political and the national unit should be congruent” (I). That said, it could also be argued that this period was not only transitory, but also necessary, since, as a sovereign entity, Yugoslavia undoubtedly played a key role in enabling its constituent parts to achieve the level of socio-political development that is otherwise required for the formation of individual nation-states (Flere, 2003b; Gellner, 2006; Pašić, 1993).

Evidence that the quest for individual nation states was indeed omnipresent from the beginning of the Yugoslav era is also clearly discernable from the fact that ethno-nationalism was not only always present as a “political doctrine in its many forms” (Jovic, 2001, 104) but also identified as one of the principal enemies of the Yugoslav federation (Pavković, 1997; Štaubringer, 1980). Not surprisingly, “neoprimitive scholars” (Gagnon, 2004, xiv) often argued that the election of nationalist parties to power (which, according to these scholars, tried, following the sentiments of the wider population, to create homogenous
nation-states) could also be seen as supporting the “longing hypothesis”. In other words, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the formation of nation-states could be seen in the context of alleviated repression (Gagnon, 2004), social development (Gellner, 2006) and weakened Yugoslavism (Jovic, 2001), which finally enabled people to “express their true interests, sentiments, and values” (Gagnon, 2004, 33).

In sum, it seems that two opposing arguments could be made when answering questions about Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Specifically, one might ask whether the dissolution came about because of the actions carried out by the elites acting as agents of peoples’ longings or because of elite activism, whereby the elites merely used the public in order to materialize their own particular interests. Since neither of these two alternative positions have been systematically substantiated in a quantitative manner, the main aim of the current study was to empirically test whether support for independence existed among the general public. More specifically, the current study analyzed the magnitude of support for “emancipation”, i.e., how entrenched was the quest for independence among the nationalities in Yugoslavia, thus providing a better understanding of how the subjects “on the ground” perceived what (Jovic, 2001) named “objective factors” (economic and political crisis, international politics, etc).

1.2 The Current Study

The main aim of the current study was to investigate survey evidence from roughly half a decade preceding the final downfall of Yugoslavia, focusing on the issue of living inside the social and political framework of the federal state of Yugoslavia. This issue was hotly debated, particularly from 1986 on, when the split erupted between politically active intellectual dissidents from Serbia and Slovenia (Ćosić, 2009).

4 For why this argument could not be supported empirically, see Gagnon’s detailed review of various national surveys conducted in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gagnon, 2004, 31–51; 87–177).

5 Because of the limitations of the data that was used, we were not able to analyze the perceptions, intentions, beliefs, etc. of political actors. Our work should thus be read and used together with works that analyze the beliefs, goals and actions of the Yugoslav elites (see, e.g., Budding, 1997; Goati, 1997; Jovic, 2009; Pavković, 1997). As suggested by Jovic (2001), this can contribute significantly to the field, since much of the misunderstanding of the Yugoslav collapse and conflict stems from the fact that researchers place too much emphasis on “objective factors” and pay too little attention to “the subjective in politics” (115).
Of course, since processes of inter-ethnic fear-mongering and media propaganda, as underscored by Kaufman (2001) and also touched on by Sekulić et al. (2006) and Gagnon (2004), were previously connected with activities on the part of cultural and political “entrepreneurs” (in building up public opinion and political action), the task of empirically disentangling the effect of the former on the latter is extremely difficult. In other words, findings which would support the “longing” hypothesis could easily be interpreted as being merely the result of successful propaganda. Obviously, this problem would be nullified if there was no presence of longing for mononational states.

We approached this problem by using data from two different surveys (both included respondents from all federal units) taken at different time periods (1985–86 and 1989–90; see Method section for sample details), arguing that the dissolution/emancipation of the national states was not quite an immediate political option at the time when the first of these surveys was conducted (1985–86). This in turn means that a strong presence of longing (by strong we mean that more than half the respondents would express longing in one way or another) at that point in time would support “longing” hypothesis. We hypothesized that this was not the case, not in 1985–86 (H1) or in 1989–1990 (H2). We also hypothesized that (following the “elite activism” argument) quest for independence would be more salient among “elites”, i.e. among those with higher socioeconomic status, regardless of the sample used (the potential effect of education and economic status was analyzed separately) (H3).

1.3 Method

1.3.1 Data and samples

We used the data from two different surveys that were conducted during the 1986–1990 period. The studies included people from the entire area of the former Yugoslavia and as such provided substantive insight into the views of its adult and young adult population.

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6 We would like to emphasize, that we are well aware of the fact that using socioeconomic status indicators as an indicator of elite status is problematic and that the data used cannot not possibly capture stances of “political entrepreneurs”. Consequently, the sole purpose of the current study was to test whether the support for independence was invariant with the respondents’ socioeconomic status.
(1) First source for our analysis was “YUPIO86” (Yugoslav Research of Youth) research project, headed by S. Vrcan (Ule & Vrcan, 1985). The data were collected in 1985–86, sample included Yugoslavia’s youth from all social strata. More specifically, it included secondary school students, higher education students, agriculturists, the employed and employment seekers. The sample was not fully representative of the youth population, but it was representative of the general ethnic population structure of Yugoslavia. The research was operationally supported by the Institute of Social Research at the University of Zagreb (IDIS). N = 6,215. The majority of participants were between 17.5 and 23.5 years old (Bosnia & Herzegovina 84.0 %, Croatia 78.6 %, Macedonia 71.9 %, Montenegro 75.1 %, Serbia 78.7 %, Slovenia 86.8 %, Vojvodina 80.7 %). Across samples, there were slightly more male than female participants (Bosnia & Herzegovina 54.9 %, Croatia 51.7 %, Macedonia 77.5 %, Montenegro 62.7 %, Serbia 57.0 %, Slovenia 56.0 %, Vojvodina 63.4 %).

(2) The second source was the “LOL91” (Social Structure and Level of Living) research project, headed by I. Svetlik (1991) of the University of Ljubljana. Data was collected in 1989–90, and it included N = 12,035 participants. The sample was representative of inhabitants with permanent residence, aged between 18 and 75 (M = 47.54, SD = 14.95), and modeled in a manner to ensure reflection of the republics’ and provinces’ proportions, as well as of smaller territorial units and households within them, resulting in a greater proportion of elderly respondents. In all samples (except in the Slovenian), there were somewhat more males than female participants (Bosnia & Herzegovina 71.0 %, Croatia 57.8 %, Macedonia 68.6 %, Montenegro 70.4 %, Serbia 61.6 %, Slovenia 48.4 %, Vojvodina 56.1 %, Kosovo 65.8 %).

1.3.2 Measures

(1) YUPIO86 survey: The dependent variable chosen to assess “longing” was formulated as follows: “The preservation and progress of all republics depend on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia as a whole”. This statement was chosen not only because it indicates whether socially desired goals (preservation and progress of each republic) are tied to the preservation of the federation, but also because it reflects the level of loyalty towards Yugoslavia, understood as an organic and indissoluble whole. Responses were given on a four-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.

“Elite status” was measured by four indicators most commonly used for assessing socioeconomic status (Heimer, 1997): respondent’s level of education (1 = “never went to school, 9 = “masters/doctorate”), education of respondent’s
mother and father (1 = “never went to school, 9 = “masters/doctorate”), and monthly household income. The latter was assessed by an ordinal scale with nine ranks (1 = “lowest income”, 9 = “highest income”, expressed in what was then a valid national currency – the Yugoslav Dinar). Since reliability analysis indicated that maternal and paternal education could be combined into a single measure (C. alpha ranged from .65 to .86 across eight samples), we consequently used three indicators of “elite status” – the respondent’s education, parental education and economic status of the respondent’s family.

Age, gender, respondents status, and type of residence, used as controls in subsequent analysis (see Data Analysis), were assessed in the following manner: age: respondent’s indicated their age in years; gender: 1 = “female”, 2 = “male”; respondents status: 1 = “employed”, 2 = “unemployed”, 3 = “high school pupil”, 4 = “student”, 5 = “farmer”; type of residence: 1 = “rural area”, 2 = “small town”, 3 = “metropolitan area/larger city”. To control for the potential effect of nationality, a single dummy variable called “membership of majority group” was computed: 1 = “member of majority group”, 0 = “other”.

(2) LOL91 survey: In the LOL91 survey the following item was used to assess “longing”: “Each nationality should have its own state”. Responses were given on a five-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”. As Sekelj notes that, under the circumstances, this was understood as “Each Yugoslav nationality…” (1993, 277).

“Elite status”, using LOL91 data, was assessed by four indicators: education of the respondent (20-point Likert type scale, number of years of schooling, excluding “repeated” years: 0 = “never went to school”, 20 = “doctorate”), education of the respondent’s father and mother (1 = “never went to school”, 8 = “masters/doctorate”) and economic status. The latter was measured by ownership of twelve items, among which at least five were considered to be a (semi)luxury item (art items with high value, personal computer, color TV, etc.: 0 = “respondent did not own a particular item”, 1 = “respondent owned a particular item”, max. value = 12). As previously, reliability analysis indicated that maternal and paternal education could be combined into a single measure (C. alpha ranged from .79 to .87 across eight federal units). Thus, we used three indicators of “elite status” – respondent’s education, parents’ education and economic status.

Again, age, gender, respondent status, and type of residence were used as controls in subsequent analysis. All items were assessed by a single item. Age: respondents indicated their age in years; gender: 1 = “female”, 2 = “male”; occupational status: 1 = “unemployed”, 2 = “farmer”, 3 = “employed – unskilled labor”, 4 = “employed – semi-skilled labor”, 5 = employed – high qualification
work”; type of residence: 1 = “rural area”, 2 = “small town”, 3 = “metropolitan area/larger city”. To control for potential effect of nationality, a single dummy variable called “Membership of majority group” was computed: 1 = “member of majority group”, 0 = “other”.

1.3.3 Data Analysis

First, simple descriptive analyses and mean level comparisons were completed by federal units on measure of longing. Since we used data from two different surveys, this was completed independently for each measure. This procedure was then repeated by including only the major nationality of each federal unit. This was done not only because some federal units were ethnically more diverse than others, but also because using the whole sample could potentially mask the “true” level of longing in each major nationality by federal unit. Second, zero-order correlations were computed between measures of “elite status” and “longing” by federal unit. Again, this procedure was repeated by the major nationality of each federal unit. Next, structural equation modeling was used to examine relationships between measures of “elite status” and “longing”, by federal unit. All models included five demographic variables as controls (age, gender, respondents’ status, type of residence, and an indicator of whether the respondent was a “member of the majority group” in each respective sub-sample). Specifically, each control variable was included in the proposed model as a manifest variable, where nominal ones (respondents’ status) were transformed into dummy variables.

1.4 Results

Results from mean level analyses, using YUPIO86 survey data, indicated that five years before the final dissolution, agreement with the statement “The
### Table 1-1: Mean level analysis – agreement with the statement “The preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia as a whole” (YUPIO86), by republics and provinces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JUIPO86</th>
<th>Yugoslav sample</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH)</th>
<th>Montenegro (M)</th>
<th>Croatia (C)</th>
<th>Macedonia (MA)</th>
<th>Slovenia (SL)</th>
<th>Serbia Proper (SR)</th>
<th>Kosovo (K)</th>
<th>Vojvodina (V)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of majority nationality in population 1981*</td>
<td>36.3 (Serbs)</td>
<td>39.5 (Bosniaks)</td>
<td>68.3 (Montenegrins)</td>
<td>75.1 (Croats)</td>
<td>67.0 (Macedonians)</td>
<td>90.5 (Slovenians)</td>
<td>85.4 (Serbs)</td>
<td>77.4 (Albanians)</td>
<td>54.3 (Serbs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia...

\(1 = \text{Strongly disagree}, \ 4 = \text{Strongly agree}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (p&lt;.001)**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>C, MA, K</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>BH, MA, SR, K</td>
<td>BH, C, SL, SR, V</td>
<td>MA, K</td>
<td>C, MA, K</td>
<td>all except MA</td>
<td>MA, K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the majority group</td>
<td>3.61/.70 (Serbs)</td>
<td>3.59/.63 (Bosniaks)</td>
<td>3.44/1.10 (Montenegrins)</td>
<td>3.42/1.78 (Croats)</td>
<td>3.21/1.01 (Macedonians)</td>
<td>3.51/.79 (Slovenes)</td>
<td>3.63/.69 (Serbs)</td>
<td>3.06/.94 (Albanians)</td>
<td>3.62/.65 (Serbs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (p&lt;.001)**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>MA, K</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>SR, K, V</td>
<td>BH, SL, SR, V</td>
<td>MA, K</td>
<td>C, MA, K</td>
<td>all except MA</td>
<td>C, MA, K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6215</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1243</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Data on the percentage of the major nationality in each federal unit are entered into the table, as they are relevant for understanding the particular situation (Source: *Statistical yearbook/Statistički bilten 1992*). ** For e.g., if a significant (p<.001) mean difference between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and Croatia exists, then Croatia (C) is entered in the cell under BH.
preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia as a whole” was relatively high in all the environments (i.e., above the scale normative mean of M = 2.50), although significant differences did exist among federal units (Table 1-1).

Specifically, the lowest mean agreement could be observed in the Kosovo region (M = 3.09, SD = .92). As expected, this mean agreement was lower when only members of the majority group were observed (Albanians), a pattern that was evident across all federal units (indicating that minority groups, at least to some extent, favored the preservation of Yugoslavia more than the majority group). On the other hand, the highest mean level agreement could be found among Serbs (M = 3.63, SD = .69), who as a whole (including those residing outside Serbia proper, particularly, in Vojvodina) attained a mean above the Yugoslav sample mean (M = 3.49; SD = .80). High mean level agreement was also found among the Bosniaks (M = 3.59, SD = .63), which is understandable, as their position was precarious both within Yugoslavia and within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic Slovenians in Slovenia (Slovenia was the first federal unit to bid Yugoslavia farewell) – were still seeing their future inside the Yugoslav framework, at least at that point in time (M = 3.51; SD = .79). This changed somewhat in 1990, as only 18 per cent of Slovenians disagreed with the statement that Each nationality should have its own state (for the sake of space we opted not to show the frequency table). Only one ethnic group reported lower levels of disagreement (i.e., higher levels of positions indicative of longing) – Albanians in Kosovo. This is clearly reflected in means shown in Table 1-2, as both Slovenians and Albanians are above the scale normative average (M = 3.00). All other ethnic groups in the remaining six federal units expressed lower levels for the position indicative of “longing” (again, results indicated great variety among federal units; see Table 1-2). More specifically, in all of the remaining federal units more than 50 per cent of the majority group expressed total disagreement with the statement “Each nationality should have its own state” (percentages ranged from 53 per cent in Macedonia to 84 per cent in Vojvodina).

Results from the mean analysis thus indicated that the majority of respondents were inclined towards disagreement with the statement (i.e., they expressed a lack of longing), thus supporting H1 and H2. As indicated in Table 1-2, this was somewhat weakened when majority groups were observed, however only for Croatia, Slovenia, Kosovo, and (to a very limited extent) Serbia.

Next, results from zero-correlation analysis between measures of longing and “elite status” indicators showed that in 1985–86 the relationship between measures of “elite status” and longing was either negative or non-significant.
Table 1-2: Mean level analysis – agreement with the statement “Each nationality should have its own state” (LOL91), by republics and provinces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOLO</th>
<th>Yugoslav sample</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH)</th>
<th>Montenegro (M)</th>
<th>Croatia (C)</th>
<th>Macedonia (MA)</th>
<th>Slovenia (SL)</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each nationality should have its own state (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree)

| Entire sample | 2.12/1.56 | 1.39/1.99 | 2.06/1.42 | 2.04/1.48 | 2.81/1.75 | 3.29/1.50 | 1.77/1.53 | 4.58/1.40 | 1.46/1.11 |
| Members of the majority group | 1.65/1.26 (Serbs) | 1.38/1.95 (Bosniak) | 2.03/1.38 (Montenegrins) | 2.21/1.54 (Croats) | 2.35/1.63 (Macedonians) | 3.35/1.51 (Slovenes) | 1.79/1.35 (Serbs) | 4.66/1.75 (Albanians) | 1.39/1.04 (Serbs) |

Notes: * Data on the percentage of the major nationality in each federal unit are entered into the table, as they are relevant for understanding the particular situation (Source: Statistical yearbook/Statistički bilten 1992). ** For e.g., if a significant (p<.01) mean difference between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and Croatia exists, then Croatia (C) is entered in the cell under BH.
### Table 1-3: Zero-order Correlations between Longing and Indicators of “Elite status”, 1986 (YUPIO86) and 1991 (LOL91), by federal units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longing I(^a) (YUPIO86)</td>
<td>-0.06** (-0.04*)(^c)</td>
<td>-0.16** (-0.14**)</td>
<td>-0.15* (-0.09)</td>
<td>-0.09** (-0.07*)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.11** (-0.14**)</td>
<td>-0.09** (-0.10**)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.07** (-0.05**)</td>
<td>-0.16** (-0.20**)</td>
<td>-0.11 (-0.18*)</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.04)</td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.08 (-0.08)</td>
<td>-0.08* (-0.09*)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.01 (-0.01)</td>
<td>-0.16** (-0.18**)</td>
<td>-0.11 (-0.11)</td>
<td>0.04 (-0.03)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.06)</td>
<td>0.02 (-0.03)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.04)</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.13*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.04** (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.09** (-0.07*)</td>
<td>-0.17** (-0.18**)</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.01)</td>
<td>-0.07* (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.11** (-0.12**)</td>
<td>-0.08** (-0.08*)</td>
<td>0.09* (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longing II(^b) (LOL91)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05**)</td>
<td>-0.09** (-0.07*)</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (-0.01)</td>
<td>-0.17** (-0.01)</td>
<td>-0.07** (-0.07*)</td>
<td>-0.07** (-0.07*)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02 (-0.01)</td>
<td>-0.07** (-0.06*)</td>
<td>-0.27** (-0.25**)</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.09** (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(^a\) The preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia...: 1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree. This item was reverse recoded for easier reading/comparisons. \(^b\) Each nationality should have its own state: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree. \(^c\) The numbers in brackets indicate Spearman’s rho when only members of majority group were included in the analyses. * p < .05; ** p < .01; (2-tailed).
More specifically, 25 correlations of the 55 were statistically significant in the negative direction, meaning that in the majority of cases the respondents’ education or economic status actually decreased longing or did not exert any influence. This did not change in 1989–90 (the only exception could be found in Kosovo, where the relationship between respondents’ education level and longing was significantly positive: rho = .09*) as again 20 correlations out of 55 were statistically significant and negative. The rest, except for one (before mentioned case of Kosovo), were non-significant (Table 1-3).

Results from these analyses thus provided evidence that higher socioeconomic status did not mean greater longing, as was hypothesized under H3. As indicated, where the relationship reached statistical significance, the relationship was negative (except in Kosovo, LOL91). This did not change when only members of the majority group were included in the analyses. Specifically, although some statistically significant changes (p < .05) could be observed in terms of the strength of association (for the sake of space, results of the corresponding z-tests are not shown), there was not a single case, regardless of the sub-sample analyzed (YUPIO86 or LOL91), where a significant negative association between measures of “elite status” and longing was significantly positive. In addition, the exception found for Kosovo (in terms of the direction of association, LOL91) became non-significant once the majority group was analyzed (rho = .09, p < .05 → rho = .08, p > .05). The only exception to this pattern was observed on the aggregate level. Namely, when using LOL91 data and aggregate sample (Yugoslav sample, members of the majority group only), a positive, but non-significant association between parents’ education and longing became significant (rho = .01, p > .05 → rho = .05, p < .01).

Next, results from SEM analysis, which included demographic controls, indicated that those who could be identified as elites did not express significant higher longing levels, at least not in 1985–86 (Table 1-4).

Specifically, the effect of higher socio-economic status on longing was either negative or non-significant, thus mirroring the results from zero-order correlation analyses. The only exception to this pattern could be observed in Croatia, where those who ranked higher in terms of disposable household income expressed higher levels of longing (beta = .09, p < .05). No such effect could be found for the other two status variables (Respondent’s education, Parental education, same subsample). However, results indicated another potentially interesting pattern – that being a farmer or unemployed raised levels of longing (in comparison to the reference group, i.e., secondary school pupils). This was especially true for Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, and Vojvodina. Interestingly, the effect of membership of the majority group reached statistical
### Table 1-4: SEM Analyses on the Relationships between “Elite status” and Longing, 1986 (YUPIO86), by Federal Units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Longing</th>
<th>Yugoslav sample</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia Proper</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = 6215</td>
<td>N = 1090</td>
<td>N = 233</td>
<td>N = 1243</td>
<td>N = 561</td>
<td>N = 650</td>
<td>N = 1338</td>
<td>N = 538</td>
<td>N = 555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longing</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-1.6*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longing</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of the majority group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Elite status”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in the table represent standardized regression weights (i.e. betas); * \( p < 0.05 \); ** \( p < 0.01 \); *** \( p < 0.001 \). The preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia... 1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree. This item was reverse recoded for easier reading. Since Status variable was a nominal variable (five values), four dummy variables were computed. The largest, fifth group (secondary school pupils) was treated as a reference group. Membership of the majority group: 1 = Member of majority group, 0 = Other.
### Table 1-5: SEM Analyses on the Relationships between “Elite status” and Longing, 1991 (LOL91), by Federal Units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yugoslav sample</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia Proper</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOL91</strong></td>
<td>N = 9414</td>
<td>N = 2122</td>
<td>N = 314</td>
<td>N = 2508</td>
<td>N = 1004</td>
<td>N = 1395</td>
<td>N = 3054</td>
<td>N = 526</td>
<td>N = 1113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender → Longing</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age → Longing</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Residence → Longing</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statusb</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer → Longing</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed → Longing</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed – MQc → Longing</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed – HQd → Longing</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of the majority groupc → Longing</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>.09*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
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<td>“Elite status”</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent’s education → Longing</td>
<td>-.04*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s education → Longing</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic status → Longing</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in the table represent standardized regression weights (i.e., betas); * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
Each nationality should have its own state: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree.  
Since Status variable is a nominal variable (five values), four dummy variables were computed. The largest, fifth group (Employed – Low Qualification) was treated as a reference group.  
MQ = middle qualification, HQ = high qualification.  
Membership of the majority group: 1 = Member of majority group, 0 = Other.
significance in only one subsample (Kosovo), where the effect was positive (being a member, i.e., Albanian, had a positive effect on longing). This changed somewhat when data from the LOL91 survey was used (Table 1-5). Membership of the majority group had a significantly positive effect on longing in all of the then three regions then in crisis, i.e., in Croatia, Slovenia, and Kosovo. It is also interesting that this effect was just the opposite in Vojvodina and especially in Macedonia, possibly indicating that those groups perceived the breakup as something, which would very much endanger their existence. Again, those who were unemployed tended to express more longing, although the effect of unemployment reached statistical significance in only two samples (the results for being a farmer were more varied this time around).

Results from the second set of SEM analyses also indicated that measures of “elite status” did not exert the hypothesized effect on longing. Again, the effect was either negative or non-significant. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the results showed greater variance this time. But this did not change the overall picture in that we could not find empirical evidence to support H3 (of course, this lack of empirical support should be understood within the context of the measure used to assess “elite status”). Potential implications of these findings, together with their limitations, are discussed below.

1.5 Discussion

The current study analyzed the magnitude of support for “emancipation” (“longing”), i.e., how entrenched was the quest for independence among the nationalities in Yugoslavia. This was done by investigating survey evidence from roughly half a decade preceding the final downfall of Yugoslavia. Using two samples and two measures of longing, we found that results indicated very limited support for “longing” for national emancipation in the form of national states. In fact, one can infer without much hesitation that, even in late 1990, a great majority of Yugoslav citizens did not support such a cause, although they had no cognizance of the war and atrocities that would follow dissolution. However, it should be clearly stated that longing levels did vary across the eight federal units. More specifically, signs of greater support for independence were found especially in Kosovo, and later in Slovenia. Such attitudes could in themselves have caused major unrest, although it could be argued that an operative state could easily have contained them.

At this point one could speculate that the 70-year span of Yugoslav statehood had created a certain inertia and possibly that 45 years of Tito’s Yugoslavia
had generated a sense of certainty among general public that was, at least to a certain extent, hostile to risky, novel options in the matter of state boundaries and even national emancipation. The main achievement of Tito’s Yugoslavia was, as Hodson and colleagues (1994) and Sekulić and colleagues (2006) have found, a prevalent inter-ethnic tolerance (see also Gagnon, 2004, especially pp. 31–51 and Oberschall, 2000). However, one should not simply speculate that support in favor of Yugoslavia came from its being a “paternalist state” (Allcock, 2000, 433), taking care of both employment and welfare, since the “paternalist state” was in poor condition at the relevant time, unable either to extend employment or to provide vistas of a prosperous future.

Thus, our findings do not yield empirical support for the assumption that the establishment of mono-national states was clearly and longitudinally supported by the respective national populations, with the probable exception of Kosovo Albanians. In other words, joint life and the Yugoslav state, no matter how imperfect, was not without wide popular support. This seems valid even for “national socioeconomic elites,” since these did not express greater levels of “longing.” This may be an indicator of systemic state weakness, showing where the rank and file of “freedom fighters” was originate from. To the contrary, judging by the empirical findings presented in the current study, those with higher socioeconomic status expressed on average less longing. It thus seems that the breakup process was, at least when one poses the question about the role of the elites, indeed instigated by a small group of “political entrepreneurs” (Sekulić, et al., 2006, 803) which, as expected, could not be captured by national surveys. As argued by Jovic (2009), the sentiments of these entrepreneurs sprang out of the process that started more than two decades before the dissolution, i.e., in the time when anti-statist Constitution of 1974 led to the situation where “party elite became an ally of the forces of disintegration” (83).

Our findings thus give support to the idea that public opinion changes and that it is mostly opportunistic, i.e., that the public opinion does not anticipate events, but follows them. Nevertheless, it is clear that our findings are somewhat at variance with the results of the referenda for independence in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro (Kosovo could be seen as a special case, since there were a number of referenda, none taken under “ordinary” circumstances).

Explanations for these variances may vary somewhat themselves, since they were taken within a 6-year period. It is nevertheless, necessary to attempt to find a common pattern in these variances. Firstly, the findings we describe pertain to a 6-year period, during which the Yugoslav crisis became ever more acute, and this was perceived and felt within the nations and republics (and autonomous province, in the case of Kosovo) differently at different points in
time, not coinciding amongst the republics. The dynamics of the crisis were thus not simultaneous in the various environments. Secondly, the response format of the referendum questions was different from the format used in the survey (a simple dichotomy vs. a 4/5-point Likert type scale), possibly making the referendum results more polarized. Thirdly, it is possible to hypothesize that subjects perceived the “referendum context” differently from the “survey context”. As noted in *The International Encyclopedia of Behavioral and Social Sciences* (Smelser & Baltes, 2001), in elections, even more so during plebiscites, there is “a funnel of causality” leading to the vote, primarily dealing with “emotional attachment” in the case of these plebiscites, manipulated and over manipulated by fear mongering propaganda, with the results that “opinion polls provide a better tool for understanding individuals behavior” (Smelser & Baltes, 2001, 16324).

One can thus summarize the problem as Yugoslavia being confronted by the interlocked nature of an inefficient economic system with public (“social”) ownership and an elaborate system of “self-management” with a utopian political system, which, as indicated by Jovic (2009) was based on Kardelj’s understanding of Marxism, and which was able to operate only as long as Tito, who embodied Yugoslav nationalism, commanded and arbitrated, with unquestioned legitimacy of his authority, between different and conflicting interests. As a consequence, fundamental consensus about political change and elections could be achieved only at the republic level and at different paces, bringing about republic pluralist elections, which thus favored secessionist and generally particularist stances and organizations, as pointed out by Ramet (2004). Such a situation opened the way for politicians and intellectuals, “political/cultural entrepreneurs” (Sekulić, et al., 2006, 803), who might also be called “ideological mobilizers” (Malesević, 2002, 210) to start finding a scapegoat for the situation in other nationalities “exploiting”, “suppressing” and doing “injustice” to their own nationality. As noted by Gagnon (2004, 180), this was a strategic move, which enabled the conservative part of national ruling elites to retain power “by demobilizing those parts of the population that were calling for fundamental changes” (for the cost of atrocities that followed). This was followed by more or less symbolic moves on the part of the major religions (the Serbian Orthodox Church by moving the relics of the saint-king Lazar through “Serbian lands”) and the Croatian Catholic Church by reviving their promotion of the martyrdom of Alojzij Stepinac, a contested figure during World War II, particularly on the grounds of his attitude towards Serbs and the Orthodox (Velikonja, Mardešić, Mojzes, Radić, & Zgodić, 2003).

In sum, although we were unable to delineate either the entirety of the circumstances in which Yugoslavia fell, or a complete explanation of the event,
we did find empirical support for the contention that the breakup process was not a long-term project on the part of the majorities within nationalities; i.e., the breakup of Yugoslavia and the establishment of Post-Yugoslav states could not be attributed to a longing on the part of the masses.

1.5.1 Limitations

First limitation that needs mentioning is that our study was clearly limited to the data that was not collected to answer the question that is in the focus of the current study. In other words, all the research was scholarly in nature and did not directly address the issue of independence movements themselves. This would have been impossible at the time, since the issue was a very sensitive one. Conditions for scholarly study were unpromising, particularly in Kosovo, where a state of emergency was declared on 27 February 1989. Nevertheless, we believe that the data we used is relevant for shedding light on the problem at hand.

We were also unable to enter into the specifics of individual nationalities, with their histories, their specific discourses on their position in Yugoslavia and their paths of exit from the former state, as this is a topic of enormous proportions on its own.

Next, the measures that were available in the used datasets also posed their own set of problems. For instance, support for the federation versus separate national states could be conditional – e.g. Serbs were in favor so long as Serbia restored its dominant political position; Croats were in favor so long as Serbs did not become dominant, etc. Because a simple survey question cannot get at the conditionality of such preferences, the current study was not able to provide an answer to this (and similar) questions. Similarly, we are also well aware that measures used to assess socioeconomic status respondents are only partially indicative of “elite status” and that such a measure cannot possibly capture those who were later on labeled as “political entrepreneurs”.

Nevertheless, we do believe that the current study, in spite of its shortcomings, is one of the few that tried to empirically test the extent of grassroots support for breaking up Yugoslavia and whether this support (or lack of it) was invariant of respondent’s socioeconomic status. We believe that this fact alone makes the current study important in understanding the corollaries of the breakup process.
1.6 References


(S. Flere)

Abstract
The study analyses the development of sociology in the post-Yugoslav entities (1991–2011). The following topics are explored: transition, war, dissolution, ethnicity, religiosity, stratification, family, gender, politics, youth, and orientation towards the EU. Our study was limited by the availability of sources. A great difference in sociological research among the post-Yugoslav entities was identified. Whereas Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian scholarship covered most of these areas and at times attained levels comparable to international standards, scholarship in Macedonia and Kosovo proved to be limited. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the gap in public financing for sociological research has been partly filled by non-governmental organizations, although the production remains modest. In Montenegro, the first attempts at sociological investigation are noted. We identified almost no cooperation, with a view to comparability, among ex-Yugoslav sociologists. Policy recommendations: (1) There is a need to assist scholars in the social sciences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia (possibly also in Montenegro) to upgrade their knowledge of the methodology and writing skills required by scholarly papers, to bring these closer to current standards. An undertaking in this direction would fill a major gap. (2) It would be scientifically relevant to gain systematic comparative knowledge on the societies in question, to gain insight into the extent of common and divergent development since 1991.

Key words: sociology, post-Yugoslav societies, cross-national research.
2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 The problem and its relevance

Research sociology in countries that are successor states of Yugoslavia – a discipline developed before the dissolution – has been confronted by two major research problems since the beginning of transition: the transition from a Communist society to a democratic and capitalist one, and the dissolution of the Yugoslav state and the establishment of new, mostly (mono) national states, with parliamentary democracy, sometimes with difficulties in implementation. Both changes are fundamental and radical, influencing the life of people in many ways, creating new social groups and doing away with others, changing the entire social system and the entire social structure. Thus, one may say, that all areas of social life were affected. Dramatically new conditions of social life came about afflicted almost the entire population. This does not mean that other changes did not occur and continue (like the further expansion of education). Dissolution war conflicts create a separate set of sociological issues.

Research sociology was unevenly developed before 1991 in various parts of Yugoslavia, although a single Yugoslav Association of Sociology did exist and had operated, particularly by way of annual or bi-annual pan-Yugoslav conferences, since the 50s\(^\text{10}\). The last one was held in Zagreb, June, 1991. Republic and provincial associations also existed the entities (Montenegro being the exception). However, it would not be an overstatement to say that, prior to 1991, almost no sociological research was carried out in Kosovo and Montenegro, although some sociologists were active there, dealing primarily with teaching and other activities. Belgrade, Ljubljana and Zagreb were the major canters of academic work of all kinds, from the inception in the 50s until 1991.

2.1.2 Focus and limitations

In this study we have attempted to focus on the sociological research carried out by sociologists in that are successors to Yugoslavia and published since 1991. Of course, not all research was covered, either because of the lack of availability, or because of the pieces’ marginal relevance for our study.

One problem was how to separate work which is not scholarly in the proper sense, although it was done by sociologists. In principle, we were not favorable to the inclusion of such publications, which were not scholarly, but a few exceptions were made, particularly when they included sociological criticism.

As for research sociology, which is our subject of interest, we understood the notion to include all types of research, not only empirical but also theoretical, as long as it met the standards of professional work. With these limitations, the review and the bibliography are far from complete, since number of publications was considerable, although some were uneven in quality. We were not able to cover all works, nor was completeness even a possible goal, although we tried not to overlook the most relevant works. However, we did not include works on sociological theory (particularly commentaries on international sociological theory), sociological studies of the past (before 1991, historical sociology) or methodology. Neither did we include all sociological specializations: to put it simply, we omitted some disciplines and issues that are not close to the centre of sociology, nor to the basic issues of social transformation at the time under consideration. What we considered of core interest is evident from the contents and is, of course, open to criticism. Some sociological issues were not treated separately (under special rubrics), but within the given headings, for reasons of space. Sometimes data were noted within scholarship that was otherwise otherwise poor, but where the data themselves were relevant. And, vice versa: sometimes, scholarly opinions were relevant, although not based on empirical findings.

However, sociological research on Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslavia carried out by scholars who do not pertain to the region (these types of studies were common), remained outside the scope of our interest, except when such scholars worked together with sociologists from the region.

The separation between sociology and other social sciences also proved to be a problem. Some issues in the area of ‘historical sociology’ are particularly questionable. Of course, works dealing directly with other sciences are not covered, although in the area of social psychology and political science, it is sometimes difficult to set the boundaries.

The studies considered within the various categories deal with similar phenomena, e.g., politics, but from very different angles, although always remaining within the field of sociology. For this reason, we classified the works within each category (whenever possible) by the countries/entities of publication and treatment, alphabetically (cases of joint work and work by sociologists outside their states are infrequent).
The findings indicated in this paper are those which the author considered relevant, either their for factual relevance, critical stand or theoretical relevance, and may very well not coincide with what the individual authors considered most relevant.

Our review is far from exhaustive. The author is aware that many of the noted authors have published much more, but some works were selected as typical, if it was possible to gain insight into all); some works were not available and some works were considered of insufficient relevance. Mostly those works which contained relevant data, opinions or criticisms in sociological meaning were noted. We concentrated on the core areas of sociology, as perceived by the author, not following any of the valid classifications of sociology, as that would go beyond our intent and capacity. Whenever possible, something indicative of a general sociological nature (pertaining to the functioning of society) was noted. Of course, the phenomenon of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of its social system could not be overlooked, as this was the main point of departure for all changes. What was interesting to see was whether or not this brought about an initial retraditionalization of society, and a subsequent modernization (of a type other than the socialist one).11

This also means that the size of the presentation is intended to correlate with the relevance of the contributions. Some only needed to be mentioned, whereas as to others were more relevant to the present.

Some relevant scholarship was neither considered nor mentioned if it was followed and extended by later scholarship in a continuous fashion, for reasons of space, although in some instances the opposite was done, to underscore change.

Criticisms of the mode of scholarship, of the basis for conclusions, or assessments of the development of sociology have mostly been omitted and will be summarily presented at the end of this manuscript.

2.2 Transition

2.2.1 Dissolution and war

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a doctoral dissertation by Tramošanin was devoted to the dissolution and its ethnic precursors (2005). The author divides

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11 This issue will be dealt with in the Conclusion.
the causes of dissolution into internal and external ones. His understanding of the major internal factor lies in the “inversion” of class into the national’ in the former Yugoslavia, giving precedence to national and not to class ‘emanicipation’. He remains mostly within the Serbian ideological interpretation of the ‘drawbacks’ of the Yugoslav system, as seen by Serbian intellectuals in the 80s. Milošević is seen as having made a mistake in not adopting a multi-party system.

Cvitković carried out an investigation during the Bosnian war (1992–5), finding (besides organized war instigation by the other two confessional players) that many of the numerous arms borne by Catholic combatants had been blessed by priests, who also distributed rosaries and beads. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church was the most reluctant in expressing support for “its” combatants (2004). The Bosnian-born Malešević makes a strong criticism of Hechter’s rational choice in explaining the Bosnian conflict at a micro-level as a rational choice on the part of Serbs and Croats in pillaging Muslims; he explains that in the very process of conflict the direct participants were coerced into acting, including committing crimes and that rational choice has no place in an explanation at that level (Malešević, 2002).

Thus, we find little research sociology in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is not a paradox, but an indicator of the sociology’s lack of recuperation since the 1992–95 war, at least as a research discipline.

An important work was published by the late, esteemed Croatian sociologist S. Vrcan, a compilation of texts centering on the war. He did not wish to pinpoint direct causes and responsibility, but he did indicate the following points of departure: Yugoslavia was a country where religion was fundamental to cultural identity, and identity politics prevailed on the eve of dissolution; and such positions made the political process nonnegotiable (his central contention), leading to a conflict, where ‘all religious institutions were led to play’ the card of memory. (2001, 18–19). ‘The Serbian Orthodox Church was most consistent in giving cultural legitimacy to Serbian nationalism’ (2001, 30), noting the words of the Serbian St. Nicholas Valimirović: ‘When God sends war to the earth, it is only to turn the men’s heads towards heaven’ (quoted 2001, 32).

Among Croatian authors, Kukoč may be mentioned, for analyzing the three confessions.’ Among Catholic Croats, national protection is never to the detriment of religion’ (1995, 934). According to Kukoč, Islam is totalitarian and may be so in Bosnia as well. ‘Serbian Orthodoxy is a typical example of the immersion of religiosity in ethnicity’ (1995, 943). The author denies that the Bosnian war was a religious one, ‘nor /was it a war of / religious hatred or intolerance’ (2005, 15). ‘But owing to a hypocritical policy of Western gov-
ernments, the BH government accepts aid from Islamic countries’ (2005, 15). Thus, ‘the influence of Islamic militants will rise, if the Western governments leave Bosnia to the mercy of the Serbian aggressors’, concludes Kukoč (16).

On the other hand, there were attempts to take a less biased and multifactorial view of the dissolution. Endeavours by Sekulić and associates should be noted as most prominent (Sekulić, 1997; Sekulić et al. 2006), using data on ethnic identity and distance in the former Yugoslavia. He studied the lack/narrow base of Yugoslav cultural identity (both as ethnic identity and as a general cultural identity) and stressed that not the entire elites, but ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ entrepreneurs, by way of war mongering, in political mobilization in various environments – triggered the dissolution.

Croatian sociologists were prolific. Štulhofer wrote a bold piece, explaining the uprising by the Serbs in Croatia as an attempt at rational choice, as having been done to preserve their alleged privileged position, a very contentious issue. Štulhofer introduced quantitative analysis of Serbs and Croats in Croatia, stressing the greater participation by the former in the police and armed forces as an indicator of privilege. For Štulhofer, this explanation was the most scientifically parsimonious, emanating ‘Occam’s blade’ (1993). He did not ask about the rationality of Croatian participants’ behavior in the same manner. Even bolder were the ethno-psychological and ethnic essentialist explanations offered by Meštrović and associates. They alleged Serbs to be essentially authoritarian, emotionally imbalanced, prone to alcoholism, power hungry and privileged in the distribution of material and political resources in the post-1945 period (and earlier) (Meštrović et al., 1993; Meštrović (ed.), 1996; Meštrović, 1997). They suggested this as the reason for the impossibility of joint existence for the Yugoslav peoples and for their misery during the joint state, particularly for the Croats (and Slovenians). These works were written and published in English, giving them international publicity. Their content was evidently intended to influence the policy of Western states.

Žunec, in a voluminous work, depicted the life situation and discourse of the Serbian uprising and the ‘Republika Srpska Krajina’ in Croatia (2007).

In 2007, Zakošek attempted a very balanced and long-reaching view of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. He considered the use and abuse of historical memories on the part of Croats, Serbs and Albanians, political entrepreneurship (for which he gives only the Serbian example) and the self-defeating socialist institutions, the defeat of which was again exploited by ethnic elites. He concludes that the dissolution came about through a combination of ‘nationalist traditions which survived socialism, unfinished processes of nation-building in some South Slav nations, strategies of political elites who mobilized national-
ism and the failure of the Yugoslav socialist federation’ (2007, 35). It would appear from his narrative that only Croats, Serbs and Albanians were decisive players in the game. He calls for measures to correct injustices and promote understanding, which cannot be imposed by the international community, but must come from within the former Yugoslav countries.

The major work by Croat sociologists was done by Sekulić and associates, albeit carried out mostly outside Croatia. They point not to the elite (elites) as entireties in producing unrest, national mobilization and independence promotion, but instead to ‘cultural political entrepreneurs’, using aptly empirical data from the last pan-Yugoslav surveys (1997, 2006). These data do not support the hypothesis that elites were more pro-independence than the majority.

He studied the lack/narrow base of Yugoslav cultural identity (both as ethnic identity and as a general cultural identity) and stressed that it was not the elites as a whole, but ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ entrepreneurs, by way of war mongering, in political mobilization in various environments, who triggered dissolution of Yugoslavia.

He empirically disavows that rooted ethnic hatred and intolerance may have been the cause of the dissolution.

Stanković Pejnović (2010), after rejecting unifactorial explanations, finds the essence in the inability of the elite to create a community and in a lack of legitimacy in the political system. ‘The community was not fully constituted’ (2010, 601). This was the only case we encountered of a Croat scholar publishing on this subject in a Serbian scholarly journal.

The most vocal Croatian sociologist to critique the treatment of the Serb uprising was the late S. Livada (2007).

Among Serbian sociologists, one of the few who wrote on the subject, was R. Nakarada, who has written extensively on the matter (1995, 2007, 2008). Her mode of analysis may be typical of the environment: she focuses on geopolitical influences and interprets the solution exclusively in terms of factors external to Yugoslavia, including the USA’s endeavour to limit the growth and stabilisation of Europe and the European Union. Moreover, Antonić denies that the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation could have saved it (although it could have been constituted had Milošević been more flexible), because there was no Yugoslav identity to protect and because Slovenian and Croatian politicians were not sincere in proposing it (1994).

Among authors from Serbia, Sekelj’s book published in English should be noted, because of its well-founded and relatively impartial stand. He focuses
on recent politics and national elite strategies (‘ethnocracies’) and finally on
the lack of democracy in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the lack of institu-
tional capacity to transform SFRY into a constitutionally representative plural
democracy. He also points out that in 1990 the majority of survey respondents
in all republics and provinces, with the exception of Kosovo, were against to
the establishment of new national states (1993).

In repudiating Huntington, V. Vratuša Žunić claims, on the basis of 1990
survey data, that the ‘collective owners class’ was interested in independence
and ownership transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus responsible
for the war (1995).

Comparing various approaches offering an explanation of the NATO bombing
campaign, Vratuša has no reservation in demonstrating that ‘imperialist NATO
bombing motives pass without greater difficulty the test of comparison with
facts’ (1999, 42). She also asserts other explanations that allegedly pursue from
the authors she considers particular extra-scientific interests.

Among other Serbian sociologists, Mitrović, in an ambitious paper attempts
to depict the structural, functional, genetic and teleological aspects of the
dissolution, stressing that the Serbs needed Yugoslavia because of their being
dispersed and the varying expectations of the state on the part of the differ-
ent nationalities. ‘Serbs in various parts of Yugoslavia meekly accepted the
strait-jacket which Kardelj had cut for them and Tito slipped upon them and
fastened’ (1994, 192) – as part of section on the genetic analysis.

In the same issue of Sociološki pregled, devoted to the dissolution, Lazić is much
more cautious in his classification of factors in the dissolution and particularly
in their interpretation. He thus notes that the collectivist nature of the former
Communist ruling ideology was easy to transform from a class into a national
ideology (1994, 162). Warning against reductionism and simplification, Lazić
considers ‘systemic factors’, meaning inherent drawbacks of the communist
political system have been decisive (1994, 166).

In the same issue, Obrenović contends that the crucial dissolution phenomenon
was separatism on the part of Slovenian and Croatian elites, the success of
which was decisively aided by Western powers (1994).

In 2000, Vuković draws attention to the role of the US in the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. It is his contention that the US changed its policy of support for
Yugoslav unity, owing to global changes in spheres of interest and the recogni-
tion that the US could not control the whole of Yugoslavia as part of its sphere
of interest (2000, 88). The US thus supported the dissolution and took part
in it. Vuković, in 2003, gives a glancing overview of economic relations and
policies in Yugoslavia for the entire period since 1918, indicating that the economic and financial policies were geared in favour of North Western regions, preparing them, in fact, for separation. ‘A few years before separation, they (the North Western republics) became insatiable. Breaking into the system of payments became a regular phenomenon. (2003, 200).

In yet another article in the same scholarly sociological journal, Vuković elaborates on the Vatican’s role in ‘breaking down’ Yugoslavia, taking a long-term view of the alleged Catholic animosity to the Serbs (2004)\textsuperscript{12}. Vuković also published a book devoted to an analysis of the role of the Western media in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The basic contention is that the Western media, public relations agencies and other publicity actors, presented Serbs, indiscriminately and without justification, in a negative light (2007).

In 2001, Papić gave a harsh assessment of the Milošević regime, from a feminist point of view, asserting the link between media action and the patriarchalization of Serbia: ‘Why did the majority of Serbian women side with Milošević? It is because they too embraced a schizophrenic role, an absolute separation of their private and public identities. They wished to be ‘mothers of great warriors’, they wished to sacrifice themselves – you must know yourself how easily women internalize the position of victim. In patriarchal societies they cannot imagine themselves outside this role of victim. Also, many prominent ‘democratic’ persons from the opposition, indeed gradually internalized some of the elements of fascism: the ‘Serb holy nature’ of certain territories, the heroic Kosovo past, the holy objects of the Church’ (2001). Nikolić Ristanović wrote of rape and other forms of women’s suffering going unrecognized by the perpetrating party. She criticizes feminists for insufficiently protesting against the phenomenon. (2001).

In another critical treatment, Kuljić draws attention to the systematic revision of history (after dissolution and the inception of transition) in all environments (he considers Serbia and Croatia, in particular). ‘New revised official histories in all new Balkan states created a similar narrative continuity and provided a similar set of memories of a great, glorious past as proof of coherent ethnic histories and the absence of any common past. In the vacuum of memory, which was provoked by the collapse of the one-party system and the federal state, a new ethnic personal and collective memory formed a new identity, new continuity and a new set of values. Tension between anti-fascist values

\textsuperscript{12} From Vuković’s point of view, it would have made sense for the Western republics to continue the exploitation of the East and South of Yugoslavia and not to secede, but he twists this uncorroborated statement into an introduction for secession.
and the new national and confessional identity can be seen everywhere. The disappearance of the decreed communist past left an explosive vacuum, where ethnocentrism, nationalism, xenophobia and ancient values could flow’ (2006).

Somewhat later, Bakić, a Serbian sociologist, undertook a secondary analysis of foreign scholarship (and security forecasts on Yugoslavia) from the 80s. He concludes that, among scholarly forecasts, Ramet initially justified Croatian nationalism as far back as before Milošević’s coming to power. In contrast, Rusinow and Burg had cautiously forecast the potential for maintaining Yugoslavia. (2010). He finds that the flaw in all this scholarship lies in a failure to grasp ‘that the external factor was decisive in the maintenance and disappearance of Yugoslavia’ (2010). He also affirms that non-Serb nationalist movements could not be called defensive, as Connor did in 1984. Bakić sees republican and provincial border delineation as being ‘to the detriment of Serbs’ (2010). Bakić also deals with intellectual political interpretations of the dissolution and the ensuing war, among Western scholars, finding difference between the liberal left, who blame Milošević and Serbian nationalism, and the extreme left, who blame Western interventionism (2008).

Radojčić analyzed the work and pronouncements of anti-war organizations in Serbia during the 90s and early 2000s. Quoting profusely from the spokespersons and other prominent personalities in this movement, she concludes that they were ‘anti-Serbian’ and that they aimed to ‘empty Serbs of their essence’ (2008, 216).

Among Slovenian sociologists, the dissolution attracted relatively little attention. Before dissolution itself, Flere wrote an article dealing with ‘ethnic antagonism’ and concluding that ‘the basic problem is the lack of full-scale modernization, giving rise to frustration and ‘scapegoating’ of other ethnic groups. Historical reasons and cultural heterogeneity are also of considerable influence (1991, 183).

The basic picture was that, until 1991, Yugoslavia was the frame of reference for politics, but during 1991 Slovenia became the sole and unquestionable frame of reference. While in the 1991 issue no. 1 of Teorija in Praksa, then the major social and political science journal, Vreg wrote on ‘perspectives of political pluralism in Yugoslavia’ (1991), in no. 3–4 Bebler could blithely continue writing about ‘the geopolitical and military political position of Slovenia’ (401–5), as if nothing had happened. During the entire decade, no article on the dissolution of Yugoslavia appeared in this journal.

Godina wrote that, in terms of identity, supra-ethnic state identity was weaker than ethnic identity, while the latter also common to the elites and peoples of
the federal entities. This gave the elites a dominant position. Yugoslavia lacked a common identity after the death of Tito (2007).

The work by Meštrović et al., was criticised by Flere. Besides criticising their focus on one ethnicity only (Serbs as incompatible with others), and their dismissal of the complexity of the former Yugoslavia, Flere, by inspecting disposable empirical data from the last Yugoslav surveys and other sources, rejected such allegations and assertions (2003). He found them to be ‘ethnically essentialist’ and thus inappropriate for the explanation of such complex phenomena. He particularly dismissed the allegation that Serbs were characterized by their systematically privileged position, authoritarianism, psychological instability and alcohol consumption – and again dismissed such ‘explanations’ of the dissolution (2003).

Klanjšek and Flere returned to the problem, finding that, as late as 1986 (see the next chapter), the majority of nationalities and the majorities within federal units were, with the exception of Kosovo, were against the formation of national states within the Yugoslav entities. The picture changed somewhat by 1990 – according to another survey – when the majorities remained everywhere, with the exception of Kosovo and Slovenia. However, other processes were operating and ‘a multiple organ failure’ came about. (2011).

Let us also note that there were numerous papers on the religious/confessional element in the wars, all falling short of declaring it a religious war (see Velikonja et al. 2003, Vrcan 2001).

### 2.2.2 Transition to a capitalist economy

The transition to a capitalist economy was a difficult process, particularly because of the legacy of almost complete employment during socialism, often on the basis of social, welfare criteria, and partly because of inconsistent policies and legislative measures under privatisation (Slovenia being the exception) – not to mention the wars. Of course, the level of economic productivity of the economy was also very debatable to begin with, and one of the logics of transition is that the new capitalist economy would be economically more efficient. This transition was carried out in a number of ways, as to legal forms, beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be noted that in Serbia and Kosovo the legislation has not been finally adopted.

In a national survey 2002–4, the Serbian sociologist Mihailović, employed a refined methodological apparatus to the identify an in-depth and extended ‘ideological confusion’ and ‘ideological chaos’ in the comprehension of transi-
tion and the attitudes towards it, to a large extent instigated by political parties (2009, 117).

In 2000, Lazić, studying Serbia longitudinally, particularly the elite in transition, assessed the Serbian transition, from various perspectives as ‘a dramatic failure of transformation’ (2000, 13). He flatly ascribed this to the Milošević regime, with its failure of institutional steps towards true transition and transformation of the former elite into a new one, by what Lazić calls ‘conversion of resources’ (e.g., from political to economic resources).

In 2001, Adam and Makarovič in 2001 give an assessment of the transition process in Slovenia, noting the relatively low social costs, good Gini coefficient, fall in unemployment, and the low level of poverty but also noting uncertainty and risk (2001).

Velikonja, however, also in Slovenia, found that a ‘nostalgia for socialism is in fact a retrospective utopia, a wish and a hope for a safe world, a fair society, true friendships, mutual solidarity, and well-being in general, in short, for a perfect world’ (2009, 535).

2.2.3 Transition to pluralist democracy

In an early work on unmasking transition and pointing out its dark sides, the Croatian sociologist Katunarić writes of the establishment of political leaders who retain power by personal favours. The higher echelons of the political power elite thus became rich, and arbitrary changes in the power elite are used to instil fear (1995).

In Croatia, Pusić also made a relatively early critical analysis (1999) of the political aspects of transition in Croatia. Firstly, she classifies the transition as belonging to of the ‘Southern model’, since it was carried out without a broader social and political consensus. Furthermore, she provides a strong critique of the role of nationalism in Croatia; an amorphous state (already containing varied elements) has already become an aggressive one, when Croatia intervened militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, in 1999 she speaks of dictatorship as a political regime, having Croatia in view, calling for a ‘new transition’ of moderation in democracy (1999, 198).

The late sociologist Vrcan, in one of his last pieces, wrote of the sustainability of civil society, which spearheaded transition changes (at least in some parts of Yugoslavia). Noting a downturn in the activities of civil society, he seems to find the deepest root in the turn to the politics where justice and elimina-
tion of repression and exploitation, no longer prevail as goals. Instead, lifestyle choices and forming a personal ‘nest’ within given macro-institutions prevail (2006, 54).

The Serbian sociologist Kuljić made an interesting and necessary study of a particular aspect of transition: ideological and world view change at the individual level, conversion, revision reinterpretation of history, presenting oneself as a victim of the previous situation by persons of power in the previous period. His study is corroborated by other theoretical stands on the issue, while also being particular in the study of Croatian and Serbian situations and individuals. The main direction of conversion was from Marxist anti-capitalism towards anti-communist liberalism, although this main direction ‘was clouded by blind national-patriotism’ (2002, 438). In the first stage, internationalist Yugoslavism was rejected as mondialism, whereas in the second, socialist collectivism was condemned as command economy. Throughout, national feeling served as an emotional mediator’ (2002, 438).

The pronounced presence and phenomenology of anti-heroes and arch-criminals in Serbian media and public discourse in the 90s is analysed by Pavičević and Simeunović Patić (2005).

Electoral studies were newly popular during this period; electoral behaviour became the subject of extensive empirical study.

In 2006, a volume was published (2006, Milošević, ed.) on the balance of the first five years since the fall of Milošević. Although 2005 was a year of economic growth, the relative majority considered themselves as ‘losers’ in the transition. These losers were concentrated particularly among supporters of the Radical Party (2006, 60). Relevant value orientations (traditionalism, ‘hyperpatriotism’ et sim.) also drastically differed by party allegiance (Mihailović, 2006, 221).

### 2.3 Stratification (inequalities, elites)

#### 2.3.1 Social inequalities, exclusion

The process of transition with privatisation of the economy and the restitution of nationalised property, unfolding within a market transformation, and often without much order, brought about conditions for a drastic change in social status, at least for many groups and individuals. In our case, we may mention just disappearance of a relatively privileged and numerous group of Yugoslav...
People’s Army officers and their family members, we found no sociological research on this. Within these changes, the question arises of winners and losers in the transition, as to social status.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there are no detailed studies of stratification, Brozek gives an extended depiction of social exclusion, indicating war, ‘tycoonization’, neoliberalism and unbridled privatization as sources of widespread exclusion (2009, 48). In attempting to assess it quantitatively, without all the necessary statistical resources, he speaks of major forms of social exclusion touching three-quarters of the population (2009, 2). Internal differences (within regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina) are also great, which Brozek illustrates by disparities in dental work between Sarajevo and Nevesinje (2009, 4–5). The context may be supplemented by the GDP data indicating that Serbia had 1.58 and Macedonia 1.15 per capita GDP in comparison with Bosnia and Herzegovina /BH = 1/ (2009, 33).

In Croatia, the phenomenon of ‘benefiting from the privatisation process owing to close relations with the political elite, is mentioned by Henjak (2007).

In Macedonia, Jakimovski found that, among the rural population (data collection in 2006) 75 % considered that living conditions had significantly or somewhat less significantly worsened in comparison to 1990. Such opinions were concentrated among the elderly and peasants (2006, 42).

In one of the first investigations into factors of occupational attainment in Montenegro, Bešić reports on the predominance of political capital over human capital (Bešić, no date).

The pattern noted above by Henjak is not exceptional, although it may be more pronounced in some states than others. In Serbia it was certainly found to be pronounced, along with pauperisation during the 1990s (Lazić and Cvejić, 2004, 47). ‘According to empirical research, the older, less educated, less urban social strata and refugees, as well as marginalized groups of young people (the unemployed, the poor, or “sports fans”), those who are, in one way or another, “transition losers”, opt for the Serbian Radical Party and extreme right-wing ideas’ (Vujadinović, 2009, quoting S. Mihailović, 2005). The poor, again, are to be found among the elderly, the uneducated, single parent families, more often in the rural than urban areas. Mihailović found that in Serbia 30 % of respondents considered themselves to be transition losers and 9 % winners, all others opted for transitional categories (2010, 38).

In Serbia, the dichotomy of transition ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is widely used. It is rarely specified, although it follows that the elderly, unemployed workers and women are more likely to be among the ‘losers’. Stojiljković found gross dif-
ferences in political participation on the basis of belonging to these categories (abstention on the part of the ‘losers’) (2007, 29).

Lazić, in discussing the blocking of the transition process in Serbia during the 90s, despite some implementation in that period, notes that a new elite established itself, composed only of the previous nomenklatura of that period. He calls this the ‘conversion of resources’ (of one form of capital into another). In 1999 he finds a wide value spread within the elite, but in 2004 liberal values are more pronounced in their presence (2006).

Lazić and Cvejić (2004) undertook an attempt to study social mobility under conditions of transition in Serbia (1990–2000). Their task was difficult, owing to changes in the class structure itself. They worked with three- and six-class models (dividing each further into an upper and lower stratum). Besides noting pauperisation in Serbia during the 90s, they found a strengthening of self-reproduction within the classes, with little change in class position.

Studying impoverishment in Croatia, Šućur notes that objective impoverishment exists at the level of 27% of the population, whereas subjectively, it is much higher. The poor are to be found among the less educated, the elderly and among single parent households (2006a). When studying deprivation, Šućur finds that health is also of importance (2006b).

In a rare study of the working class, even more unusual in a comparative context, Lazić and Cvejić study the workers class in Serbia and Croatia during transition. They find stark similarities in the low levels of intergenerational mobility, indicating an outflowing, in the lack of labour union influence and in the ‘statist-paternalist’ outlook, where workers in both countries attain the same score (Lazić and Cvejić, 2010).

Dragoš and Leskošek computed that, in Slovenia, the rise in economic inequality, a notorious transition phenomenon, did not ensue from employment income but exclusively from capital (a increase of 18 times in the period under consideration, approximately the first decade after the onset of transition) (2003). Fifty-nine percent consider that dissatisfaction prevails in the community.

As to the issue of impoverishment, which was acute in the transition period, M. Novak found that old age per se did not present a special risk of impoverishment. Education main factor in economic inequality. (2000).

In Slovenia, B. Luthar undertook a novel approach to the study of stratification, by way of empirical combining, clustering of elements of taste, attitudes and spare time activities, without taking objective elements of social status.
as independent variables. She encountered 5 such ‘types’ of habitus: (1) the liberatrician habitus (20 %), (key words: global culture, rejection of national myths, equal rights for the differing, urbanity, travel abroad); (2) the traditional conformist (17.5 %) (key words: home, faith and nation, submission, staticity, low education, low income), (3) the chauvinist grumblers (19.6 %), (key words: We Slovenians, one state – one nation, prescriptive attitude, average income, anti-Church attitude, males from suburbia), (4) the ‘neither-nor generation’ (22.5 %) (key words: I don’t care, it’s not my problem, above average property, buying is enjoyment, brand image), and (5) the undefined on the margin (20.2 %) (key words: I’m not quite sure, living for others, modesty, average salary and property). Other authors in Slovenia worked in the same direction (Ule, 2002). The supposition is that life styles and time budgets are increasingly less structurally determined.

H. Ganzeboom, A. Kramberger and Niewbeerta (2000) worked on a longitu- dinal study of educational and occupational mobility in Slovenia (going as far back as 1968, using public opinion survey summing) and concluding that father’s education and occupation had dropped significantly in its impact on children’s outcome during the socialist period, only to attain rise again in the first transition years13.

2.3.2 Elites

Elites are an attractive subject of study, particularly since the changes in the social system basically transformed the mode of establishment and legitimation of both the economic and the political elite.

In Croatia, the elite was studied by Sekulić and Šporer, who found that the quantity of circulation in the eight post-communist years in Croatia did not differ from that in observed communist periods. The main differences detected were as follows: the national composition of the elite changed from having an overrepresentation of the Serbian minority to having none at all; an increase in the numbers of returning emigrants included in the elite. The new post-communist elite had lower levels of education and was older then the communist elite. Overrepresentation of ruling party members in the managerial elite was detected.

13 Stratification changes seem to have brought harsh impoverishment to the majority, with the exception of Slovenia. This is also indicated by the types of stratification studies, where major studies for Croatia – to our knowledge – are lacking.
Lazić did extensive work on Serbia, particularly its reproduction during the Milošević era, which crippled transition. The basic mechanism was the ‘conversion of resources’ (2000, 41). Members of the new entrepreneurial elite come either from the ranks of the former ‘ruling class’ or from middle- or lower-ranking entrepreneurs (2000, 41). Although, this is not peculiar to Serbia, the Milošević regime allowed a longer period for ‘conversion’. Lazić makes an elaborate analysis.

In Slovenia, Adam and Tomšič (2000) found a high level of retention of position among the previous elite within the new elite (over 75 %), and explains it in terms of oligarchic tendencies. They also consider that such a situation might have slowed down the processes of privatisation and denationalisation. In a qualitative study, Tomšič finds leftist leanings on the part of the Slovenian elite (2006). An investigation of the political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina proved to be unsuccessful, because of the failure of respondents to take part.

In Slovenia again, Iglič and Rus studied the linkages within the pre-transition and transition elites (1988 and 1995). They found these elites to be well connected. The number of contacts for each transitional elite member increased, but the strength of the associations decreased (2000). The post-Communist elite tended to integrate more than the previous one. The authors explain this in terms of the hierarchical nature of the previous elite and the limitation of the ruling ideology to the political elite only.

Adam, Tomšič and Kristan compare elites in two small new EU members, Slovenia and Estonia, finding that they radically differ. The Slovenian elite is characterized by its leftist-liberal and gradualist stands on change. There is a ‘hegemony of informal elite networks’ (2008, 60). They do not corroborate these statements by direct findings. They state that the composition of the Slovenian elite (high retention) is due to the ‘soft’ type of transition.

Žerdin and Mrvar studied the Slovenian economic elite, and comparing 2004 and 2006 with 1984, found a high level of continuity with the former economic elite. However, the persons with whom these elites associate with have drastically changed (2007).¹⁴

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¹⁴ Serbian and Slovenian studies seem to be similar in finding high transfer from the socialist into the capitalist elite, which is understandable as long as knowledge and expertise are the foundation of belonging to the elite.
2.4 Religion

2.4.1 Dynamics of religiosity

Religion and religiosity had already received sociological treatment during the Yugoslav period (for an overview, see Flere, 1994). After 1991, this issue focused more and on areas that had not previously been the subject of sociological study of religiosity. Some new issues were raised.

In most countries, an initial rise in religiosity was identified during the transition (Greeley, 2004).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation remains peculiar, owing to the consequences of the war (1992–5), which had religious dimensions. The present institutional solution is also a matter of dispute. Abazović speaks of a prevalence of ‘religious nationalism’, including a return to religiosity in various forms among all major groups (Catholics, Muslims and the Serbian Orthodox) (2010). Krajina writes of ‘hyperreligiosity’ in the multiconfessional region of Doboj, where declaration of religiosity is detected almost without exception among the respondents from all three major groups (2001). Very high levels of nominal Orthodox belief and practice are found by Krneta and Šević among higher education students in Republika Srpska. In their study focusing on family religiosity they find that the family is not a decisive factor in explaining religiosity among students; these findings are in line with other findings in the country (2011).

Vrcan (2001) also noted differences within Croatian lands and among Croatian Catholics in their religiosity and general attitudes (data collection in 1999). The basic idea is to stress the differences between high levels of authoritarianism among the Herzegovina Croats and its lack among Istria Croats. In line with this, among Herzegovinians traditionalism, national exclusivism and national idealization are prominent (2001, 101–153).

In data collected in 1999, Vrcan also found gross differences between Catholics and Muslims on their stands towards Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15.6% of the former considering its dissolution a tragedy, in contrast to 54.6% among Muslims (2001, 184).

In Croatia, Črpić and Zrinščak (2008) find that the post-Communist rise in religiosity is lasting and strong. In 2005, Marinović Jerolimov also find (data collection 2004) that four-fifths of respondents in a representative national sample declare themselves as religious, within a situation the author describes
as prevailing desecularization. However, the author stresses inconsistencies in the religiosity of the respondents.

**Kosovo** remains the only area where we have no reports of sociological studies of religiosity for the entire region/state. However, in the *Mitrovicela Public Opinion Survey*, indirect information does indicate confessional distance. Albanians had a much more favourable view of the existence of confessional distance (around one-fourth of the respondents) in comparison to Serbs (absolute majority) (Krasniqi et al., 2011).

Pajaziti (2006) studied religiosity among Macedonian youth. He found a greater presence of religiosity among Albanian Muslims in comparison with young Macedonian Orthodox. He even ventured into the study of consequentiality, where a higher proportion of males, in comparisons to females (close to three-fifths of the male respondents) would call off the wedding, if the girl were found not to be a virgin. Among males, this was a majority in both confessional groups, whereas among females it was about one-fourth. Differences among confessions were not significant.

In Montenegro, research carried out by Bakrač among youth with an Orthodox background found 81% declaring themselves to be religious, and other identifications below this high number (2011). In an earlier survey study on a representative sample of the Montenegro population, Bešić found that 18.5% of the Orthodox prayed frequently or daily, indicating a lower level than that suggested by Bakrač. In a methodologically oriented study, Bešić found greater presence of the observed dimensions of religiosity among Muslims in comparison to the Orthodox and Catholics (1998).

Serbian Orthodoxy was also a subject of study in Serbia. The rise in religiosity was somewhat belated, in view of particularities of the transition in Serbia (Blagojević 2005). Blagojević writes of a ‘radical desecularization’, whose bearers are the young and the educated (2005, 248). Blagojević notes particularly the consistency and stability of religiosity. This is confirmed by Radisavljević Čiparizović (2001, 2002).

In contrast, Slovenia is the only country where reports do not indicate a rise in religiosity in the post-1991 period. To the contrary, there are reports of mimicretic, i.e. inauthentic religious behaviour (Smrke, 2002), along with shallowness and inconsequentiality of religiosity in Slovenia (Flere and Klanjšek, 2007).

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15 Since conflicts, particularly ethnic and confessional conflicts often produce a rise in religiosity, we find reports of ‘revivals’, with the exception of Slovenia. Slovenia may, however, be an anticipator of changes yet to be observed in other environments.
Steps were made to operationalize religiosity in a more structured way than had been done previously, when the issue was treated mainly as the difference between church and non-church religiosity. Marinović Bobinac followed the Glock and Stark typology of five dimensions of religiosity, constructing and testing scales for studying religious experience, knowledge and consequentiality on Croatian national samples (2005a, 2005b, 2005c).

Flere, Klanjšek, Lavrič and Edwards ventured into the study of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, final and instrumental religiosity, in line with Allport’s typology of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Flere, Edwards and Klanjšek, 2008; Lavrič and Flere, 2011). The polemic between Tomka and Flere was reflected in Serbian scholarship, after it was translated. Whereas Tomka held that Orthodox religiosity contained traditionalist, quest, consequential and other dimensions demanding a ‘special methodology’ in the study of Orthodox religiosity, Flere found empirically that none of this could be validated and that among the Serbian Orthodox, a guilt religiosity component was present (Tomka, 2010; Flere, 2010). Radisavljević Ćiparizović studied Serbian Orthodox pilgrimage, noting that its motivation was permeated by superstition (2011).

2.4.2 Religious organisations and institutions

The position of religious groups changed markedly with transition, particularly the historically entrenched and majoritarian ones in the respective environments. Their relations with the state may not have changed technically, but their position in public and political life became, without doubt, more prominent.

M. Đorđević, regarding the Serbian Orthodox Church, nominated it ‘ethno-philetist’ and pointed to its activities in stirring up ethnonationalist conflicts of the 1990s (2006, 2010a). Dragoljub Đorđević undertook additional many-sided studies of Orthodoxy (Đorđević and Jovanović (eds.) 2010. They underscore the problem of modernisation within the Church, ‘which is too oriented towards the past’, finds it difficult to cooperate with non-governmental organisations (2010b, 23). As to the situation in Croatia, Baloban described the charity and welfare activities of the Catholic Church, which increased after 1990 (2005).

In Slovenia, the position of the Catholic Church was subject to sociological critical analysis of their position as being hegemonic and thus not in accord with the principle of separation of church (Smrke 2005; Smrke 2009; Črnič, 2008).
2.4.2.1 Small groups

Minority religious groups and practices also drew attention from sociologists in their studies, definitely more so than in the previous period. Overviews of small religious groups were made by Plačko for the capital of Croatia (1992), while Taševa conducted such research in Macedonia (2003). A more ambitious and in-depth study was conducted on the conversion of Romans to Protestantism, particularly Pentecostal Protestantism in South East Serbia by Đorđević and Todorović. They depicted the reluctance of Orthodox priests to undertake the same task (2011). The process is not limited to that area and, according to Đorđević, both missionary activities and other forms of conversion are at work. (2007).


2.4.3 Associations between religion and other social phenomena

On the basis of longitudinal survey data (beginning with 1986) from Croatia, and studying the predictive power of religiosity, Sekulić and Šporer (2006) found ‘that ethnonationalism is the only construct which is causally unquestionable’ in being associated with religiosity (2006, 15). They also found associations with conservative traditionalism and authoritarianism. Additionally, Šram found similar associations in Croatia (2008). Flere and Klanjšek reached similar conclusions associating religiosity and authoritarianism (2009). This is important in view of the ethnonational war and other conflicts in the area during the 1990s.

Special mention should be made of an analysis of ‘the religious other’ in the (post)Yugoslav context sociologically implemented (by means of a critical content analysis). It was mainly conducted by sociologists, particularly with a view to historically entrenched misrepresentations (Moe, ed., 2008). The book aims to support doing away with these misrepresentations and prejudices. It covers Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, but not the other environments of the former state.
2.5 Ethnicity

2.5.1 Ethnic identity and inter-ethnic relations

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it is difficult to find analyses for the entirety, Skoko made a descriptive survey of mutual perceptions and misperceptions among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs (data collection in 2010). Negative assessments of perception of others and social distance prevail in all directions, although very few of the members of these nationalities acknowledge being prejudiced themselves (2010, 9). A further study in Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic identity in the major groups was conducted by Turjačanin and Čekrlija. (2005, 163). It is, hardly surprising that they find strength of ethnic identity strongly correlated to religious identity (r = .38**). The study is mostly limited to methodological issues, thus applying exploratory factor analysis and finding conformity (general obedience), irreligiosity and a focus on the opinions of others as major factors in identity. Although on weak quantitative grounds, the authors allow for the possibility coexistence of ethnic, state and European identity, providing that the European identity not be artificially imposed(2005, 51).

Katunarić (2010) and Banovac (2009) studied the differences in identity in Croatian areas where armed conflicts among Serbs and Croats had either occurred or not. The latter author concludes that the role of instrumentalization of ethnicity in setting up inter-group boundaries was decisive.

In Macedonia, on a regional population sample, a study reported high social distance on the part of ethnic Macedonians towards the Albanians (and almost none towards Serbs); it also found high distance by Albanians towards Serbs and Macedonians is reported (Georgievski 2007). Data collection was in 2003, 2 years after the inter-ethnic conflict.

Montenegrin ethnic identity was contested and incompletely articulated, since many Montenegrins, including P. P. Njegoš, claimed to be simultaneously Serbs by ethnic/national belonging. They attributed varied meanings to the two identifications, with fine distinctions. This is also a matter of public contention. This issue was not empirically studied until Đukanović et al. (2001) undertook a study in Montenegro (where other ethnic groups reside autochthonously, as well). In their studies, they also used the categories of Montenegrin-Serb and Serb-Montenegrin. Montenegrins represent a relative majority in the sample (44.1 %). Possibly, the most telling datum about willingness to preparedness to take part in an armed conflict among Serbs and Montenegrins. 40.4 % of the total respondents would take part on Montenegro’s side, whereas the number
among those declaring themselves to be Montenegrins is 54.5%. (2001, 98). The authors consider that the formation of ethnic identity in Montenegro is still in flux.

In Montenegro also, Bešić (no date b), again in a pioneering investigation, contrasted ethnic and civic identity. In a mosaic of identities of various intensity and combination, Bešić considers the future of Montenegrin national identification to be uncertain.

The Montenegrin sociologist Filipović depicts the process of ‘nation building’ among the former Yugoslav peoples by the following pattern: transforming dialects into separate language, mobilizing the intellectual elite, attracting ‘identity’ assistance from the diaspora, conflating nation with attaining freedom, deconstructing and reconstructing national identity and forgetting the recent past. She considers the same pattern being applied in Montenegro, always as something applied by oligarchies (2001).

In Kosovo, pioneering work was again being carried out in sensitive conditions; in a study of youth, it was found that Kosovo Albanians were much more reluctant to establish social contacts with Serbs than vice versa (65%, 33%, Ahmetaj, 2007, 25).

Among numerous analyses in Serbia, Mihailović (2009) gives an extended analysis, both historical and cross-sectional, giving nationalism the status of ‘the main axis of Serbian history’ during the past two centuries. He gives it a historical explanation. He founds his empirical conclusions on very high, dominant social distance towards neighbouring nationalities, (an absolute majority of respondents reject marriage with or having as political leaders who are Roma, Albanians, or Croats) (data collected 2006) (2009, 211). Pešić undertakes a qualitative analysis of the perpetuation of Serbian nationalism in the post-Milošević era, linking it to both past and present politics. The adoption of the constitution under Koštunica regime, which defined impossible, unachievable objectives, and inclusion of the notion of ‘betrayal’, when politics deviates from these goals. This accompanies ‘authoritarian government which can only go along with paranoid nationalism’ (2009, 83).

After the end of war enmities, Petrović was the first to undertake a systematic empirical study of stereotypes among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. The findings reflect situational circumstances (2003).

In Slovenia, Kralj depicted the tribulations of members of the Yugoslav nationalities after Slovenia gained independence, then their gradual integration, including at the level of diminishing social distance. She finds that discrimination against them was institutional (2008). The same problem is studied by
Vidmar Horvat, who elaborates on the members of these minorities in Slovenia, who remained without citizenship, residence or status (2011).\textsuperscript{16}

\subsection*{2.5.2 The Roma}

The Roma became a prominent subject of sociological attention, which had not been so before.

In Croatia, Štambuk reports on the difficulty for local Roma of settling down to the sedentary way of life (2000).

Overall social distance towards the Roma is reported to be relatively low, below the normative average, in Macedonia (data collection in 2003) – The study was performed on a regional ethnic Macedonian population sample, and found no distance towards Serbs and predominant distance towards Albanians (Georgievska 2007). Caceva deals with the trafficking of Romas from Macedonia, associating that with their marginal position in society and their readiness to travel without travel documents (2006). Roma Protestantization was also the subject of a descriptive study by Cacanovska et al. in Macedonia (2009).

Roma Protestantization in Serbia has already been mentioned (Đorđević and Todorović, 2011). Miladinović Studied the social position of the Roma in Serbia, and, on the basis of a survey, finds that when it comes to marriage, ethnic social distance prevails. This form of social distance, among Roma is second highest (only Albanians achieving a higher score). This is associated with widespread prejudice against and the marginal social position of the Roma (2008).

Kirbiš and Flere (unpublished manuscript) established that, according to EVS 2008 data, Slovenian xenophobia towards the Roma is below the EU 10 level but above the EU 17 level (Slovenia: 38 % would not have them as neighbours). Taking other things into consideration, they opine that the state is more part of the problem than an agent in the solution.

In Slovenia, Zupančič studied the particularities of Roma settlements, assessing that there are about 310, that they were first established in the 1970s and that they have a lacking infrastructure (2007)\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{16} Ethnicity does not allow for a good picture, which is hardly to be expected after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, the problem is more lies the insufficient elaboration of the problem. These issues are dealt with in other sections of the paper, as well.

\textsuperscript{17} The reports on the Protestantization are very interesting, but provide only a partial picture of an introduction into dominant society.
A sole interview by Naterer in Slovenia indicates some integration of the Roma, in this case, alochthonous urban Roma, into Slovenian society. Knowledge of how to get social welfare benefits and do work with waste enable one individual him a decent life, along with his immediate family (Naterer 2011).

2.6 Family and Gender

2.6.1 Family

Family is definitely not a new subject of sociological study. It had been one of the oldest subjects in sociology, including in this region (Le Play, 1855; Bogišić, 1867). However, transition confronts the family with new problems and challenges and the major question is whether it promotes a single pattern within the expectations of the modernization theory, or whether differences are not only reproduced but also strengthened.

Majstorović writes of the everyday struggles of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war experience, which included a struggle with retraditionalization; it was noted that the difference between the public and ‘private position’ could lead towards a more favorable position of women (2011).

In Croatia, Labus found a strong prevalence of traditional values and stands on data from a national sample survey. On a scale of 1–4, respondents agreed at an average of 2.77 that ‘Most tasks in the home best correspond to the woman, 2.84 with the statement, ‘Without a leader a people is as a man without a head’ and indicated other pro-traditional positions (2000).

Values regarding marriage reflect the finding that cohabitation outside marriage is condemned by 47 % of Croatian general population survey respondents, in comparison to 17 % among higher education students (Črpić and Valković, 2000). 65 % of general population respondents also think it is inadmissible to have a lover. However, Nikodim et al., comparing EVS results in 1999 and 2008 find clear indications of a diminution of traditional stands on the family and marriage in Croatia in all instances (2010).

In an overview of structural changes, Puljiz (2001) notes trends longitudinally: a diminution of the fertility rate, the nuptial rate, a rise in the divorce rate, a rise in the proportion of children born out of wedlock, deinstitutionalization of the family, the appearance of new family forms and population aging. In an in-depth explanatory paper, Obradović and Ćudina (2011) find that decision
making about childbearing rests with the wife, who will in future be increasingly less motivated to reproduce. They find that there are two motivations behind a couple’s childbearing: the child as a joy and the child as a social obligation. In both cases, it is the wife’s decision whether to have a child. The authors foresee a further decline in the rate of childbearing, although they find considerable traditionalism in all of their explicatory constructs (2011).

The variety within the former Yugoslavia can best be demonstrated best as to family relations. Today, 20% of marriages in Kosovo are still arranged by parents, with a further 23% marrying with the consent of parents (Ahmetaj, 2007, 25). This is a long way from the situation in rural Kosovo in the 70s when the total decision making lay with the elders. Indeed, it lends support to conclusions about a unilinear model of development. In the divided city of Mitrovica, a study unveiled social distance in 2010: 64% of Albanians would be prepared to live in the same settlement with Serbs, where the number is 54%. 4% of Albanians would be ready to enter into family relations with Serbs, in comparison to 8% among Serbs (Krasniqi et al., 2011, 48). In the first case the figure could be due to insecurity, whereas in the second, it is due to traditionalism; in both cases we are confronted with an abnormal situation.

In Macedonia, Sulejmani gives a depiction of the present Albanian family, concluding that ‘patriarchal values are on the verge of extinction’ (2006, 52). In his survey, 30% of households are composed of two or more core families. 47% of families are composed of other relatives beside parents and children. 2% of respondents consider that the wife should deliver children continuously (2006).

The basic trends in the development of the family in Serbia are well described by Milić (2004). The number of single person households is on the rise (2003 = 10.3%). The number of households consisting of a couple is also increasing (24.5%). The nuclear family has experienced a sharp drop in numbers (31.7%). Extended households (not within the traditional pattern) of varied composition are also on the rise (30%). She considers these and other changes to be ‘regressive’ in comparison to previously attained levels of modernisation (2004, 342), since family social capital is almost the sole type of social capital according to her investigation. Young adults remain with their parents, since the family is their only support and resource. Young adults postpone establishing their families. All this is part of the strategies to survive in Serbia, impoverished and in long term crisis.

In Serbia, the transition had a serious effect on economic family conditions, particularly during the 90s. Babović found that 12.3% of family households focused exclusively on resources from barter ‘substitution’, i.e., they had no
market resources, but only their own production and services within the household as a means for subsistence (2009, 108). She also found that in everyday resource decision making, women were main actors at 46.2 %, in contrast to men (35.8 %), whereas for strategic decisions, the men in households took decisions in 49.6 % of cases, in contrast to 26.9 % (2009, 136).

On the basis of data collected in 2008, and using a sample representative of Serbia, Milić studied values regarding family and marriage and finds great differences and contradictions at the individual level and among marital partners. These patterns are typical of transition to a modern family. Thus, 16 % of wives agree with the statement ‘It is good that both partners take part in decision making, but it is natural that the husband has the last word’, with which 40 % of the husbands agree (Milić, 2010, 242). In the same study, Ljubičić finds that approximately half the families are ‘dysfunctional as to adaptability’ (2010, 280), which has to do with the impossibility in adjusting to radical change during the transition and physical closeness to war.

In a study of dyadic partnership by qualitative methods, Bobić focused on LAT unions. She found that female decision making predominated in such unions, in contrast to the traditional ones (2003, 92–93). She also found that partners did not have their own dwellings but continued to live with parents, owing to economic limitations.

Ćopić studied wife abuse in three post-Yugoslav countries: Serbia, Macedonia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She found that wife abuse is one of the most serious yet at the same time most hidden forms of victimization (2004)18. Physical abuse was more widespread in Serbia than in Macedonia, whereas data for Bosnia were not directly comparable. This was contextualized with the war situation19.

In Slovenia, major studies were undertaken by Rener and associates, who noted the post-modern turn in family life (particularly the individualization and pluralisation of forms), including the challenge to the very notion of the family itself (Rener et al., 2006).

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18 We did not study victimization in general, which became an independent discipline in this period.
19 Although data on the family were numerous, they were not systematic. The war, transition and immanent modernization, it may be hypothesised, stimulate modernisation and post-modernisation of the family in various manners. However, points of departure were very different, from the Albanian ‘fis’ extended family to the Slovenian conjugal family, institutionalized during feudal times.
2.6.2 Issues of Gender

Issues of gender gained a new significance in the post-1991 period. Many authors noted a retraditionalization, including a greater burden placed upon women by the transition. In transition unemployment, women were afflicted more harshly in all countries (Pešić, 2009, 174). Pešić also studies repatrachialization in the Western Balkans, looking at the relationship between private (home, family) and outside (work, politics) relations. She creates summation scales on the basis of survey data compiled in the post-Yugoslav countries (excluding Slovenia) in 2003–4, finding public and private patriarchy value orientations to be higher in Kosovo in contrast to Croatia, followed closely by Serbia (2009, 178). On the basis of research results in 2006–7 in South East European countries, Pajvančić finds that among all political options, only social democracy allows possibility of gender parity within parties. She favors special measures in promoting this parity. The research finds that political parties did not recognize women as a special electoral segment, that women are less present as party members than in the electoral population (some 30% of members), and that they are underrepresented in party leaderships. She favors the introduction of gender quotas for party leadership (2007).

In a review paper, Galić, Buzov and Bandalović (2009) also underscore the unanimity of findings in Croatia on women bearing the burden of transition, because of retraditionalization and unemployment. They also point out that the Croatian public has become more critical of the Catholic Church position on the role of women in society, which has become majoritarian (2009, 196). In the same country, other value orientations have also evolved recently towards a more emancipatory position.

In a survey in Macedonia, 6% of ethnic Macedonian women considered 4–5 children as the proper number for each woman to bear, whereas among Albanian women this answer was given by 25% (Jakimovski and Matilov, 2002). Major financial decisions are made by the husband among 16% Macedonians by 16%, and among 32% Albanians (2002, 54).

In Montenegro, known for a tradition of patriarchy, Filipović wrote a study on gender (2003). It contains data on public gender disparity, including the fall in the number of female members of the Montenegrin parliament with the inception of transition (from 12% to 5%, to rise again later). Filipović also illustrates patriarchy with reference to Montenegrin epic poems (‘Females are unlucky, lacking in heroism, (unlucky in) in having no say and in not being known’, 2003, 129). The peak of female public role in traditional Montenegrin society is to be found in women’s singing at funeral occasions.
In an important study in Slovenia, Černič Istenič reaffirms that transition was not a gender neutral process, but one afflicting women much more harshly, after noting that the position of women during socialism was ‘enviable’ (2007, 478). In her survey study, she did not find major rural-urban differences in the perception of gender roles, but education and religiosity prevailed in explaining differences.

The articulation of national identity in the period 1991–2000 was permeated by patriarchalization, and by deterioration in the position of women in Croatia (Topic, 2008).

### 2.7 Politics, power

#### 2.7.1 Power structure

Politics was fundamentally changed by transition, again both because of the transition to the multi-party representative system and because of the dissolution of the SFRY.

The peoples of Yugoslavia – in the period under consideration – in their states or states in the process of establishment (and turmoil) were confronted with the first multi-party election in the period 1989–1991. Since then, further elections have taken place, and the issue of constitution of electoral majorities and minorities has become a standard topic of political sociology. Of course, the first elections were much more than the usual electoral process, as they legitimised states (or failed to do so, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and further elections were in some instances also part of the national constitutive process.

In a critical analysis of the functioning of the media in Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Stanisavljević touches on political life in the entity. His basic finding is that a tiny elite of party leaders control the media, that these leaders create the agenda of issues, particularly of the alleged danger of the crushing of Republika Srpska and of their necessary role in protecting it. He stresses the need to create a civil society and independent media. Media consumption is ethnically determined.

As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which may at this time be considered ‘the sick man’, Skoko’s at the end of his analysis, concludes that accession to the EU is not a sufficient motive to overcome the problems and differences, considering that the state is ‘artificial’ (36, 2010). In an analysis of media functioning in
Republika Srpska, Stanisavljević reaches a somewhat more optimistic conclusion as to the need for fundamental change in political life, whereby the media would not be limited to individual ethnicities and to propagating the need for their protection and salvation. He considers that the media are manipulated by politicians to maintain their power (2010).

In Croatia, Zakošek explains electoral behaviour by contending that three factors intermingle: the territorial, ideological and social status divisions in party-electoral orientations and divisions. Later, he sums the three factors into two: the ‘Croatian centre’, nationalist and traditionalist in nature, and the ‘Croatian periphery’, more modernist and moderate. Šiber, in the same book, speaks of the strength of the family tradition in political positions, particularly within the right (Kasapović et al. 1998).

In 1997, Šiber found on a representative sample of Zagreb adults, that authoritarianism effectively predicts voting for right wing parties, even more for the HDZ than for those to the right of it (1998). Authoritarianism dominated over anti-authoritarianism, as to presence. In a longitudinal study, the same author finds that turnout at elections depends on the feeling of helplessness (which is related to non-participation), whereas what he calls ‘ideological exclusiveness’ stimulates participation in the ballot (2004).

Henjak, as mentioned, as late as 2007, found that in Croatia, socio-economic status does not significantly predict electoral behaviour, whereas religiosity and political stands do (2007). The findings were similar by Milas and Rihtar a decade earlier, where political positions in the left-right dimension and party preferences could well be explained by forms of social conservatism vs. its absence (1997). Both Milas and Posavec Lamza in their articles point out the moral erosion of the HDZ in explaining its defeat in 2000.

In a major study of the Macedonian electorate, Hristova et al. (2011) found some typical, long-term characteristics of the electorate. Ethnic Macedonians have a positive opinion of socialism (75% regard it as non-repressive), in contrast to ethnic Albanians (65% consider it repressive). Regardless of this, the value structure is traditionalistic throughout. Value preferences, however, do not have an impact upon electoral choices, where party loyalty is typical. The party system is fragmented, as well as ethnically divided. Party programmes and impressions of parties among the electorate do not have an impact upon policy, when the respective parties are in power. Leftist SDMS has major support among the more educated and those with higher social status, as does the major Albanian party, DPA.
In Macedonia again, after the 2001 conflict a new system of local government was established, typical of the accord between the ethnic majority and minority. It is described by Malevska and Hristova. The majority does not have absolute power, although the minority has veto power over sensitive issues in local decision making (2006).

Antonić devoted much energy to analysis of the Milošević era in Serbia (1987–2000). In explaining it, he dismissed the role of authoritarianism in its psychological and cultural meanings, as well as lack of democratic tradition and absence of institutions. Instead, he considered Milošević’s ‘genius’, his role as actor, as having been decisive (2000, 65; 2002). Again, in Serbia, a political scientific qualification was given of the Milošević rule by stages, in work by Antonić (2002). He categorizes Milošević’s rule as Caesarism in the first stage and Sultanism in the latter. His in-depth study of the period does not give prevalence to the objective factors of political life, but to the subjective ones.

A major study of Serbian elections 1990–2007 was undertaken by Slavujević (2007). The task Slavujević undertook is a complex one, since Serbia was undoubtedly a special case. After 1990, all elections were multi-party ones, but they were not fair until 2000, with Milošević transforming ‘from a sovereign state and national leader to a patron of war profiteers’. He also gives lengthy characterizations of the other main political personalities. The focus is, however, on the electoral campaigns and technologies used by the parties and other players. He analyses the topics and discourses of the various campaigns, of course all centering, in one way or another, on the Serbian national question. The work is well documented with data on the dynamics of support for politicians and on electoral results. (Of course, Serbia experienced a change in its territory, in the period of election coverage, since Kosovo ceased to be an operational part).

A parallel volume was published on political parties in Serbia, not depicting individual political parties, but focusing on certain problems (Lutovac /ed./, 2007). Đurković deals with narodnjajuštvo (a term difficult to translate: closest equivalent nationalist populism) (173–192). Mihailović deals with leftist and rightist extremism. Conducting empirical research, he draws conclusions about the confusing political stances among the populace (193–222). Among relatively new subjects, Pajvančić deals with gender equality in political programmes (283–298). Finally, Pantić asks to what extent party political programme items are truly accepted by their supporters (299–320).

Mihailović undertook a study of political extremism in Serbia, including its institutional bearers and ideologies and the conditions bringing them about (2007). He also points out their association with football fans. A similar study
in Croatia was undertaken by Lalić, where fans also represented a similar social problem, being associated not only with violence, but also with ethno-nationalism (1993).

Mihailović studied the backing of parties by socio-occupational groups at elections in 1990 and 2000. The basic change came about in workers, who switched from backing Milošević to backing Koštunica (2002).

Pavlović studied the internal functioning and decision making in Serbian political parties, in the post-Milošević period, confirming, without exception, the monopoly of the leader, who controls the flow of information, the setting up of rules and financial resources (2007).

Studying a subject outside elections, civic activism, Franc, Sakić and Maričić, find that in Croatia (2007) perception of efficiency is relevant (in contrast to religiosity and political orientations) as predictors of electoral behaviour in Croatia.

In Slovenia, Adam and Makarovič (2001) found the drawbacks of politics in that country in ‘an instrumental understanding of democracy, in a lack of trust in the system, in insufficient efficaciousness of the political system, in a limited circulation of elites and a limited media pluralism’ (2001, 377). Their analysis was not directly corroborated.20

2.7.2 EU orientation

Čipek attempted an analysis of Roman Catholicism, Serbian Orthodoxy and Islam towards European Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He found that the latter two were split into pro- and counter-EU camps, whereas the Catholic Church had uniform pro-EU stand (Čipek 2011).

In undertaking a closer inspection (in comparison to public opinion polls on the support of accession) in Croatia, Sekulić and Šporer find initially, positive correlations between sub-national, national and European orientation. However, using factor analysis, they discern that sub-national and national loadings coalesced with conservative positions, in contrast to the European orientation (2008).

20 One should not expect social scholars to be satisfied with political systems and their functioning. One may note that the analyses differ significantly in their assessment of the drawbacks and deficiencies of the respective political arrangements and functioning. Adam’s analysis of Slovenia may be the most lenient.
Lazić finds a relatively high level, majoritarian pro-EU orientation, in the Serbian elite (Lazić and Vuletić, 2009), by way of comparative analysis. They indicate a basic change in comparison to previous period. They corroborate the issue by citing party and electoral changes.

Distance from the EU is illustrated by Molnar, who analyzes the ideology of Serbian post-Milošević politics, particularly the Constitution adopted in 2006. ‘In the ideological projection the preferred image of Serbia after the successful completion of the revanche is discernible. Since it is incorporated into the Constitution, it surpasses the level of the usual political propaganda and becomes a means for measuring in change of reality’ (2007, 209). Molnar, of course is writing on the inclusion of Kosovo as a component part of Serbia in the preamble of the 2007 Constitution.

It pursues from Tomšič that accession was not a publicly contested issue in Slovenia (2006).

2.8 Other significant issues (as subject of study)

There are many sociological issues which could be subject of our analysis, but that would exceed the aims of the study and our energies. One dares not even enumerate the subjects, which overlap mutually and that touch on other social science disciplines. Two topics should in no case by circumvented. One is social capital, a relatively new topic, the other is youth (in contrast to the study of generations and of the elderly, who compose a growing segment of the population in almost all of countries at issue).

2.8.1 Social capital

Social capital is a notion that was not tackled in Yugoslav sociology before 1991 and otherwise it is a relatively recent construct in sociology in general.

In Croatia, Štulhofer studied social capital in the period 1995–2003 on Croatian national samples, by surveys. He found social capital to be diminishing, in spite of political stabilization after the end of hostilities in 1995. The main source of decline in social capital was to be found in the loss of trust into major official institutions and the awareness of high official corruption, as well as a decrease of religiosity. Generalized trust in people, however, remained the same (2004).
The Serbian scholar Prokopijević gives a general overview of the factors involved in producing a low general level of social capital and trust in the Balkans. A lack of social capital is detrimental to the transition process. He invokes long term historical reasons, including foreign domination, lack of a democratic tradition and relations between ethnic and confessional minorities and majorities. He does not propose particular policies to raise social capital (2002).

In Slovenia, Iglič studied generalized trust on a general population sample, finding the level to be low comparison to Western countries. She finds that in the Slovenian case social capital is not associated with participation in voluntary organizations. It is associated with satisfaction with life, education, and perception of functioning of public institutions. Adam and Rončević also find social capital in Slovenia relatively low, but hypothesize transition changes may result in its increase (2004).

2.8.2 Youth

Youth is not a novel subject in sociology, nor was it novel as an empirical subject (particularly important was the study by Vrcan et al. 1986), where value differentiation, by ethnies and republics, among youth within Yugoslavia was focused.

In a systematic study of youth in Serbia (2008), Mihailović finds the presence of the phenomenon of ‘extended youth’, to be something imposed and not a matter of choice in opting for life styles; the study places ‘extended youth’ into the context of the ‘catastrophe’ through which Serbia passed in the 90s. He regards the present situation of Serbian youth as transitional, and as also determined by the existence of a ‘gerontocracy’ (32, 2004). Among half the respondents, marriage and birth of children are synchronized in awareness (Tomanović and Ignjatović in Mihailović (ed.) 2004, 55). Although cohabitation with a partner is supported as an attitude by 78 %, it is practiced by only 2–3 % (Tomanović and Ignjatović in Mihailović (ed.) 2004, 54)22. Respondents wish to bear children at the age of 30.

In Slovenia, in 2010, a national youth sample established that the young consider themselves adults significantly earlier than was the case in 1986 (21 and 26, respectively). This shift reflects, in fact, the situation of frustration

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21 All studies find low levels of social capital. The sources have not been definitively uncovered, although joint historical experiences force themselves as factors.

22 One may note the advancement of modern and postmodern concepts of partnership.
with blocked entry into adulthood (Flere and Lavrič, 2011, 67). Flere and Tavčar Krajnc found that Slovenian youth aged 20–24 have the highest levels of participation in tertiary education among the EU 27 (2011, 98), a situation which has primarily to do with social policy. Finally, the study found that cohabitation in any form in the age group 25–29 has been diminishing during the past decade, another sign of blocked entry into adulthood (2011, 87) 23.

2.9 Conclusion

Sociology had been practiced in Yugoslavia at least since 1956. Its growth was slow and uneven. The main research and academic centres were Beograd (first academic studies), Zagreb (specializing in rural sociology) and Ljubljana (stressing public opinion research). We have focused on post-World War II development. Sociology was developed in many ways in some other centres, as well, although it was under strong ideological pressure.

The studies that were considered here, either implicitly or explicitly, took the post-communist transition as a point of departure, both economically and politically, with many, often unexpected social consequences. However, very few studies took into consideration that the transition was extended into a global crisis and that this is presently the framework of functioning and changes in society. This is not an objection to the studies, since they were almost exclusively performed or begun before the onset of the crisis. A few exceptions were encountered, such as Lavrič et al. (2011), where the post-transition, globally extended crisis was the point of departure for his and associates’ analysis of youth in Slovenia.

Since 1991, which we consider the time of dissolution, sociology has grown quantitatively (in terms of centres of academic study and quantity of research). However, our main finding is that sociology has developed far from optimally. In particular, writing and publishing in the manner approved by internationally recognized journals is still rare. Writing is not well connected; authors give themselves too much freedom using puns and witticisms, that are not directly connected to the subject of study. This both goes for theoretical and empirical sociology. Work such as that carried out by Sekulić to international recogni-

23 Changes in social position and situation have less to do with transition than with global changes in the economy, which excludes many from ‘regular’ employment, possibly even the majority of young people. Although there are various models of youth situations, the extension of schooling and blockages in transitions to adulthood are almost universal.
tion (in fact he conducted most of his work abroad) is almost the exception. Theoretical works are often ideologically burdened, sometimes even intending to propagate political stands, but most of all they lack the rigour of explication and the chain of discourse. The quantitative studies have often retained their pre-1991 form: questions and answers are operationally inarticulate and thus difficult to process. The statistical processing is often elementary, limited to frequencies and cross-tabulations. Even the formulation of questions often lacks validity, reliability, depth and comparability.

In brief, one could say that development in the field of sociology is nevertheless evident. Independent investigations of a sociological nature practically did not exist in Montenegro before 1991, and subsequent progress is noticeable. However, basic disparities between Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia (where sociological research is more advanced and systematic) and the others have remained and possibly grown even more acute. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a troubling case, where one can speak even of deterioration in comparison to the state before 1991. It seems that sociological investigation concerning the entire state is not being carried through public channels of research financing (not even at the entity level); however some non-governmental organizations have taken over a significant role (this applies particularly for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). To a lesser extent, these organizations are present in investigative activity in Macedonia, as well. The situation is definitely worst in Kosovo, where there are few investigations exclusively financed and even organized through international channels, and the data, as well as their treatment is rudimentary. The difference between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo is to the detriment of the former, since there had been publicly sponsored sociological investigations before 1991, whereas in Kosovo this was always practically absent. This is, of course, due to the situation there, which cannot be described as conducive to empirical sociological investigation.

It seems that Slovenian sociology is best integrated into international scholarship, although this was not investigated in depth. Participation in international scholarship is necessary in the interests of both structuring scholarship by a modern criteria, making it comparable and comparative, and by integrating scholars into the international scholarly community.

One of the main tasks, therefore, is to advance scholarship in sociology (probably in other social sciences, as well) from an elementary level to the mode of drafting, design, writing and publication that is recognized in contemporary scholarship. Most sociologists from the countries in question have been cut off from this and a special impetus in this direction should be encouraged.
The issue of *dissolution* dominates the picture of sociological discourse, although it engaged few researchers other than Croatian and Serbian sociologists. Refraining from judging their work individually, it can freely be noted that some were not immune to making propaganda, while others were victims of propaganda in situations unfavourable to unbiased investigation. Certainly, this is a task to be continued, even though the empirical data from surveys on the eve of the dissolution has already been exploited. There are, however, many forms of sociological work to be undertaken, including sociological interviews with ordinary people, or for example, with officers and soldiers of the once lauded and ‘embellished by wreath of fame’ Yugoslav People’s Army, who achieved an infamous end.

As for the substance of our findings about what else sociologists have treated in the past two decades, it is difficult to say that the above works allow any inferences on joint *developmental trends*: it would be difficult to infer that modernization is under way, and that the countries/societies and nationalities have simply reached various stages, but are going in the same basic direction. Sulejmani provides a good example: he speaks of the extinction of patriarchy among Albanian Macedonians, but poses the question of whether women should bear children ‘continuously’. The percentage of positive answers is very low, but indicative of the issue’s continuous relevance. There is still a long way in doing away with patriarchy and approaching LAT relationships common in Slovenia (Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2011, 364). Nevertheless, the relative number of children born is valid for the 20-year period for all environments (if we compare 30–50-year-olds and those 51-and-over, by way of EVS data). Religious revival was also a phenomenon that proved to be short-lived and reversible. (Data from EVS 2008 indicate a drop in Serbia and Montenegro entities, in comparison to 1990, while the number of those not pertaining to any confession in Slovenia is stable at 3 tenths). Environments in which war raged in the 90s still displayed no diminution in 2008.

*Stratification* changes seem to have brought harsh impoverishment to the majority, with the exception of Slovenia. This is also indicated by the types of studies of stratification, where major studies for Croatia – to our knowledge – are lacking.

Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian studies seem to be similar in finding high levels of transition from the socialist to the capitalist *elite*, which is understandable, as long as knowledge and expertise are in question. (The Croatian finding suggests that this was not at issue, namely, it was not about expertise). It is also known that low circulation is not a particularity of these countries, the authors considering only short periods of time. Higley, on the other hand,
advances the idea of a gradual circulation of elites, where gradual circulation is understood as a precondition of democracy, high retention is noted by Higley and Lengyel, 2000).

However, cleptocratic tendencies among the elites were not underscored in these studies, a phenomenon that surfaced clearly later (this ‘lack of perception’ definitely applies to Slovenia, whereas in Croatia and Serbia there was some acknowledgement of it, although not of a ‘scholarly nature’).

On this topic of whether conflict, particularly ethnic and confessional conflict, produces a rise in religiosity, we find reports of ‘revivals’, with the exception of Slovenia. Slovenia may, however, be a herald of changes yet to be observed in other environments.

Although data on the family were numerous, in sociological research, they were not systematic. The war, transition and immanent modernization, it may be hypothesised, stimulate modernisation and post-modernisation of the family in various ways. However, points of departure were very different: ranging from the Albanian ‘fis’ extended family to the Slovenian conjugal family, institutionalized during feudal times. As has been established, we feel that changes to family and marriage follow a single trend of modernization and individualization. Also, temporary retraditionalization was noted and the bearing of the burden by women and wives.

Changes in social position and situation have less to do with transition than with global changes in the economy; these have made ‘regular’ employment an impossibility for many, even perhaps for the majority of youth. Although there are various models of youth situations, the extension of schooling and obstacles in transitions into adulthood are almost universal.

Beside the findings referred to above, it should be stated that conditions are ripe for a study of the post-Yugoslav lands. Such an investigation would have several benefits: (1) it would enable scholars in less advanced environments to learn and master the techniques of state-of-the-art drafting, planning and implementation of research, quantitative analysis and writing publishable in journals of repute; (2) it would result in a more in-depth study than EVS enables and a more comprehensive general comparative study of the entire populations than YUSTA enables. Possible foci of study, which would be integrative in nature, are (i) youth and (ii) political culture in the scholarly sense (Almond, Verba and Pye). Finally, the renewal of cooperation among scholars in the region would in itself be an important element of reconciliation and would marginalise or change the opinions of those among scholars who have propagated hatred and prejudice, as quoted herein.
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Abstract

The breakup of Yugoslavia meant not only the disintegration of a political federation, but also the collapse of its economic system and the associated market. Reorientation to the west, structural reforms, democratization of political sphere and the establishment of a market economy were seen as a recipe that would eventually bring the former Yugoslav republics closer to the standard of living experienced in the West. After giving a short description of Yugoslavian development after the Second World War, the current paper offers a quick glance at some of the most common indicators of economic development, in order to indicate what happened to the political entities that used to form a joint state of Yugoslavia. Results of this general overview indicated the following: a) that there was an overarching drop in economic activity across the region, but that all units were eventually able to advance economically (i.e., achieve higher GDP per capita in PPP terms); b) that Slovenia and Croatia maintained their status as ranking “first” and “second” in terms of their economic development, and that they were able to extend their lead to a certain degree (unless price differences between entities are taken into account); c) that the process of transformation/transition, including the tragic events of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, brought considerable change to the social fabric, including social costs that are usually not captured by the growth indicators (e.g., higher levels of unemployment, higher levels of inequality); d) that people living in the area (on average) now live longer, acquire more education, and are also more satisfied with their lives.

Key words: Yugoslavia, Breakup, Economic Development Indictors, Social Costs, Transition.
3.1 Introduction – A Brief Look into the Past

The collapse of the Berlin Wall, with the dissolution of the “Eastern Block” represents one of the most dramatic events of the second half of the 20th century. As such, it attracted tremendous attention, not only in academia but also among the general public. The same could be said for the collapse of Yugoslavia, a country that was often seen and described as a prime example of the “third way”\(^\text{24}\), as a country where different ethnic groups could not only live but also prosper socially and economically (for a brief description of some aspects of Yugoslav economic and social progress after the Second World War, see for e.g., Ananijevic-Pandey, 1994; Farmerie, 1972; Obradovic, 1967; Silpoch, 1975; Vanek, 1963; for a detailed description of how Yugoslav economic system evolved, see for e.g., Horvat, 1976). It was thus not surprising that the collapse of Yugoslavia spawned numerous, often conflicting theoretical debates about why the dissolution came about (for a short review of those views see for e.g., Klanjšek & Flere, 2011; for a detailed description of how Yugoslav economic system evolved, see for e.g., Horvat, 1976). One of the more frequent approaches stressed the importance of the erosion of Communist legitimacy (Veljak, 1997), which was often related to the increasing political paralysis (that could be seen as a result “of anti-statist ideology”; Jovic, 2001, 105; see also Allcock, 2000; Burg, 1983; Pavlowitch, 1999) and to the economic turbulence within Yugoslavia’s highly indebted, unevenly developed federal units (for a detailed description of how and why economic situation in Yugoslavia worsened, see for e.g., Jovic, 2009; Milanovic, 1991; Žižmond, 1992).

Regarding the problem of uneven development, it can be noted that this was something that the Party had tried to remedy since it came to power (Hashi, 1992). As indicated by Lang (1975), the Party declared regional inequality to be intolerable in a socialist country. Specifically, Boris Kidrič, who was the President of the Economic Council at that time, noted as early as 1948 that “the idea of an integrated socialist economy was incompatible with economic inequality among the republics”, and that “relatively advanced republics such as Slovenia had a “sacred obligation” to surrender part of their revenues to help develop the backward regions of the country” (cf. Lang, 1975, p. 314).

\(^{24}\) The beginning of Yugoslavia’s unique geopolitical and socioeconomic position could be traced back to the 1948 break with Stalin, that continued with the establishment of a “self-management system” as something that came close to the idea of “market socialism” (see footnote No. 4), and with the formation of “The Non-Aligned Movement” (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961 and which included a group of states that considered themselves not aligned formally with or against any major power bloc.
As noted by Hashi (1992), the issue of regional disparities was not at the head of the political agenda only because such disparities were incompatible with the egalitarianism that lies at the core of the Marxist idea, but also because “the party believed that the nationalities question would persist in Yugoslavia as long as these wide disparities persisted” (p. 5). This question was often identified as one of the principal enemies of the Yugoslav federation (Pavković, 1997; Štaubringer, 1980).

The emphasis on narrowing the development gap between the “poor South” and the “rich North” waned somewhat after the federal government had to shift focus by orienting its economy to the West (because of the Soviet-Yugoslav break), giving more emphasis to productivity and to the goal of maximum growth for the economy as a whole. Another factor that influenced the disparity debates (and policy orientations) was the process of decentralization, which strengthened after 1974 and which weakened Yugoslav nationalism (and unity) (for a detailed description of how Yugoslavia dealt with the issue of regional inequalities, see for e.g., Lang, 1975). According to Jovic (2009), this happened primarily because of Kardelj’s anti-statist (and anti-nationalist) ideology, which manifested itself in the 1974 constitution (which treated the republics as sovereign states)25. Nevertheless, the channeling of capital accumulation continued in some form until the break up. However, efforts to bridge the developmental gap were not successful. To the contrary, on average the disparities between regions widened. For example, while GNP per capita in Macedonia reached 71 percent of the average Yugoslav GNP per capita in 1952 (or around 39 percent of the average Slovenian GNP per capita), it stood

25 As indicated by the author, this fragmented Yugoslavia politically and economically and also prevented “fast and decisive responses to political and economic crises” (Jovic, 2009, p. 20). The role of Kardelj’s ideology (and the 1974 constitution) is also central to Jovic’s main argument: that the collapse of Yugoslavia cannot be properly understood “without including the perceptions of the political elite...without an analysis of its ideological beliefs and of the mechanisms by which these beliefs were transformed into political action” (Jovic, 2009, p. 3). Consequently, he suggested that an important part of Yugoslavia’s problems leading to its demise could be traced to the elites’ loss of ideological consensus, “which was based primarily (but not exclusively) on Kardelj’s interpretation of Marx” (ibid.), i.e., on the withering away of the state, as operationalized by a degrading of the competences of the federal state. According to the author, this led to a situation where the “ideological vision of objectives and shared interpretation of reality” (3) among elites became more and more blurred. A similar argument was also made by Crawford (1998). On the other hand, it is important to note that not all shared this view. For example, Bičanić (1988) argued that regional diversity and greater complexity in the system as a whole demanded more flexibility, which could be achieved through decentralization, i.e., that regions “instead of being agents of further disintegration” (p. 134) actually “enabled the system to continue” (ibid.).
at 67 percent in 1987 (or at 33 percent when compared to the Slovenian GNP per capita, which was the highest in the federation). The same pattern could be observed for other less developed republics. On the other hand, Slovenia’s lead increased between 1952 and 1987, when its GNP per capita was more than twice as high as the Yugoslav average (see Table 3-1).

Table 3-1: Differences in Economic Development of Yugoslav Republics, GNP per capita, in 1972 prices, 1952–1987 (Yugoslav Average = 100).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SLO</th>
<th>CRO</th>
<th>SER*</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>BH</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>201 (+20)</td>
<td>128 (+8)</td>
<td>89 (-4)</td>
<td>75 (-13)</td>
<td>68 (-28)</td>
<td>67 (-4)</td>
<td>27 (-20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: BH = Bosnia and Herzegovina, MN = Montenegro, M = Macedonia, SER = Serbia, CRO = Croatia, SLO = Slovenia. Data for Serbia includes Kosovo and Vojvodina. Numbers in parentheses indicated percentage change.

Žižmond (1992) noted that these economic disparities always threatened the stability of Yugoslavia, but became a real issue when the economic situation worsened and the interests of the economically most developed entities (Slovenia and Croatia) were not properly addressed by the common political and economic system. According to this author, the system suited, above all, the needs and interests of the less developed parts that dominated in terms of population. In addition, the aforementioned redistribution of income between regions, in the form of federal aid to less developed areas, was poorly supervised, which often led to inefficient use of investment resources (and even more reluctance to support such endeavors). The problem was deepened further by the prevalence of “particularism”, i.e., of “the pursuit of narrow local, or republic, policies at the expense of the welfare of the country as a whole” (Lang, 1975, p. 319). Thus, it was not surprising that many people living in more developed parts of Yugoslavia, such as Slovenia and Croatia, came to resent the subsidies and cross payments (Chandler, 2000) and increasingly felt that they (and the republics in which they lived and worked) could be better off economically if they separated from a political entity that seemed more and more paralyzed politically and economically. This sentiment is clearly reflected in the following statement:

“Claims for an independent Slovenia largely reflect concern to maintain a high degree of control over the use of the republic’s resources. Independence is seen as the only way to prevent a decrease in its GNP caused by the centralisation of macroregulation; this is vital for more rapid development and entry into the European market, even though secession would probably cause tremendous short-run economic difficulties.” (Žižmond, 1992, p.14)
Although such a view could undoubtedly be found among the general public in Slovenia and Croatia (and elsewhere), it is worthwhile mentioning that it was far from being widespread. For example, results from a nationally representative survey in 1986 indicated that only 2.9 percent of Slovenians and 2.5 of Croats disagreed completely with the statement that “The preservation and progress of all republics depends on the preservation and progress of Yugoslavia…” (for more detailed results and information about the study, see Klanjšek & Flere, 2011 or chapter 3 in this book). In other words, just on the brink of the collapse, the majority within every political entity that formed Yugoslavia still saw the potential for social and economic progress inside the federation. This supports the thesis that it was elite activism that brought about the downfall of Yugoslavia and to a large extent should not come as a surprise, since the economic indicators from the post-war Yugoslavia portray a rather impressive picture. For example, data for 1952–1967 indicate that the officially reported unemployment rates for Yugoslavia as a whole never exceeded 3 percent (Mesa-Lago, 1971). In addition, data for 1952–1989 indicate that Yugoslav economy grew (in real terms) at an annual pace of around 5 percent. Similar rates could be observed when analyzing average annual real GNP per capita growth rates (4.6 percent; see Figure 3-1).

To put these numbers into a broader perspective: pre-war data (1926–1939) indicate that the Yugoslav economy grew at an annual rate of 2.1 percent, which resulted (after allowing for a rather high rate of population growth) in a very low rate of increase in GNP per capita of only 0.6 percent (Stipetić, 1982). In addition, the region was considered to be one of the poorest, least developed areas in Europe at that time, burdened with high levels of illiteracy, infant and premature mortality, income inequality and poverty. As indicated by Ananijević-Pandey (1994), life expectancy at birth in post-Second-World-War Yugoslavia was among the lowest in Europe (men 54.8 and women 56.8 years).

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26 As indicated by Adamovich (1995), there were cases where each individual state and province considered itself exploited by the other seven.

27 This thesis is corroborated by various studies that go beyond “one-factor” theories or those involving “ethnic essentialism/primordialism”. For example, Sekulić and his colleagues (2006) recognized that elitist manipulation of the public was a fundamental contributor to the process “of the rise of intolerance” (Sekulić, et al., 2006, p. 822; see also Hodson et al. 1994; Goati, 1997); that “cultural and political entrepreneurs” (Sekulić, et al., 2006, 803) packaged an image of the enemy that coalesced with incidents of ethnic conflict. Similarly, Gagnon (2004) asserts that (the conservative) segment of the ruling elites used their power to “demobilize population” (p. 180), i.e., they used their power “to bring an end to political mobilizations that represented an immediate threat to the existing structures of power” (p. 181), by shifting “the focus away from the issues around which challenger (elites) were mobilizing their populace…” (p. 8; see also Gagnon, 2010).
By 1985, the situation had improved significantly. Life expectancy at birth increased to 68.3 years for men and to 73.6 years for women (ibid., p. 339), an average increase of 30 percent. Even more impressive were the results regarding premature mortality, measured by the crude rate of years of potential life lost. Data for the 1970–1990 period indicate that this number “fell from 12,762.6 to 6,320 per 100,000 population aged 0–64 (ibid.), a 50 percent decrease. Similar improvements can be found when analyzing education statistics. As indicated by Farmerie (1972), in the 1945–1970 period, illiteracy has been cut in half, “the quality and number of schools have substantially increased, vocational and technical education has greatly expanded, and pupil enrollment has tripled” (p. 148). In other words, positive developments after the Second World War (in the economic and social sense), which had put Yugoslavia “far ahead of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries” (Adamovich, 1995, p. 150), had obviously left a strong (i.e., positive) imprint on people’s perception of what Yugoslavia was and what it represented in regard to their well-being. As has been established before, this positive sentiment remained rather strong in almost all political entities of the federation, even after the majority of economic indicators turned negative in the eighties. Namely, during the 1980–1989 period, Yugoslavia faced stagnant economic growth, (hyper) inflation, liquidity problems and unsustainable levels of indebtedness, growing unemployment (Woodward, 1995; Žižmond, 1992), and rising poverty (Milanovic, 1991; Pošarac, 1991). For example, data for 1978–1989 indicate that poverty increased from 17.2 to 23.6 percent (Pošarac, 1991, p. 103) and
that the entire increase in real wages achieved during the 1970s was lost in the 1980s (real wages fell by about 30 percent between 1978–1987) (Milanovic, 1991, p. 191).

At this point one could speculate that the 70-year span of Yugoslav statehood had created a certain inertia and possibly that 45 years of Tito’s Yugoslavia had generated a sense of certainty among the general public that was, at least to a certain extent, hostile to risky, novel options in the matter of state boundaries and even national emancipation. The main achievement of Tito’s Yugoslavia was, as Hodson and colleagues (1994) and Sekulić and colleagues (2006) have found, a prevalent inter-ethnic tolerance (see also Gagnon, 2004, especially p. 31–51 and Oberschall, 2000). In other words, one should not simply speculate that support in favor of Yugoslavia came from its being a “paternalist state” (Allcock, 2000, 433), taking care of both employment and welfare, since the “paternalist state” was obviously in poor condition at the relevant time, unable either to extend employment or to provide vistas of a prosperous future. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s even this inertia and the hope that Yugoslavia would be able to evade the political and economic turmoil as a whole was not strong enough to save the federation. Yugoslavia began to disintegrate when confronted by the interlocked nature of an inefficient economic system with public (“social”) ownership and an elaborate system of “self-management”28 with an utopian political system, which was able to operate only as long as Tito, who embodied Yugoslav nationalism, commanded and arbitrated, with unquestioned legitimacy of his authority, among these different and conflicting interests.

28 Self-management, envisioned by Milovan Djilas, Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič, could be seen as a system that tried to be something in between centralized socialist planning and the market economy. It rested on the enterprise as its fundamental unit in which workers, had (at least formally) the right to deliberate and vote on basically all important issues, including business plans, wages, etc. (for more detail, see for e.g., Horvat, 1976; Kardelj, 1980). As indicated by Vetta (2009), the whole system, although “it did not derive from a grassroots initiative but was more a revolution from above”(p. 80), could be seen as a step toward participatory democracy. Nevertheless, the system proved dysfunctional, not only because the notion of autonomy was more or less illusory (the appointment of directors and decrees on production policies could be controlled by the Communist Party), but also because there was “a fundamental contradiction between the normative principles of self-governance and the absence of political pluralism and free market regulations” (Vetta, 2009, p. 80). As Vetta (2008, p. 81) explains, this stems from the fact that that property rights in socially owned organizations are ambiguous; that “selfish” workers always opted for higher wages rather than new investments; that the fragmented nature of the working class and the degree of decentralization of the associative labor system proved to be too bureaucratic. In addition, self-management was also seen as “a political obstacle to change in macroeconomic policy because it was the means to shift the locus of bargaining over wages and jobs to the level of the firm or lower” (Woodward, 1995, p. 329).
3.2 After the Break-up – New Hopes and New Realities Of The Transition

The process of disintegration, which according to Jović (2001, 2009) started as early as 1974, caused many concerns, not only inside Yugoslavia (see for e.g., Ramet, 2005, especially p. 108–129), but also outside. Such concerns came from western politicians, who in the past had generally expressed clear support for Yugoslavia’s unity, independence and territorial integrity (Zimmermann, 1995). As noted by Chandler (2000), this could be explained by the fact that “Yugoslavia’s brand of market-communism was an example to the rest of the Soviet Bloc to leave the constraints of the Soviet Union and open up to Western influence” (p. 23). However, this was not the sole reason. Support for a strong, unified Yugoslavia also rested on the assumption that a weaker Yugoslavia would necessarily lead to greater influence by the Soviet Bloc in Europe. Although such fears were largely annulled after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 (and even more so after the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989), a new one arose. This was the fear that the disintegration of Yugoslavia would destabilize the whole Balkan region. This was clearly expressed in an article based on an official statement of the American Administration and which appeared in The New York Times (Binder, 1991) on July 03, 1991 (i.e., after Slovenia and Croatia had declared independence):

“The American position, outlined repeatedly over the last week and again today, is that unilateral actions like the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence could ignite a civil war, and should not be rewarded.”

Unfortunately, it soon became clear that those concerns were not unfounded. The tragedy of the Balkan wars that ensued is well documented in the literature (see for e.g., Burg & Shoup, 1999; Glenny, 1996; Johnson, 2007; Silber & Little, 1997). Still, the prospect of the dissolution of Yugoslavia also brought hope that a new start and a better future were possible. These hopes were especially strong in regard to the prospects of economic development, since it was often argued (see for e.g., Žižmond, 1992) that it was the federation and federal government, with their lack of coherent economic policy and their conflicting interests, where politics trumped economics, that impeded economic recovery. Looking back, it seems that at least some of those hopes were fulfilled, although to a rather varying extent.

29 It should be mentioned, that there were, as some authors noted (for e.g., Woodward & Brookings Institution., 1995), speculations about how some countries (Austria, Italy) wanted to expand their influence to the “East” and how the dissolution of Yugoslavia would be beneficial to such efforts.
3.2.1 Economic Growth and Development

Although doubts regarding the question of whether economic growth/development, seen as a core process of modernization, actually means development or even progress in a broader (i.e. social) sense, could be traced all the way back to Rousseau’s *Discourse on Arts and Sciences*/*Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750/2004), economic growth is often seen as a major pillar of social development (Welzel, Inglehart, & Kligemann, 2003), and thus of belief in better future. With the falling of the Berlin Wall, symbolizing the collapse of “a tragically flawed experiment”, as Nolan and Lenski (1999, p. 365) call efforts to build a communist society, it was also clarified how to achieve this better future, i.e., which is the best way for modern societies to develop – by following in the footsteps of those who had already achieved Fukuyama’s “The End of History” (1992), i.e., by embracing a market economy, economic liberalism, and capitalist globalization. Or, as was eloquently expressed by Margaret Thatcher in the 80s, “There Is No Alternative” (Berlinski, 2008).

The idea that there are no reasonable alternatives to the market type of relationships, echoing Lazić’s assertion that “socialism was not an alternative model of modernization”30 (cf. Lazić & Mrkšić, 1995, p. 9), became something that was more or less internalized among the policy makers in all Post-Yugoslav republics (although they differed in speed and in regard to the extent that they adopted economic liberalism). As a result, all the former entities embarked on a path of economic transition (i.e., institutional transformation) that included the replacement of a version of the centrally planned economic system31 with a market economy32.

First on this path was Slovenia, which declared its independence on June 25, 1991. Slovenia enjoyed the status of the most economically developed entity

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30 According to the author, the system lacked intrinsic mechanisms allowing it to continually develop economically. In other words, economic stagnation in the 1980s was not a manifestation of crisis but rather “the externalization of the stagnant nature of socialism” (cf. Lazić & Mrkšić, 1995, p. 10).

31 As mentioned, the Yugoslav economic system of self-management differed importantly from the centrally planned economies of the Soviet Block. It represented a third way, something between centralized socialist planning and the market economy.

32 As indicated by Štulhofer (1998), this included the establishment of property rights (i.e., privatization), and new institutional and regulatory structures (for a more detailed description of the transition process see, for e.g., Rõna-Tas, 1994). In a broader sense, the transition process also includes an ideological and a wider social transformation, which usually occurs with a lag, a phenomenon that was has been identified and described by W. Ogburn (1923).
not only of the former Yugoslav federation, but also of the whole Eastern bloc (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2: Real Gross Domestic Product (per capita, PPP U$ 1989).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1989</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4,270</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5,064</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>7,420</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6,245</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4,770</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>5,095</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>10,000 (est.)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>6,270</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Note: Based on available data, which indicate that Slovenia GDP per capita was roughly twice the Yugoslav average (see Figure 3-3).

Slovenia was also able to continue its economic growth soon after the breakup (in comparison to other former Yugoslav republics and other socialist economies; see Table 3-3), partly because it was least affected by the Balkan wars (the military conflict between Slovene forces and the Yugoslav army at the start of Slovenia’s independence lasted only a few days), and partly because its economy was already relatively more open and strongly oriented and connected to the West. As indicated by Žižmond (1994), Slovenia thus entered the transition with some advantages when compared to other socialist economies. Besides being more open, it was also less indebted, while possessing a more skilled/educated labor force and more independent enterprises. Nevertheless, the Slovenian economy faced strong head winds in the early 90s, mainly due to the loss of markets in republics of the former Yugoslavia, economic sanctions imposed by United States and the European Community33, as well as delays in economic reforms and even to the stabilization policies, which were employed to cure the problem of inflation and external imbalance but which also hindered economic growth (Bojnec, 1996; Zizmond, 1994). Together, this

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33 Although these sanctions did not target Slovenia per se, but Yugoslavia as whole, they still had direct and indirect effect on Slovenian economy.
resulted in a GDP drop of 22 percent in the 1987–1992 period (Zizmond, 1994, p. 77), the worst year being 1991, when real GDP fell by 8.1 percent (Bojnec, 1996, p. 22). The situation began to improve in 1993, when Slovenia's real GDP rose by 1.3 percent (ibid.) (Table 3-3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-3: Real Gross Domestic Product (annual percent change).</th>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Macedonia (FYR)</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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Slovenia continued its economic recovery until the 2009 (average annual growth rate for the 1994–2009 period stood at 4.6 percent)\(^{34}\), a fact which, together with other reform efforts, enabled Slovenia to be the first of the former republics to be accepted into the European Union (May 2004) and first among all post-socialist countries to be accepted into the European Monetary Union (EMU; Slovenia joined the third stage of the EMU in 2007, when the national currency, the Slovenian Tolar, was replaced by the Euro). According to EUROSTAT, in 2008 Slovenian GDP *per capita* (using Purchasing Power Parity/Standard – PPP/PPS) reached around 91 percent of average EU27 GDP

per capita (this figure fell to 85 percent in 2010), exceeding even the “old” member state of Portugal, whose GDP per capita stood at 78 percent of the EU27 average. Not surprisingly, Slovenia was often seen as a success story and as a role model for other economies in the Central/Balkan region. This image waned somewhat after the financial crisis. Thus, in 2009 Slovenia recorded one of the greatest decreases in real GDP inside the EU27 area, a blow from which it still has not recovered. Although its real GDP grew somewhat in 2010 (1.3 percent; it remained virtually unchanged in 2011), the outlook for 2012 is less positive, mainly because the fiscal tightening adds to the risk of a return to recession (“Country Economic Forecast: Slovenia,” 2012).

Croatia, the second most prosperous bloc of the Yugoslav region (Croatia declared its independence on the same day as Slovenia – June 25th, 1991), experienced economic recovery a year later than Slovenia (1994), although its economy suffered greatly during the Croatian war of independence between 1991 and 1992. Vojnić (1993) estimated that Croatian post-war GDP (1992) was almost 40 percent lower than that of pre-war Croatia, and that half of this drop could be attributed to war damages. In addition, the first decade of Croatia’s transition was “very much under the impact and priorities of new state building, including strong presence of anti-liberal national ideologies” (Franičević & Bićanić, 2007, p. 639), which overshadowed economic issues, including mismanagement of the economy and mishandled privatization (Štulhofer, 1998). These issues resurfaced by the end of 1998, when Croatia faced another recession. Its real GDP fell by 1 percent\(^{35}\) (or by 1.6 percent in Purchasing Power Parity/ PPP terms\(^{36}\)) in 1999. As indicated by Stallaerts (2010, p. 103), recession happened largely because post-war growth was mainly generated by demand – driven reconstruction activity and easy consumption (financed by international lenders), and less by structural reforms, which would have ensured greater macroeconomic stability and thus sound foundations for growth.

Rising debt, poor economic performance, and problems with corruption led to a change in leadership. Franjo Tuđman’s\(^{37}\) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
lost the 2000 elections to Ivica Račan, whose new economic policy\textsuperscript{38} laid the foundations for Croatia’s continuous economic growth; the average annual growth rate for the 2000–2008 period stood at 4.3 percent. Although growth ended in 2009 with the onset of the global financial crisis, other institutional changes and reform efforts made mainly in the post 2000 period put Croatia on the path towards full EU membership which should materialize in July 2013.\textsuperscript{39}

Nevertheless, Croatia’s GDP \textit{per capita}, expressed in real and PPP terms, rose by “only” 22 percent in the 1990–2009 period (see Figure 3-2; by comparison, Slovenia’s GDP \textit{per capita} in the same period rose by around 50 percent). In addition, Croatia’s unemployment rate remained high even during the “golden era” of 2000–2008. Specifically, while the unemployment rate in 2001 stood at a high of 15.6 percent (EU-15: 7.3 %; Slovenia: 6.2 %), it dropped to only 13.4 percent in 2006 (EU-15: 7.8 %; Slovenia: 6.0 %). It is thus not surprising that the development gap between Croatia and the EU27 still looms large. Specifically, while various reform efforts did enable Croatia to close some of that gap (in 1995, Croatia’s GDP \textit{per capita} stood at 46 percent of the EU27, in 2008 it reached 64 percent), Croatia will still be one of the least economically developed countries of the EU. Specifically, according to EUROSTAT (2010 data), Croatia’s GDP \textit{per capita} bested Bulgaria’s (44 percent), Latvia’s (51 percent), Estonia’s (57 percent) and Romania’s (46 percent) GDP \textit{per capita}. As indicated by Lejour and colleagues (2009), some of Croatia’s main weaknesses include its relatively disappointing export performance of goods (23 percent of GDP; this share rises to 50 percent when services are included, since tourism is one of the most important sectors of the Croatian economy) and still rather low levels of institutional transparency (with the problem of corruption), but the authors believe that Croatia has much to gain once it becomes a full member of the EU. In addition, Croatia, despite its weaknesses was (and still is) much better off economically than other former Yugoslav republics. Looking at the post 1990s era, one can see that most of them experienced much more modest results (see Figure 3-2).

\textsuperscript{38} This included stabilization policies (fiscal tightening, lowering of interest rates) structural reforms, curbing corruption) and efforts to open Croatia’s economy towards the international community to attract more foreign capital. This was largely achieved by Croatia’s preparedness to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and by joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Central Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) (for more details, see Stallaerts, 2010, esp. p. 102–106).

\textsuperscript{39} Croatia applied for EU membership in February 2003 and was granted candidate status on June 2004 (Lejour, Mervar, & Verweij, 2009).
For example, while Macedonia’s GDP per capita, expressed in real and PPP terms, increased by only around 5 percent during the 1990–2009 period, Serbia’s GDP per capita in 2009 was actually still below 1990 levels by almost 15 percent (e.g., Slovenia reached pre-breakup levels of economic development in 1998; no comparable data for Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro is available). This should be seen as the direct result of a significant decline in GDP per capita, which fell more or less continuously between 1987 and 2000. The seriousness of a decline in living standards in Serbia was clearly illustrated by the February issue of The New York Times (Sudetic, 1992), which in 1992 reported that,

“An official in the Yugoslav federal Government estimated that the average worker’s income in Serbia has tumbled to about $100 a month from about $450 a month in early 1991. Official statistics show that Serbian industries produced about a third less in December 1991 than they did in December 1989, but many economists say the actual picture is even worse.”

The collapse of economic activity was accompanied by a rise in both open unemployment and underemployment, a drop in real wages, hyperinflation\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{40} The hyperinflation of 1992–1994 reached historic proportions, because of both its extreme peak and duration. As indicated by Petrović and colleagues (1999), inflation reached its
and the spread of poverty across the country. In the mid 1990s it was estimated that 50–70 percent of the population was below the poverty line (Mrkšič, 1995, p. 38). As indicated by Krstić and Sanfey (2011), the socio-economic conditions were further exacerbated by the influx of nearly 700,000 people who had been displaced by the war. However, Sørensen (2006) noted that Serbia’s problems in the 1990s should not be seen only in the light of state disintegration, war and the economic sanctions that Serbia faced, but also as a direct consequence of the fact that “the nomenclature transformed the state into an instrument for cleptocracy, through which a small percentage of the population grew very rich” (p. 321). Although the problem of the “grey”/“shadow” and “black” economy and corruption in general are issues often debated inside the field of “transitology” and reported in almost all transition countries of Eastern Europe (Anderson, Gray, World Bank., & Ebrary Inc., 2006), it seems that the problem was more pronounced in Serbia, where a specific type of corruption practices occurred:

“Large-scale systemic state capture, which is the root of widespread corruption, is acquiring such proportions in Serbia that it may undermine the success of its transition. This phenomenon of state capture has to be differentiated from the corrupt actions of giving and receiving bribery (“administrative corruption”) and connected with the institutional and legal weaknesses of the social system. Recent literature defines state capture as the “seizure” of laws to the advantage of corporate business via influential political links in the parliament and government. When the state is captured in this manner, the whole legal system becomes the opposite of what it should be, because it works to the advantage of illegal interests that are dressed up in a legal form.” (Pesić, 2007, p. 1)

The problem of the grey economy, which in the early 1990s represented almost 40 percent of FRY’s (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) registered GNP (Mrkšič, 1995), together with the problem of corruption has indeed seriously hampered Serbia’s recovery, as many authors have called Serbia’s transformation process in the 1990s a “blocked transition” (see for e.g., Bolcic, 2003; Lazić & Cvejić, peak in January 1994 when the monthly inflation rate reached 313 million percent, “thus becoming the second highest recorded rate of inflation after the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945–1946” (p. 336).

41 As defined by Sorensen (2006, p. 323), “A ‘grey economy’ would, for example, include all economic activities that evade the tax collector or the official statistics, while a ‘black economy’ typically involves the production and trading of illegal goods or services (the narcotics trade, trafficking, etc.). Sometimes “shadow economy” is used instead of “grey economy” (see for e.g., Nastav & Bojnec, 2007).

42 This term is often used when talking about the process of social change in Eastern Europe (see for e.g., Berdahl, Bunzl, & Lampland, 2000; Bönker, Müller, & Pickel, 2002; Dobry, 2000).

43 In late April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the two-republic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
20 years later: Problems and Prospects of countries of former Yugoslavia

Not surprisingly, Serbia entered the new century as an economically impoverished country, burdened by high levels of corruption, unemployment, and poverty (Lazić & Mrkšić, 1995). At a regional level, Serbia also lost its position as the third richest entity of Yugoslavia (after Slovenia and Croatia). Thus, while Serbia’s GNP per capita stood at just above 89 percent of the Yugoslav average in 1987, its GDP per capita (in PPP terms) reached only 77 percent in 200044, besting only the poorest entity of former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Montenegro, which at that time was still a part of a joint state of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)45, whose GDP per capita reached only 55 percent of the Post-Yugoslav average46.

The picture becomes even more dramatic when differences in the cost of living between entities are not taken into account. Then Serbia slips to last place among the former Yugoslav republics, as its GDP per capita (2000 prices, US$) reaches only around 28 percent of the Post-Yugoslav average. Or expressed differently – if the Slovenian level of economic development in 1987 was roughly twice as high as that of Serbia, the gap widened by almost six times in a time frame of only thirteen years (see Figure 3-3).

Although the economic situation in Serbia began to improve somewhat after Slobodan Milošević left office in October 2000 (see for e.g., Krstić & Sanfey, 2011, especially p.181), causing more optimism47, some authors argued that Serbia’s post-Milošević governments were still not doing enough in terms of passing adequate reforms to ensure “accountability, transparency, rule of law, public sector effectiveness and merit-based public office appointments” (Pesić,

44 Although there are important differences between the two concepts (GNP = total value of goods and services produced by all nationals of a country, whether within or outside the country; GDP = total value of products & services produced within the territorial boundary of a country), and they are thus not directly comparable, they are used together only to indicate the relative economic position of each political entity at a specific period of time.
45 The status of the union between Montenegro and Serbia (which replaced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2003) was decided by the referendum on Montenegrin independence on 21 May 2006.
46 This average was calculated by using the official data published by United Nations Economic Commission for Europe-Statistical Division Database (http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/; see notes under Figure 3-3 for more details about the data used).
47 Bolcic (2003), for example, stated that Serbian society “has entered the New Millennium as a considerably changed society, with many features similar to other post-socialist societies. Also, it seems sound to claim that such real social transformations, which were going contrary to the regime intentions to prevent transition, have made possible recent change of regime and the end of Milosevic’s rule in Serbia” (p. 1).
20 Years Later: (Socio)Economic Development after the Breakup of Yugoslavia (R. Klanišek)

2007, p. 3)\textsuperscript{48}. Pesić notes, that they often focused more on the revival of nationalist values for “resolving the Serbian national issue” (ibid.)\textsuperscript{49}. It could be argued that this has changed with the election of the more pro-EU oriented Boris Tadić in 2008, under whose leadership Serbia was granted the status of an EU candidate country.\textsuperscript{50}

Figure 3-3: Differences in Economic development of (Post)Yugoslav Entities (GNP/GDP per capita, fixed prices*), 1952–2009.

![Graph showing economic development of various entities over time.](image)

** Data for Serbia for 1952–1987 include Serbia proper, Kosovo and Vojvodina, for 2000–2009 no information was given.

\textsuperscript{48} The attempt of Z. Djindjic to do so ended tragically on March 2003, when he was gunned down by a member of the “Red Berets”, a military “Special Operations” unit, dissolved two weeks after the assassination (for more information see for e.g., Ramet, 2005, pp. 267–270).

\textsuperscript{49} Pesić is especially critical of Vojislav Koštunica’s rule (see also for e.g., Cigar, 2001), who often indicated that Serbia’s national issues were of greater importance than the economic ones.

\textsuperscript{50} The European Council agreed to grant Serbia the status of candidate country on 1 March 2012, following a recommendation by the General Affairs Council on 28 February. Serbia applied for EU membership in December 2009. The Commission delivered an opinion in October 2011.
The observed policy shifts, together with an improving economic situation (as discernible from Figure 3-3, Serbia was able to close some of the development gap in the 2000–2009 period), indeed offer more solid grounds for a more optimistic view of Serbia, although, as Lazić and Cvejić (2007) note, “the new normative and value forms took hold unevenly and disparately” (p. 58) owing to the “previous course of developments” (ibid.).

A gap between normative and value forms can also be found in Serbia’s “closest” neighbor, Montenegro. Nevertheless, as indicated by Figure 3-3, Montenegro, after losing some of its momentum in the post-crisis period of 2009–2010 (for more information about Montenegro’s economic outlook, see “Outlook for 2010-11,” 2010), recorded rather robust growth rates in the 2000–2008 period (see Figure 3.2), consequently besting Serbia and improving its relative position among the six former Yugoslav republics. Specifically, if in 1952 Montenegro ranked fifth (among the six republics) in terms of its economic development (GNP per capita), it ranked third in 2009 (GDP per capita), at least in PPP terms. This could be at least partly attributed to the fact that Montenegro was not directly involved in the bloody wars of 1990s, which in turn also caused Montenegro’s economy to be less seriously influenced by the clandestine side of the war (Andreas, 2004). This is supported by the corruption index, which puts Montenegro (66th place) considerably above Serbia (86th place; see Table 3-4).

Table 3-4: Perceived Levels of Public-Sector Corruption in Post Yugoslav countries, Rank/Score, 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank (out of 183)</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0–1: Highly Corrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


51 Montenegro is Serbia’s neighbor, not only in the geographic, but also in the political and cultural sense – both share the Eastern Orthodox religion; Montenegro was also in close political alliance with Serbia until 2006 when it declared independence.

52 This was especially true for 2005–2008, when Montenegro experienced stellar growth rates. According to the EUROSTAT data, Montenegro’s real GDP in the 2005–2008 period grew at an average annual rate of 10.2 percent.
Still, Montenegro does face problems of corruption ("Outlook for 2010–11," 2010) and the grey economy, where the latter should, as indicated by Milić (2004), be seen as a result of the “slow transition process that is reflected through uncomplimentary and outdated legal regulations in regard to the law and standards of EU” (p. 20). Based on the data in Table 3-4, it should not come as a surprise that the same issues arise in the two remaining republics of former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Starting with Bosnia and Herzegovina, one could argue that it endured heavy losses, not only during the war years that devastated the country after the breakup, but even before that. Namely, as indicated by Figure 3-3, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been lagging more and more economically even when it was still part of the federation. As indicated by Malcolm (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina had the lowest rate of economic growth among the six constituent republics in the 1952–1968 period. This trend continued until the breakup, as the Bosnian GNP per capita, while reaching almost 96 percent of the Yugoslav average in 1952, stood at only 68.4 percent in 1987. This picture, where Bosnia and Herzegovina stands last in terms of its economic development, has not changed to the present day. Its 2009 GDP per capita (in PPP terms) was the lowest among the six entities compared. It stood at around 60 percent of the Post-Yugoslav average (see Figure 3-3), and in 2005 it was still less than 50 percent of its pre-war level (Pugh, 2005).

As in the case of Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was heavily hit by the Balkan wars in the 1990s, although it could even be argued that it suffered the most. According to official legal estimates of the number of victims, published by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), over 100,000 people died in Bosnia, where around 68,000 came from the Muslim minority (they were followed by Serbs with around 23,000 victims, and then Bosnian Croats with around 9000) (Zwierzchowski & Tabeau, 2010).

Although much of the post-breakup economic loss can be directly attributed to the war (human losses, property destruction, etc.), as argued by Stiperski and Lončar (2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economy was also heavily hit by corruption and by the grey and black economy (see Table 3-4, but also for e.g., Bojnec, 1996; Divjak & Pugh, 2008; Festic & Rausche, 2004; Nastav & Bojnec, 2007; Pugh, 2005). As indicated by Andreas (2004), much of this

53 The picture changes somewhat if price differences are not taken into account. Then Bosnia and Herzegovina’s GDP per capita virtually equals that of Montenegro and Macedonia, and exceeds that of Serbia (see Figure 3-3).
has to do with the fact that the political economy of all wars has a clandestine side (and this side has a major criminalized component, when “at least one side does not have a regular army and is not a full-fledged state”) (ibid., p. 29). The criminal side of war and its agents (smugglers, arms traffickers, criminal combatants, etc.) always leaves a strong imprint on a post war economy: “Many of these actors emerge from the devastation of war as part of a new elite with close ties to political leaders and the security apparatus, often impeding reforms and complicating post-conflict reconstruction efforts” (ibid., p. 31). It could be argued, that since Bosnia and Herzegovina’s situation in terms of its political/regulatory system was very “fluid”\(^{54}\), this exacerbated the problem more than this was the case for Croatia and Serbia (see for e.g., Pugh, 2005, especially pp. 451–453). In other words, it seems that the cost of transition, in terms of corruption levels, was highest for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Serbia not far behind.

The other four republics, especially Slovenia, fared much better. This also goes for (FYRO – Former Yugoslav Republic Of) Macedonia, another former republic that was, at least to a certain extent\(^{55}\), spared the aftermath of the Balkan war of the 1990s. However, Macedonia was not able to escape the economic aftermath of the collapse. From 1990 onwards, it experienced massive, double digit declines in its real GDP (see Table 3-3). This trend reversed in 1996, after the Macedonian government, under the International Monetary Fund, adopted a set of policies that lowered the high inflation rates (1690 percent in 1992) and the budget deficit (from 13.8 percent of GDP in 1993 to 2.9 percent in 1994; see Kekic, 2001). This brought about macro-economic stability that enabled Macedonia to a the path of economic recovery.

As explained by Kekic (2001), Macedonia’s losses in the early 1990s could be attributed to both internal and external factors. While former should be mainly

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\(^{54}\) This “fluidity” was clearly indicated by Festić and Rausche (2004, p. 29): “Federation customs officers were guarding Bosnia’s western borders, while RS (Republika Srpska) officers were monitoring Bosnia’s eastern borders. The bifurcated border monitoring created opportunities for scams”. Namely, the Dayton Agreement established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a State comprising two Entities, each with a high degree of autonomy: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH), as well as the Brčko District (BD), which functions as a single administrative unit of self-government existing under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From a constitutional point of view, the current system bears the features of a very decentralized federal system, with each Entity having its own Constitution, President, Government, Parliament, judicial organization and penal law.

\(^{55}\) As indicated by Kekic (2001), the war over Kosovo in 1999 caused an influx of 250,000 ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo, which placed a severe strain on the country’s finances and affected Macedonia’s social and political stability.
understood in terms of inherited macro-economic instability (as something that burdened and influenced economic recovery in all former Yugoslav republics), the latter include 1992 UN sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro (Macedonia’s most important trade partners), and Greece’s 1994 trade blockade, which closed “what had been the country’s fourth largest export market in the 1980s and one that policy makers had hoped could substitute for the lost former Yugoslav markets” (Kekic, 2001, p. 189; see also Adamovich, 1995 esp. p. 157–158; Bartlett, Cipusheva, Nikolov, & Shukarov, 2010). In addition, the breakup of Yugoslavia also deprived Macedonia of the budgetary support that Macedonia, being one of the poorest republics of the Yugoslav federation, had received until the federation collapsed

As indicated, Macedonia’s economy began to grow after 1996, but war over Kosovo in 1999 and conflict between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA, a militant group comprised of ethnic Albanians) and the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia at the beginning of January 2001 endangered economic recovery. While the former had somewhat limited impact, the latter, according to the EUROSTAT data, contributed to a 4.5 percent drop in real GDP. After 2001 real GDP grew again (until 2009) at an average annual rate of 4.1 percent (see Table 3-5).

| Table 3-5: Real Gross Domestic Product (annual percentage change), Post-Yugoslav republics, 2000–2011. |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                  | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | AAGR* |
| Slovenia         | 4.3  | 2.9  | 3.8  | 2.9  | 4.4  | 4.0  | 5.8  | 6.9  | 3.6  | -8   | 1.4  | -0.2 | 2.65  |
| Croatia          | 3.8  | 3.7  | 4.9  | 5.4  | 4.1  | 4.3  | 4.9  | 5.1  | 2.2  | -6   | -1.2 | 0.6  | 2.65  |
| Serbia           | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --   | --    |
| Montenegro       | --   | 1.1  | 1.9  | 2.4  | 4.4  | 14.7 | 8.6  | 10.6 | 6.9  | -5.7 | 2.5  | 2.7  | --    |
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | --|
| Macedonia (FYR) | 4.5  | -4.5 | 0.9  | 2.8  | 4.6  | 4.4  | 5   | 6.1  | 5   | -0.9 | 1.8  | 3   | 2.73  |

Note: AAGR = Average Annual Growth Rate, 2000–2011.

56 In spite of these redistributive policies, Macedonia, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, continued to fall behind (in relation to the Yugoslav average income) until the federation’s collapse, when Macedonia’s GNP was at around 67 percent of the Yugoslav average (see Figure 3-3), besting only Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As is the case for other entities, Macedonia experienced a slowdown in economic activity after 2008, although comparatively, the toll was somewhat lower, especially when Slovenia is taken into consideration (as indicated in the Table 3-5, Slovenia recorded an 8 percent drop in its GDP in 2009, the fifth greatest in the EU27 area). The South East Europe Monitor is also optimistic about Macedonia’s future – it is predicting an average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent over the period 2012–2016 (BMI, 2011).

In sum, results of this general overview indicated that the economic costs of the disintegration, setting aside the costs caused by war(s), were substantial, the greatest being the cost of market disintegration. Thus, the disintegration of Yugoslavia caused internal markets to become foreign markets, consequently weakening trade connections between countries in the former Yugoslavia. This, along with the sanctions imposed by the international community, seriously hampered the potential for a quick economic recovery in each of the now newly independent states (of course, this was more true of war-stricken entities). As indicated by Bičanić (1988, pp. 122–123), a significant part of purchases and deliveries was made at an inter-regional level (i.e., between republics). Although trade connections in the area have strengthened recently, they are still below the levels of the “Yugoslav period” (Stiperski & Lončar, 2008).

Another indirect indication of the economic costs of disintegration can be found when comparing the relative levels of economic development, first of Yugoslavia as whole and then of an area that includes the economies of all six constituent republics (see Table 3-6).


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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria = 100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Post-Yugoslav republics</td>
<td>56.40</td>
<td>44.10</td>
<td>31.27</td>
<td>31.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA = 100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Post-Yugoslav republics</td>
<td>46.80</td>
<td>38.10</td>
<td>25.76</td>
<td>26.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While deliveries in 1980 represented between 24 (Croatia) and 33 percent of GDP (Montenegro), purchases from other republics ranged from 22 (Croatia) to 36 (Macedonia) percent of GDP (Bičanić, 1988, p. 123).
The data indicates that although Yugoslavia was getting weaker and weaker relatively, the area today is still considerably below the levels of the 1980s (speaking relatively). Of course, the latter should not be automatically and directly attributed to the process of disintegration itself. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the economic situation in the area would not be any different had Yugoslavia not collapsed. However, the fact remains that the collapse of the federation did cause the collapse of internal markets, which in turn did contribute to the initial drop in economic activity across the area (Adamovich, 1995; Zizmond, 1994).

Another conclusion that can be drawn when looking at economic indicators is that, although all units were eventually able to advance economically, their individual paths differed considerably. While Slovenia and Croatia have strengthened their economic position in the region, others have generally fallen behind (this being especially true for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for Serbia). As indicated by Stiperski & Lončar (2008, p. 27), Slovenia and Croatia, taken together, produced 43 percent of the area’s GNI in 1987 and 63 percent in 2005. Or to put it differently, it seems that economic disparities between the “north” and “south”, which always existed, only strengthened after the dissolution:

“… in the area of former Yugoslavia totally different economic worlds exist, with different orientations and concerns. The same economic models cannot be applied in all parts of the former Yugoslav region.” (Stiperski & Lončar, 2008, p. 27).

This happened not only because of different starting points, but also because of what happened after the collapse, especially in terms of political stability. Taken together, these had a profound effect not only on the economy of each individual unit, but also on other dimensions of social life in the region.

### 3.2.2 Unemployment, Inequality and Human Development

“Instead of reveling in the collapse of communism, we could head off economic and social havoc by admitting that for most of us, capitalism doesn’t work, either…. Homeless, jobless, illiterate people, besieged by guns and drugs, are as bereft of a democratic lifestyle as anybody behind the old Berlin Wall… If we look within ourselves, we will see that a capitalistic order that is dependent upon cheap labor and an underclass to exploit is too dangerous a concept to continue.”


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58 This is only true if price differences among entities are taken into account. If they are not, the economic strength of all four other entities (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) is relatively lower than it was before the dissolution.
Although the citation alludes to a broader region of Central/Eastern Europe, it still captures a sentiment that continues to be present among the many that live in the area of former Yugoslavia. The sentiment that life under the “new system” had not become better but worse, that the former system, although not satisfying “the maximalist goals of a nationalist from any one national and/or ethnic group, nonetheless provided a framework for “live and let live”… (Adamovich, 1995, p. 150), could even be found among a rather substantial part of young people who had not even experienced life under the old regime. Specifically, results based on a survey, carried out in 2009 on a sample of social science undergraduate students coming from all former Yugoslav countries (Flere & Kirbiš, 2011), indicated that almost one out of five thought that the transition from Communism/Socialism to a democratic and capitalist society represented something bad or very bad for her/his family. Even more striking is the fact that more than 35 percent thought the change of system had brought “nothing in particular”. Further evidence of such sentiments can be found in Macedonia, where around 50 percent of people felt that their living standard in 2006 was lower than in 1989, and around 80 percent felt that the economic situation of 2006 is worse than that of 1989 (Bartlett, et al., 2010). According to the same authors, even worse results could be found in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ibid.). Interestingly, results from Ule and Miheljak’s (1995) study, conducted soon after the dissolution, even indicated that the new (democratic) Slovenian government was less favorably assessed by respondents than Tito’s partisan movement of World War II, “one of the main symbols of socialist Yugoslavia” (Flere & Kirbiš, 2011, p. 333). In other words, substantial empirical evidence exists that there are still many who favor the “old system” that provided a “security blanket” for people, who are now “miserable”, without the “safety net” and the “guarantees” provided by the “ paternalist state”.

In a way, this should not come as a surprise. As previously indicated, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the institutional transformation that followed contributed, at least initially, to a significant drop in living standards across the region. Namely, although economic problems started long before the dissolution happened, the process of disintegration exacerbated them, mainly because the collapse of the federation meant the collapse of the joint market. The political instabilities, Balkan wars, and international sanctions only added to the problem, consequently making the past much more attractive.

The question, to what extent people who are prone to “historical amnesia” are idealizing the “old system”, thus forgetting the problems that it faced, is hard to answer, but there is no doubt that there are certain objective markers justifying dissatisfaction with the new realities of “freedom and choice”. Leaving aside the horrors of war, all entities experienced a sharp decline in economic
activity during much of the 1990s, which directly translated into a sharp rise in unemployment. For example, the number of unemployed in the economically most developed part of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, almost quadrupled in the 1988–1995 period (it went from around 2 percent to around 8 percent).

The unemployment rate in Slovenia subsequently decreased (according to EUROSTAT, it hovered between 6 and 7 percent during the 1996–2006 period), reaching historic lows in 2008 (4.4 percent). Nevertheless, in comparing the best “independent Slovenia” year and the worst “Slovenia in Yugoslavia” year in terms of unemployment rate, results still favor the latter (4.4 percent vs. 2.9 percent; see Table 3-7).

Table 3-7: Unemployment Rates (share of unemployed in the total labor force), (Post)Yugoslav republics, 1953–2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (incl. Kosovo and Vojvodina)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FYR)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>15.9**</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers show the share (in percentages) of unemployed (i.e., person seeking a job) in the total labor force (active population), thus mirroring the ILO methodology. Although certain discrepancies exist in relation to who is captured under the term “unemployed”, we still believe that the comparison is justifiable.

** Estimated unemployment rate for “Yugoslavia 2008” was calculated using national Labour Force Survey data for 2008 (first, the sum of unemployed from each entity was calculated, then this sum was divided with the sum of all active persons living in the six Post-Yugoslav entities, multiplied by 100).


59 For the 1953–1989 period, the term “unemployed” captured all persons seeking jobs through the Employment Service. For the 2000–2011 period, the term included all persons of 15 years and above who did not work at all during the reference week, were actively looking for work during the four weeks previous to the interview, were available to start work within the two weeks following the survey week, and were not actively looking for work because they had found a job to start in the future. In our opinion, both methodologies underreport the problem: the former because there were unemployed people who were not seeking jobs through the Employment Service; the latter because it does not count someone as unemployed if that person has been working for, say, six hours in a whole week.
A similar conclusion could be drawn when observing other entities, with one exception – Serbia, which in 2008 had a lower unemployment rate than in 1989. The picture is even more telling if we compare “bad years” with “bad years”, i.e., 1989 and 2011. Acknowledging the fact that unemployment represents one of the most difficult economic and social problems, since it has a direct effect on other social problems such as poverty, crime, and low life satisfaction, it becomes more evident why some still express a form of yearning towards the “old system”.

The idea that many did not benefit from the new opportunities presented by democratization, marketization, and the opening up of markets, or at least not proportionally, is further corroborated by the fact that the transformation process was accompanied by a process of income polarization and thinning of the middle class (see Table 3-8).

### Table 3-8: Income distribution, Yugoslavia, EU and Post-Yugoslav entities, 1964–2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Income share held by the middle 40 %</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>30.7(^{1998})</td>
<td>29.8(^{2004})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>31.6(^{1998})</td>
<td>30.7(^{2004})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (incl. Kosovo and Vojvodina)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>28.9(^{2004})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>30.1(^{2005})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>31.1(^{2001})</td>
<td>27.6(^{2004})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FYR)</td>
<td>31.8(^{1998})</td>
<td>26.4(^{2004})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>19.0(^{2000})</td>
<td>18.6(^{2005})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Average income share held by the middle 40 percent. Numbers in superscript denote the year that the data for the particular entity was available. Sources: Flakierski (1989), World Bank Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator), and EUROSTAT(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database), accessed on March, 25, 2012.

Specifically, these data indicate that a process of income polarization was almost uniformly present in almost all entities and that the distribution of income towards the upper income strata increased in all entities when compared to the distribution of income in former Yugoslavia. This should not come as a surprise, since most transition countries experienced a sharp rise in labour earnings (World Bank., 2000) that in turn had the greatest impact on total income inequality (Milanovic, 1999).
These findings spawned various debates about the disappearance of the once powerful middle class and its effect on the social fabric. For example, Adamovitch (1995, p. 165), citing the findings of a Croatian (J. Županov) and a Serbian sociologist (B. Jakšić) asserts that,

"The new social pyramid for the former Yugoslavia is no longer a pyramid...it has an extremely large base composed of the 90 to 95 percent of the population who are now confronting basic problems of subsistence and their very existence. The top five to 10 percent of the population is composed of war profiteers, managers, new owners of the privatized state enterprises and some politocrats."

Since a substantial number of empirical studies indicated a negative relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction (for a short review of those studies and competing views see for. e.g., Verme, 2011), one could expect that the average levels of life satisfaction would also fall and that the levels would generally be lower in countries with higher Gini coefficients. Since comparable longitudinal data for Post-Yugoslav entities is extremely sparse, these two hypotheses are difficult to test. Nevertheless, the findings shown in Figure 3-4 do indicate that on average the satisfaction with one’s life, while still lagging behind the average EU15 level, is on the rise in all entities for which the longitudinal data exist.

**Figure 3-4: Satisfaction with life: 1 = Dissatisfied, 10 = Satisfied, Post-Yugoslav Entities.**

Source: WVS/EVS Aggregate file (WVS, 2009), SJM 81/82. (Malnar, 1982; Toš, 1981).
It thus seems that higher levels of political stability and living standards have offset the negative impact that rising inequality has on life satisfaction. The rise in life satisfaction could also be attributed to the fact that all ex-Yugoslav republics experienced positive development in terms of human development as measured by the Human Development Index. Namely, according to the data, people living in the area not only have higher incomes but also live longer, and are becoming more educated, see Figure 3-5).

**Figure 3-5: Human Development Index, by Post-Yugoslav entity.**


But again, marked differences exist between countries. This is especially true when Slovenia is compared to other entities. Even Croatia is severely lagging behind Slovenia, which in 2011 ranked 21 among 187 countries (Croatia ranked 46). In other words, Slovenia trailed Austria (19th place), while equaling France (20th place), and besting countries such as Finland (22nd place), Italy (23rd place), and Spain (24th place).

In sum, it seems that the divide between the “north” and the “south” has strengthened even in term of indicators that go beyond the economic sphere.
Nevertheless, data does indicate that the last two decades did bring some positive developments in the region as a whole. Beside relative political stability, there are empirical signs that people in the area do live longer, that they are acquiring more education, and that their incomes are continuing to rise. In addition, it also seems that they are becoming more satisfied with their lives.

### 3.3 Conclusion

The sudden breakup of Yugoslavia caught many by surprise. It meant not only the disintegration of a political federation but also the collapse of its economic system. Reorientation to the west, structural reforms, democratization of the political sphere and the establishment of a market economy were seen as a recipe that would eventually bring the former Yugoslav republics closer to the standard of living experienced by the West. Many believed that prosperity was just around the corner. However, the collapse of a well-integrated joint market, wars, international sanctions, and inherited structural imbalances made it difficult to move successfully from the “old” to the “new” system of market economy.

The main aim of the current work was to offer a brief glance at how today’s independent states made the aforementioned shift in relation to their socio-economic development. This was done by analyzing some of the most common indicators of economic development and some that go beyond the sphere of economics. The focus was on not only the transitional period but also on the long-term dynamic of Yugoslav economic development. However, it should be noted that there was no intention to comprehensively describe the process of change in either the Yugoslav economic system or in the different economic systems of the individual countries that used to form Yugoslavia, simply because this would make the current work much bigger and would thus go beyond the scope and aim of the work as a whole. Another issue that needs to be mentioned is related to the data. Namely, although the subject of the collapse of Yugoslavia is widely documented and much data on various subtopics exists, the comparison proved much more challenging than initially thought, the main reason being the incomparability of much of the data available. Nevertheless, based on what was gathered, some general conclusions can be reached.

First, results indicated that the economic costs of the disintegration, setting aside the costs caused by war(s), were substantial, the greatest being the cost of market disintegration. Namely, the disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in internal markets becoming foreign market, thus weakening trade connections.
between the countries in the former Yugoslavia. Together with the sanctions imposed by the international community, this seriously hampered the possibility of a quick economic recovery in each of the now newly independent states (this was even more true for war-stricken entities). The latter is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the area as a whole is still below the level of relative economic strength of the former Yugoslavia (at least when compared with two, highly developed western countries, Austria and the USA).

Next, although all units were eventually able to advance economically, their individual paths differed considerably. While Slovenia and Croatia have strengthened their economic position in the region, others have generally fallen behind (this being especially true for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for Serbia). This happened not only because of different starting points, but also because of what happened after the collapse, especially in terms of political stability. Taken together, they had a profound effect not only on the economy of each respective unit, but also on other dimensions of social life in the region. In other words, some localities have benefited from the new opportunities much more than others. Specifically, Slovenia and Croatia, maintained their “first” and “second” rankings in terms of their economic development, and they were able to extend their lead to some degree, although not by much if prices differences are counted.

Third, if the process of transformation/transition, including the tragic events of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, brought considerable changes in terms of economic performance and outlook in the various entities, the same could be said for the people living in what is now six sovereign states (not counting Kosovo). Namely, the process of establishing a market economy has universally caused a greater internal economic divide, making many dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. Specifically, by analyzing unemployment statistics and income distribution, we can safely assume that many have been left behind, and that many who were enjoying a rather high living standard under the “old system” are struggling today, being either unemployed, retired or employed at a subsistence wage. The “new system” clearly lacks the security of the “old system”, while at the same demanding new skills, greater flexibility, etc. from those who were never prepared for the “new rules of the game”. It is thus not surprising that a strong sentiment of yearning for the old system and Yugoslavia as whole can be found among a significant part of the population, more so among those who lack appropriate skills to take advantage of new opportuni-

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60 This is true only if price differences among entities are taken into account. If they are not, the economic strength of the four other entities (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) is relatively lower than it was before the dissolution.
ties. Generally speaking, the positive developments after the Second World War (in an economic and social sense) that put Yugoslavia “far ahead of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries” (Adamovich, 1995, p. 150) left a strong (i.e., positive) imprint on people’s perception of what Yugoslavia was and what it represented in regard to their well-being, especially after experiencing the economic and political turmoil of the transition period.

Fourth, and last, although it seems that the divide between the “north” and the “south” has strengthened, that there are two distinct worlds where there is little chance that this divide will diminish in the future, the data does show that the last two decades did bring some positive developments in the region. Besides relative political stability, there are empirical signs that people living in the area (on average) do live longer, they are acquiring more education, and that their incomes are continuing to rise. In addition, it also seems that they are feeling more satisfied with their lives. Nevertheless, as indicated, new challenges/problems have arisen, related to greater economic and social insecurity/inequality. The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 has only exacerbated these. Undoubtedly, one chance to alleviate them lies in efforts to reintegrate the area and foster the benefits that once already helped the people to live better lives.

### 3.4 References


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Recent Changes in the Post-Yugoslav Family

(S. Flere)

Abstract
Family structure types in the former Yugoslavia historically differed substantially as to size, pattern and family relations. In this paper, after a historical overview, the trends in basic dimensions of family life in post-Yugoslav entities are studied. The further development of a modern family structure is noted, particularly in those parts of the former Yugoslavia, where an extended family was present until the very dissolution of Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The presence of the extended family may presently be practically excluded, with partial exceptions of diminished extended families. The diminution of family size and the parity of spouses – after transitory retraditionalization and during post-communist transition – are basic trends in all environments, although changes are most noted in the former economically least developed parts. The impact of various factors in explaining the diminution of the number of children is studied, pointing in various directions, within post-Yugoslav states.

Policy recommendations: The diminution of the number of children has, in all environments, except for Kosovo, reached a point where having children needs to be stimulated by social policy in order to renew replacement level. Results indicate that this is a particular problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the number of children in the 30–50 age group was in 2008 the lowest among the environments observed. The findings support the view that raising income is a major stimulus for child bearing.

Key words: Family, household, extended family, nuclear family, ‘zadruga’.
4.1 Historical Introduction

In order to commence an insight into family structure change during the last two decades in post-Yugoslav lands, a longer historical view backward is needed. Namely, as what existed some two decades ago in Yugoslavia varied very much and a few instances of family organisation went back, almost to time immemorial, whereas other instances indicated a modernized pattern typical of Western Europe. Thus, family organisation could be considered a divisive factor in Yugoslavia before its dissolution.

The ‘Yugoslav family’ had been the topic of extensive scholarly attention in early history of the social sciences in the region, in fact before the establishment of the first Yugoslav state. This attention was brought about initially by domestic scholars (Vuk Karadžić, 1818; Valtazar Bogišić, 1874), as well as by the French scholar Le Play (1857). The former two spoke of the ‘zadruga’ among South Slavs, whereas Le Play wrote only of working class families in Slovenia and classified his Slovenian monograph example as ‘disorganized’. Whereas the former two were focused on traditional rural family, Le Play was interested in industrial society, all three working around the middle of the 19th century.

Possibly, Karadžić’s influence was of greatest importance, because he introduced the term ‘zadruga’ into his benchmark language dictionary, launched it into scholarly use and popularity. The attention paid to the study of the zadruga was great and major scholars of the family invested their efforts in its depiction and explanation (for an extensive analysis of scholarship see Hammel (1972), for the best empirical investigation see Erlich, 1966). Hammel and Erlich agree on the substance of the zadruga, as do most scholars. Hammel writes: ‘familial zadruga is basically a product of patrilocal extension and virifocality’ (1972, 338). This would mean that a community of male ancestors of a male progenitor remain within a single familial household, bringing their brides into the households, while marrying their daughters into other families. Males would never leave the familial household. It is also often held that this family had joint and inalienable real estate (Hammel, 1972).

The origins of the zadruga remain unclear. They have been associated with South Slav/Balkan way of life in general, giving the institution uniqueness. It would be kin to the Russian myr, also an extended family. Others associate it with feudalism and resistance to feudal taxation, to Ottoman rule, to Austrian rule and the organization of the military frontier against the Turks. It is evident that in the 20th century this organization gradually withered away, although Hammel asserts in 1975 that the alleged modern decline is described ‘seriously defective/ly/ and superficial/ly/’ (1972, 339), allowing for its exist-
ence at the time. However, Hammel’s stress is, however, on the zadruga never having been a reified immutable institution, since its consequences would have brought soon about ‘a Patriarch (with a family) of Biblical proportions’ (1972, 339). Namely, the analyses of Ottoman and other censuses do not give clear confirmation of the zadrugas existing in an ideal typical form, which cannot be explainable only by high mortality and accidental situations. The zadruga is, according to Hammel, a cyclical phenomenon, bringing about splits among brothers. Hammel (1972, 339) and particularly Todorova cast serious doubt as to the Balkan zadruga in recent centuries ever been a dominant family form among any of the Slav Balkan peoples (1993). Todorova believes the zadruga was essentially the vision by traditionalists of ‘a local and unique institution that would save the peculiarity and uniqueness of the peoples vis a vis the disruptive modernizing influences of the West, by promoting virtues such as solidarity and mutual aid.’ (1993, 163), although she is short of denial of its existence at all.

In fact, the famous M. Mead wrote zadruga was ‘a vision of scholars hypnotized by by the use of a Balkan term for a Balkan institution’. (1976, xx).

Empirical investigations of the Serbian past (village Orašac in 1863), however, disclose of 13 % true zadrugas (frereches), 31 % nuclear families, the rest being other forms of extended families Halpern and Kerewski Halpern, 1972).

Socially and culturally, it was a pre-eminently patriarchal institution. Males monopolized authority and of esteem. It is even mentioned that the Balkans were the most extreme form of patriarchal societal organization. Backer goes as far as denoting the Albanian Kosovo segment of this type as ‘the most patriarchal in the world’. (2003, 46). The patriarchy has to do not only with decision making and authority, but strict codes on proper behaviour, on division of labour, spatial organization of the house, practically depriving women of any rights (including property and succession), but women do have their own, separate sociability within the extended family.

Was the zadruga equally dispersed throughout the former Yugoslavia? The answer to this question is negative. Although it was Serbian scholars who did the most to promote the idea of the zadruga, Croats following (Nimac et al., 1960), it is evident that the extended family system was most developed, institutionalized and longest lasting in Kosovo among Albanians (by the name of fis). Backer notes that 50 odd members of such an extended family were common in rural Kosovo during the 70s of the 20th century (2003). Somewhat later, the investigation by Rrapi in the 80s indicated the same, noting that extensive families with more than 40 members were ‘rare’ (1995, 32). Beside that, in relatively recent times, there have been reports of a 60 member zadruga
among Serbs in Bosnia in the 60s (Burić, 1976) and in Macedonia in a more systematic report of a significant proportion of households being of this type in the 70s, of 18–25 members, although their size was diminishing relative to the pre- World War II state, when they often numbered into 40s (Burić, 1976, 127). On the other hand, there are practically no traces of the zadruga in Slovenia (this is stated explicitly by Mosely in the volume on the Zadruga, 1976). Slovenia’s traditional rural family type was the conjugal nuclear family within the German type feudal system, with the feudal lord allowing a farmstead to gain a new head by matrimony, after the position became empty (owing to death or inability of the former head, usually father), with the possible care provided for the new head’s parent(s) as preužitkarstvo (an unfavourable situation, Vilfan, 1996). This brought about a much later entry into matrimony (Laslett, 1972), a large number of children born out of wedlock (Hudales, 1997). After the emancipation of serfs in the second half of the 19th century, the authority to allow matrimony and thus headship of the farmstead was transferred to the father, owner of the property (Černič-Istenič, 1996, 367). This did not change the basic pattern of late marriage, significant number of solitaires and significant portion of illegitimate children – as a live father would be unlikely to enter into the unfavourable position of preužitek.

Although there are reports of zadrugas throughout Croatia, and even of a draft legal code on them, empirical reports on the zadruga in Croatia indicate its small strength in regulating social relations, in comparison to the other regions (Nimac et al., 1960). In Serbia also, the zadruga was difficult to find in full pattern and to define empirically, although efforts to its assertion sprung particularly from this environment (Todorova, 1993).

Thus, the most preserved instance of the extended Balkan family, present to the latest, is the Kosovo Albanian extended family. Erlich, writing as the then undisputed dean of Yugoslav anthropology, conceded so in a sort of self-critical tone (in comparison to her life opus). The zadruga prospered and asserted itself in its classical form (at the time of the last writing, approximately 1970) among Kosovo Albanians only (Erlich, 1972).

In Montenegro, zadrugas also existed, although they were integrated into another social system: the tribe, making the cultural scene somewhat different. Beside Kosovo Albanians, it was the Serbs of Bosnia and Macedonians who cultivated this family pattern to the most (Mosely, 1972). Zadrugas were less pronounced among Bosnian Muslims, although they did exist, including such composed of brothers with plural wives (Mosely, 1972, 67).

The entire discourse on the zadruga has been overcast by romanticism and ideology, as pointed out by Hammel (alleged onherent ‘peaceful cooperation’), and
by Burić (alleged ‘democratic spirit’ and ‘equalitarianism’ criticized by Burić as unrealistic, 1976). The zadruga debate was extended into a discussion on types with more features of the family and less geographic exclusiveness. The East European type would be more prevalent as one travelled east, although never exclusive. (Szoltysek, 2011).

This model needs to be set into a wider context. Let us note some of the features of the Eastern/Central Eastern historical family types as summarized by Laslett (1972): very high proportion of multigenerational households, very high proportion of complex-multi family households, very high proportion of frereches (households of brothers with their nuclear families), married servants irrelevant, absence of foster children and of illegitimate children. Kinship structure is patrilinear. Landed property of females did not exist traditionally. The penetration of Christian doctrine of the primacy of the conjugal bond (in comparison to patrilinearity) was joint to both, but according to Laslett and Mitterauer the influence of the Eastern Church on everyday life was weaker, allowing for patrilinear organization (http://dmo.econ.msu.ru/Data/mitterauer.html).

Modernization began to change and uproot all these traditional norms and patterns. This began in the end of the 18th century, but it gained momentum with monetary economy, doing away with serfdom and the ensuing fragmentation of lots and farmstead, due to loans and defaults by farmsteads, i.e. its heads, to industrialization, general elementary schooling in the 19th century. It would pursue that this process was slower to the European East (Erlich, 1966, Gruber, 1996).

Further, modernization in this aspect received particular impetus by Communist rule. Communists brought the idea of equality and dignity of women with men if not into reality, at least made part of the official culture, making a sharp turnabout. Although elections under them cannot be considered democratic, women were given the same status as men and numerous women took political positions in almost all regions within the Communist system. Schooling of girls became widespread, as did schooling to the highest levels (Kosovo significantly lagged behind). In 1987 women overtook men in the proportion among higher education students, without reversal of the trend.

After World War II, divorce was institutionalized in Yugoslavia (previously it existed primarily in parts with Hungarian law before World War I, with slim possibilities within the Orthodox Church and none in Catholic jurisdictions). Institutionalized, relatively attainable judicial divorce was, along with employment of women, were major pillars of women’s emancipation and democratization of the family.
These changes and other superimposed changes and trends in conjugal and family relations, one may expect, were appropriated in the environments of the former Yugoslavia, diminishing the strength of the zadruga. Thus, one may expect conjugal and family relations and structure to be most modernized (or most ‘post-modern’) in Slovenia, and least so in Kosovo. Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina could also be considered strongholds of extended patriarchal family organization, although not as much as Kosovo.

The literature on recent (post-1991) changes in the family mostly stress the dislocation, the distress, even regression in family relations in the 90s in particular environments (Jogan, 2001; Milić, 2010; Ćopić, 2004; Galić et al., 2009). However, other authors from the least developed environments note a certain progress in the meaning of depatriarchialization (Sulejmani, 2006; Ahmetaj, 2007). Majstorović writes of the present, transition period everyday life of women in Bosnia, indicating difficulties in attaining parity on the part of women, but also that ‘divisions between private and public sphere’ being ‘possible bridges’ to emancipation (2011, 295). Namely, she ponders on the attainments in one sphere (public, employment) being later transferred into the other (private). Nikodim found in Croatia a definite change in attitudes in the direction of detraditionalization (2007). Puljiz for Croatia (2001) and Ahmetaj for Macedonia (2007) speak of long term diminution of the family size. It is evident that war and transition caused certain temporary changes, which obfuscate long term trends. Rener et al. note individualization and pluralization of family patterns in Slovenia (2006).

The phenomena mentioned were in the late 20th century limited only to some rural areas and some former Yugoslav environments. The urban environments and Slovenia in total were not touched by these phenomena and to the contrary were in touch with the main processes in Western modern and post-modern trends (Boh and Istenič, 1987). The major processes under way in modern society need to be mentioned: deormalization and destablization of the conjugal bon, including the establishment of the living apart together arrangement (Levin, 1999). Along with this, the number of children born is diminishing, leading towards what some sociologiata denominate as a ‘childless society’ (Hara, 2008), although there are successful examples of population policy (France, Sweden in raising the fertility rate). But the conjugal bond has definitely been destablized, not to speak of its ‘desanctification’.
4.2 Structure and Pattern of Conjugal and Family Relations Today

4.2.1 Method

In this part we studied the changes in the size of the family and household in the post-Yugoslav entities. The number of children will be observed by two age groups in 1986 and 2008 within age groups. Of course, we were aware that within the younger age group (31–50) the procreation period has not ceased for most respondents, but this circumstance is the same in all observed entities. Further, insight was be made into the average number of children and relative economic development of the entity. Finally, explanations of the number of respondents’ children will be attempted by way of regression analysis, by a regression analysis of some often applied modernization variables, in order to shed light on explaining the changes.

It is a general trend for households to diminish, but what we are attempting to trace also the transformation of family structure. The number of household members is often taken as proxy in the study of family structure, particularly its complexity (Burić, 1976, 119).

In 1921 the average Yugoslav household size was 5,1, to diminish in 1948 to 4,37 (Burić, 1976, based on official statistics). These numerals are not large, but it should be taken into consideration that both pertain to the immediate post-war periods. To study the issue more in detail in the period at issue, the period since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, see Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: Average household size, by units of former Yugoslavia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>4,48</td>
<td>4,59</td>
<td>3,96</td>
<td>8,02</td>
<td>5,05</td>
<td>3,80</td>
<td>3,96</td>
<td>4,60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,98</td>
<td>4,23</td>
<td>3,70</td>
<td>7,00</td>
<td>4,67</td>
<td>3,13</td>
<td>3,83</td>
<td>4,09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,17</td>
<td>3,51</td>
<td>3,07</td>
<td>4,90</td>
<td>3,96</td>
<td>3,17</td>
<td>3,19</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1986 KB, 1990 LOL, 2008 EVS. For 1986 and 1990 Vojvodina and Serbia proper were recoded as single entity. In 1990 it was explicitly stated to count in also temporarily dislocated persons (students, recruit soldiers et sim.)

The data in Table 4-1 indicate a general diminution in household size during the period before and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in all observed coun-
tries. But, in the period observed, the drop is highest in Kosovo, the environment with originally the largest household membership, in fact well beyond any European country at the time – where the average size has dropped by 39%. In 1986, in Kosovo, according to Rrapi, who undertook his empirical investigation at the time, extended families among rural Albanians prevailed as family pattern (although not in urban environments and not among Serbs) in Kosovo Rrapi (1995) was significant. This was reflected in the average number of household members, which is sometimes taken as a proxy of family type and pattern (Burić, 1976, 118). But in 2008, the data for Kosovo do not allow much to ponder on the efflorescence of an extended family, even in rural areas, although one cannot exclude some instances and some relationships, particularly those of solidarity and authority amongst relatives, may have remained.

Table 4-2: Average number of respondents’ children, by units of former Yugoslavia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 31–50</td>
<td>2.48 (1.12)</td>
<td>2.64 (1.20)</td>
<td>2.07 (0.97)</td>
<td>4.43 (1.51)</td>
<td>2.57 (1.14)</td>
<td>2.07 (0.98)</td>
<td>1.93 (1.00)</td>
<td>2.40 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 51 and over</td>
<td>3.60 (1.40)</td>
<td>3.38 (1.38)</td>
<td>2.36 (1.30)</td>
<td>5.16 (2.20)</td>
<td>3.35 (1.41)</td>
<td>2.40 (1.19)</td>
<td>2.16 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.79 (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 31–50</td>
<td>1.48 (0.79)</td>
<td>1.61 (0.81)</td>
<td>1.69 (0.63)</td>
<td>2.24 (0.97)</td>
<td>1.57 (0.70)</td>
<td>1.50 (0.68)</td>
<td>1.57 (0.72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age 51 and over</td>
<td>2.07 (0.89)</td>
<td>2.46 (1.19)</td>
<td>1.87 (0.99)</td>
<td>3.11 (1.41)</td>
<td>2.12 (1.08)</td>
<td>1.97 (1.01)</td>
<td>1.79 (0.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: KB for 1987 data. For 1986 Vojvodina and Serbia proper were recoded as one entity. EVS for 2008. For GDP: Statistički godišnjak, 1989.

The data in Table 4-2 address a parallel phenomenon, the average number of children (in this case by respondents, divided into age cohorts), again for the same historical period. We are again confronted by a diminution, which was also observable by the age cohort comparison. The drop between the two time instances for the younger cohort is always greater, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The diminution is smallest in the case of Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia, for in 1986. Again (similar to household size), we find that the
younger cohort in Kosovo indicates a dramatic drop, it has practically halved, this age group at the latter point being close to those of the same age in 1986 in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. In the 31–50 age group in 2008, only Kosovo reaches the 2.1 number indicative of the rate of population replacement. The drop in this age group between 1986 and 2008 in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very dramatic and certainly reflects the war 1992–1995 and the failure to consolidate after that.

We did not carry out a systematic study of relationship between the number of children and economic development of the entity, but we can note that there is no linear relationship such as would be the lowest birth rate in economically most developed entity and vice versa (see Table 4-2). The highest birth rate was always found in Kosovo, the least economically developed entity, within a situation of disparities in GDP 1:7,5 in 1987 (Statistički godišnjak, 1989, 105). The lowest number of children in 1986 was found in Serbia, slightly above the Yugoslav average as to GDP among the observed entities. In 2008, the ranks in economic development remaining the same, the lowest number of children is found in the relatively underdeveloped, but also war stricken Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas in the older cohort, it is found in Serbia (http://projects.ff.uni-mb.si/cepyus/?id=3&clang=en).

If we compare the diminution in the number of children, known to be a pan-European phenomenon (Booth and Crouter 2005), with EC 12 (EU) countries, we find that in the period 1990–2008 the diminution was substantially smaller in relative terms. In the younger cohort the average fell from 1.85 to 1.58 (by 15 %), whereas in the older it fell only by 9 % (EVS 1999–2008.). In both cases the initial averages were smaller than in the case of the (former) Yugoslavia. However, comparing 1986 Yugoslav entities to EC 1990, 5 of the 12 EC countries did surpass Serbia, the republic indicating the lowest average at the time, as to number of children in the younger cohort. This reflects significant differences in averages not only in Yugoslavia, but also in the EC.

The issue is relevant as the former Yugoslavia demographic were very uneven, the Kosovo Muslims, and other Muslims, having significantly higher fertility rates. These demographic imbalances could also translate into more general and political imbalances. As Rrapi notes, demographic growth in Kosovo during the 70s and 80s was marked, attributing it primarily to a decrease in infant mortality (1995, 32). In the period 1953–1983, the general level of fertility in Yugoslavia dropped from 3,81 to 2,10, and it dropped in the same proportion in Kosovo, but still remained double the Yugoslav average (4,29) (1995, 34).

This is part of a more general trend of higher Muslim fertility. In the period 1991–2001, in European countries the general rise of population was 3.16 %,
whereas in Turkey, the largest Muslim country, it was above 15%. The transition development had a negative trend in many post-communist countries, due to post-communist transition (http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/population/Demographic_Yearbook_2001.pdf). It is of interest for us to see, whether the same basic mechanisms were operating in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. However, higher fertility among Muslims is not universal, possibly a demographic diminutive transition under way in Muslim environments (Zuehlke http://projects.ff.uni-mb.si/cepyus/upload/files/Cepyus_Conference_2010_14.10.2011.pdf).

We need to bear in mind the differences in economic development, in the differences in armed conflictuality during the 90s, and cultural differences. However, we were not able to analyse all these, themselves complex variables as predictors.

The phenomenon of the diminution of bearing children along with economic development, observed in Table 4-2, is widely known, although explanations vary. Socio-economic explanations, tying the drop in births stress that in pre-industrial society children are a small investment, while being a major profit, primarily as work force. In modern and post-modern society this changes, children becoming a major investment, while not bringing tangible profits to parents (Caldwell, 1982; Coleman, 1990). Even if the assertion held, it certainly does not hold linearly: thus, according to Lawson and Mace, the very poor make the difference between the first and the second child, whereas the rich consider every further child a grave expense (2010). On the other hand, there are findings as to richer having fewer children, not only in the United States (Weeden et al., 2006). Theories stressing prevailing values and socialization, underscore secularization, individual choice and hedonism. Individuals placing great value on career and possessing luxury goods tend to have smaller number of children (Alwin, 19969. Adsera finds that regarding religiosity, it is attendance in church which forms behavioural and normative pattern (Adsera, 2006), not belief itself, particularly in monoconfessional countries, among developed countries (Weeden et al., 2006). All these variables as predictors fit into the more general construct of societal modernization. Already in 1945, Burgess and Lock defined the basic transformation in the family from its normatively prescribed nature into a voluntary arrangement (1945). This explains the changes and the knowledge on them during the late 20th century concerning ‘rational choice’ in partner choice and procreation (Becker, 1981).

We were not able to study the issue from all relevant aspects (those mentioned above and those not), but we did try to examine the issue from the point of view of the variables available from the EVS dataset (see Tables 4-3 and 4-4).
Table 4-3: Descriptives of independent variables, by units of former Yugoslavia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education (q110)</th>
<th>Income (v353m_pp)</th>
<th>Traditionism I (q42I)</th>
<th>Traditionism II (q21v103)</th>
<th>Religiosity (q36)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia--Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>2.96 (.95)</td>
<td>.64 (.48)</td>
<td>1.76 (.69)</td>
<td>1.72 (.55)</td>
<td>8.19 (2.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.31 (1.39)</td>
<td>.44 (.34)</td>
<td>1.69 (.66)</td>
<td>1.67 (.57)</td>
<td>8.00 (2.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>3.22 (.98)</td>
<td>1.21 (1.08)</td>
<td>1.82 (.64)</td>
<td>1.97 (.38)</td>
<td>7.30 (2.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.68 (1.45)</td>
<td>.81 (.88)</td>
<td>1.91 (.68)</td>
<td>1.88 (.46)</td>
<td>7.39 (2.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>3.24 (1.08)</td>
<td>.46 (.45)</td>
<td>1.50 (.59)</td>
<td>1.82 (.55)</td>
<td>9.06 (1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.32 (1.62)</td>
<td>.39 (.41)</td>
<td>1.60 (.66)</td>
<td>1.85 (.58)</td>
<td>9.03 (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>3.23 (1.95)</td>
<td>.70 (.49)</td>
<td>1.76 (.69)</td>
<td>1.83 (.51)</td>
<td>7.12 (2.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.68 (1.54)</td>
<td>.61 (.51)</td>
<td>1.57 (.65)</td>
<td>1.79 (.54)</td>
<td>6.77 (2.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>3.18 (1.42)</td>
<td>2.02 (1.42)</td>
<td>1.78 (.68)</td>
<td>1.95 (.34)</td>
<td>4.90 (3.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.30 (1.47)</td>
<td>1.29 (1.02)</td>
<td>1.76 (.71)</td>
<td>1.83 (.48)</td>
<td>5.59 (3.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>3.35 (1.11)</td>
<td>1.14 (1.10)</td>
<td>1.49 (.64)</td>
<td>1.88 (.68)</td>
<td>7.79 (2.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.74 (1.26)</td>
<td>1.05 (1.17)</td>
<td>1.48 (.62)</td>
<td>1.72 (.67)</td>
<td>7.59 (2.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>3.34 (.99)</td>
<td>.85 (.56)</td>
<td>1.69 (.70)</td>
<td>1.88 (.49)</td>
<td>7.08 (3.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51–2</td>
<td>2.75 (1.37)</td>
<td>.66 (.50)</td>
<td>1.75 (.65)</td>
<td>1.79 (.54)</td>
<td>6.77 (2.94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Format: q110: 1–20; v 353 Monthly household income (x1000), corrected for ppp in euros, pro-trait direction; v42I (traditionism I) (sharing household chores): 1 = very important, 3 = not very important (counter-trait direction), ‘When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’ (Traditionalism II): 1 = agree, 2 = disagree, counter-trait direction, q36 (religiosity) ‘How important is God in your life’: 1: not important at all – 10: very important, pro-trait direction.
Table 4-4: Regression analysis, predicting number of children, by units of former Yugoslavia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education (q110)</th>
<th>Income (v353m_pp)</th>
<th>Traditionalism I (q42I)</th>
<th>Traditionism II (q21v103)</th>
<th>Religiosity (q36)</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>- .23**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.10*</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 31–50</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 51 →</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: * p < .05, ** p < .001

Notes: Format: q110: 1–20; v 353 Monthly household income (x1000), corrected for ppp in euros, pro-trait direction; v42I (traditionalism I) (sharing household chores): 1 = very important, 3 = not very important (counter-trait direction), ‘When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women’ (Traditionalism II): 1 = agree, 2 = disagree, counter-trait direction; q36 (religiosity): ‘How important is God in your life’: 1 = not important at all – 10: very important, pro-trait direction.

It was necessary to present descriptives for independent variables, to enable a better insight into their presence. Education is always lower in older cohorts, reflecting expansion of education. Income varies much among the entities
observed and among the age cohorts (the younger always receiving sizeably higher average income). Both traditionalism measures indicate higher traditionalism in the older age group, in line with expectations. Religiosity levels differ significantly among environments: Kosovo respondents indicate highest religiosity in the EVS sample in general, although the younger group is slightly less religious than the older one. Only is in Slovenia is it found that religiosity is ever below the normative average (in the younger cohort only). It is thus the lowest observed one.

The regression analysis carried out for each country and for the two age cohorts within it in Table 4-4, enables significant insight, although the R squares remain always low. We were not including such important events, processes and structured phenomena as the war and other conflictual situations, the transition, gender, various demographic variables and variables on origin and social participation. We limited ourselves to choosing some available and theoretically relevant variables.

Education always has a negative impact, although seemingly less among the older cohort. Only in a few instances the impact is without statistical significance. Income has an impact of significance only once, in Slovenia, with a high magnitude among the younger cohort and in the positive direction. Otherwise, it seems of little relevance, which is in line with usual findings (Lawson and Mace, 2010). Traditionalism, by both measures, indicates the expected impact (negative values theoretically expected, as they indicate traditionalism), in the less economically developed environments. We find religiosity significant in all environments, although not always in both age cohorts.

Thus, we find not results which would be unexpected from a point of view of modernization, including structural and cultural components. Probably, the result in the Slovenia younger group indicating a positive impact of income reflects the modern comprehension of children as expense, but giving joy to life (Obradović and Čudina, 2011).

4.3 Discussion and Conclusion

One could assert that differences in family organization were the greatest of all cultural differences in the former Yugoslavia, not less relevant than the confessional and ethnic ones. These differences set apart Slovenia in a distinct manner even from Croatia, although these differences were not so clear cut to be able to speak of clear frontiers in family pattern zones (Erlich, 1976). The major
exception was Slovenia. The other ethnic groups had various forms of traditional extended families in conjunction with nuclear families and households.

Our findings are basically a dramatic confirmation of the trend of ‘contraction of the family’ Durkheim spoke of, in conjunction with modernization, and of assertion of egalitarian understanding of partner relations. The last may be somewhat under the influence of social desirability, but the trend is beyond doubt. The changes in Kosovo are the most remarkable ones. In 1990 the average household amounted to exactly 7 members, taking into account ethnic variety and rural-urban differences, the average Albanian rural household was in the two digit zone. In 2008, the situation has radically changed.

We are confronted by a finding which may, at first sight, be surprising. The post-Yugoslav entities indicate a common trend in the development of the family. Cultural factors, such as Islamic belonging do not present an obstacle to the development of a common family pattern.

The common family pattern may be discerned at three levels:

– The formation of a nuclear family (and further evolution of the family) where previously extended family could be found, at least in rural areas, indicative of the first demographic transition, although not within an industrialization Kosovo, as would pursue from theory (Chesnais, 1992), but from an extended war and crisis

– The diminution of the number of children, most prominently in areas with previous highest fecundity (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)

– The transformation of the husband – wife relationship in the direction of equality and parity. This was evident from the data on traditionalism in Table 4-3, but we will give a better insight by contrasting answers to an almost identically worded question in 1986 and 2008.

In Table 4-5, we are able to follow changes in views regarding the position of women in society – women’s employment vis-à-vis men’s being an acute indicator – in the period under consideration. We may not allow too much to attribute to a shift in social desirability, as women’s ‘emancipation’ was a high value priority under communism, not only at lip service level. The data are comparable, although the wordings slightly differ. We recoded the format to fit for comparability. The picture is stark. In all observed environments, the normative average of 2 in 1986 is well surpassed, indicative of favouring husband’s ‘work’, if ‘only one is employed’, further indicating of a shortage of jobs. The situation is reverse in 2008, in all environments this is rejected when averages are observed, Croatia being highest in denying this attitude,
Recent changes in the Post-Yugoslav Family (S. Flere)

Flanked by Slovenia, and Kosovo being lowest, but still well above the 1986 low of Slovenia. In fact, now Macedonia, marks highest agreement with jobs reserved for men, flanked by Bosnia and Herzegovina and only then followed by Kosovo.

Table 4-5: Mean agreement with “Husband holding the job is more appropriate”, by units of former Yugoslavia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If in a marriage only one is employed, it is natural that it be the husband (v265)</td>
<td>2.78 (.61)</td>
<td>2.88 (.45)</td>
<td>2.73 (.66)</td>
<td>2.73 (.64)</td>
<td>2.51 (.85)</td>
<td>2.52 (.81)</td>
<td>2.64 (.75)</td>
<td>2.67 (.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a jobs than women (v103)</td>
<td>1.68 (.91)</td>
<td>1.45 (.79)</td>
<td>1.29 (.66)</td>
<td>1.61 (.87)</td>
<td>1.79 (.88)</td>
<td>1.34 (.72)</td>
<td>1.54 (.85)</td>
<td>1.53 (.84)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: for item in row 1: LOL91; for item in row 2: EVS 2008
Legend: for item in row 1: 1 = disagree, 2 = neither, 3 = agree; for item in row 2: 1 = disagree, 2 = neither, 3 = agree.

We have found strong support of an assertion for the family to be evolving along same routes and patterns, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In spite of the often cited repression of women and women being the main targets of unemployment within transition, as well as of general temporary retardationalization, we found strong support for modernizational view, in spite of all the obstacles. Changes can be observed both at the structural and at the cultural level. Changes are most radical in those parts of Yugoslavia, which were most ‘backward’, in Kosovo, Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This finding surpasses the usual findings on transition lowering procreation, as we are evidencing changes in family type, the disappearance of the extended family under societal duress, which surpassed transition. These processes are stressful for individuals, as Majstorović depicts of Bosnia (2011).

The mechanism of steps in the change of the family seem to differ significantly among the countries observed. Mostly they coincide with variables which are indicative of modernization. The finding for income, for the younger Slovenian cohort, out of line with all other findings regarding this variable, may indicate a historically new situation, one of superseding classical modernization, although this sole finding is insufficient to judge on it. What needs to be stressed is that the value and structural decomposition of Yugoslavia, found e.g. by Radin
(1986, 62), failed to continue, at least in the respect we studied, after the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. After early transition retraditionalization (Flere and Molnar, 1993; Milić 2010), the position is supported that modernization proves to be the pattern as a longue duree wave, at least as far as the subject we are studying and less developed regions seem to have made greater leaps. Childbearing ceases to be prescribed, as was posed in a survey in Macedonia in 2002, that it is ‘proper for a woman to bear children continuously’ (a minute percent opted for this position, but is is interesting of its being posed – Jakimovski and Matilov, 2002).

However, our study of family structure changes was very limited. There are numerous issues of marriage and partnership, childbearing and family organisation we did not enter into. Such are issues of divorce in the family of origin, number of siblings (on the part of the candidate parents), various rational choice patterns (Lawson and Mace, 2010), a host of other values and attitudes (Booth and Crouter /eds./, 2005).

Many issues of family, even less of fertility, were not studied in this paper. The initial retraditionalization, later surpassed, is not visible. War tribulations (Wachtel and Bennett 2009; Calic 2009), on the one hand, and the post-modern forms of conjugal union (see Levin, 1999), on the other, these and other issues, some major in nature by itself, remain out of scope. We have also not studied issues of childlessness (Hara, 2008).

Furthermore, we relied on survey data, which may not be as exact as census ones, but these are still lacking in some of the countries at issue (censuses being only partly successful). Nevertheless, although the findings may not be as precise as good censuses, our findings do fit a pattern and unclosre trends which are beyond doubt.

4.4 References


Recent changes in the Post-Yugoslav Family (S. Flere)


of the Domestic group over the Last Three Centuries in England, France, Serbia, Japan and North Colonial America, with Further Materials from Western Europe (pp. 335–373). London: Cambridge University Press.


Gender Role Attitudes in Post-Yugoslav Countries: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Analysis

(A. Kirbiš & M. Tavčar Krajnc)

Abstract
Gender role attitudes in post-Yugoslav countries were examined using representative national samples from World Values Survey 1995–8 wave and from 2008 European Values Study. At the aggregate level mean levels of gender role traditionalism were associated with levels of socioeconomic development in 1995–8 and in 2008, with Slovenian and Croatian respondents reporting lowest scores on gender role traditionalism in 2008. Longitudinal analysis showed that a modernization trend in the direction of liberalization of gender role attitudes has taken place in all six countries with available longitudinal data. Multivariate individual-level analysis indicated that gender and respondents’ education proved to be the strongest predictors of gender role traditionalism – women were less traditionally oriented, as were respondents with higher educational levels. At the compound sample level religiosity (measured by self-assessed importance of God and frequency of church attendance) predicted higher levels of gender role traditionalism, net of other predictor variables, though these results were not uniformly confirmed across national samples. Similar mixed results were indicated by respondents’ residential status (urban environment) and parental education. Finally, only in Slovenia and Croatia did the younger populations report less traditional gender role orientations, implying that in the next years a divergence between post-Yugoslav countries with regard to gender role attitudes might occur, which was also detected in present research, though small in its magnitude. Independent variables predicted between 3% and 12% of variance in gender role attitudes. Implications of the results are discussed.

Key words: post-Yugoslav states, gender role attitudes, traditionalism, gender equality, religiosity, modernization.
5.1 Introduction

Over the last several decades the majority of industrial societies have witnessed dramatic changes in their populations’ gender role attitudes. Past research has shown that a “silent” cultural revolution has been taking place in advanced modern democracies since the second half of the 20th century onwards (Inglehart, 1977). Though cultural changes have occurred with regard to diverse set of values, beliefs and attitudes, Inglehart and colleagues stress that “the most important change in recent decades has been the revolution in gender roles that has changed the lives of most people in advanced industrial societies” (Inglehart et al., 2003: 104).

A large majority of past studies have shown that in the recent decades views of Western populations have generally become more liberal with regard to gender roles, adopting more egalitarian (i.e. non-traditional) attitudes (see, among others, Loo and Thorpe, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Scott, 2006).61 The changing nature of gender roles is generally understood as a part of a larger trend of modernization taking place in Western societies. Cross-national comparisons of gender role attitudes have shown differences regarding gender role attitudes between socioeconomically most and less developed countries (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007; Olson et al., 2007). Accordingly, there attitudinal differences were also detected between Western and postcommunist countries (see, for example, Glick et al., 2004; Inglehart and Norris, 2005). However, little is known about the differences in gender role attitudes between postcommunist countries themselves, especially post-Yugoslav countries. We believe these societies provide a unique ground for addressing this gap in literature, among others for the reasons stated by Flere in the introductory chapter in this book. Also, our aim in this chapter was to examine the predictive value of postmodernization theory within post-Yugoslav cross-national context. In addition, we wanted to extend the literature on gender role attitudes by investigating the effect of sociodemographic predictors in post-Yugoslav countries. Thus, when investigating the strength of individual level predictors found in the literature on gender role attitudes, we controlled for a number of other individual-level predictors. In this way we wanted to tease out the effect of each individual sociodemographic predictors, net of other predictor variables.

61 There are also a few studies (carried out on student samples) showing that gender-role attitudes have not become less traditional from early 1990s to early 2000s (e.g., Olson et al., 2007).
5.2 Micro- and macro-level correlates of gender role attitudes

Throughout the history women have had an inferior social position in almost every society and have constituted the largest underprivileged segment of the population (Newell and Reilly, 2001; Rus and Toš, 2005: 249; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007: 12). Investigating gender role attitudes within a given country can provide us with insight into climate women face (Frieze et al., 2003: 256). We define gender role attitudes as “people’s beliefs about the appropriate roles and obligations of women and men” (Frieze et al. 2003: 256, also see Bergh, 2006; Judge and Livingston, 2008). There are two broad types of gender role attitudes: the first is a traditionalistic, segregated, inegalitarian type and the second is a non-traditionalistic, shared, egalitarian type of gender role attitudes (Berridge et al., 2009; also see Valentova, 2012). On the one hand, “traditionalists” believe that gender roles should be segregated, that women should stay at home, take care of the children and should be predominantly (or exclusively) active in domestic activities, while men should be active in the public domain, are supposed to be “breadwinners” or “heads of household” and should especially provide the financial support needed for the family to survive (Berridge et al., 2009).

Gender role attitudes have extensively been recognized for the critical role they play in diverse areas of outcomes. For example, substantial research literature associates gender role attitudes with the amount of housework done by husband (for a review see Coltrane, 2000). Specifically, traditional gender role attitudes were found to be predictive of traditional division of household labour at the individual level (see Massey et al., 1995; Coltrane, 2000; Batalova and Cohen, 2002). Stickey and Konrad (2007) found that among married employed women, women with egalitarian attitudes had significantly higher earnings than women with traditional attitudes. Traditional gender role attitudes were previously also found to predict having stereotypes about women (Glick et al., 2000), and a study of Sakallı-Uğurlu and colleagues (2008) showed that male students that scored higher on traditional gender role attitudes measures were more likely to view sexual harassment of women as a result of provocative behaviours of women, and to view perceived sexual harassment as a trivial matter. Traditional gender role attitudes have also been found to be associated with other traditional orientations. For instance, Parrott and Gallagher (2008) found that traditional gender role attitudes were associated with increased sexual prejudice toward lesbians. Also, in some contexts young people with traditional gender role attitudes report less safe sexual practices (Bhana et al, 2008; Pleck et al. 1993; compare to Letamo, 2011). Gender role traditionalism
was also found to be predictive of expressing lower levels of subjective well-being (Napier et al., 2009), and Hunt and colleagues (2006) found that in older age groups it predicted suicidal thoughts.

It can be said that the majority of past studies regarding gender-role attitudes have focused on micro levels correlates of gender-role attitudes. Yet past studies have also shown that gender role attitudes have important implications at the macro levels. Inglehart and Welzel, for instance, have shown that there is a macro-level association between the levels of traditional gender role attitudes and percent of women in parliaments (2007: 276). Moreover, a study by Jamal and Langohr (2007) showed that countries that scored high on traditional gender role attitudes were also more likely to have “a lower number of women in parliament, a lower number of women in government, and lower levels of female literacy, economic activity, and education rates. Gender attitudes were a significant factor explaining all the objective gender indicators except for life expectancy” (Jamal and Langohr, 2007: 7). The same authors conclude that “societies that have better attitudes towards female leadership [non-traditional attitudes] also have more women in parliament. None of the other social, political or institutional variables matter. Most surprising is that national and party quotas designed to increase female political representation seem to be insignificant as well” (ibid.: 12). In one of the most recent studies, Brandt (2011) analyzed a longitudinal World Values Survey data set that included representative data from 57 societies. By means of multilevel modelling his research has shown that traditional gender role attitudes predicted increases in gender inequalities (measured by GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure); United Nations Development Programme, 2009). His study provided clear evidence that sexist ideologies (i.e. traditional gender role attitudes) may create objective gender inequalities within societies. He concludes that the findings suggest that traditional gender ideology “not only legitimizes the societal status quo, but also actively enhances the severity of the gender hierarchy”.

In sum, past research has indicated that gender role attitudes have important implications for other attitudes, behaviour and (objective) outcomes at the individual and at the macro-level. In the next section we turn to the processes that bring about cross-national differences in gender role attitudes and gender inequalities.
5.3 Cross-national and longitudinal trends in gender role attitudes

One of the main theoretical perspectives in explaining the cross-national differences in orientations and behaviour is postmodernization theory (Inglehart, 1997; Welzel et al., 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). Inglehart’s extensive research shows that citizens who have grown up in countries and contexts of relative economic security exhibit more liberal orientations to a greater degree (i.e. non-traditional, post-materialist, tolerant orientations), compared to citizens who have grown up in conditions of relatively low socioeconomic development or even in the presence of existential insecurity. The process of generational replacement that occurred in recent decades increased the proportion of posttraditional, egalitarian oriented public and similar trends, if socioeconomic conditions will continue to improve in the world, are expected in the future. In his numerous works Inglehart (1977; 1990, 1997) has analyzed a large-scale Eurobarometer and World Values Survey data and found that the orientation of citizens (their political culture – values and attitudes) affect the functioning of democracies.

Inglehart’s works demonstrate that culture (i.e. values and orientations) primarily reflect the existential living conditions. In other words, value change occurs together with the changing existential conditions (albeit with a certain time-lag). Those orientations “survive” or gain importance that provide guidance to members of society in terms of allowing them to cope with the given existential conditions. In sum, revised modernization theory (i.e. postmodernization theory; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) has two important implications: 1) it argues that mass orientations reflect the prevailing existential conditions; 2) if changes in existential conditions occur (e.g. levels of socioeconomic development), as a rule, mass value change follows (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007: 22–23).

Since the 2nd World War Western industrial societies have transformed into post-industrial societies. These changes occurred on several levels. First, the period from 1950 with economic growth and increasing levels of economic development in many western countries onward decreased material limitations and limitations to individual autonomy and increased existential security. Secondly, socioeconomic development generally leads to an increased educational level of citizens and gives them access to a wide range of information, especially through the mass media (see Lerner, 1958; Inkeles and Smith, 1974) and information society mobilizes human’s cognitive abilities. In other words, socioeconomic development reduces the cognitive and informational limita-
tions of human choice and promotes human intellectual independence (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007: 24). Thirdly, socioeconomic development increases professional specialization and complexity, and generates a process where individual’s interactions with other people become much more diverse. This kind of enhancement of the diversity of human interactions also increases an individual’s independence and autonomy from other individuals. It frees him of ascribed social status and he in a larger manner creates his social position in the context of achieved status.

In sum, in times when survival is uncertain, “people cling to traditional gender roles emphasizing absolute rules and old familiar norms, in an attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world… when survival begins to be taken for granted… changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007: 54).

5.4 Gender attitudes in (post)communist countries

In former communist regimes, the communist ideology strongly influenced the between-gender relationship, as it influenced other areas of life. Interestingly, communist ideology in SFRY was in some aspects even more “modern” than the ideology promoted in the Western liberal democracies. Many authors emphasize that the communist regimes took various measures to encourage female employment, enabled universal child care and encouraged the perception of work and employment (including employment of women) as a civic duty, and promoted gender equality as a societal goal. Although gender equality in communist countries was never achieved, at least at the declarative level, the emancipation of women was one of the aims of the communist transformation (Massey et al., 1995; Lafont, 2001). Not surprisingly, communist ideology had left an imprint on people gender role attitudes. For example, citizens in some communist countries expressed less traditional gender role attitudes than citizens of Western democracies (for review, see Treas and Widmer, 2000). Similar findings have been documented in some research after the collapse of communism in Eastern and South-eastern Europe. For example, in a survey of students Morinaga and colleagues found that the lowest rates of gender role traditionalism were expressed by respondents from Slovenia. They were followed by Japanese students, while American student were most traditionally oriented (see Morinaga et al., 1993; cf. Crompton and Harris, 1997, Olson et al., 2007).
Gender Role Attitudes in Post-Yugoslav Countries ...

Past research on Yugoslav samples has shown that traditional gender role attitudes were associated with other “subject” (Almond and Verba, 1963), i.e. traditional orientations. In study of the Yugoslav youth from 1985 (Radin, 1986), the traditionalist orientations to gender roles were included in the factor “traditional familialism”, which denoted an empirical dimensions of general traditionalism and traditional gender role attitudes. Within this dimension traditionally oriented respondents also expressed traditional orientations toward the organization of families and raising children in the spirit of obedience, which is an element that otherwise constitutes authoritarian values (see Funke, 2005). Familialism dimension was also positively associated with both collectivism and religious traditionalism. In addition, several determinants of familialism were determined; among others, males were more traditionally oriented, as well were respondents younger than 18 (probably due to a strong influence of family socialization and low levels of education). Differences were also found among the then Yugoslav republics (least traditional orientations were expressed by Slovenian and Croatian youth; see Radin, 1986). Majority of studies of Yugoslav republics on value orientations other than those relating to gender roles, also found that traditional orientations were more widely reported in socioeconomically less developed republics (see, for instance, Bertsch and Zaninovich, 1974; Mihailović, 1986; Radin, 1986; Pantić, 1988; 1998; Vujović, 1990; Miljević and Poplašen, 1991; Vasović, 1991a; 1991b; Flere and Molnar, 1992; Hofstede, 1994).

There were only a few cross-national studies of gender role attitudes of post-Yugoslav entities, though most of them did not include all post-Yugoslav entities. Simkus (2007) carried out a study of gender role traditionalism in all post-Yugoslav entities, with the exception of Slovenia. Study results showed that there were between country differences, with Croatian, Montenegrins and Serbs expressing lowest levels of gender role traditionalism, while respondents from Kosovo, Bosnia and FYR Macedonia had highest traditionalism scores. In only studies, where all post-Yugoslav entities have been included, Kirbiš and Flere (2011), Tavčar (2010) and Kirbiš (2011) have shown, corroborating study results by Simkus (2007), that at the cross-national level, socioeconomic development predicted gender role traditionalism, with Slovenian students having lowest scores on gender role traditionalism, followed by Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin students, while respondents from Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and BiH were most traditionally oriented. Nevertheless, past cross-national studies of post-Yugoslav countries therefore have three important weaknesses: 1) there is only a handful of studies investigating gender role attitudes in post-Yugoslav countries, 2) studies carried out on representative samples do not include all post-Yugoslav countries (e.g. Simkus, 2007), 3) studies that
do include all seven post-Yugoslav states were carried out on unrepresentative samples (e.g. on student populations, see Tavčar, 2010; Kirbiš, 2011; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). Despite these shortcomings, the results of abovementioned post-Yugoslav research show that postmodernization theory can be used to explain cross-national differences with regard to gender role attitudes.

Postmodernization theory would also predict that gender role attitudes have increasingly become more liberal in countries that had experienced economic growth and higher levels of socioeconomic development, and their citizen consequently experienced increased existential security. But was this the case in postcommunist states, in particularly in post-Yugoslav countries? Transition to democratic and free market system brought about uncertainty in all former communist countries. This hold particularly true for former Yugoslav republics, since together with political and economic transformations, cross-national conflicts and bloody wars also took place. Consequently, several authors detected increases in traditionalism, authoritarianism, and related non-democratic political-cultural orientations in the transition period on the territory of former Yugoslavia (see Flere and Molnar, 1992; Galić, 2000; Bernik and Malnar, 2003). While all these types of “subject” political-cultural orientations might have a negative impact on the democratic process and the effectiveness of democratic institutions (Welzel, 2007), gender role attitudes in particularly have been shown to have an independent effect on gender inequalities within societies (Brandt, 2011). In sum, traditional gender role attitudes might impede the process of democratic consolidation in post-Yugoslav countries since they present an obstacle to gender equality, which is an important facet of a functioning democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007).

Past longitudinal research of post-Yugoslav states did not show uniform patterns of change in gender role attitudes. In Slovenia, for instance, between 1991 and 2000 there has been an increase of traditional gender role views among Slovenian male students (female students showed no change). Croatian student population showed no discernible attitudinal change (Frieze et al., 2003). Research by Sekulić and Šporer (2006), on the other hand, showed a decrease of gender role traditionalism in Croatia in the 1985–2004 period. Despite of these mixed results, authors emphasize that traditional gender role orientations are nevertheless quite widespread among majority of post-Yugoslav citizens (Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007). In the next section, we set out our research hypotheses based on previous findings in the literature.
5.5 Hypotheses

Our first hypothesis is based on the postmodernization theory (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) and it refers to the aggregate level. We predict that socioeconomically more developed post-Yugoslav countries will have lower mean scores traditional gender role attitudes (H1), in line with results of previous studies of post-Yugoslav countries (Simkus, 2007; Olson et al., 2007; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011; Tavčar, 2010; Kirbiš, 2011) and other cross-national research (Inglehart and Norris, 2005).

On the other hand, based on previous studies no overall predictions can be readily made for the longitudinal changes in the gender role attitudes since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Still, despite the instabilities in the region since the dissolution, taking into account that the major war conflicts took place in the 1990s, we predict (H2) that there were changes in gender role attitudes from 1995–1998 to 2008 in the post-Yugoslav countries, with post-Yugoslav citizens becoming less traditional (of course, cross-national differences might be detected). This might be particularly true for Slovenia, which is often described as one of the most successful postcommunist countries with regard to transition and levels of socioeconomic development (Rizman, 2006; also see HDR, 2010).

The next hypotheses are at the individual level. First, we expect to find a gender gap, i.e. women will be less traditionalist oriented than men (H3) (see Apparala et al., 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; also see Tu and Liao, 2005; Crouter et al., 2007; Berridge et al., 2009; for post-Yugoslav context see Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007; Tavčar, 2010). In addition, we predict that the “gender gap” with regard to gender orientations will be more pronounced in socioeconomically more developed countries, owing to the modernization process and subsequent women emancipation (H4). On the other hand, both men and women are expected to accept traditional gender roles in socioeconomically least developed post-Yugoslav countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2005; cf. Kunovich and Kunovich, 2008).

Next, we anticipate that besides gender other sociodemographic factors have an impact on gender role attitudes. We predict to find less traditional (more egalitarian) orientations with regard to gender roles among younger populations (H5), those with higher educational levels (H6) and those living in urban environments (H7) (Apparala et al., 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007; Simkus, 2007; Kunovich and Kunovich, 2008). In the context of family socialization patterns we anticipate that family characteristics also have an impact on gender role attitudes. We therefore predict
(H8) that respondents who had a more educated father/mother will score lower on gender role traditionalism (Kulik, 2002; Kunovich and Kunovich, 2008).

Finally, we believe that gender role traditionalism will be associated with other traditional orientations. Specifically, we predict (H9) that attitudinal religiosity (importance of God) and church attendance will both be positively associated with traditional gender role attitudes (Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007; van Egmond et al., 2010; Kirbiš, 2011).

5.6 Plan of analysis

We will first compare levels of gender role traditionalism (GRT) across post-Yugoslav countries. The composite GRT measure will consist of three items measuring gender role traditionalism. Next, we will present longitudinal analysis of GRT scale (WWS wave 1995–2008 and 2008 EVS wave). We will then present findings with regard to individual levels predictors of GRT by means of regression analysis. Lastly, we will compare the strength of individual-level predictors in explaining the GRT across post-Yugoslav countries. In the next section, we present the design and measures used in our study.

5.7 Method

5.7.1 Sample

The employed data in our analyses were the European Values Study from 2008 and the World Values Survey wave from 1995–8. EVS 2008 wave is at the moment the only dataset that covers all seven former Yugoslav republics and territories. As Simkus (2007: 3) rightfully notes, there is a relative lack of cross-national social survey data on Balkan states. The newest wave of European Values Study (2008) has largely overcome this empirical gap. World Values Survey (together with European Values study) is the largest quantitative dataset gathered by scientists from the large part of the world. The aim of WVS and EVS was to study changes in mass values and political orientation and their influence of social and political life. Surveys in all included countries were carried out with national funding. All WVS the surveys were carried out on representative national samples. Combined the WVS survey included almost 90% of world population. Samples were drawn from the entire population.
of 18 years and older, and the minimum sample was 1000 respondents. In majority of countries there were no upper age limit imposed and some form of stratified random sampling was used to obtain representative national samples (Toš, 2008; for additional methodological information see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). While WVS and EVS have in the past been carried out in majority of world countries, the present study deals only with seven post-Yugoslav countries.

5.7.2 Measures

5.7.2.1 Traditional gender role attitudes

Traditional gender role attitudes (i.e. gender role traditionalism, GRT) were our main dependent variable and were tapped by several items. Unfortunately, the items measuring gender role attitudes that can be most often found in the literature and were included in the WVS 1995–8 wave, were not in the 2008 EVS wave, which presented us with problems for longitudinal analysis. Only one item measuring gender role traditionalism was used in both 1995–8 and 2008: “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women” (1 = agree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither).

We recoded this item so that higher values represented greater GRT (1 = disagree, 2 = neither, 3 = agree) and then we standardized it to 100 point for ease of interpretation. This item alone has been used in previous studies to investigate cultural attitudes toward gender roles (e.g. Tesch-Roemer et al., 2008). Because the measure included only one item we named the scale GRT1 and we used it for longitudinal and cross-national analysis. Also, individual level regression analysis predicting gender role traditionalism in EVS 2008 was also carried out with GRT1 as dependent variable.

We also performed cross-national analysis of GRT on the WVS 1995–8 data. For this analysis we used two commonly used GRT items: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (1 = agree strongly, 4 = strongly disagree) and “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (1 = agree strongly, 4 = strongly disagree). This GRT2 scale was summed across both of these items and standardized to 100 points for ease of interpretation. Higher GRT2 values represented greater gender role traditionalism.
5.7.2.2 Predictor variables

In accordance with our hypotheses we included several individual-level predictor variables in our analysis: respondent’s education (0 = Pre-primary education or none education, 6 = second stage of tertiary education), father’s/mother’s education (0 = Pre-primary education or none education, 6 = second stage of tertiary education), size of town (1 = under 2,000 inhabitants, 8 = 500,000 inhabitants and more), importance of God (“How important is God in your life?”, 1 = not at all, 10 = very), church attendance (“Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?”, 1 = more than once a week, 7 = never or practically never), gender (1 = male, 2 = female), and age (measured in year of birth).

Next to individual-level predictor variables, we also included one country-level predictor. Specifically, the data for levels of economic development of each post-Yugoslav countries in GDP for years 2000 and 20008 were taken from International Human Development Indicators (see http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/20206.html), with the exception of Kosovo (we acquired the 2008 data from Kosovo Human Development Report 2010).

5.8 Results

5.8.1 Cross-national comparison of gender role traditionalism

Figure 5-1 below shows the comparison of levels of gender role traditionalism in post-Yugoslav countries and their respective levels of socioeconomic development (WVS 1995–8 wave and HDRO database were used for the analysis). To remind the reader, composite GRT2 scale consisted of two items and higher values represented greater gender role traditionalism.

Figure 5-1 indicates that all mean scores were well below the normative mean (50). In addition, there was only relatively small cross-national variance in gender role traditionalism in 1995–1998 period. Economically less developed countries (on the left of Figure 5-1) were generally somewhat higher on the Y axis, or in other words, their citizens scored higher on gender role traditionalism measured by GRT2, yet as we said, the cross-national differences were relatively small. There was also a country outlier. We would expect that Slovenians and Croatians would have the lowest scores, yet the Macedonians had the lowest mean GRT2 values. Figure 5-1 also shows that FYR Macedonia was the only
outlier that could be detected, i.e. the only case that was not in line with our prediction. All other countries were positioned on the GRT2 measure where we would expect them to be according to their levels of economic development. Specifically, most traditionally oriented were respondents from Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia, as expected from the low levels of economic development of their respective countries. Thus despite the Macedonian outlier, these results give confirmation to H1 derived from postmodernization theory.

**Figure 5-1:** Cross-national comparison of gender role traditionalism (composite GRT2), post-Yugoslav states, WVS 1995–8.

![Figure 5-1](image)

Source: Wold Values Survey (2009; data for 1995–8 wave; HDRO (2012). Note: Gender role traditionalism was measured with GRT2 scale.

### 5.8.2 Cross-national and longitudinal comparison of gender role traditionalism

Figure 5-2 below shows the cross-national and longitudinal comparison of levels of gender role traditionalism in post-Yugoslav countries and their respective levels of economic development, this time for WVS 1995–8 and EVS 2008 data. Specifically, result show the comparison of the item “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women”, which was our GRT1 measure. It was recoded so that higher values represent greater gender role traditionalism.

Several points can be noted. In the 2000–2008 period GDP (X line) increased in all six post-Yugoslav countries (we do not have comparable data for Kosovo in 2000), as can be seen from the move of six vectors in the direction from left to the right. Secondly, the vectors also moved downwards, showing that the gender role traditionalism decreased (Y line) in all post-Yugoslav countries.
(again, we do not have GRT data for Kosovo in 1995–8 period). In 2008 the least agreement with item measuring traditionalism was expressed by respondents from Croatia, which were closely followed by Slovenians (respondents from both countries were below the value of 20). Montenegrins (M = 22) and Serbian (M = 27) ranked next. Somewhat surprisingly, respondents from Kosovo followed, despite the fact that Kosovo was and still is economically the least developed country. Highest agreement with the GRT1 scale was expressed by Bosnians (M = 34) and Macedonians (M = 40). The country rankings for the 1995–8 GRT data were virtually the same.

**Figure 5-2:** Cross-national and longitudinal comparison of gender role traditionalism and GDP, post-Yugoslav states, WVS 1995–8 and EVS 2008.

As with Figure 5-1, Figure 5-2 also gives a support to our H1. Generally, the more developed countries were in the lower right corner of Figure 5-2, while less developed countries were in the upper left corner. Again, the association between GDP and GRT1 was not perfectly linear. In 2008 Croatians expressed somewhat more liberal attitudes toward gender roles than Slovenians. Also, respondents from Kosovo reported more liberal orientations than respondents from economically more developed BiH and FYR Macedonia. Despite of these outliers, the general picture again supports our H1 – the higher the level of economic development in a country, the more liberally oriented are their citizens.

Figure 5-1 also shows that the largest decrease in GRT1 has been detected in Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia, followed by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Smallest decrease in GRT was detected in Serbia. Figure 5-2 can also provides a partial answer to a question whether there has been a
convergence with regard to gender role attitudes among countries, or whether the between-country differences with regard to GRT have increased in the last decade. Additional statistical analyses (results not presented) showed that not only has the difference between both extremes – BiH and Slovenia – remained constant if we compare 1995–8 (15.4 %) and 2008 wave (17.2 %), the difference has even minimally increased. A similar pattern could be found when we compared FYR Macedonia and Slovenia – the difference between countries slightly increased from 21.6 % in 1995–8 to 22.8 % in 2008. Similar results could also be found when we compared both BiH and FYR Macedonia with Croatia. It seems then that differences between least and most economically developed countries increased in the last decade. Lastly, another finding should be emphasized: in 1995–8 period Macedonians were most liberal with regard to gender roles compared to other post-Yugoslav citizens, while they were the least liberal in 2008. We discuss this issue in the final sections in more detail.

Despite longitudinal increases in cross-national differences in gender role traditionalism, the direction of the changes in GRT in the observed period has been identical in all observed environments – people in post-Yugoslav countries have become more liberal in terms of orientations toward gender roles. Therefore based on our results we can confirm H2 – citizens of all six countries, for which we have available data, have become less traditional with regard to gender role attitudes.

5.8.3 Predicting gender role traditionalism

Finally, we carried out a multivariate analysis of predicting gender role traditionalism (GRT 1 scale) by means of regression analysis. In the EVS 2008 data we regressed GRT1 on sociodemographic predictors. This approach enabled an assessment of the independent impact of each variable on GRT1 while controlling for the effects of all others. Table 5-1 presents the results of the regression analysis.

We predicted that women are less traditionally oriented than men (H3). Results in Table 5-1 confirm this prediction at the compound sample, as well as in six out of seven post-Yugoslav countries. Results give a confirmation to H3. In fact, only in Slovenia, controlling for other sociodemographic determinants, gender does not show an independent effect on GRT. If we compare the gender effect we see that mean Betas in socioeconomically least developed countries (Kosovo, BiH and FYR Macedonia) are slightly larger ($\beta_m = 16.5$) than in three most developed countries with significant betas ($\beta_m = 14.1$). Results therefore do not give confirmation to H4 – gender differences are not most pronounced.
in socioeconomically more developed countries. Generally the differences in gender gap size are not dependent on levels of socioeconomic development at best, and seem to be in opposite direction at worst. H4 therefore is therefore not confirmed.

Table 5-1: Regression model explaining gender role traditionalism, post-Yugoslav compound and country samples, EVS 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable / Country</th>
<th>POST-YU</th>
<th>KOS</th>
<th>BIH</th>
<th>MAC</th>
<th>SER</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>CRO</th>
<th>SLO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-0.161**</td>
<td>-0.105**</td>
<td>-0.160**</td>
<td>-0.230**</td>
<td>-0.112**</td>
<td>-0.182**</td>
<td>-0.130**</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.047**</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.080*</td>
<td>0.162**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.111**</td>
<td>0.063*</td>
<td>-0.079*</td>
<td>-0.144**</td>
<td>-0.128**</td>
<td>-0.096**</td>
<td>-0.128**</td>
<td>-0.191**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of town</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.188**</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.102**</td>
<td>0.066*</td>
<td>-0.061*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education</td>
<td>-0.044**</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.102**</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of God</td>
<td>0.100**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.094**</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
<td>0.151**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R² (%)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Study (2008).
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001. Coefficients are Betas. Gender role traditionalism was measured with GRT1 scale.

We also predicted that respondents’ age (H5), educational level (H6) and living in an urban environment (H7) will be negatively associated with GRT. In our analysis age proved to have an independent effect on GRT at the compound sample level, yet Beta was nevertheless rather small (β = 0.047). Also, this effect was replicated only on Slovenian and Croatian samples, while the age effect was insignificant in other national samples. In other words, it seems that young populations are becoming more liberally oriented with regard to gender role only in Slovenia and Croatia. These results do not give a clear confirmation to H5. Respondents’ education, on the other hand, was the only variable that had a consistent negative effect in all seven national samples and at the compound sample level, as predicted by H6. Size of residence has proved insignificant at the compound sample level, but proved significant in four countries (BiH, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia). In Kosovo and FYR Macedonia size of the town did not seem to have a significant impact on gender role attitudes. Results thus give H7 only partial confirmation. Parental education also proved significant at the compound level, but only in Macedonian national sample, which means that H8 did not receive confirmation. Finally, both measures of religiosity (self-assessed importance of God and frequency of church attendance) also had a significant effect on GRT1 at the compound sample,
yet only in two and one national samples, respectively. The results therefore do not give a clear confirmation of H9. Finally, Table 5-1 also shows that seven independent variables predicted only 6.2% of variance in GRT1 at the compound level, with smallest variance being explained in the Kosovo sample (3.1%) and largest variance in the Slovenian sample (12.4%).

Lastly, we examined the impact of one additional sociodemographic variable – ethnic majority/minority status. Since according to EVS 2008 data only three post-Yugoslav countries are ethnically heterogeneous enough for such analysis to be carried out where SPSS data provides us with enough cases, we compared GRT scores in 2008 among three religious groups in Kosovo, BIH and FYR Macedonia. Religious denomination variable was used as a proxy of ethnic majority/minority status (also see Musil in the present volume), since item on ethnic/national status also did not provide us with sufficient number of cases. Figure 5-3 therefore shows levels of gender role traditionalism in three religiously and ethnically heterogeneous post-Yugoslav countries – Kosovo, BIH and FYR Macedonia.

**Figure 5-3:** Comparison of gender role traditionalism among major religious groups in Kosovo, BIH and FYR Macedonia, EVS 2008.

![Comparison of gender role traditionalism among major religious groups in Kosovo, BIH and FYR Macedonia, EVS 2008.](image)

The data indicate that in Kosovo there are virtually no differences between Albanians (Muslims) and Serbs (Orthodox denomination), which are ethnic minority. On the other hand, in BIH Bosniaks (ethnic majority) scored significantly higher than both ethnic minorities – Serbs (Orthodox denomination) and Croats (Roman Catholics). Similarly, in FYR Macedonia Orthodox
Macedonians (ethnic majority) scored significantly lower on GRT than Albanians (Muslims). These results therefore seem to indicate two key findings: 1) two of the three ethnic/religious mixed post-Yugoslav countries have very heterogeneous population with regard to gender role traditionalism; 2) the within-national variation in GRT lies in denominational status and not in ethnic minority status. In other words, Muslims are most traditional whether they reside in BIH where they are an ethnic majority (Bosniaks) or whether they reside in FYR Macedonia where they are an ethnic minority (Albanians).

5.9 Discussion and conclusion

The purpose of our research was to examine cross-national differences in gender role attitudes in post-Yugoslav societies. In addition, we investigated the determinants of traditional gender role attitudes at the individual level. The present study found that at the aggregate level socioeconomic development was associated with measures of gender role traditionalism. Our results seem to give confirmation to the main prepositions of the postmodernization theory (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) and to a large degree corroborate past studies carried out on representative post-Yugoslav national samples (Simkus, 2007), as well as on student samples (Tavčar, 2010; Kirbiš, 2011; Kirbiš and Flere, 2011). Our study thus also seems to indicate that student samples, despite being unrepresentative, are valid for cross-national comparison (see Flere and Lavrič, 2008). To sum up, research carried out on different segments of population now confirms that in post-Yugoslav context socioeconomic development predicts gender role traditionalism at the cross-national level.

Also in line with postmodernization theory were the results of longitudinal analysis, which has shown that gender role attitudes have changed in the last decade (from the 1995–8 to 2008) in all six analyzed post-Yugoslav countries (longitudinal data for Kosovo was not available) in the direction of greater attitudinal gender role equality, as found in some previous studies of individual post-Yugoslav countries (e.g. Sekulić and Šporer, 2006). On the other hand, this does not mean that there has been a convergence with regard to gender role attitudes among post-Yugoslav countries, since countries “started” from different positions in 1995–8 period. In fact, the differences between socio-economically least and most developed countries increased in the last decade. Still, the direction of longitudinal changes has been the same in all observed environments – views of citizens of post-Yugoslav countries have become less traditional (i.e. more liberal) with regard to orientations toward gender roles.
We have seen that one country was a particular outlier with regard to GRT – FYR Macedonia. Our results showed that while in 1995–8 period Macedonians had the lowest scores on the analyzed item of gender role traditionalism, in 2008 they became most traditional oriented in 2008, compared to other post-Yugoslavs. Though the trend in FYR Macedonia was, similar to other countries in the region, i.e. one of detraditionalization, the extent of such trend was smallest in Macedonia. We can speculate on two possible reasons. First, FYR Macedonia had one of the smallest increase in GDP in the observed period. It is therefore not surprising from the postmodernization theory’s point of view that the increase in liberal orientations was the smallest in this country. Also, one other important factor should be considered. FYR Macedonia experienced armed conflict in 2001 due to ethnic tensions between ethnic majority and Albanian minority, which was the last armed conflict on ex-Yugoslav territory. Postmodernization theory does predict that contextual factors (other than socioeconomic development), i.e. unfavourable macro conditions (e.g., economic crises, ethnic strife and especially armed conflict) increase feelings of existential insecurity. This, in turn, may affect the decrease in liberalization of attitudes, or in other words, public becomes less in favour of changes (e.g. those regarding gender role attitudes) and rise of survival value orientations and traditionalism occurs. Though no attitudinal reversal was detected in FYR Macedonia, it seems that these two conditions might have played a crucial role in determining relatively traditional gender role attitudes of Macedonians. In his chapter on post-Yugoslav family, Flere already presented a review of findings pointing to traditional extended family and zadruga type families found in Macedonia in 1970s. It seems paradoxical that the structure of Macedonian family was more traditional in 1970 in comparative perspective, yet Macedonians had most liberal attitudes to gender in late 1990s, and were again most traditional by 2008. On the other hand, family structure in Macedonia (if number of children is taken as an indicator) was one of the most traditional in late 1980s, and one of the most postmodern in 2008 (on average there is a relatively low mean number of children in a typical Macedonian family; see Flere in present volume). Future studies should examine the issue of gender role attitudes in Macedonia in more detail, especially the factors that decreased the speed of attitudinal changes of its public.

At the individual level we also found gender differences in gender role attitudes. Corroborating previous studies (Apparala et al., 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; also see Tu and Liao, 2005; Crouter et al., 2007), we found women to be more liberal than men. On the other hand, gender gap was not found to be most pronounced in socioeconomically most developed countries, as Inglehart and Norris (2005) would predict. One possible explanation is that
in Slovenia and Croatia not only women have become more liberal, but men also, or in other words, the changes in GRT have not been greater for women in the analysed countries. It seems then that men’s attitudes have changed at the relatively same rate as the women’s. While this is encouraging in terms of equality in gender role attitudes, it still remains to be determined if these attitudinal changes have translated into more egalitarian behaviour. For instance, a question can be posed whether the inequalities in house work, public participation or political engagement, have decreased in the last decade. It is up to future studies to investigate these patterns in more detail.

In our study age also proved to have a positive effect on GRT at the compound sample level, yet only in Slovenia and Croatia were the young more liberally oriented, which gives only partial support to previous studies (Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Apparala et al., 2003). Our findings suggest that although the liberalization of gender role attitudes is taking place, in the future, country differences might not decrease since youth in more developed countries are less traditionally oriented, while no age effect has been detected in less developed countries. In the long term, the cross-national differences therefore might even increase, as we have shown, has already happened in the last decade (the reader should note that cross-country differences did increase only slightly).

On the other hand, such a scenario might not play out if we consider another key finding of our study, i.e. the liberal effect of education. We found education to be the strongest and universal predictor of gender role attitudes across samples, corroborating previous studies (Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007; Simkus, 2007; Kunovich and Kunovich, 2008). We might speculate that with increasing levels of education in socioeconomically least developed countries gender role traditionalism might further decrease in the coming decades, and increasing levels of education might bring less developed countries closer to developed ones. While size of town in our study did not prove to have a univocal impact on GRT, similar can be said of personal religiosity (compare to Brajdić-Vuković et al., 2007). Still, it seems that attitudinal religiosity plays a somewhat stronger role in GRT than church attendance.

Our results with regard to within-national differences in GRT have also provided us with an interesting results that seems to indicate two key findings: 1) two of the three ethnic/religious mixed post-Yugoslav countries (Kosovo, BIH and FYR Macedonia) have very heterogeneous population with regard to gender role traditionalism along the lines of religious denomination; 2) the within-national variation in GRT lies in denominational status and not in ethnic minority status. In other words, Muslims are most traditional whether they reside in BIH where they are an ethnic majority (Bosniaks) or whether
they reside in FYR Macedonia where they are an ethnic minority (Albanians). Despite the fact that ethnic minority status was in past research found to be a significant determinant of political-cultural orientations with ethnic minorities being more traditional, authoritarian, materialist oriented than ethnic majorities (for research on Yugoslav republics see Pantić, 1990a: 190; 1991a: 104; Vasović, 1991a: 135–141; for research on postcommunist states see Lühiste, 2008), our study results indicate that religious denomination variable (and not ethnic majority/minority status per se) has the deciding impact. In this sense Muslims, whether an ethnic minority or minority, score higher on gender role attitudes than Orthodox or Roman Catholic respondents. Our results also corroborate findings of Simkus (2007), who compared ethnic minorities and majorities in six post-Yugoslav states on three measures of cultural orientations, with gender role attitudes being one of them. He also found that Muslims scored higher on gender role traditionalism both in BIH and FYR Macedonia. Our results are also in line with findings of Inglehart and Norris (2005), who in their analysis of gender role attitudes in world context found that Muslims generally have more traditional gender role attitudes than members of other religious groups. This effect was not simply due to the fact that many Muslims live in less affluent countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, since the effect of Muslim religion on GRT stayed significant even after controlling for macrovariables of social modernization and political development. Inglehart and Norris concluded that “[Muslim] traditional religious values and religious laws have played an important role in reinforcing social norms of a separate and subordinate role for women as homemakers and mothers, and a role for men as patriarchs within the family and primary breadwinners in the paid workforce” (2005: 68). Our analysis indicates that this might also hold true in post-Yugoslav context, and future research should focus on this aspect of gender role attitudes.

Finally, we should mention some caveats of our study. First, at the aggregate level we only dealt with one macrovariable – the level of socioeconomic development. Previous research has shown that other factors might also influence cross-national differences in citizen orientations. One of them is the predominant religious tradition (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). In the future studies of post-Yugoslav states researcher should take religious tradition into account and investigate its effect on gender role attitudes at the aggregate level, independently of socioeconomic development. Yet such a research endeavour would undoubtedly present problems because of the small sample size with only seven post-Yugoslav countries. Besides analysing the effect of only one macrovariable, we also investigated only two gender role attitudes items as dependent variable. In future studies, other dimensions of gender role attitudes should
be investigated, for instance those that measure participation of women in the public (e.g. political) sphere and work carried out within family, etc. Future research also ought to employ a multilevel analysis to disentangle the effect of individual and country-level variables.

Despite some of the study caveats, we believe our study contributes to the existent literature by investigating the predictive power of modernization theory in the post-Yugoslav context. Out study gives supports to the findings of other authors (Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) in terms of macro-explanations, while micro-level determinants have not been uniformly confirmed. Our results also show that cross-national differences in traditional gender attitudes are still present, as they already were before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, when the respondents from less developed republics have reported higher levels of subject, traditional and authoritarian orientations (see, for example, Mihailović, 1986; Miljević and Poplašen, 1991). We believe that the most important finding of present research is the one-directional change that took place in the last decade with regard to gender role attitudes. It is rather likely that this trend will continue in the future if the socioeconomic conditions in the region stay stable or if, better yet, the levels of socioeconomic development increase in the following years. Of course, economic instability, for instance in the form of the present global crisis, and especially political instability, might put a halt to this liberalization trend. The major socio-political actors in the regions and EU institutions should therefore strive to enable further improvement of living conditions and existential security of the people in the Balkans, and to improve relations between post-Yugoslav countries.

5.10 References


Determinants of political participation in Western Europe, East-Central Europe and post-Yugoslav countries

(A. Kirbiš)

Abstract
This chapter examines the determinants of political participation in three European regions: a group of established European democracies, a group of Central and Eastern European EU member states, and the group of post-Yugoslav countries. In this last group we examine longitudinal changes in conventional political participation (voter turnout (official IDEA data), party membership (World Values Survey)) and protest participation. We also analyze the impact of three sociodemographic variables (age, gender and socioeconomic status) on political participation in these three European environments. Results indicate that in post-Yugoslav states voter turnout has decreased since the early 1990s, while protest engagement has increased in the last decade. Also, sociodemographic predictor variables explain the largest variance in political participation in the EU20 group, indicating that inequalities in participation are, on average, greater in established democracies than in postcommunist European countries. Finally, sociodemographic variables prove to have greater impact on protest engagement than on conventional political participation. Implications of the results are discussed.

Key words: political participation, civic engagement, protest participation, determinants, post-Yugoslav states, postcommunist countries, modernization.
6.1 Introduction

Understanding determinants of political participation in postcommunist countries is of crucial importance in order to understand the common coexistence of “old” and “new” Europe. The aim of the present chapter was to analyze and compare determinants of political participation in three European country-groups. This chapter is divided into several sections. The first section gives a brief overview of the significance of political participation for the functioning of democracies, gives the working definition of political participation and presents the dimensionality of political participation. Literature on the determinants of political participation is examined in the second section. In the third section the main study hypotheses are outlined, and in the fourth section the main results are presented. The fifth and final section puts the main results into the wider context of past literature and presents the main implications of the study.

6.2 Political participation, democracy and ongoing trends

In a seminal study on political participation, Verba and Nie (1972: 2) defined political participation as “… those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take”. We use a wider definition of political participation, one that is in line with Vromen’s research (2003: 82–83). She defines participation as “… acts that can occur, either individually or collectively, that are intrinsically concerned with shaping the society that we want to live in”. This broader conceptualization of political participation leads to the inclusion of civic participation (i.e., social participation, for example membership in voluntary associations), protest participation (e.g., signing petitions, protesting) and other forms of “unconventional” political participation, which occur beyond formal and electoral politics (Vromen, 2003). Our understanding of participation also coincides with past studies which have given a theoretical and empirical confirmation to the predicted multidimensionality of political participation (e.g. Verba et al., 1995; Vromen, 2003; Claggett and Pollock, 2006). Since researchers most commonly differentiate between conventional political participation and unconventional (new, alternative) political participation (protest participation, but also social/civic participation; see Barnes and Kaase et al., 1979; Mihailović, 1986; Pantić, 1988; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Torney-Purta and Richardson, 2002; Zukin et al., 2006), our analysis will involve these two dimensions of political participation.
Political participation is widely regarded as a central condition of democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pateman, 1970; Dahl, 1972; Barber, 1984; Parry and Moyses, 1994; Dalton, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2002; Barnes, 2004). Indeed, an active, engaged, participatory-oriented citizen is a critical element in a stable and effective democracy (see Verba et al., 1995: 1; Schlozman, 2002: 433). Or, as Verba and colleagues have concisely affirmed, citizen participation is “at the heart of democracy” (Verba et al., 1995: 1). So, an important issue that needs examination is the level of political participation within different European environments, with a special focus on the post-Yugoslav states. Verba and Nie (1972: 1), for instance, argued that “Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is”. Consequently, the levels of participation in a given country are by some students of democratization considered to be an indicator of its level of democracy (Parry and Moyses, 1994: 46; see also Vanhanen, 1990: 17–18). Some worrying trends have been detected in recent years that pose questions regarding the functioning of modern democratic states. Specifically, past studies point to a decrease in the levels of voter turnout, party membership and the strength of party attachment, social participation and political and institutional trust (Crozier et al., 1975; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Katz et al., 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Wattenberg, 1998; Gray and Caul, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Macedo et al., 2005; Blais, 2007; Scarrow, 2007).

Equally important is the distribution of participation across social groups. In other words, if politics is an arena that determines “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell, 1936), it is of vital importance to examine who in Europe participates, and also whether there are any differences between determinants of political participation in different European regions. Since political participation is not equally distributed across social groups, the result is that … “only certain voices reach the government and that many citizens’ concerns go unheard … Such inequality undermines the representativeness of a democracy” (McFarland and Thomas, 2006: 401).

### 6.3 Determinants of political participation

The central finding of previous research is that higher levels of political participation are found in countries that are socioeconomically more developed. For example, studies have found that well-off countries have higher levels of voter turnout, non-electoral conventional political participation (e.g., contacting politicians and public officials, contributing money to working for political par-
ties and candidates; membership in political parties), civic/social participation and higher levels of protest participation (Norris, 2002; Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Janmaat, 2006; Blais, 2007; Newton in Montero, 2007; Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Roller and Rudi, 2008). A large number of studies have also found that established Western democracies have higher levels of participation than post-communist countries (see, among others, Norris, 2002; Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Newton and Montero, 2007; Dubrow et al., 2008).

In other words, two important factors have an impact political participation at the aggregate level: level of socioeconomic development and time. In recent years conventional political participation has been markedly in decline (see above). Protest participation, on the other hand, shows the opposite pattern. Inglehart and Catterberg (2002), for instance, made the long-term prediction that protest participation would increase in new democracies, despite the decline in the initial “post-honeymoon” period. Similarly, Barnes (2004) reported increases in protest approval in 11 out of 12 postcommunist democracies in the first decade following the collapse of communism, with the mean levels of protest approval in the overall postcommunist country sample also increasing.

Next to these two macro-determinants, past studies have also uncovered a wide array of individual-level determinants of political participation. Among these, age, gender and socioeconomic status have proven to be especially potent predictors of political participation.

6.3.1 Age

Political participation by young people is important, as it reflects the “health” and functioning of a democracy and also has a positive impact on adolescents’ identity formation (Flanagan and Levine, 2010: 160). Examining the patterns of participation among youth shows that participation is also important because political and civil participation in adolescence predicts an individual’s participation in adulthood. In other words, the best predictor of future political participation is the individual’s past political participation (Plutzer, 2002; Obradović and Masten, 2007). It is therefore not surprising that participation of young people in representative democracy and civil society is identified as an area for action by the Council Resolution of the European Union on a renewed framework for European cooperation in the youth field (2010–2018) (Official Journal of the European Union/C311, 2009: 7).

Although studies show that young people participate in politics less often than adults (e.g., Schussman and Soule, 2005; Zukin et al., 2006; Quintelier, 2007;
Dalton, 2008; Fahmy, 2008), are less interested in politics and show lower levels of perceived internal political efficacy (Thomassen, 2002; Torcal, 2006), the low level of participation among youth refers primarily to conventional politics (i.e., formal, institutional political participation). In fact, young people are aware politics has a major impact on people’s lives, but they perceive political institutions and elites as non-responsive (Bennett, 1997; also see Marsh et al., 2007; cited in Berry, 2008: 368), which is why young people are alienated from the political system (Henn et al., 2005: 574).

Though young people are usually less often engaged in conventional political participation, they often engage in new, direct, individualized, “alternative” or “unconventional” forms of political participation. Protest participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations, joining boycotts, etc.) is the main form of non-institutionalized, direct civic action, which, is by many scholars seen as central to the functioning of democracy (e.g., Kaase and Marsh, 1979; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Guérin et al., 2004). Indeed, protest-engaged citizens are found to be pro-democratically oriented and may play a key role in the consolidation of new democracies (Tavčar Krajnc et al., 2012). Research shows that youth is more often engaged in protest, social and individualized forms of participation than adults and the older population (see Shin, 1999; Guérin et al., 2004; Gundelach, 2004; Zukin et al., 2006; Quintelier, 2007; Dalton, 2008; Fahmy, 2008), a pattern also found in postcommunist countries (Guérin et al., 2004; cf. Dubrow et al., 2008).

6.3.2 Gender

Gender has also been found to have an impact on political participation. This has been confirmed by earlier studies of political participation (Lane, 1959; Campbell et al., 1960; Almond and Verba, 1963; Milbrath, 1965; Verba et al., 1978; Marsh, 1979; Jennings, 1983), as well as by more recent studies (Pantić, 1988; Parry et al., 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Schlozman et al., 1995; Verba et al. 1995, 2003; Miller et al., 1999; Shin, 1999; Vassallo, 2006).

Gender differences were also detected in the psychological dimensions of political engagement; for example, women score lower on expressed interest in politics (Inglehart, 1981; Alisauskiene, 2002; Torcal, 2006; Roßteutscher, 2008); report lower levels of political and institutional trust (Listhaug, 2006; Magalhães, 2006), satisfaction with democratic institutions (Zapf and Habich, 2002) and perceived political efficacy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Parry et al., 1992); have lower levels of knowledge about politics (Dell Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Frazer and Macdonald, 2003), are
less attached to political parties (Shin, 1999) and pay less attention to politics (Verba et al., 1997).

Despite research spanning several decades, and research results in recent years, the gender differences in political participation are not uniform. On the one hand, some research confirms that gender differences in participation and motivation still exist (Bennett and Bennett, 1989; Torres and Brites, 2006; Torcal, 2006; Vassallo, 2006; Gallego, 2007); on the other hand, some studies suggest that gender differences have diminished (Verba 1972: 158–159; see also Barnes, 2006: 91). What’s more, some earlier studies have shown gender differences in participation to no longer be statistically significant (Andersen, 1975; McGlen and Black, 1979; Wirls, 1986); this has been confirmed by several recent studies (Topf, 1995a; McDonough et al., 1998; Stolle and Micheletti, 2003; Schussman and Soule, 2005; Gunther and Montero, 2006; Korosteleva and Hutcheson, 2006; Listhaug, 2006; Armengon, 2007). Moreover, some studies even suggest that there is a reversal in the gender gap: in some forms of civic participation, women are more often involved than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Norris et al., 2006). The reverse gap was also detected in voter turnout (see Hadjar and Beck, 2010: 533).

### 6.3.3 Socioeconomic status

Another important determinant of political participation is socioeconomic status (SES), which is often measured through educational level and economic income of the individual or his/her family. Studies show that higher personal or family SES has a positive impact on political participation (Verba, 1962; Almond and Verba, 1963; Nelson, 1979; Pantić, 1988; Parry et al., 1992; Shin, 1999; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001; Verba et al. 2003; Patterson, 2005; Torcal, 2006; Gallego, 2007; Boyle and Schmierbach, 2009). Barnes (2006) notes that in postcommunist Europe in recent years the impact of SES on political participation is on the decline (for a review of the impact of SES on participation, see Cho et al., 2006; for a review of the impact of SES on participation of young people, see Sandell Pacheco and Plutzer, 2008).

Higher SES levels are generally associated with higher levels of political participation, since SES increases citizens’ skills with regard to managing and understanding political content and being active in the public sphere. Individuals with high SES therefore have more resources available (higher education and occupational status, more economic resources, etc.), which allows them to participate in political life more frequently and with less effort (see Cho et al., 2006). Verba and his colleagues argue that the majority of differences in
participation at the individual level stem from the socioeconomic status of an individual (Verba et al., 2003: 56).

Some of the earliest research after the collapse of communist regimes showed that SES was not a statistically significant predictor of political participation: for example, the study done by Kluegel and Mason (1999), who analyzed empirical data from 1991. However, more recent empirical studies suggest that SES is a stronger predictor of political participation in postcommunist countries than in established democracies (Smith, 2009).

### 6.4 Hypotheses

First, based on previous research on established and new democracies (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Katz et al., 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Wattenberg, 1998; Gray and Caul, 2000; Macedo et al., 2005; Blais, 2007; Scarrow, 2007; Pacek et al., 2009), we predict that in the 1995–8 and 2008 periods levels of conventional political participation in post-Yugoslav states will be found to have decreased (H1a), while protest participation (i.e. elite-challenging actions) will have increased (H1b).

Additionally, we predict that three determinants will significantly predict political participation at the individual level. With regard to age, we anticipate that young people will score lower on conventional political participation measures (H2a), but higher on protest participation (H2b). We also hypothesize that women will score lower on conventional participation measures (H3a) and on protest participation (H3b). Finally, we predict that socioeconomic status will significantly determine both conventional (H4a) and protest (H4b) participation. Though we will not make any predictions regarding between-group differences in the impact of sociodemographic variables, we will investigate whether any divergent patterns exist.

### 6.5 Method

#### 6.5.1 Sample

The World Values Survey and the European Values Study were employed in the present analysis. The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It is conducted by a network of social
scientists at leading universities all around world. Interviews have been carried out with nationally representative samples of the public of almost a hundred societies on all six inhabited continents (WVS, 2012a). In order to monitor these changes, the EVS/WVS has executed five waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007 (the newest wave of the European Values Survey was carried out in 2008). Representative national surveys were undertaken in 97 societies, containing almost 90 percent of the world’s population (WVS, 2012b). The World Values Survey has produced evidence of gradual but pervasive changes in what people want out of life. Moreover, the survey shows that the basic direction of these changes is, to some extent, predictable (WVS, 2012a).

Our analysis focused on three groups of countries. In the first group of countries we included 20 established EU democracies (hereinafter EU20).62 In the second group we included nine postcommunist EU member states (East and Central European new democracies, hereinafter ECEEU9).63 Finally, in the third group we included all the countries of former Yugoslavia.64 In order to test out hypotheses regarding micro-determinants of participation, we used the EVS 2008 data to compare all three country groups. In addition, we employed the WVS from 1996–2000 to carry out longitudinal analysis of political participation in post-Yugoslav states.

### 6.5.2 Measures

We included three dimensions of political participation in our longitudinal and individual-level analysis. First, conventional political participation in the form of electoral participation was measured with the following item indicating voter turnout: “If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?” (1 = Yes, I would vote, 2 = No, I would not vote). With regard to non-electoral political participation, respondents were asked whether they were members of a political party (1 = yes, 2 = no). Our third measure of politi-

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62 This group included the following established EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Though they are not EU member states, we also included Iceland, Norway and Switzerland in this group, since all fall in the group of advanced European democracies, according to economic and political indicators (HDR, 2011).

63 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic.

64 The post-Yugoslav group included all post-Yugoslav countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.
Political participation was protest participation, which was tapped by three Likert format items: “signing a petition”, “joining boycotts”, and “attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations” (1 = would never do, 2 = have done, 3 = would do). A summation variable was created by adding the three items and dividing the values by 3. The protest participation scale was summed across all three protest items and standardized to 100 points for ease of interpretation. Higher protest values represented greater levels of protest engagement.

Three sociodemographic predictors were analyzed: Age (date of birth), gender (1 = male, 2 = female) and SES. SES was not a summation scale; instead, we analyzed the impact of family income and respondent’s educational level separately. Family income was measured by asking respondents about their monthly household income, and respondents’ educational level was measured on a scale from 1 (pre-primary education or no education) to 7 (second stage of tertiary education).

6.6 Results

6.6.1 Longitudinal changes in political participation in the post-Yugoslav states

First, we predicted that in post-Yugoslav countries the levels of conventional political participation would have decreased (H1a) (Gray and Caul, 2000; Macedo et al., 2005; Blais, 2007; Scarrow, 2007) and that protest engagement would have increased in the 1995–8 and 2008 periods (H1b) (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). Figures 6-1 and 6-2 show the levels of conventional political participation in the past two decades. Since a question on voting was only included in 2008 in all post-Yugoslav states in EVS 2008, to longitudinally inspect the issue, Figure 6-1 shows the official turnout rates for parliamentary elections in all post-Yugoslav states (data acquired from IDEA (2012) database). Specifically, the turnout rates in all parliamentary elections for each country are shown. If we first consider the data for the last elections in each country,

65 The actual question regarding protest engagements in the EVS questionnaire was framed as follows: “Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it”.

66 Subsequently the calculation was made (x1000, corrected for ppp in Euros).
we see that turnout was generally somewhat higher in the more well-to-do post-Yugoslav countries (Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia), with close to 60% turnout or higher, while it was below 60% in the three least developed countries. Longitudinal data show that turnout in the first (found-ing) elections was highest in three countries and was among the higher in the rest. After the initial euphoria, it seems, turnout rates declined (the turnout drop was especially large in Slovenia and Croatia). Only in FYR Macedonia and in Serbia did the turnout rates stay relatively stable (an exception was the relatively high turnout in Macedonia in 2002).

Figure 6-1: Voter turnout in the post-Yugoslav countries, official data from IDEA.

![Voter turnout in the post-Yugoslav countries](image)

Source: IDEA (2012).

Figure 6-2 shows party membership in the same period. Among the six countries for which we have longitudinal data available, party membership decreased in three: minimally in FYR Macedonia and somewhat more in BiH; and the largest membership decline took place in Montenegro. Interestingly, such a strong decline was possible because on the first occasion, Montenegrins reached extremely high party membership rates (cca. 20%). In 2008 they fell below the 5% mark. In Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia membership rates increased. Taking into account that party membership is one of the least widespread political activities, slight increases in three countries cannot be understood as indicative of tectonic participatory movement.
In sum, the official turnout data and WVS/EVS data seem to provide a confirmation of H1a: levels of conventional political participation have generally decreased – a pattern found in the majority of post-Yugoslav countries.

Figure 6-3 shows protest participation in the 1992–2008 period. The available data for each country is shown. As predicted, protest engagement rates increased in the majority of countries (FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia).

The longitudinal data for protest engagement show a predicted pattern: the public in post-Yugoslav states were increasingly more likely to be engaged in protest behaviour. Only in BiH did protest rates decline somewhat (for Kosovo, there is no longitudinal data), while in other countries, an increase is evident, confirming our H1b.
6.6.2 Individual-level predictors of political participation in Europe

We also predicted that three sociodemographic variables would significantly predict political participation at the individual level. With regard to age, we anticipated that young people would score lower on conventional political participation measures (H2a), but higher on protest participation (H2b). We also anticipated that women would score lower on conventional participation measures (H3a), but higher on protest participation (H3b). Finally, we predicted that socioeconomic status would significantly determine both conventional (H4a) and protest (H4b) participation.

To test these predictions, first, a logistic regression analysis was performed with non-voting as the dependent variable (indicating conventional political participation), and age, gender, respondent’s education and monthly family income as predictor variables (see Table 6-1). The full model significantly predicted non-voting (omnibus chi-square in the post-Yugoslav group = 162.260, df = 4, p < 0.0005). The model accounted for between 2% and 2.9% of non-voting in post-Yugoslav group.

| Table 6-1: Logistic regression predicting non-voting, EVS 2008, three European regions. |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                      | EU20                | EUECE9              | POST-YU              |
| Omnibus chi-square                     | 586.158             | 155.514             | 162.260              |
| df                                       | 4                   | 4                   | 4                   |
| p                                        | < 0.0005            | < 0.0005            | < 0.0005             |
| Variance accounted for (%)              | 2.9 % (< 5.4)       | 2.5 % (< 2.2)       | 0.2 % (< 2.9)       |
| Hosmer and Lemeshow Test                | p > 0.05            | p > 0.05            | p > 0.05             |
| Accurate predictions (%)                | 86.6                | 71.2                | 71.6                |
| Age v303_year_of_birth                  | -0.022**            | -0.012**            | -0.015**             |
| Gender (female) v302(1)                  | 0.224**             | 0.053               | 0.158*               |
| v336_education                          | -0.292**            | -0.194**            | -0.058**             |
| v353m_pp                                 | -0.087**            | -0.024              | -0.238**             |

Note: ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

Let us look at some between-group differences. Variance accounted for non-voting was highest in EU20 countries, indicating that the three individual-level predictors were strongest in this group, compared to the smaller predicted variance in non-voting in both postcommunist country groups. Age turned out
to be a significant negative predictor of non-voting in all three environments. In other words, in all three groups young people were more likely to abstain from voting, as predicted. Gender, on the other hand, proved to be significant predictor only in the EU20 and post-Yugoslav groups, where women were less likely to vote. In the EUECE9 group, women were not more likely to abstain from voting. Respondent’s education also proved a significant negative predictor of non-voting, with lower educational status being associated with a higher likelihood of non-voting. Finally, similar to gender, family monthly income proved a significant predictor only in the EU20 and post-Yugoslav groups, but not in the EUECE9 group, where respondents with higher incomes were not more likely to vote.

Table 6-2 shows the results of regression analysis with protest participation as the dependent variable. Variance accounted (adjusted R Square) was again highest in EU20 countries (16.7 %), indicating that three individual-level variables were the strongest predictors of protest participation in this group of countries, while the predicted variance in both postcommunist groups was substantially lower, with 6.1 % and 7.8 % in the EUECE9 and post-Yugoslav groups, respectively. All three variables had the effect we predicted within all three country groups. Age turned out to be a significant negative predictor of protest participation, with young people more likely to engage in protest activities. Women were found less likely to protest in all three groups, with betas relatively close. Higher income and education all increase the likelihood of protest engagement, with education being the strongest predictor variable in all three environments. Interestingly, the effect of education on protest participation was strongest in EU20 countries, and lower in both postcommunist groups.

Table 6-2: Regression model predicting protest participation, EVS 2008, three European regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU20</th>
<th>EUECE9</th>
<th>POST-YU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance accounted for (%)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age v303_year_of_birth</td>
<td>0.102**</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>0.097**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female) v302(1)</td>
<td>-0.070**</td>
<td>-0.087**</td>
<td>-0.139**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v336_education</td>
<td>0.334**</td>
<td>0.176**</td>
<td>0.181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v353m_pp</td>
<td>0.054**</td>
<td>0.069**</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
6.7 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter we examined determinants of political participation at the individual level in three European regions: a group of established EU democracies, a group of East-Central European EU member states and the group of post-Yugoslav countries. The main focus of this chapter was to compare longitudinal patterns of conventional and protest participation in post-Yugoslav countries.

Based on past studies, we predicted that in the 1995–8 and 2008 periods, levels of conventional political participation in post-Yugoslav states would have decreased, while protest participation (i.e., elite-challenging actions) would have increased. Our results regarding the longitudinal patterns of political participation in post-Yugoslav countries largely confirm our predictions, since we found conventional political participation to be on the decline, while protest engagement has increased during the last decade. Specifically, official data has shown that turnout in the first elections was generally among the highest, if not in all cases the highest, and in the years that followed turnout rates declined. While longitudinal patterns were somewhat mixed with regard to party membership, protest engagement rates increased in the majority of post-Yugoslav countries.

Our results confirm the results of past studies showing that protest participation has been on the rise in recent decades, with the process of (post) modernization being identified as one of the main reasons. Specifically, it is often argued that socioeconomic development has caused changes in political culture (orientations – values, feelings towards political and social objects (e.g., toward the political system, public officials, and external authority in general)) among citizens in established and postcommunist democracies. The process of modernization and postmodernization caused a reduction in political trust among citizens, while self-expression values took priority and “critical” citizens emerged (Norris, 1999; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). In other words, citizens have increasingly obtained the objective means and subjective abilities to confront political elites and to engage in elite-challenging participation (Inglehart, 1997; Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Inglehart and Welzel, 2007; Welzel, 2007). While conventional political participation (i.e., institutional participation linked with party politics) has been declining in recent decades, protest participation has been on the rise in western democracies, although it declined in the first decade after the collapse of communism in postcommunist countries (see Inglehart and Catterberg, 2000). Research therefore increasingly indicates that “cause-oriented” politics is on the rise (see Norris, 2004; Harris et al., 2010), and our results corroborated this pattern for the post-Yugoslav states.
With regard to individual-level determinants of political participation, we anticipated that three variables would significantly affect political participation. With regard to age, we hypothesized that young people would score lower on conventional political participation measures, but higher on protest participation. We also hypothesized that women would score lower on conventional and protest participation measures. Finally, we expected socioeconomic status to significantly predict both conventional and protest participation.

Interestingly, we found that sociodemographic predictors have a stronger impact on protest participation – a mode of participation where all of our hypotheses were confirmed – compared to conventional political participation measured through voter turnout. In fact, in the EUECE9 group, gender and income proved non-significant, while all three predictors explained the highest variance in both turnout and protest participation in the EU20 group. It seems, then, that inequality in political participation is least in both postcommunist country groups. This might be a result of the communist legacy, where in many regimes participation was considered an important element of communist ideology (see Almond, 1983).

Still, gender differences were detected in our study in two groups of countries in protest participation, corroborating past studies (Gallego, 2007; Vassallo, 2006), although electoral participation proved to be the least gender related (Topf, 1995b; Verba et al., 1978). As Vassallo wrote in her research, “the time to finally close the gender gap in political activism had still to come in 1990” (Vassallo, 2006: 426). The same can still be said for post-Yugoslav states and EU20 countries two decades later. We argue that public policy provisions facilitating women’s participation ought to be designed and implemented more successfully, with the aim of reducing gender inequality in the central aspect of participation in a representative democracy – voter turnout. Of course, increased emphasis should be given to protest participation.

Along with gender, age also proved to be a key determinant of political participation. In all these environments, youth proved more ready to engage in protest participation – a mode of participation that is largely the reflection of a democratic political culture (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) and which was found positively associated with democratic culture (Tavčar Krajnc et al., 2012). On the other hand, in our study the younger generation appeared inclined to participate in conventional political activities. Particularly problematic seems to be the low voter turnout among younger generations (Dalton, 2008), since for many citizens turnout is the only form for demonstrating their own will through conventional politics. Additionally, in our study socioeconomic status, especially education, was found to be a strong predictor of political participa-
tion, a result consistent with previous research (see Verba, 1962; Nelson, 1979; Mihailović, 1986; Pantić, 1988; Parry et al. 1992; Shin, 1999; Patterson, 2005; Cho et al., 2006; Torcal, 2006; Gallego, 2007; Sandell Pacheco and Plutzer, 2008; Boyle and Schmierbach, 2009).

Interestingly, our research corroborates the findings of Ødegård and Berglund (2008), who analyzed determinants of old (conventional) and new modes of participation (“cause-oriented” participation, especially protest participation) among Norwegian youth and found that “structural and cultural conditions influence the new political activities to a higher degree than the traditional form”. Results of our study confirm that this pattern is found throughout the adult European population. On the other hand, Ødegård and Berglund hypothesized an opposite pattern: building on work by Giddens and Beck, they predicted that politics in late modernity has become less influenced by an individual’s class position than was true for traditional industrial society. The study of Norwegian youth and also our study results indicate that the socioeconomic model is, surprisingly, stronger in countries that are socioeconomically more developed. To further test Giddens’ and Beck’s proposition, a longitudinal study should be carried out in order to compare explained variance in the socioeconomic model in the conventional vs. unconventional political participation.

Future studies should also examine the aggregate-level impact of socioeconomic development on individual-level inequalities in participation, since our results indicate that the EU20 group, as the economically most developed, has the greatest inequalities in participation. On the other hand, it is not clear whether low levels of economic development or other macro-determinants (communist legacy, political culture, etc.) affect rather low inequalities in participation in postcommunist countries. From the perspective of participatory democracy (Barber, 2004), it is important to see whether rising levels of socioeconomic development in postcommunist states would actually increase inequalities in participation. For now, it seems, postcommunist states are more egalitarian in this aspect of democratic functioning than their economically more developed Western counterparts. On the other hand, this equality does not say much about postcommunist political elites. Namely, in previous studies these were found to be more corrupt than western elites and having lower levels of democratic political culture (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). Moreover, the responsiveness of postcommunist elites to citizens’ demands might be lower than in established democracies. Finally, lower levels of inequalities among postcommunist citizens might also be due to lower general levels of political participation in these countries, as previous studies suggest (Norris, 2002; Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Newton and Montero, 2007; Dubrow et al.,
2008). In other words, while socioeconomically better situated individuals in established democracies might be politically more active than those less well-off, in postcommunist countries both upper and lower strata citizens are, on average, less politically active.

In sum, inequalities in political participation are a persistent phenomenon in Europe and in future studies researchers should examine these patterns closely, with the aim of identifying the causes and suggesting potential solutions for reducing inequalities in political participation, which is a central characteristic of a democratic polity.

### 6.8 References


Basic Shifts in Value Orientations in Post-Yugoslav Region: Convergence or Divergence?

(B. Musil)

Abstract
Since the beginning of the 1990s all the post-Yugoslav countries have faced intensive and extensive changes (dissolution of the former state, socio-economic and political transition). At the intersection of these societal factors with individual ones, we analyse values as beliefs about desired states of existence on representative samples from WVS/EVS data from different waves. According to our analysis, a trend of convergence among most post-Yugoslav societies is noticeable in the cultural aspect of value orientations and subsequent social practices. From this uniform picture, the most distinct digression is Slovenia. Conceptually, diversity among these countries is best represented by the distinction between traditionalism and self-expressive values, and in language of categories with a distinction between religious faith and independence. The complex and exacerbated conditions did have a cumulative effect in retraditionalization of most post-Yugoslav societies.

Key words: Values, value orientations, value shift, post-Yugoslav societies.
7.1 Values and value orientations: Stability or change

The end of the former millennium and the start of the current can be conceptualized as a time of change (e.g., the end of the cold war, followed by globalization and most recently by financial, economic and socio-political crises). To paraphrase Beck on risk society (1992), these are times of uncertainty. The intensity and extent of change are attributes that fundamentally modify the established perception of society as a relatively stable and (more ideally) permanent collective structure.

If we transform our perceptions of the stability and sustainability of the broader social world, does this also reflect well at the individual level? i.e. in the psychic organization of the individual? This question, of course, can be posed the other way around: whether changes in the functioning of the individual affect changes in society as a whole? This debate about causality is neither crucial nor fatal, but may have significance at later interpretative stages. At this point, let us assume that we are interested in the interconnection of societal change and changes in the functioning of individuals.

At the intersection of the individual and collective research context, we can highlight the concept of values. As ideals, goals or standards, they shape the aspirations of individuals and direct their lives, but they can also be interpreted as a central motivational theme of societies and subsequent societal change.

According to Smith and Bond (1999), “the best conceptual frameworks currently available to guide cross-cultural research are those provided by studies of value differences” (p. 69). Values or value priorities in society are the main and probably the most central element of culture (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). Value priorities of individuals represent central goals, related to all aspects of behavior; they are strongly influenced by everyday experiences in changing ecological and socio-political contexts; they are adapted for examining the ongoing processes of cultural and individual change in response to historical and social change; they can be used for the differentiation of cultures and subcultures that have emerged as human communities have evolved (Smith & Schwartz, 1997, pp. 79–80).

Following a review of the literature, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) defined values as “(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance” (p. 551).

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) also advanced some theoretical assumptions about the nature and sources of values. Values are cognitive representations
of three types of universal human requirements: biologically based needs of the organism, social interactional requirements for interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands for group welfare and survival (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p. 551).

Of great interest for cross-cultural research is the duality of the values concept. First, values represent an implicit part of culture, (predominantly) universal or cross-culturally comparable, on the one hand, and possessing the power to discriminate between cultures, on the other; second, values can also be explored as categories of the individual, as motivating and identifying conceptualizations of personality and the self. In that sense, they are dual phenomena, interpreted as individual or personal but also as collective or sociocultural. Or, to sum up with Rokeach (1973), the concept of values is the main dependent variable in the study of culture, society, and personality, and the main independent variable in the study of social attitudes and behavior (p. ix). Thus, they are valuable conceptualizations for analyzing and understanding individuals, groups, institutions, and consequently distinguishing among cultures and among individuals within and across cultures (Knafo, Roccas, Sagiv, 2011: 179).

There are numerous empirical, cross-cultural studies of values in psychology and related scientific disciplines (e.g., Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, Basañez, & Moreno, 1998; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Musek, 1993, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996). What is common to all these studies is the search for an underlying structure, higher order value system or orientation. Based on similarities between the different dimensional approaches to values, Smith and Schwartz (1997) propose two basic dimensions identified in different ways by different researchers:

1. the preferred cultural view of individual-group relations (autonomous versus embedded) and

2. the preferred cultural mode of motivating responsible social behavior and allocating resources (negotiation among equals, versus acceptance of unequal, hierarchical roles) (p. 103).

From a more personality-oriented perspective based on Triandis’ (1995) two dimensions of vertical vs. horizontal and individualism vs. collectivism, Smith and Bond (1999) suggest a differentiation between horizontal and vertical collectivism, universalism and particularism.

Many definitions of values have clearly established their (at least relative) stability (e.g., Musek, 2000: 9; Rokeach, 1973: 5). Furthermore, from the book
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Kroeber, Kluckhohn, 1952), we can extract arguments for assumptions about the content (cross-cultural) and temporal (historical) stability of values according to the existence of universals in human existence. The first one is based on the similarities in human biology, which outweigh the variations; the second argument relates to the fact that people always and everywhere are faced with unavoidable problems that arise from natural situations (ibid. 176). This is why no culture is completely isolated or self-sufficient, but is related and comparable to any other, which, according to the authors, shows in the similarities among cultures, especially in the content of values (ibid. 177).

We can summarize these arguments in the following way:

There is a limited number of human problems for which all people at all times must find some solution… While there is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither limitless nor random, but is definitely variable within a range of possible solutions… All alternatives of all solutions are present in all societies at all times but are differentially preferred. (Kluckhohn, Strodtbeck, 1961: 10).

According to Rokeach, one of the pioneers of value research in the social sciences, the stability of values or value systems must be considered relative, since any assumption of complete stability renders the individual and social change impossible (1973: 5–6). A valid conceptualization must therefore take into account the ongoing and changing character of values.

This opens the possibility of changes in values, but these are generally gradual in content and time. We can certainly conclude that the speed and depth of change is influenced by the power of external global factors, such as globalization in the economic and political sense, and micro social (socialization) processes, which dictate the successful reproduction of society and the individual as a psychological correlate of the first.

In the discussion of societal (value) changes, Iglehart’s (post)modernization theory and the theory of human development (Inglehart, 1997; Welzel, Inglehart, Klingemann, 2003) should be mentioned. According to macro analyses of longitudinal data from the worldwide empirical research (project World Values Survey) two key cultural value dimensions were extracted: Traditional vs. Secular-rational values and Survival vs. Self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997: 81–98). The shift from Traditional to Secular-rational authority is associated with modernization, the shift from Survival to Self-expression with postmodernization (ibid.). The abovementioned interpretation is fundamentally linked to modernization theory, where economic development is associated with changes in culture and social and political life (Inglehart, Baker, 2000: 21). The scenario is as follows: industrialization leads to professional specialization,
higher educational levels and higher incomes, and ultimately leads to further change – changes in gender roles, attitudes to authority and sexual norms, declining fertility rates, broader political participation, and an autonomous public sphere (ibid.). In contrast to the growing materialism associated with the industrial revolution, the existential security of industrial societies created an intergenerational shift towards postmodern and postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), a shift from economic and physical security toward an emphasis on the autonomous individual, on subjective well-being and the quality of life (Inglehart, 1997).

In a further elaboration of the theory of human development, Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) proposed socioeconomic development, cultural change and the process of democratization as constitutive components of social progress with a common focus in broadening human choice. First, socioeconomic development broadens peoples’ choice by increasing their individual resources; cultural change induces a rise in self-expression values; finally, the institutional dimension, through the process of democratization, contributes to effective rights, thus giving human choice a legal basis (ibid.).

### 7.2 Focusing the scope

Questions of value changes interested us in a specific sociocultural context, in societies of former Yugoslavia. These societies represent an interesting area of study, at least for the following reasons: seventy years of joint history in the 20th century undoubtedly left a lasting social and even cultural imprint upon all post-Yugoslav societies; it is interesting to study how many of these common traits persist decades after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, from the beginning of the 1990s until present, all post-Yugoslav countries have faced intensive and extensive changes (dissolution of the former state, socioeconomic and political transition) and are at various stages of post-Communist/Socialist transition.

The questions that arise are as follows: Did important changes of value orientations occur in the societies of former Yugoslavia? Has there been a convergence among these societies, or greater diversity among them?

We tried to find answers with an analysis of data from culture-comparative studies that include the region of interest, especially in transnational studies, which also allow the monitoring of phenomena across time.
There are several culture-comparative empirical studies from the Yugoslav context (e.g., Cepyus, 2009; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; JJM, 1990; Jupio, 1986; KB, 1987; LOL, 1991; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978); however, items and data in these surveys are not comparable. There are traditions of public opinion surveys, in particular in ex-Yugoslav countries, allowing longitudinal monitoring of certain aspects of social life (e.g., in Slovenia see Toš, 1997, 1999). In our analysis we focused on the project World Values Survey (WVS, 2012), a cross-national study of sociocultural and political changes in worldwide societies, covering the vast majority of the world population. WVS combines both culture-comparative analysis and analysis from temporal perspective.

### 7.3 Method

#### 7.3.1 Procedure

We analysed the World Values Survey (WVS) wave from 1995–8 and the European Values Study (EVS) wave from 2008. The World Values Survey (and within the WVS also the EVS) represents one of the largest worldwide quantitative datasets in social science research involving surveys on representative national samples. The aim of WVS (and EVS) was to study changes in values and political orientation and their influence on social and political life. The data from the World Values Survey (WVS) wave from 1998–5 and European Values Study (EVS) wave from 2008 cover all the political entities in the region of former Yugoslavia, thus enabling us to compare two points in time for each country. In the analyses, we included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Longitudinal analysis was not possible for Kosovo, owing to the lack of data before 2008. In the three most ethnically heterogeneous entities (i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo), we also examined the impact of an additional variable – ethnic affiliation and ethnic majority/ minority status\(^67\).

\(^67\) Since this was not our main focus in the analysis, and the WVS item on ethnic/national status does not provide a sufficient number of cases, we used a proxy variable for ethnic affiliation in religious denomination.
7.3.2 Measures

The emphasis in the analyses was on WVS (EVS) items and indexes that were used to calculate the two initial value dimensions (Inglehart, Baker, 2000: 24):

Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values:

It is more important for a child to learn independence and determination than obedience and religious faith (Autonomy index, ranging from 2 to -2);

- Abortion is justifiable (1 = “Never justifiable”… 10 = “Always justifiable”)
- Importance of God (1 = “Not at all”… 10 = “Very”)
- Sense of national pride ((1 = “Very proud”… 4 = “Not at all proud”)
- Respect for authority (1 = “Good”… 3 = “Bad”).

Survival vs. Self-Expression Values:

- Respondent has signed and would sign a petition (1 = “Have done”… 3 = “Would never do”)
- Respondent describes self as happy (1 = “Very happy”… 4 = “Not at all happy”)
- Homosexuality is justifiable (1 = “Never justifiable”… 10 = “Always justifiable”)
- You can trust people (1 = “Most people can be trusted”… 2 = “Need to be very careful”)
- Priority of economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life (Materialist/ postmaterialist values index, ranging from 1 to 3).

All items and indexes were transformed so that higher values expressed the Secular-Rational and Self-Expression pole on value dimensions. Initial scales were transformed into scales, ranging from 0 to 1. To stress the polarity of value dimensions, final aggregate variables were ranged on scale from -2.5 to +2.5. Because of incomparable data for Macedonia in the EVS 2008 wave for the Autonomy index, we computed the Traditional vs. Secular-Rational value dimension for Macedonia in 2008 based on the four remaining items.

Subsequently, we analysed WVS (EVS) items about the importance of child qualities – what children can be encouraged to learn at home (good manners; Independence; hard work; feeling of responsibility; imagination; tolerance and respect for other people; thrift, saving money and things; determination, perseverance; religious faith; unselfishness; and obedience). Respondents choose up to five qualities that are especially important.
7.4 Analysis

7.4.1 Cross-national and longitudinal comparison of value dimensions

The first analyses we conducted concern the WVS value dimensions, Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values and Survival vs. Self-Expression Values (e.g., Inglehart, Baker, 2000).

Figure 7-1 shows the comparison of samples from the general population from post-Yugoslav countries in a two-dimensional space of two value dimensions. In the upper diagram are countries according to data from the WVS 1995-8 wave; the middle diagram shows transitions from WVS 1995-8 to EVS 2008, and in the diagram below are countries according to data from the EVS 2008 wave.

In the distinctive polarity of value dimensions all the countries are in the space of Traditional Values. However, in the WVS 1995-8 wave, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia are closer to the Secular-Rational pole, and Croatia also closer to the Self-Expression pole.

Over a period of approximately 10 years we can see drastic changes in the position of countries, especially on the value dimension Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values. All countries, with the exception of Slovenia, become more traditional. According to the results of the t-tests, all differences on the value dimension are statistically significant, with the exception of Slovenia (p > 0.05) and, marginally, Montenegro (p = 0.05). However, there is no distinctive pattern in the Survival vs. Self-Expression value dimension. As confirmed by the results of the t-test, Macedonia and Slovenia are moving closer to the Self-Expression pole and Croatia in the opposite direction.

In the diagram with the WVS 1995-8 wave, the countries are more dispersed than in the presentation of the EVS 2008 wave. In the latter we can distinguish a homogenous group of countries with two outliers, Slovenia closer to the Secular-Rational and Self-Expression value pole, and Kosovo to the Traditional pole.

We further analyse youth samples to observe future trends in these societies. Figure 7-2 shows the comparison of youth samples (aged between 15 and 29 years) from post-Yugoslav countries in a two-dimensional space of two value dimensions.
Figure 7-1: Post-Yugoslav states on value dimensions, general population, WVS 1995–8 and EVS 2008.

Figure 7-2: Post-Yugoslav states on value dimensions, youth, WVS 1995–8 and EVS 2008.

All these trends in the general population are even more pronounced in the young cohort. The most drastic transition is observed in Croatia, which moved from the Secular-Rational and Self-Expression value space to the Traditional and Survival one\(^{68}\).

### 7.4.2 Changes in the importance of child qualities

The next indicators analysed are WVS (EVS) items about the importance of child qualities. All qualities relate to the question about what children can be encouraged to learn at home. In that manner, they indicate social (normative) expectations of socialization outcomes, i.e. features of social character. These qualities comprise standards of conduct, whether as regulators of social interaction (good manners, feeling of responsibility, tolerance and respect for others, religious faith, unselfishness and obedience), or as more personally oriented competences (independence, hard work, imagination, thrift, saving money and things, determination and perseverance).

Table 7-1 presents the percentages of respondents from post-Yugoslav countries in the WVS 1995–8 wave and the EVS 2008 wave that indicated child qualities as important. In the last line for each country (with the exception of Kosovo) can be found the corresponding changes in percentages for this period. Generally, good manners, feeling of responsibility, tolerance and respect for other people are emphasized, and imagination, religious faith, obedience and unselfishness are among the qualities less often indicated. However, there are some peculiarities: in Montenegro the greater importance of hard work, in Slovenia the greater importance of independence, and in Kosovo no religious faith among the least important qualities.

\(^{68}\) In the analysis of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the most distinctive are Bosniaks and Albanians (Muslim denomination), with more expressed Traditional Values and in the case of Bosniaks also Survival Values. From 1998 to 2008, a shift towards Traditional Values is also noticeable in the Croatian ethnic group (Roman Catholics) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Macedonians (Orthodox denomination) in Macedonia. In Macedonia among both ethnic groups Survival Values decline in this time period.

In Kosovo there are no distinctive differences between Albanians (Muslims) and Serbs (Orthodox denomination) on Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values. Albanians indicate slightly more Survival Values.

All these findings are also identified in the youth cohort.
Table 7-1: Levels and changes in the importance of child qualities, WVS 1995–8 and EVS 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Good manners</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Hard work</th>
<th>Feeling of responsibility</th>
<th>Imagination</th>
<th>Tolerance and respect for others</th>
<th>Thrift, saving money and things</th>
<th>Determination, perseverance</th>
<th>Religious faith</th>
<th>Unselfishness</th>
<th>Obedience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B &amp; H</td>
<td>1998 72.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 82.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1996 64.2</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 82</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>-22.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1996 80.4</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 82.9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1996 80.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 87.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-14.2</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1995 81</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 81.7</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2008 84.5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The cells show the percentages of people who mentioned child qualities as important. Macedonia was excluded from analysis because of incomparable data.

Analysis of changes from WVS 1995–8 to EVS 2008 in the importance of child qualities shows an increase of good manners and religious faith (with the exception of Slovenia), decrease in determination, perseverance and Independence (with the exception of Slovenia), and Imagination (with the exception of Serbia). There is also a moderate trend towards a decrease in obedience (with the exception of Croatia). On average, the indication of child qualities changed most drastically in Croatia (absolute average 19.92 %), followed by
Serbia (7.25 %), Bosnia and Herzegovina (6.53 %) and Montenegro (5.85 %). Slovenia (2.54 %) was the most stable in the comparison.

To answer the central research question about the convergence or divergence of post-Yugoslav societies in value and social character outlook, we compare the variability in the importance of child qualities across societies in the WVS 1995–8 wave and the EVS 2008 wave. In Figure 7-3 standard deviations as measures of variability indicate the dispersion of these societies according to the importance of child qualities.

What we analyse is the rise or fall in variability of the importance of specific child qualities and not the comparison of variability across different qualities. From the analysis we can extract the higher dispersion of hard work, independence, religious faith and feeling of responsibility, and the lower dispersion of good manners, thrift, saving money and things, imagination and obedience in the societies explored.

Figure 7-3: Variability in child qualities, Post-Yugoslav states, general population, WVS 1995–8 and EVS 2008.

![Variability in child qualities](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>1995-8</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard work</td>
<td>14.73</td>
<td>17.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>13.19</td>
<td>15.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious faith</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of responsibility</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselfishness</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination, perseverance</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance, respect for others</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligence</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>7.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselfishness</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance, respect for others</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good manners</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Macedonia was excluded from analysis because of incomparable data. Because of comparability, we did not include Kosovo in the 2008 analysis.

In the analysis of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most distinctive are Serbs (Orthodox denomination), who record a higher importance for hard work, unselfishness, and a lower importance for good manners and religious faith in wave 1998, and the comparatively greater importance of independence and lesser importance of religious faith in wave 2008. Croats (Roman Catholics) recorded more imagination and less obedience in wave 1998, and Bosniaks (Muslims) recorded more obedience in both waves.

In Kosovo, Albanians (Muslims) differ from Serbs (Orthodox denomination) in the greater importance of independence, hard work and imagination, and the lesser importance of feeling of responsibility and obedience.
Figure 7-4: Hierarchical cluster analysis of the importance of child qualities, general population, EVS 2008.

Source: European Values Survey, wave 2008.
Note: The Ward method was used for the cluster analysis. Macedonia was excluded from analysis because of incomparable data.
Finally, we analysed post-Yugoslav societies from the broader perspective of countries included in the EVS 2008 wave according to the importance of child qualities. We conducted hierarchical cluster analysis to form groups or clusters of societies showing similarities. Graphic presentation (dendrogram) is in Figure 7-4.

From the dendrogram we can conclude that, no matter how many clusters we choose, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia fall into the same group, Montenegro is closer to this group, and Slovenia is the most distant. What is most distinctive in the context of separate child qualities are independence (more emphasized in Slovenia) and hard work (more important in Montenegro and less in Slovenia). In groupings of countries with Slovenia, there is also a greater emphasis on feeling of responsibility, tolerance and respect for other people and lower religious faith and obedience.

7.5 Discussion and Conclusion

In the present chapter we analyse shifts in value orientations and value-related concepts in the region of former Yugoslavia. What can we conclude from analyses of these concepts in selected sociocultural contexts in the recent decade?

In the context of values and value orientations, we can acknowledge a general divergence among post-Yugoslav countries in a longitudinal perspective on the last decade. But more extended examination of the analyses reveals a more complex picture of these societies and the relations among them. Across analyses, there appear two distinctive outliers: Slovenia and Kosovo70.

If we conduct further exploration of the child qualities as indicators of perceived future socialization outcomes, the comparative data show the dominance of standards of conduct that emphasize harmonious social interaction (e.g., good manners, feeling of responsibility, tolerance and respect for others) over personally oriented competences (e.g., imagination) across these societies. Based on our analysis, the most stable country in identification of child qualities across time is Slovenia, which is also the most different from others. From the analysis of variability in child qualities over time (Figure 7-3), post-Yugoslav societies are more homogenous in some qualities (good manners, thrift, saving money

70 In the latter case we have some limitations in interpretation because Kosovo is a relatively recent participant in international comparative studies; consequently, there is lack of adequate data for the past period. This is quite the opposite in the case of Slovenia.
and things, imagination and obedience) and more dispersed in others (hard work, independence, religious faith and feeling of responsibility).

All these findings can be extracted from the presentation of hierarchical cluster analysis of child qualities and the graphical presentation of transitions in value dimensions. In the dendrogram (Figure 7-4) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia closer together, while Slovenia is the most distant. More illustrative and meaningful are the transitions among value dimensions (Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2), indicating the homogenization of all these societies, with the exception of Slovenia\textsuperscript{71}. Trends in samples from the general population are more pronounced in the youth samples (Figure 7-2).

To dispel the first impression about divergence, from all analyses the trend towards convergence of most post-Yugoslav societies is noticeable in the cultural aspect of value orientations and subsequent social practices. From this uniform picture, the most distinct digression is Slovenia. Conceptually, diversity among both groups of countries is best represented by the distinction between traditionalism and self-expressive values, and in the language of categories with a distinction between religious faith and independence\textsuperscript{72}.

Value orientation diversity in the region is best represented by diversity in family structure and processes. According to Flere (this volume), historically relevant differences in explaining cultural differences in the societies of former Yugoslavia can be seen in varied forms of family organization (nuclear vs. traditional extended family), on the one side, Slovenia with the most modernized family relations and structure, and, in contrast Kosovo, where family relations have changed the least\textsuperscript{73}.

Despite common (modernization) trends in family life, socioeconomic development in the region, and, specifically, changes in gender role attitudes\textsuperscript{74}, cultural indicators of value orientations do not yield a distinct (post)modernization pattern. The conclusion arising from the cross-national longitudinal

\textsuperscript{71} For Kosovo, there are no data for the period 1995–1998.

\textsuperscript{72} For detailed elaboration of religion and religiosity, see chapter by Lavrič in the present volume. However, analyses of ethnic groups in the three post-Yugoslav countries that are most mixed from an ethnic/religious perspective indicate that Muslims are the most distinctive and most traditional oriented in two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In this respect, Kosovo is inter-ethnically more homogenous.

\textsuperscript{73} For detailed elaboration of this subject, see the chapter Recent Changes in the Post-Yugoslav Family.

\textsuperscript{74} See chapters 20 Years After: Economic Development after the Breakup of Yugoslavia, Recent Changes in the Post-Yugoslav Family, and Gender Role Attitudes in Post-Yugoslav Countries: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Analysis.
value dimension analysis in the post-Yugoslav region is that there exist no uniform trend of transition from Traditional to Secular-Rational Values, or from Survival to Self-Expression Values; this could have been expected on line with external factors (political stabilization of the region and economic development according to GDP). We can conclude that Slovenia, with the most stable conditions and a relatively successful transition process (Adam & Marković, 2001), is probably the best case for postmodernization theory, at least in the post-Yugoslav region.

There is evidence of retraditionalization in most post-Yugoslav societies (e.g., Flere & Molnar, 1994; Galić, 2000; Sekulić & Šporer, 2006). Where can we find a partial explanation for this process?

A possible argument can be extracted from postmodernization theory. According to Inglehart (1997: 110), unfavourable social conditions (e.g., war, conflict, crisis) could result in existential insecurity and consequently in a rise of survival value orientations (as opposed to prodemocratic, self-expression values). In the context of former Yugoslavia, complex and exacerbated historical conditions (e.g., economic, socio-political crises, ethnic conflicts and military confrontations) probably did have a cumulative effect in most societies. If we connect these external conditions with the most distinctive and discriminant factor from our analyses, i.e. religious faith, there is considerable evidence of higher levels of religiosity in relation to different social dominance constructs (e.g., nationalism, ethnocentrism, national exclusivism, national idealisation and authoritarianism) in post-Yugoslav contexts (e.g., Abazović, 2010; Krajina, 2001; Pajaziti, 2006; Vrcan, 2001).

These conclusions pose an interesting question about the predictability of the postmodernization theory. In stable conditions we can predict future development of societies, but problems occur when conditions are either complex or multidimensional. This is indeed the case in the post-Yugoslav region (e.g., war, ethnic conflict and political and economic transition). A linear progression from human restraint to human choice probably has many alternatives (e.g., degression or circularity); consequently, this questions the implicit assumption of a progression towards the autonomous individual, quality of life or a broadening of human choice in postmodernization theory and the theory of human development (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Welzel, Inglehart, Klingemann, 2003). Since, according to Kroeber and Kluckhon (1952), in some classical interpretations culture can be seen as the irrational aspect of human existence.

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75 From the Figures 7-1 and 7-2, we can see the most drastic changes in Croatia and Serbia.
(in contrast to (rational) civilization), the future of societies is probably far less uniformly predictable\textsuperscript{76}.

What is probably of most interest for further investigation in the post-Yugoslav region is the question of identity and especially its formation in relation to social context, i.e. social identity. It seems that there are some uniform historical patterns. Among the explanations for the dissolution process of Yugoslavia, Stanković Pejnović (2010) emphasizes the inability of the elite to create community and the lack of legitimacy in the political system; moreover, Godina (2007) highlights the lack of a common (supra-ethnic) identity. These factors result in a potential strengthening of national and religious identification (see Kuljić, 2006, Vrcan, 2001), and family as the most important social support system (see Milić, 2004). The comprehensive picture of the countries and changes within them thus yields a weak overall socio-institutional framework and enhanced social identity, based on primary or traditional groups (e.g., family, ethnicity or religion). This may strengthen the perception of security on the individual or group level, but in the long-term perspective can weaken global social cohesiveness and induce societal instability. The solution lies in three maxims: rule of law, transparency and (civic) political participation.

\textbf{7.6 References}


\textsuperscript{76} In recent article, Bomhoff and Man-Li Gu (2012) analyze self-expression values in the East Asia region and conclude that seeing self-expression values as a necessary condition for a healthy democracy does not make sense in this region.


Religious Change and the Impact of Religiosity upon Emancipative Values in Post-Yugoslav Countries

(M. Lavrič)

Abstract
Based on the secondary analysis of data from the World Values Survey data for the period between 1995 and 2009, the study primarily aimed to test the hypothesis of privatization of religion in the region of the former SFRY. The analyses revealed three basic conclusions: (1) During the observed period religiosity has gone through a process of substantial privatization in all the observed societies. (2) The privatization of religiosity has been disproportionately present among younger and more educated segments of population, which leads to conclusion that the trend of privatization of religiosity is likely to continue (at least) in the near future. (3) The (negative) impact of religiosity upon emancipative values has generally decreased in all the observed societies, which can be seen as an additional evidence for the privatization thesis. It is argued that these changes can be understood as beneficial for the future stability and democratization of the region.

Key words: Religion, Privatization, Emancipative values, Yugoslavia.
8.1 Introduction

The most logical point of departure for the analysis of religious change in the countries of the former Yugoslavia seems to be the existing literature on religious change in the wider European context, which has been studied within different theoretical perspectives. Traditionally, the secularization approach suggesting the general decline in power, popularity and prestige of religion across the modern societies has been the dominant approach within sociology of religion (e.g. Bruce, 2002, 2011; Norris and Inglehart, 2004), and these approach found most of its support precisely within the context of European countries (Davie 2002-a).

On the other hand, many authors have noticed trends of revitalization of at least certain aspects of religion in many parts of the modern world, including some European countries (e.g. Casanova, 1994; Berger, 1999; Davie 2002b; Greeley, 2002; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). These observations have also been theoretically supported, perhaps most notably by the proponents of the so-called rational choice theory approach to religion (Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Stark and Finke, 2000). According to this approach, modernity in itself does not significantly erode the religious demand, which means that the variations in the levels of religiosity within stable modern societies can mostly be attributed to differences in religious supply.

Between these two opposite stands, another line of scholarly efforts observes that during the past few decades, the religiosity of people in Europe has been generally shifting in a direction which may be understood under the term ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie, 1994, 2000, 2002b) or, more generally, the ‘privatization of religion’ (e.g. Luckmann, 1967, Beyer, 1994). Privatized religion is, according to Thomas Luckmann, a logical consequence of a more general (post)modern trend of functional differentiation of society and of the emancipation of the individual. Thus, religious is gradually and partially retrieving from the public sphere and remains predominantly within the private sphere. In an analysis of religion in the context of globalization, Peter Beyer concludes that no religion within the modern global society will be able to avoid the trend of privatization (1994: 107). Research in the US generally supports this thesis (e.g. Wuthnow, 1998; Roof, 1999).

Another important line of observations with regard to religious change in the European context is that there are major differences among European countries, which are most obvious when comparing the less religious countries of the ‘protestant north’ and more religious countries of the ‘catholic south’. Further analyses show substantial variations also within these groups (Martin,
Without entering deeper into these variations, it is important to note that European trends might not correspond to the situation in the Balkans. As Grace Davie suggests, typical European patterns begin to dissolve where Europe is reaching its boundaries in the Balkans (2000: 27). A slightly closer look towards the region of the former Yugoslavia was offered by Pollack and Müller (2006), who seek to confirm the hypotheses of the individualization/privatization of religion in Central and Eastern Europe using their own survey data, gathered in 2000. Based on their analyses, they seem to have found substantial evidence to support their hypothesis. One major problem of this study, however, is that it is designed as a cross-sectional study, although it tries to answer questions regarding longitudinal trends. Nevertheless, it offers very useful operationalization of the concept of privatization of religion, which is a good starting point for the present study. It also should be mentioned that Niko Toš (1999) found patterns of privatization of religion for Slovenia in an analysis of longitudinal survey data. During the period between 1991–3 and 1998, the share of self-declared religious individuals rose (from 61 % to 65 %), while percentage of those who trust in church substantially decreased (from 37 % to 11 %).

When speaking of religion in the countries of former SFRY, it should perhaps first be mentioned that Yugoslavia was a multiethnic and multireligious country in which great majority of people belonged to one of the three major world religious traditions: Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim. It should also be stressed, that, especially after the World War II, the region has gone through the intensive process of secularization (e.g. Flere, 1990).

Our attention here, however, is directed to the question what changes have occurred in individual countries after the dissolution of the common state. This question has already been addressed by Reinhard Henkel, who concluded that “...after 1990 resurgence of religion in all states of Ex-Yugoslavia was and still is stronger than secularization” (2009: 59). He sees this resurgence manifest itself especially in a stronger social position of the religious organizations and a stronger identification of people with the religious organizations rather than in active church involvement. He aims to explain this situation using the term of “confrontational identity”, whereas role of religion increases as a consequence of the confrontation with other religions. Henkel’s research is, however, based on different country-specific datasets, which are usually incomparable, dealing with particular issues, and in some cases perhaps even unreliable. Further, it

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77 For that reason she explicitly states that the situation in the Balkans exceeds the aim of her analysis of religion in contemporary Europe (ibidem: 47).
is questionable how can the approach of “confrontational identity” be applied to Slovenia, where the confrontations on religious background were practically absent.

The basic aim of this article was to address the question of religious change in post-yugoslav societies with all the available comparable data and to conduct a comprehensive analysis that was not yet applied for the region as a whole. Following the analysis of Pollack and Müller (2006), the main research focus in this regard was to test the hypothesis of the privatization of religion as the dominant general trend.

To achieve this goal, we used a modified version of operationalization as suggested by Pollack and Müller (2006: 23). Thus the privatization of religion takes place if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Indicators of institutionalized religion are in decline, or are growing significantly less substantially as compared to the indicators of individualized religion
2. Indicators of individualized religion show growth, or are decreasing significantly less substantially as compared to the indicators of institutionalized religion

Considering both points, the privatization hypothesis is confirmed if within the observed society the ratio between the level of privatized religiosity and the level of institutionalized religiosity changes in favour of the former. Regarding the available data, we will analyze the period between 1995 and 2008.

The confirmation of this hypothesis would put into question Henkel’s basic explanation for the revitalization of religion in the region. Namely, if the confrontational identity explanation is correct, than we should expect the revitalization to be stronger within the realm of institutionalized religion.

The present analysis will not deal with the third set of indicators used by Pollack and Müller, which consider alternative forms of religion. This omission is based on a consideration that alternative forms of religion are not necessarily entirely privatized. In other words new and alternative religions also include dimensions like attendance of religious services and trust in religious organization and can therefore not be considered as privatized forms of religiosity as such.

The second goal of this article was to address the question of how the observed trends were present among different social groups, namely among the young and among those with tertiary education. These two groups are especially important in view of future trends that we can expect in the region. Thus we
tried to make some predictions about what kind of religious change is likely to occur in the next ten or twenty years.

Finally, the third goal of this article was to address the question of how the observed changes influence the impact of religion on social and, more specifically, political life. The question is, of course, not a new one. Jose Casanova (1994) for instance disaggregated the theory of secularization into three disparate components, one of which was the theory of privatization of religion as a precondition of modern democratic politics. Indeed, religiosity has been identified as an important cultural factor influencing democracy (e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2002). For instance, Huntington (1996) made a claim that a culture dominated by Protestant Christianity tends to be favorable to democracy, whereas a Muslim dominance tends to be detrimental to democracy. This idea was partially confirmed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) who, however, stress that contextual factors such as the level of economic development and average level of education play a crucial role in this relationship. More importantly, based on the analyses of a huge sample from all World Values Surveys from 1995 to 2006, Welzel and Inglehart conclude that religiosity in general (regardless of confession) tends to weaken the cultural foundation of democracy by depressing emancipative beliefs (2009: 128).

The idea of religiosity being detrimental to democratic values logically leads to the idea that the privatization of religion should be related to higher level of democratic/emancipative values. Most recently this view was supported by Ulrich Beck, who basically argues that the second form of modernity, that builds on individualization and a multiplicity of choices, provides the basis for seeking a ‘God of one’s own’. For Beck, the individualization of religion is the hallmark of secularization but also of the emergence and spread of world religions and therefore the greatest hope for the peaceful coexistence of different religions.

Casanova (2009) is on the other hand quite critical about theory of privatization refuting the idea that public religion represents a threat to democratization. He illustrates various instances in which public religious mobilization had contributed to the democratization of authoritarian polities, like for instance in Spain, Poland, and Brazil.

Both Beck and Casanova, however, agree that religion does not necessarily represent an impediment to democratization. Given the mentioned empirical evidence of religiosity being correlated to lower levels of democratic/emancipative values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009), this argument leads to the question of the dynamics of the relationship between religiosity and democratic orientations. Given that the basic argument of the privatization/individualization
thesis is that religion is losing its strength in other areas of life of modern individuals including politics (Luckmann, 1967; Hervieu-Léger 1990), it would be reasonable to propose the following (our second) hypothesis:

During the observed period (between 1995 and 2008), the negative impact of religiosity upon emancipative values has been generally decreasing in the region of post-Yugoslav societies.

8.2 Method

8.2.1 Procedure

The proposed research goals were met by secondary analysis of data from the World Values Survey data which generally cover all the political entities in the region former Yugoslavia. Since however, some smaller entities (particularly Kosovo, the Republic of Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were not covered in a manner that would enable reliable longitudinal observation those entities were not included in the analysis.

Considering the available data, the analysis had to focus on the period between 1995 and 2009, comparing two points in time for each country. Regarding the first point in time (1995–98), the data for most of the observed countries refer to 1998, which means that the comparison begins after the period of war for all the observed societies. The second point in time varies from 2006 (Serbia) to 2009 (Macedonia), whereas all other countries are observed in 2008.

8.2.2 Measures

Regarding the basic privatization hypothesis, the institutionalized religiosity was measured by

1. Confessional identification (0 = ‘No’; 1 = ‘Yes’), whereas the higher share of citizens of a given country expressing confessional identification with any religious organization was taken as a measure of higher level of institutionalized religiosity.

2. Attendance of religious services (1 = ‘Never’ … 8 = ‘More than once a week’), whereas the higher average levels of attendance were taken as a measure of higher level of institutionalized religiosity.
As indicators of individualized religiosity the following two measures were used:

1. Average levels of the importance of God (1 = ‘Not at all important’ … 10 = ‘Very important’), which seems a better indicator of privatized religiosity as compared to the belief in God which was used by Pollack and Müller, since the declared belief is a part of the official doctrine of all the observed religions, making it closer to the institutionalized dimension. On the other hand, the concept of the importance of God in everyday life clearly captures a distinctly personal relation to religion.

2. The expressed presence of getting comfort and strength from religion (0 = ‘No’; 1 = ‘Yes’), which also quite clearly captures an intimate, private aspect of religiosity.

With regards to the impact of religiosity upon political attitudes, we used one item per each of the two observed religious dimensions as independent variables:

1. The importance of God was used as a measure of privatized religiosity, since it can be considered as a central indicator of religiosity with regard to its impact upon moral behavior, together with values and political orientations (Stark, 2004: 145–6).

2. Attendance of religious services was used as a measure of institutionalized religiosity, since many studies point to the central role of this dimension when psychological outcomes of religion are concerned (e.g. Pargament, 2997; Lavrič and Flere, 2010).

As dependent variables, we used different related measures of emancipative values. According to Inglehart and Welzel: “Emancipative values give priority to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority, and participation over security” (2009: 129). In this study, these dimensions were conceptualized as follows:

1. Autocracy preference scale was created following Welzel (2006), whereas the first three items are derived directly from Welzel’s work and the remaining three items were added in order to improve the content validity of our measure. Thus, the indicator of autocracy preferences consisted of the following items:
   a. Agreement with: Having a strong leader in the political system
   b. Agreement with: Having the army rule in the political system
   c. Disagreement with: Democracy may have problems but is better than any other
   d. Agreement with: Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order
e. Agreement with: Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling
f. Agreement with: Having a democratic political system

2. Lifestyle intolerance scale was taken directly from the work of Inglehart and Welzel (2009: 130) and consists of the following items:
   a. Finding unacceptable: divorce
   b. Finding unacceptable: abortion
   c. Finding unacceptable: homosexuality

3. Patriarchy scale is taken from the Alexander and Welzel’s (2011) study on patriarchy among Muslims. It consists originally of the items representing patriarchy in the domains of labor market participation, education, and political leadership:
   a. Agreement with: Men make better political leaders than women do
   b. Agreement with: University is more important for a boy than for a girl
   c. Agreement with: Men should have more right to a job than women
      However, since the first two items were not used in the last wave of the WVS, only the item under ‘c.’ could be employed as a measure of patriarchy.

All the described indicators are statistically validated in the results section.

8.3 Analysis

8.3.1 The privatization thesis

In order to conduct further analyses we first needed to empirically validate the two dimensions of religiosity that were to be analyzed. For this purpose, we conducted a principal axis factoring with promax rotation to establish the factor structure of the variables supposed to represent the institutionalized and privatized type of religiosity.

As discernable from Table 8-1, a clear two-factor solution emerged. The first factor, which can be called ‘Privatized religiosity’, explains about 51 percent of the common variance, while the ‘Institutionalized religiosity’ factor accounts for about 6 percent.
Based on these results we can confirm, that the observed two dimensions of religiosity are not only theoretically, but also empirically valid, and that they can be measured using the four chosen items.

In the next step, average levels of each of the four indicators were computed for each ex-Yugoslav state, separately for the period around 1998 and period around 2008. Further, relative changes of average values between the two points in time were computed for each item in each country.

A short glance at table 8-2 reveals several interesting points, mostly referring to the relative changes:

1. Positive values prevail substantially, which confirms that at least majority of the observed societies has gone through the process of revitalization of religion.

2. There are two striking exceptions from this trend:
   a. Slovenia experienced a rather opposite (although very weak) trend.
   b. In Serbia and Montenegro, the two predominantly Orthodox countries, the share of religiously affiliated people decreased dramatically.

78 The items for each dimension were not merged into aggregate variables in order to enable a more detailed overview of the observed data.

79 Since surveys were not conducted simultaneously in all the observed countries, the data were gathered in the period between 1995 (Slovenia) and 1998 (most of other countries) and in the period between 2006 (Serbia) and 2009 (Macedonia).

80 A Closer look at the relevant (WVS) data reveals that the change occurred right before 2008, since in 2001 (previous survey of WVS) there were only 3% non-affiliates in Montenegro and only 6% of them in Serbia. Till 2008 this share grew to 42% for Montenegro and 31% for Serbia. So far, no explanation has been offered for this substantial shift.
3. The changes in positive direction appear to be larger at the right side of the table, that is, for the two items measuring privatized religiosity. This observation is crucial for the present study. Therefore we decided to compute average levels of the relative changes of the included indicators for both observed dimensions. Results are presented in Figure 8-1.

Table 8-2: Levels and relative changes in the presence of privatized and institutionalized religiosity in the period between 1995–8 and 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>How often do you attend religious services</th>
<th>Belong to religious denomination</th>
<th>How important is God in your life</th>
<th>Get comfort and strength from religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B &amp; H</td>
<td>1998 4,92</td>
<td>0,71</td>
<td>7,04</td>
<td>0,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 4,84</td>
<td>0,77</td>
<td>8,10</td>
<td>0,86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change -1,7 %</td>
<td>9,2 %</td>
<td>15,1 %</td>
<td>32,7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1996 4,48</td>
<td>0,87</td>
<td>6,29</td>
<td>0,61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 4,57</td>
<td>0,84</td>
<td>7,24</td>
<td>0,78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change 2,0 %</td>
<td>-3,8 %</td>
<td>15,2 %</td>
<td>27,6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1998 4,18</td>
<td>0,72</td>
<td>6,58</td>
<td>0,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009 4,57</td>
<td>0,93</td>
<td>7,63</td>
<td>0,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change 9,4 %</td>
<td>29,2 %</td>
<td>16,0 %</td>
<td>29,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1996 3,16</td>
<td>0,94</td>
<td>5,68</td>
<td>0,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 3,39</td>
<td>0,59</td>
<td>7,03</td>
<td>0,71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change 7,3 %</td>
<td>-37,7 %</td>
<td>23,9 %</td>
<td>45,0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1996 3,60</td>
<td>0,81</td>
<td>5,31</td>
<td>0,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 3,86</td>
<td>0,70</td>
<td>6,96</td>
<td>0,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change 7,3 %</td>
<td>-14,5 %</td>
<td>31,0 %</td>
<td>57,3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1995 4,10</td>
<td>0,77</td>
<td>5,17</td>
<td>0,57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 3,71</td>
<td>0,72</td>
<td>5,23</td>
<td>0,56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change -9,4 %</td>
<td>-6,8 %</td>
<td>1,2 %</td>
<td>-1,8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8-1 offers direct answer with regard to our major hypothesis. In average, both indicators of privatized religiosity increased substantially more as compared to the average change of both indicators of institutionalized religiosity. On these grounds it seems safe to state, that the privatization hypothesis is confirmed: during the observed period, within all the observed societies, the ratio between the level of privatized religiosity and the level of institutionalized religiosity has changed in favor of the former.

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Most striking example of this trend are Serbia and Montenegro, which witnessed substantial rise in privatized religiosity and at the same time substantial decrease in institutionalized one. The only country where the privatization thesis may be under question is Macedonia, where the difference in growth of privatized and institutionalized religiosity is very small (only about 3 percentage points).

The extraordinary vitality of the institutionalized religion may in this case be indeed well explained by Henkel’s ‘confrontation identity’ thesis. This idea can be supported also by largest level of confessional identification in Macedonia in the whole region (in 2009, only 7% of citizens expressed non-affiliation). As can be discerned in table 8-2, during the observed decade, Macedonia witnessed a substantially higher increase of this indicator than any other among the observed countries. A closer look at the data reveals that the increase is mostly due to incredible rise of the share of Orthodox affiliates which grew from 47% in 1998 to 74% in 2008 (the share of Muslims fell from 24% to 18% during this period). The Macedonian specific situation is further explained in the discussion section of this article.

Another way of testing the privatization thesis is to observe changes within major religious groups, rather than concentrating on the individual countries.

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It should be noted, that even if the relatively very low levels of religious affiliation in 2008 are perhaps related to certain methodological considerations, the privatization hypothesis is confirmed also if only church going is observed as the indicator of institutionalized religiosity. Namely, while indicators of privatized religiosity have in average increased by 34% in Montenegro and 44% in Serbia, the church going has increased only by 7% in both countries.
Such observations can be especially crucial for religiously mixed countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. For this reason, relative changes of average levels of the two measures of privatized and one measure of institutionalized religiosity were computed for each of the three dominant religious groups.

**Figure 8-2**: Relative changes in indicators of institutionalized and privatized religiosity in the period between 1995–8 and 2008–9 within three major religious groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>All countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you attend religious services</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| How important is God in your life | 31% | 16% | 10%
| Get comfort and strength from religion | 75% | 3% | 32% |

Figure 8-2 clearly shows that levels of (both measures of) privatized religiosity rose in all the observed groups, while the levels of religious service attendance decreased in all but one. The only exception in this regard is the group of Muslims in Macedonia, among which the religious attendance was relatively low in 1998 and basically only leveled with the average levels of Muslims in the region. Nevertheless, this increase can also be understood in line with the already mentioned Henkel’s confrontation identity thesis.

Regarding our basic privatization hypothesis, however, changes at the level of all countries are most crucial. These changes unambiguously confirm our hypothesis, whereas the privatization of religiosity appears to be most striking among the Orthodox affiliates and least present among Muslims, where changes were in general relatively small.

82 The other measure of institutionalized religion, namely belonging to religious denomination, had to be omitted since the analysis was limited only to affiliates of different religions.

83 In this regard it should be noted that Muslims were in both observed periods by far most intensely religious group in the region by all the applied indicators.
8.3.2 Religious change among the young and the educated as a foundation for predictions

The second goal of this article was to address the question of how the observed trends were present among the young and among those with tertiary education, since these two groups seem to be especially important in view of future trends that we can expect in the region.

Table 8-3: Relative changes in the presence of privatized and institutionalized religiosity in the period between 1995–8 and 2008, by age group and educational level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entire sample</th>
<th>Aged 15–29</th>
<th>Educated at tertiary level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institution-</td>
<td>Privatized</td>
<td>Institution-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>alized</td>
<td></td>
<td>alized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia*</td>
<td>-1 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>-15 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>-4 %</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-8 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>-16 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data for educational level were not available for the period 1995–8.

The above table reveals at least the following relevant findings:
- In most countries religiosity has been disproportionally revitalized among the young, in both the institutionalized and the privatized dimension. The only clear exception from this trend is Slovenia, where religiosity of the young has decreased quite substantially. Partially, Macedonia can also be treated as an exception, since the revitalization of religiosity among the young is about proportionate to (relatively high) revitalization at the level of the entire sample.
- In all the observed countries, religiosity has been disproportionally revitalized among the tertiary educated, in both the institutionalized and the privatized dimension. This trend can (at least) partially be explained by the expansion of tertiary education, which consequently led to unprecedented

84 Unfortunately we cannot confirm that for Croatia, since the data for educational level were not available for the period 1995–8.
inclusion of students from lower strata and rural areas in to the tertiary education (Flere and Lavrič, 2005). Since religiosity in general tends to be disproportionately present among people with lower income and from rural areas (e.g. Flere and Klanjšek, 2009; Chalfant and Heller, 1991), it is therefore not surprising to find disproportionate increases in religiosity among graduates during and after the period of expansion of tertiary education.

It is quite obvious that the privatized religiosity has gained much more vitality as compared to the institutionalized one in all three observed samples. More importantly, the difference in favor of privatized religiosity seems to have disproportionally increased among the young and the more educated segments of societies. To get a clearer picture, we decided to compute the difference in percentage points of growth between the privatized and institutionalized religiosity (see figure 8-3).

**Figure 8-3:** Differences in percentage points of growth between the privatized and institutionalized religiosity during the period from 1995–8 to 2008, within selected samples.

Note: In case of Croatia, the data for educational level were not available for the period 1995–8.

Figure 8-3 reveals that the privatization of religiosity has been generally occurring disproportionately among both the observed sub-groups. As compared to the entire sample, the privatization was substantially more present among the young in all countries except Macedonia and Montenegro. While privatization of religiosity was nevertheless substantial in the case of Montenegro, Macedonia witnessed, although only slightly, even a reversed trend. Thus, Macedonia again proves to be the exception with regard to the privatization process, especially when young people are concerned. In all the observed countries, however, the privatization of religiosity has disproportionally flourished among the more educated segment of population.
8.3.3 Privatization of religiosity and emancipative values

In order to address the question of how the observed changes interplay with the impact of religiosity on emancipative values we first needed to empirically validate the three dimensions of emancipative values that were to be analyzed. As mentioned in the methods section, in case of measuring Patrarchy we had to limit ourselves to only one-item measure. We computed Cronbach alpha coefficients to validate the remaining two measures. Based on the analysis of the WVS data, limited to waves 1994–99 and 2005–9 and to societies of the former SFRY, the Cronbach alpha amounted to 0.773 in case of the Lifestyle intolerance measure and 0.607 in case of the Autocracy preference measure. These results enabled us further analyses regarding the relationship between the two measures of religiosity and the three measures of emancipative values.

Table 8-4: Pearson’s r coefficients between the two measures of religiosity and the three measures of emancipative values within six Ex-Yugoslav countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Religious service attendance</th>
<th>Importance of God</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autocracy preference</td>
<td>Lifestyle intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;H</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six countries</td>
<td>1995-8</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A short glance at table 8-4 reveals that in general, correlation coefficients between the two measures of religiosity and the three measures of emancipative values tend to be substantially lower at the end of the observed period (between 1995 and 2009). This tendency is clearly observable at the level of compound sample (all six countries), where correlation coefficients had decreased for all the six pairs of variables. In fact, the coefficients changed in the opposite direction only in three cases (in Macedonia, where the correlation between service attendance and lifestyle intolerance and the correlation between service attendance and autocracy preference had increased and in Slovenia, where the correlation between the importance of God and Patriarchy had increased).

Regardless of these two minor exceptions, the general trend is quite clear enabling us to confirm our second hypothesis. According to our analysis, the negative impact of religiosity upon emancipative values has been generally decreasing in the region of post-Yugoslav societies in the period between 1995 and 2009.

### 8.4 Discussion

The present study yielded three basic conclusions:

1. During the period between 1995 and 2009 a clear trend of privatization of religiosity can be discerned within all the observed post-Yugoslav societies.

2. The privatization of religiosity has been disproportionally present among younger and more educated segments of population. Taking into account, that the more educated people generally more often play roles of opinion leaders and role models (Katz and Lazarfeld, 1955; Robertson and Myers, 1969), we can speculate that this finding suggests that the trend of privatization of religiosity is likely to continue in the near future.

3. The (negative) impact of religiosity upon emancipative values has generally decreased in all the observed societies, which provides additional evidence for the privatization thesis.

In other words, according to the observed data it can be concluded that religiosity in the region is neither declining nor increasing. It all depends on the chosen indicator of religiosity and the observed country. In this regard our analysis does not confirm Henkel’s conclusion regarding the resurgence of religion in the states of Ex-Yugoslavia (2009: 59).
The present analysis, however, confirms that there is a systematic and rather general change with regards to religiosity going on in these societies. More and more people, as Rodney Stark puts it describing the religious life in the USA: “...do prefer to shield their religiousness from others and to pursue it only in private” (2004: 145).

Perhaps even more interesting finding of the present study is that this trend involves changing role of religiosity in political attitudes and values of residents of the observed countries. These changes are in line with argumentations of scholars who see religion as a potential candidate for the stability of modern democracies. This view is clearly expressed in the very title of Ulrich Beck’s latest book: *A God of One’s Own: Religion’s Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence* (2008) in which Beck asserts that religion can change from a victim of disenchantment into an actor of reflexive modernization.

The present study does not tackle the question of how religion can play an active role in legitimizing and stabilizing modern democracies. It does, however, suggest that religion in the observed region seems to be maintaining or even strengthening its psychological/compensatory function, while at the same time weakening its public and moral function.

In this regard it is noteworthy that the public role of religions during the wars after the dissolution of SFRY was very much in supporting nationalist regimes and in this way aggravating conflict in the region (Vrcan, 2001). Flere (2012), dealing with the role of religions in Bosnian war even concludes that: “…*The War was articulately comprehended as religious in nature by combatants from all sides*” (p.1).

In this light, the observed changes in privatization of religiosity, leaving room for tackling public issues on ever more rational/secular terms, can be seen as a promise for a more stable and prosperous future in the region.

At the end it should be noted, that two of the observed countries can be seen as exceptions from the observed general trends. Most notable exception is Macedonia where (1) besides the substantial rise of privatized religiosity, the institutionalized religiosity has also risen very substantially (especially among Muslims); (2) where the rise of institutionalized religiosity even surpassed the rise of the privatized one among the young population, and (3) where the correlations between religiosity and (two dimensions of) emancipative values had increased. This findings are not surprising if one takes into account the fact, that Macedonia is the only among the observed countries, where an armed ethnic conflict had occurred during the observed period. Namely at the beginning of January 2001 the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army began
attacking the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia and the conflict lasted throughout most of that year. As Oschlies (2004: 59) argues, the Albanian insurrection was closely linked to Kosovo and also involved mercenaries from certain Islamic countries. Thus, conflict clearly had a religious dimension. In this light, the observed exception of Macedonia could be explained by the described conflict, which would be generally in line with Henkel’s confrontational identity thesis. It should also be mentioned, that Flere and Molnar (1993) found in Macedonia the highest levels of authoritarianism among all the Yugoslav entities in 1987. This finding points to conclusion that low levels of emancipative values could be rooted in Macedonian culture, which can, according to the basic ideas of Inglehart and Welzel (2005), be at least partially explained by relatively low level of economic development in Macedonia.

The second partial exception is Slovenia, where religiosity has decreased in both observed dimensions, and especially so among the young. The exception is thus in the opposite direction when compared to Macedonia, which can be at least partially attributed to the fact that among the observed countries, Slovenia is socio-economically the most developed, while Macedonia is the least developed one. In this sense, the differences in religiosity and religious trends between countries in the region can and should, besides by the idea of confrontational identity, also be explained by the existential security thesis (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). The data seem to generally confirm the notion that economic welfare tends to reduce existential insecurity, which in turn tends to produce secularizing effects.

Finally, some basic limitations of this study ought to be mentioned. Firstly, due to the availability of the data, the study did not cover all the political entities in the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina was taken as a single political entity and Kosovo was not analyzed at all. Secondly, the study observes trends only within one decade, which is also a specific decade. Namely, it follows the period of wars, in which religion was substantially politicized (Vrcan, 2001), which could partially explain the trends of privatization and ‘democratization’ of religiosity at least in certain countries. And lastly, the analysis was limited to World Values Survey data. Future research should thus consider wider array of data and follow the observed trends in a wider time perspective.

8.5 References


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