

# YOUTH IN A TIME OF CRISIS

First IDIZ – Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Youth Survey

Vlasta Ilišin / Dejana Bouillet / Anja Gvozdanović / Dunja Potočnik



Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu  
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Many South European countries are currently undergoing significant political and socio-cultural change. Youth studies can provide detailed information on the situation in these countries on their path to modern democratic societies. This is the very idea and starting point of this youth study in Croatia. (...) Seven carefully selected thematic focus points cover the entire scope of everyday life of youth in Croatia. (...) The results are evaluated taking into consideration not only the socio-demographic differentiation by age, social origin, education level, migration status, region and gender, but also by social lifestyles, social environment and values and attitudes. (...) This youth study has been carried out in line with all the theoretical and methodological principles in this field.

***Klaus Hurrelmann***

Professor of Public Health and Education, Hertie School  
of Governance, Berlin, Germany  
Head of the academic team of the 14th, 15th and 16th  
Shell Youth Study in Germany

The study ***Youth in a Time of Crisis*** is an original scientific research study which has significantly contributed to the corpus of scientific knowledge on youth in Croatia, as well as on contemporary Croatian society which they are an integral part of. The book is characterized by sound theoretical background, methodological correctness, thematic width, multitude of empirical data, well-argued interpretation and plausibility of conclusions. Furthermore, the results are presented in a clear and easily understandable way. An added value of the presented results is that they contribute to the continuity of scientific research of youth as the most dynamic population segment requiring permanent scientific monitoring, especially at times characterized by social upheavals and significant changes.

***Furio Radin, PhD***

Because of its multitude of empirical data, meaningful and detailed analysis and interpretation, excellent content systematization and good harmonization of scientific and popular discourse, this study will be extremely useful to a wide circle of experts promoting youth interests, from researchers and university teachers to civil society actors and youth policy makers. In this respect it will also serve as an excellent basis for development of a new national youth programme as an efficient framework and strategy for dealing with youth problems in our society, many of which have been identified in this study.

***Prof. Vedrana Spajić-Vrkaš, PhD***

Vlasta Ilišin  
Dejana Bouillet  
Anja Gvozdanović  
Dunja Potočnik

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                        |     |
|----------------------------------------|-----|
| FOREWORD                               | 5   |
| INTRODUCTON                            | 9   |
| 1. Youth in Contemporary Society       | 9   |
| 2. Youth Research in Croatia 2012      | 13  |
| RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION             | 15  |
| 1. Socio-Economic Positon of Youth     | 15  |
| 2. Family and Social Networks          | 30  |
| 3. Education, Employment and Mobility  | 46  |
| 4. Leisure Time and Risk Behaviour     | 71  |
| 5. Social Trust and Values             | 92  |
| 6. Politics, Development and Democracy | 110 |
| 7. Croatia and the EU                  | 130 |
| CONCLUSIONS                            | 139 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY                           | 149 |
| ANNEX – Questionnaire with percentages | 155 |
| NOTES ON AUTHORS                       | 181 |



## FOREWORD

The seven states created after the breakup of Yugoslavia are young countries. Two decades after attaining independence they are still in transition: the former components of a federation have not been fully transformed into national states, nor has the transformation of the socialist system into capitalist market democracy been completed. Nevertheless the entire region has at least one common goal: all the South-East European countries see their future as part of the European Union. The first of the former Yugoslav republics to accede to the EU was Slovenia, in 2004; Croatia's accession is expected on July 1, 2013; and Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia have applied for membership.

Further development of the transformation process, as well as what the EU can expect from its new member states and aspiring countries, will to a large extent be determined by the succeeding generations. In order to find out more about development trends and future prospects in the respective societies, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has initiated representative empirical studies on young people in the countries of the region. The aim of the studies is to provide insights into the wishes, expectations, interests, attitudes and social behaviour of youth and young adults, so that conclusions can be drawn on development trends in those societies. The studies are modelled on the extensive Shell youth studies that have been conducted regularly in Germany since 1953, at three- to four-year intervals, and have proved to be a reliable seismograph for society's mid-term development prospects. A happy circumstance is that Prof. Dr. Klaus Hurrelmann, head of the academic team of the 14th, 15th and 16th Shell Youth Studies in Germany, has accepted our invitation to be a consultant for the FES Youth Studies in South-East Europe. The studies in Albania and Kosovo have already been completed and preparations are under way for studies in other countries of the region. All the studies are designed so as to enable comparison of results.

The tradition of empirical youth research in Croatia dates back to the 1950s. Studies have been carried out regularly since the early 1970s, particularly by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (IDIZ), which has continued with this line of research since Croatia's independence. The initiators of this study are particularly

pleased about the involvement in this study of the IDIZ research team under the leadership of Prof. Vlasta Ilišin, which in November last year processed and analysed the survey data.

One-third of Croatia's population is below thirty years of age and knows only the post-socialist transition phase, characterized in the 1990s by great instability and insecurity. Not only was the period between Croatia's independence and 1995 marked by war, but the change of system led to an increase in social differences, new inequalities of opportunity and, above all, significant economic insecurity. Restructuring of the economy and extensive privatization were accompanied by persistent unemployment and increasing social marginalization. Only in the years of relatively high growth rates in the period between 2000 and 2008 was there a tendency towards normalization. But this period of prosperity that began with the new millennium was too short to allow the collective traumas and insecurities of the 1990s to be overcome. Since 2008 Croatia has been swept up in the vortex of the international financial crisis. Rapidly increasing unemployment in recent years has aroused concern among young people about their future, as well as a growing feeling that they have no prospects.

In terms of tendencies, this study confirms the findings of a series of empirical research studies carried out over the previous two decades. These show that the new generations react to growing insecurity in their socio-economic environment by retreating into privacy, with a strong orientation towards family, as well as by becoming more reluctant with regard to social and political engagement.

Youth and young adults today mostly live with their parents in small family circles. This is explicitly less for economic reasons and more because of their appreciation of the positive atmosphere in the family. Only a few intend to leave the comfort of living with their parents (including the relatively favourable situation it entails with regard to material possessions, such as cars, PCs and so on) in the near future. Most would like to get married at thirty (women at twenty-seven) and to have two children. It matters to many that their parents approve of their chosen partner and that the partner is of the same faith.

A large majority of young people expect and hope to realize their material and non-material wishes through a secure job and satisfactory income, preferably by employment in the public sector. A still widespread notion is that an appropriate education degree enables upward social mobility, although the adjusted youth

unemployment rate is 46 per cent (see Eurostat data), the third highest in Europe after Greece and Spain.

A promising strategy for personal advancement is seen as pragmatic adaptation to the requirements of the environment, trust in one's own resources and relying on family support. Few young people see a correlation between social and political engagement and their own future prospects – there is a conspicuously low readiness for social and political engagement. This is in accordance with the findings of the study that political parties, the parliament and the government enjoy little trust among young people.

Therefore, the older generations have little reason to mistrust young people. There is a noticeable tendency on the part of youth to emulate the older generation, to live in the same way and reproduce its world. There is no noticeable tendency towards the formation of lifestyles or subcultures that differ clearly from the adult world. Given the degree of their orientation towards the average and the mainstream, the young generations are not a suitable group on which to project prejudice and fears; there is no alternative orientation to challenge the existing one. However, this new generation does not embody the hope for change either; it is not capable of acting as the protagonist of change. Philosopher Ernst Bloch considered young people “the biological site of the new”, but there is no automatic process that would create the avant-garde of change out of this biological state.

Nevertheless, despite the long-standing crisis, Croatian youth and young adults still have optimistic expectations. They do not wish to leave the country, most of them do not even want to leave their place of residence; they want a job, expect their educational efforts to pay off and are ready to adapt and integrate in order to achieve this. There is a positive social energy in this attitude. But if the country does not develop in a direction that would enable the realization of these legitimate and elementary aspirations, anything could happen. Political decision-makers should do their best to prevent this integration-minded crisis generation from turning into a disappointed generation.

Dr. Dietmar Dirmoser

Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Head of the Regional Office Zagreb



# INTRODUCTION

## 1. Youth in contemporary society

The social and economic interest in youth as a specific social group is based on several complementary reasons. The basic interest of contemporary societies is adequate social integration of youth into society, for which appropriate social conditions have to be ensured (Furlong, Guidikova, 2001; Youniss et al, 2002). Youth are here faced with two contradictory expectations: on the one hand, to act as guarantors of social stability by adopting dominant values and behaviour patterns of the society, and on the other – thank to their supposed innovative and creative potential – to be drivers of the ever faster and therefore ever more necessary social change. These expectations form the basis of approach to youth both as a resource in the society and as a social problem, i.e. a social group with problems and/or a source of problems (Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001). In developed world, several decades of aging population demographic trend are promoting youth into an ever more important social resource. Existing global and local tendencies and processes stimulate social sciences to research a series of phenomena and processes linked to youth which contribute to the understanding of current developments and projections for future development of the society. At the same time, youth population, due to its specific features, is one of the most sensitive seismographs of social change.

Youth are considered and researched as a distinct, age determined social group defined by common social features. This primarily refers to an unfavourable social status in comparison to older population, which is manifested in their weaker integration into overall social life, and development of specific, generationally shaped sub-cultural behaviour patterns. At the same time, youth are a social group characterized by social stratification comparable to the stratification of the society they live in. Such intra-generational differentiation is caused by various situational, social and cultural circumstances in which youth is socialized and in which they undertake permanent roles in the society.

Youth is a transitional period between childhood and adulthood, so a universal feature of youth is a relatively low age. Statistically, the lower threshold for youth is mostly 15 years of age, and the upper threshold varies, mostly coming to 24, and sometimes even to 29 or 34 years of age. Research tends to extend the limits of youth downwards due to the ever earlier onset of puberty and upwards because of prolonged entry into the so-called adult world. This tendency has been recongized under the term of 'extended youth' (Ule, 1988), characterized by ever longer institutionalized education, difficult and inadequate employment, slow process of gaining socio-economic independence, delayed setting up of family and insufficient inclusion into public affairs, i.e. social decision-making. In the ever faster changing world of today, transition from youth into adulthood is becoming an ever longer and more uncertain process (Fahmy, 2006; France, 2007). Developing the capability to take on permanent social roles takes a relatively long time. This period is also a period of social vulnerability of youth. Changes in the contemporary world therefore mostly affect young people. Contemporary generations of youth mature under significantly more risky circumstances, characterized by processes and consequences of globalization, increased demand for professional mobility and flexibility, and development of ICT (information-communication tehcnology) (Beck, 1992; Roche, Tucker,1997; Miles, 2000; Mortimer,Larson, 2002; Fahmy, 2006). (Post)modernization processes – including weakening of traditional family and personal ties/ relationships, as well as established modes of intergenerational transmission of values and behaviour patterns – transform and deconstruct known forms of social reproduction, which forces youth into unsafer and more strenuous search for identity and individual social integration strategies (Furlong, Cartmel, 1997; Wyn, White, 1997; Larson, 2002, Ruddick, 2003; France, 2007).

Risks which additionally make social integration of youth more difficult are even more numerous and more prominent in transitional societies – compared with the earlier socijalist times, and compared to more developed and stable democratic societies. Namely, growing up in post-socialist societies is burdened with a double transition, because young people are passing through a universal transition period from childhood to adulthood in societies which are at the same time undergoing a fundamental transformation. Socialization of young people takes place in unstable

conditions, because institutions, processes and social norms which in the past guided the transition into adulthood are also undergoing a more or less radical change. Analyses have so far indicated that young people in transition countries are facing a series of processes which make adequate integration into adult world more difficult, such as: increase in social differences and unequal education opportunities, stronger competition on the labour market together with growth of unemployment and precarious work, growing criminality and risky behaviour, diminished quality of health care, collapse of former and slow establishment of new social values. In addition, intergenerational transmission of values is weakening, while socio-economic importance of family resources is growing stronger (Wallace, Kovatcheva, 1990; Ule et al 2000; Roberts 2003).

Problems that young people are facing both in developed countries and former socialist countries equally affect youth in Croatia. However, some specifically Croatian circumstances have to be added here. Firstly, in early 1990-ies Croatia was still at war, the economic and political consequences of which have affected direction and pace of social development in the long run. Secondly, social transformation resulted in a worse situation than in most other post-socialist countries. Unsatisfactory results manifested themselves in deficient democratization of Croatian society, and even more in devastation of economic resources. The latter was caused primarily by poorly implemented process of privatization and restructuring of companies, which directly resulted in massive going under of companies and loss of jobs, with the accompanying decrease in the standard of living and general quality of life for most citizens. The following period of democratic consolidation and long-term process of Croatia's preparation for EU accession helped decrease democratic deficits from the first transition decade, but economic circumstances mostly did not improve. To the contrary, in 2008 economic crisis started to spill over onto Croatia, which, together with the indigenous structural deficiencies, contributed to continuous worsening of the economic situation. It can therefore be said that the current generation of young people has been growing up in a society marked by the traumas of war and modest economic development, and maturing in circumstances of economic regression and significant personal uncertainty and insecurity. Unfavourable current developments are an

experience which Croatian youth share with their peers from many other European countries, and which presumably contributes to the growing feeling of anxiety and lack of perspective. In this context, Croatia, as well as most European societies, is faced with unfavourable demographic trends: namely, between 1953 and 2001 the share of youth (aged between 15 and 29) in the total population decreased from 27.7% to 20.6%. This is one of the reasons for which, as it has already been said, youth are becoming an increasingly important social resource. Because of this, additional slowing down of the social integration process and activation of youth potential can in return contribute to prolongation and deepening of the current economic and social crisis.

A thematically very broad research of youth in Croatia conducted between 1980-ies and mid 2000 (Radin, 1988; Ilišin, Radin, 2002, 2007; Ilišin, 2005) at nationally representative sample of youth showed that the transition period mostly brought more risks and insecurity to young people rather than opened new broader perspectives. Young people responded to this situation by withdrawing further into privacy and distancing themselves from social and political affairs. They also turned out to be a pragmatic generation relying mostly on personal and family resources in realization of their goals and ambitions in life. Clearly defined groups could be discerned among youth – modern and traditionally oriented, with the majority inclined towards a quiet family life, high standard of living, stable professional career and hedonistic forms of relaxation. Despite radical changes in the social and political order, young people, with rare exceptions, turned out to be very similar to older generations, which indicated that inter-generational transmission of values in Croatia had been going on without a significant interruption. It was also confirmed that young people were not a homogenous social group because of the significant differentiation within the group with regard to social status and origin, degree of maturity and different experiences in socialization and different educational achievements.

## Youth research in Croatia 2012

This research study presents the findings of the empiric research *Perceptions and attitudes of young people in Croatia towards a changing reality* (Percepcije i stavovi mladih Hrvatske prema stvarnosti koja se mijenja). The research is a joint project of the Institute for Social Research (Institut za društvena istraživanja) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zagreb and is based on and implemented in accordance with the Shell Youth Survey started in 1953 in Germany, which has spread to numerous countries in Europe and outside Europe over the last six decades.

The general aim of this research is to establish and analyse some attitudes and behaviour patterns of youth in contemporary Croatian society. In accordance with this goal, two basic hypotheses have been postulated: 1) that youth are a recognizable social group by their lifestyle, attitudes, values and behaviour patterns; and 2) that there is a difference among various segments of youth with regard to their socio-demographic characteristics. Data were collected by a modified questionnaire originally produced in 2005 for a youth research in Germany. Field data collection was carried out in July 2012 by Hendl, Zagreb.

Croatian youth sample was stratified by size of county and place of residence and by age and gender. This representative sample encompassed 1500 respondents between 14 and 17 years of age (born between 1985 and 1998) from all over Croatia. CAPI methodology was used, with individual interviews of about 45 minutes on average. Received data have been entered into SPSS database and systematized and statistically processed, including univariate (distribution of answers), bivariate (chi-squared test, t-test and analysis of variance) and multivariate analysis (factor analysis) depending on the character of individual sets of variables, i.e. requirements of the analysis.

Six socio-demographic characteristics were used for analysis of possible intergenerational differentiation: gender, age cohort, residential status (place of residence), socio-professional status, education level of respondents and of the respondents' fathers. Only statistically significant differences have been interpreted, at the level of .000.

The six selected socio-demographic characteristics of respondents are shown in table 1, since they provide the basic information on the structure of youth sample.

Data indicate that the majority of respondents are majors (average age 20.9), whose childhood, i.e. early socialization took place in the turbulent 1990-ies. More than one half of young people completed their education, while the rest are still in secondary school or at the university. It can also be seen that three quarters of youth come from families where the father only has secondary school education. Finally, the majority (i.e. three fifths) of young people live in small and big cities (regional centres and Zagreb), which indicates socialization in prevailingly urban environments.

*Table 1: Structure of youth sample (%)*

|                                         |      |
|-----------------------------------------|------|
| <b>Gender</b>                           |      |
| Male                                    | 50.8 |
| Female                                  | 49.2 |
| <b>Age cohort</b>                       |      |
| 14-17                                   | 28.5 |
| 18-22                                   | 35.7 |
| 23 and over                             | 35.8 |
| <b>Place of residence</b>               |      |
| Village                                 | 40.4 |
| Town                                    | 28.9 |
| Regional centre/city                    | 12.8 |
| Zagreb                                  | 17.9 |
| <b>Socio-professional status</b>        |      |
| Employed                                | 30.7 |
| Unemployed                              | 24.4 |
| Pupils*                                 | 23.3 |
| Students                                | 21.5 |
| <b>Father's level of education</b>      |      |
| (Non)completed primary school           | 4.7  |
| Three-year secondary school             | 20.8 |
| Four-year secondary school              | 55.7 |
| Post-secondary and university education | 18.8 |
| <b>Respondents' education level</b>     |      |
| (Non)completed primary school           | 24.8 |
| Three-year secondary school             | 16.2 |
| Four-year secondary school              | 45.3 |
| Undergraduate study and higher          | 13.7 |

\* (Interpreter's note: pupils - primary and secondary school students)

The above data are important for understanding of the analysis presented in the following chapter.

## **RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION**

### **1. Socio-economic situation of youth**


The socio-economic situation of youth is the background for development outcomes of individuals and formation of their values and attitudes, whereas the parents' investment in terms of time, financial resources and human capital in the form of own knowledge and connections is a very important component of the current and future social status of youth. In modern societies opportunities in life and socio-economic situation of individuals depend to a large extent on their educational achievements, because of which the education system is seen as an allocation mechanism for various socio-economic positions (de Graaf and Kalmijn, 2001; D'Addio, 2007). The family as the starting point influences educational and professional results of individuals through financial and social capital at their disposal. Immediate influence of financial capital on initial choices and contents available in education is complemented with the influence of social capital of the family, manifested through parents' experience and their social connections. Children who are exposed to high social capital at home are better prepared to acquire academic contents, develop the ability to acquire knowledge and intellectual concepts, and can also be directly favoured by the teachers in comparison with children with low social capital (Bourdieu, 1973).

Furthermore, parents' education can also influence the size of household and distribution of educational opportunities among siblings, as well as the environment in which children spend their childhood and adolescence, shaping their tastes and preferences (Feinstein et al, 2004). The influence of socio-economic status of the family extends beyond this framework, as pointed out by M. Marmot (2005: 1), who says that health follows a social gradient, which he calls the 'status syndrome', and his findings confirm that the likelihood of living a longer and healthier life increases with the increase in the level of education.

In order to get an idea on the social profile of youth it is highly important to have their socio-economic position in mind, the first component of which – education le-

vel of respondents and their parents – is shown in figure 1.1. Taking the specificity of our sample into consideration – namely that these are young people – it is understandable that the educational level of the majority is still below university qualifications, and that a significant share of respondents is still in school. So almost one quarter of the sample is youth who completed primary school, slightly over one sixth completed a three-year secondary school, and over two fifths completed a four-year secondary school, while slightly less than 14% have attained some level of university education.

*Figure 1.1: Education level of youth and their parents (%)*



Since researches show that educational level of both the mother and father plays a significant role in educational and professional success of young people, in observing the family status we firstly analysed mother's and father's level of education (Hayes and Miller, 1991; Kalmijn, 1994; Korupp, Ganzeboom and Van der Lippe, 2002; Johnston, Ganzeboom, Treiman, 2005). In this research more mothers than fathers have completed primary school, and there are slightly more mothers in the group with completed four-year secondary school and higher education than fathers, while fathers prevail in the group with completed three-year

secondary school and university qualifications. Looking into the connection between education levels of the mother and father we established a high degree of interconnection ( $p=.682$ ,  $p<.01$ ), and by cross-checking levels of education of the mother and father with dependant variables we established that these levels have an equally strong influence in the same direction. Therefore in our further analysis only the father's education is used as indicator of the family's social status, and therefore also of social origin of youth.

The fact that over two fifths of young people are still in school is also an explanation for the findings showing that, overall, educational achievements of the fathers are somewhat higher than the current educational achievements of young people. However, since a high percentage of respondents are attending tertiary education, we can expect an increase in the number of highly educated youth, especially because this category has the biggest potential for expansion.

Table 1.1 shows a relationship between socio-demographic characteristics of youth and their education level. It is interesting to note that place of residence and gender do not produce statistically significant differences.


*Table 1.1:* Education level of youth with regard to their socio-demographic characteristics (%)

| Youth's characteristics               | Primary school education             | Three-year secondary education | Four-year secondary education | Undergraduate studies or higher |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <i>Age</i>                            | $\chi^2=1320.15$ ; $df=6$ ; $p=.000$ |                                |                               |                                 |
| 14-17                                 | 82.4                                 | 17.6                           | -                             | -                               |
| 18-22                                 | 2.2                                  | 16.0                           | 75.7                          | 6.0                             |
| 23-27                                 | 1.7                                  | 15.3                           | 50.8                          | 32.2                            |
| <i>Father's education</i>             | $\chi^2=121.59$ ; $df=9$ ; $p=.000$  |                                |                               |                                 |
| Primary school education              | 41.4                                 | 37.1                           | 20.0                          | 1.4                             |
| Three-year secondary school education | 28.0                                 | 28.0                           | 34.7                          | 9.3                             |
| Four-year secondary school education  | 22.3                                 | 10.3                           | 52.7                          | 14.7                            |
| Post-secondary education and higher   | 24.7                                 | 15.5                           | 41.0                          | 18.7                            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                          | 24.9                                 | 16.2                           | 45.3                          | 13.7                            |

A socio-demographic feature with expected influence – age – differentiates youth in the sense of increase in level of education in parallel with increase in age. At the

beginning we mentioned the important influence of the education status of parents, i.e. the father, on development and future social status of youth, and our results show that, on average, most young people with (currently) completed primary school education have fathers with lower education levels. Youth with completed three-year secondary education mostly have fathers with lower education levels, while respondents with completed four-year secondary school have fathers with the same education level and highly educated young people have highly educated fathers. These data confirm the trend of self-recruitment, which means that the highest educational achievements of youth in Croatia today are to a large extent conditioned by similar educational achievements of their fathers. However, judging by the number of students, as has already been said, it is realistic to assume that today's young generation will in the end exceed their parent's education levels, which means that some of them will advance on the social scale in this respect.

*Figure 1.2: Socio-professional status of youth (%)*



The socio-professional status has been analysed in the same way as youth's education level, and a detailed overview of distribution of respondents into individual socio-professional categories is given in figure 1.2.

Expectedly, since this research encompasses young people up to the age of 27, the majority of the respondents in the sample, when looked at individually (over one

quarter), are employed full time, and this group is closely followed by the group of unemployed youth. There is slightly less than one quarter of primary and secondary school pupils and slightly over one fifth are students. Other categories of respondents, which are in further analyses considered as “employed” – part-time employed, freelancers, entrepreneurs and farmers – make up slightly over 4% of the sample. In short, less than one third of young people have embarked on the process of socio-economic independence, while the others are either waiting for a job or are preparing for their future professional roles. In other words, slightly over two thirds of young people from our sample belong to the category of supported members of their families. But, since employed youth in this research have not been asked whether they work on permanent or temporary basis and since the trend of fixed-term employment of youth has been significantly increasing over the past years, it can be assumed that a significant share of employed youth live in considerable insecurity, which is probably slowing down the process of their becoming socio-economically independent.

Table 1.2 shows the socio-demographic profile of observed socio-professional youth groups.

*Table 1.2: Socioprofessional status of youth with regard to their socio-demographic characteristics (%)*

| <b>Youth characteristics</b>         | <b>Employed</b>                | <b>Unemployed</b> | <b>Pupils</b> | <b>Students</b> |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| <i>Age</i>                           | $\chi^2=1137,56; df=6; p=,000$ |                   |               |                 |
| 14-17                                | 8.2                            | 11.5              | 76.3          | 4.0             |
| 18-22                                | 22.8                           | 30.7              | 4.5           | 42.1            |
| 23-27                                | 56.5                           | 28.5              | -             | 14.9            |
| <i>Respondents' education</i>        | $\chi^2=848.13; df=9; p=,000$  |                   |               |                 |
| Primary school                       | 8.3                            | 16.1              | 75.6          | -               |
| Three-year secondary school          | 39.3                           | 30.3              | 25.0          | 5.3             |
| Four-year secondary school           | 34.2                           | 27.2              | 2.4           | 36.2            |
| Undergraduate degree and higher      | 49.8                           | 22.9              | -             | 27.3            |
| <i>Father's education</i>            | $\chi^2=132.55; df=9; p=,000$  |                   |               |                 |
| Primary school                       | 38.6                           | 44.3              | 12.9          | 4.3             |
| Three-year secondary school          | 32.1                           | 34.9              | 23.4          | 9.6             |
| Four-year secondary school           | 33.1                           | 23.3              | 20.9          | 22.6            |
| University qualifications and higher | 20.6                           | 11.0              | 32.6          | 35.8            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                         | 30.8                           | 24.4              | 23.3          | 21.5            |


Employed youth are mostly in the highest age group and have above average share of three-year secondary school or post-secondary education, while their fathers predominantly have no qualifications and under-average share of university qualifications. These figures suggest that a significant share of youth from families with lower social status were forced to go into professions, which require lowest qualification levels and enable early employment, and that highly educated youth are more easily employable than those with vocational qualifications. Unemployed youth differ significantly from employed youth, since they include both older age cohorts with three-year secondary education, with fathers who only have primary school education or have not completed primary schooling. These data indicate difficulties in employment of youth trained for some blue-collar professions (which is expected in the situation of run down industrial production in Croatia) and who do not have family resources, which they can use in job search. However, pupils differ significantly from the first two sub-groups, because they are, of course, the youngest group, while their fathers have above average share of higher education. This is similar to the profile of students, whose fathers also more often have high education levels. However, students are mostly in the middle age cohort, and their entry educational level at enrolment into higher education institution is as a rule four-year secondary school education. It is also significant that approximately 36% of all students have an undergraduate degree and that they are continuing their education at graduate level.

Figure 1.3 shows one of the basic variables in the analysis of socio-economic position – household size – where it has to be added that households with young people on average consist of 3.43 persons. In other words, over three fifths of young people live in “typical” households with three to four members, while only a small share of youth live alone or in households with six or more members.

Analysis of interrelation of socio-demographic characteristics of youth and the number of household members has indicated that among those who live alone there is above average share of youth in the oldest age group ( $\chi^2=131.79$ ), with residence in Zagreb ( $\chi^2=51.64$ ), employed ( $\chi^2=120.32$ ) and with university education ( $\chi^2=45.84$ ), while their fathers have lower levels of education ( $\chi^2=39.65$ ). Youth in families of two are also more frequently employed highly educated residents of

major cities in the oldest age group, with fathers who have a three-year secondary school education. In contrast to the previously mentioned non-typical families, youth in households with 3-4 members mostly belong to the age group of 18-22 and have four-year secondary school education like their fathers. Finally, youth in most numerous families more often belong to the youngest age group, are of lower education level (like their fathers) and have the status of pupils (primary or secondary school students).

*Figure 1.3: Number of household members*




Particularly important as indicators of quality of life of young people and their families are data on the level of monthly expenditure of their households (figure 1.4). Here we have to bear in mind that monthly expenditure is also an indicator of the income of the household, whereby it can be assumed that those who live on credit have expenditure exceeding their income, and that those with higher income put some money into savings, which can particularly benefit young people.

The most significant piece of information in figure 1.4 is that almost one third of young people have not specified the amount of expenditure – partially because they do not know, partially because they would not say. However, the number of answers received – assumed that the majority of those who answered the question really are acquainted with their household's expenditure – is sufficient to gain a basic idea on the financial situation of families with young people. Aggregated data on

expenditure of households with young people give an insight into the struggle of a large number of Croatian citizens under present circumstances. Concretely, it can be said that, in addition to 30% of respondents for whom we have no information, 14% of youth live in households with monthly expenditure of up to 2,500 HRK, which is approximately the amount of guaranteed minimum salary (approx. 2,800 HRK), 36% in households with expenditure of around the average monthly salary (of approx. 5,400 HRK), and approximately 20% in households with expenditure exceeding this monthly limit.

*Figure 1.4: Average monthly expenditure of households with youth (%)*



On the basis of the above data distribution it can be seen that every seventh respondent lives in a family on the verge of poverty, that one third of young people live in families facing daily difficulties in covering bare necessities, and one fifth live in families which have least difficulty in financing most of the needs of their family members. The extent of inequality is indicated for example by the calculation that the poorest families (with up to 1,500 HRK of monthly expenditure) of average

size (3.43 members) spend monthly approximately 400 HRK per family member, and the wealthiest families (10,000 HRK of monthly expenditure) spend approximately 3,000 HRK per family member. If we add to this that in families with a higher number of family members fathers often have lower education levels (which typically means a lower income) it can be concluded that young people from such families are mostly exposed to a limited perspective in life and to risk of poverty.


For the purpose of further analysis the above distribution of responses of young people regarding average monthly expenditure of their households has been grouped into four categories (up to 2,500 HRK, 2,501 - 5,000 HRK, 5,001 – 7,000 HRK, 7,000 HRK and over) plus groups who do not know the answer and those who would not say. By comparison of socio-demographic characteristics of young people lowest household expenditure has been established for youth in the oldest age group ( $\chi^2=131.84$ ), living in rural areas ( $\chi^2=158.03$ ), unemployed ( $\chi^2=141.72$ ) and those with completed secondary vocational education ( $\chi^2=148.88$ ) and children of fathers with lower education levels ( $\chi^2=143.27$ ). Monthly household expenditure of up to 5,000 HRK is above average reported by young people also coming from rural areas and of fathers with lower education levels, but this time those who are employed. Monthly household expenditure of up to 7,000 HRK is reported mostly by youth from Zagreb and students, as well as young people with four-year secondary school education, coming from families where fathers have the same education level, and the category of over 7,000 HRK above average includes young people with university education whose fathers also have a university degree. The youngest respondents with lowest education levels, i.e. pupils coming from families with fathers who have three-year secondary school education most often do not know the average monthly expenditure of their households. All of the above trends are expected, but it is interesting that respondents who in most cases refused to answer the question on monthly expenditure were the oldest respondents from smaller towns, who are either students or working and with university education, like their fathers. This set of characteristics leads to the speculation that these are young people who probably live in households with high monthly expenditure (and income) and who believe it is better not to disclose it, so it is possible that the share of financially better off households would be bigger if the latter respondents had

indicated their households' average monthly expenditure. However, regardless of this incompleteness of information, the established polarization of financial resources, which young people have at their disposal monthly, indicates significant differences in their quality of living and lifestyle, as the determining factor for the quality and content of their private and professional lives at a later age.

The pace of life and all that young people have at their disposal today have brought about a re-definition of the term 'luxury', and things that may have been a symbol of luxury to their parents – such as cars and computers – have become basic needs for the youth, who have to be mobile and networked. From this starting point, research has been looking into how many cars, laptops and PC's households with young people have, and the results are shown in Figure 1.5.

In the analysis of these elements of economic status, we started from the assumption that households with young members are mobile and have access to IT technology. The results confirm the initial assumption, because households with youth on average have 1.23 cars and one computer (0.93). Taking into consideration the speed of new technologies' spreading, it can be assumed that over the next several years there will be no household without a PC, especially household with young members. It is noticeable that a significantly smaller portion of youth have laptops, i.e. almost two fifths of households with young people do not have a laptop.

*Figure 1.5: Number of cars, laptops and PC's in households with youth (%)*



Under the assumption that there are differences among the respondents in access to the above items, analysis was carried out and the results show significant influence of observed characteristics of young people on car, PC and laptop ownership. The results of analysis show that father's education ( $\chi^2=95.76$ ) generates statistically significant differences, since children of parents with lower education levels have less access to a car than other young people, while children of parents with three or four-year secondary education have one car per household on average, and children of parents with higher education levels have two or more cars. The influence of socio-professional status of young people ( $\chi^2=37.22$ ) is visible in the fact that the highest number of cars are owned by households with employed respondents and students, while households with unemployed youth have mostly one car per household, and households with pupils above average do not own a car.

Differences in access to and use of computers are also as expected. On the one hand there are young people living in households without a computer, which includes the oldest youth ( $\chi^2=26.18$ ), unemployed youth ( $\chi^2=41.69$ ) and youth from smaller towns ( $\chi^2=84.36$ ), with three-year secondary school education ( $\chi^2=24.46$ ) whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=96.47$ ). On the other side are young people aged 18-22, residing in Zagreb, with secondary school education and student status, with highly educated fathers who own two or more computers. One computer per household is reported in the youngest group of respondents, pupils from rural areas, with fathers who have four-year secondary school education. The profile of young people in households without a laptop is similar to those of youth without access to PC – youth from rural areas ( $\chi^2=84.36$ ), with four-year secondary school education ( $\chi^2=21.99$ ), currently unemployed ( $\chi^2=71.96$ ), whose fathers have lowest education levels ( $\chi^2=88.86$ ). In the middle of this scale are youth with one laptop per household, from small towns, pupils or students, with highly educated parents, while at the top of the scale are young people from Zagreb, mostly pupils or students of academically educated fathers (similar to those young people whose households have the highest number of laptops).

Figure 1.6 shows a set of data on some elements of the economic status of households with young people – house/flat ownership, own room for young person and Internet connection in the household.


The responses of young people in all categories of ownership are around 90% - i.e. this is how many young people live in a home or flat owned by them or their families (the remaining 10% live in rented houses or flats), have their own room and Internet access.

Of course, the analysis looked into whether and in which direction young people differ with regard to observed socio-demographic characteristics in terms of house or flat ownership, their own room and internet access. Home ownership was indicated by above average number of young people living in rural areas ( $\chi^2=28.04$ ). There is some difference between them and young people who mostly have their own room, which are young people whose housing conditions are mostly facilitated through their father's education ( $\chi^2=23.51$ ), whereas young people whose fathers have lower education levels more rarely have their own room than those whose fathers have a higher education level. The last component of the economic status shown in figure 1.6 – access to Internet connection in the household – shows that the Internet is mostly accessible to youth from larger urban areas ( $\chi^2=24.93$ ), with four-year secondary school or higher education levels ( $\chi^2=49.99$ ), students ( $\chi^2=61.24$ ), and those whose fathers have higher education levels ( $\chi^2=148.42$ ). Here it has to be added that the biggest differences in Internet access at home is found between children of parents with high and lower education levels, where children of fathers with high education levels have Internet access in almost 99% of cases, and children of fathers with lower education levels only in 59% of households. This undoubtedly has significant influence on a series of characteristics of young people's lives, such as their interests, educational success and leisure time, which will be analysed later on.

We also asked the respondents about the number of rooms in their family flat or house. The answer we got was that there is an average of 3.17 rooms per house/flat. In other words, the majority of young people have a housing unit with three rooms (34%), followed by 2 rooms (27%), while 20% live in a flat or house with four, 14% with five and more rooms, and only 5% of them in a flat with just one room. If we remember the average monthly expenditure per household, it can be said that, on average, the housing situation of young people is better than the income of their households. On the basis of this it can be assumed that the existing housing

capacities are to a large extent result of many years of accumulation of resources over several generations, especially because Croatia is characterized by a tradition of investment into real-estate.

*Figure 1.6:* Share of youth living in a house/flat owned by the family, with their own room and Internet access (%)




The comparison by socio-demographic characteristics of youth has shown that housing units with a smaller number of rooms are mostly occupied by youth in urban areas ( $\chi^2=80.31$ ), employed ( $\chi^2=51.38$ ) whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=56.55$ ). On the other hand, flats/houses with more than three rooms on average are mostly occupied by youth in less urbanized environments, and pupils and students whose fathers on average have higher education levels.

The last indicator to be analysed in this part of the research refers to the number of books per household, which, in addition to being an indicator of educational and social status of the family, can be also be taken as an indicator of cultural capital inherited by young people from their families (Figure 1.7).

As can be seen, the share of young people living in households without any books and in households, which have at least some kind of home library (i.e. over

100 books) is almost identical. Here the calculation has shown that households with young people own 75 books on average (the storage of which requires about 2m of shelf length), which means that in average housing units (3 rooms) books are just rare artefacts. According to the data, families with young people have a relatively low cultural capital, and a further decrease in the number of books in possession can be expected, due partially to the increase in online contents favoured by young people, partially due to the decrease in purchase power (books being relatively expensive). According to the results we obtained, almost every seventh respondent has no book in the household, and this mostly refers to the two older sub-groups of young people ( $\chi^2=37.59$ ), who live in rural areas ( $\chi^2=286.20$ ), are unemployed ( $\chi^2=154.62$ ) and have a four-year secondary school education ( $\chi^2=117.32$ ), whereas their fathers ( $\chi^2=333.70$ ) have a three-year secondary school education. In contrast to them, just below one fifth of youth live in households with over one hundred books; these young people mostly belong to the youngest sub-group (14-17), with residence in Zagreb, in a status of students, with university educated parents.

*Figure 1.7: Number of books in households with young people (%)*



After this overview and analysis of elements of socio-economic situation of young people we can briefly summarize the results. Most importantly, results confirm the tendency of educational reproduction in today's Croatian society, with segregation in access to education and economic resources. In other words, young people who are currently students and have fathers with university education have significantly higher resources for personal growth and development. This refers to their final education level as well as to resources enabling a mobile, active and informed life – both in the sense of higher financial resources and in the sense of access to new technologies and social networking – as preconditions for a life suited to the requirements of contemporary society.

## 2. Family and social networks


Every society, including Croatian, continuously goes through various stages of development. This development reflects on the changes in the dominant values, including changes in the perceived value of marriage and family. The most important changes in family life that we have been witnessing over the last decades include an increasing number of employed and economically independent women, ever higher marriage age, predominance of two-generation families, an increasing number of childless couples, divorces and single families, unmarried families and singles households as well as alternative communities (Stalehar, 2020: 243). The family however still remains a place where interpersonal relations are most intensive and richest, as well as the best environment for raising children and care for all family members who need care (Majstorović, 2007). In the analysis of perceptions and attitudes of young people, research of various aspects of their family circumstances and attitudes towards marriage and family has a double significance. On the one hand it indicates dominant features of the primary social community youth belong to, and on the other level of independence of the young generation in a specific society at a specific time. Therefore this part of the research report describes family circumstances of youth in Croatia and their attitudes towards some determinants of family life, as well as towards friends. Here family is seen as a social community characterized by primary social relations, and relationships with friends as part of youth's secondary social network.

The average number of family members is 3.43, what means that young people mostly live in families with three and four members. As can be seen from figure 2.1, more than two thirds of young people live together with their parents, with most of them living with both parents. Every tenth young person lives only with their mother, whereas the share of young people living only with their father is exceptionally small (approx 3%). Only slightly over one tenth of young people have formed their own family, while less than one tenth live independently.

As expected, age ( $\chi^2=312.55$ ) has the biggest influence on the ability to set up one's own family, together with socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=241.57$ ) and education ( $\chi^2=108.17$ ). The dominant structure of family with young people is moderately, but

statistically significantly, dependent also on place of residence ( $\chi^2=73.42$ ), father's education ( $\chi^2=67.26$ ) and gender ( $\chi^2=53.85$ ). Therefore young people aged 14 to 22 who are still at school or are unemployed more often live with both or one parents. A slight majority of them live in urban environments and have fathers with higher educational qualifications. In the sub-sample of youth living alone or in unmarried relationships there are significantly more young women, aged 23-27. Among them, youth with four-year secondary school or university qualifications prevail. At the same time they significantly more often come from rural areas, and their fathers predominantly have lower educational qualifications.

*Figure 2.1: Structure of families with young people (%)*




Every second respondent lives with parents because this is the easiest solution, while one third of them would like to become independent, given the right financial situation. Other reasons for living with parents are stated by less then one tenth of young people (Figure 2.2.).

This line of thinking is equally characteristic for both sexes, but it is statistically significantly dependant on their socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=229.16$ ), age ( $\chi^2=195.51$ ), education ( $\chi^2=179.84$ ) and father's education ( $\chi^2=100.47$ ), as well as place of residence ( $\chi^2=88.15$ ). Youth who consider living with their parents practical are mostly minors and pupils and students. It is noticeable that the fathers of this group have higher education levels, and among them there is a relatively high number of

those who live in a village or a major city. Younger respondents who are still in school or are unemployed would relatively more often prefer to live alone, but their parents do not agree with this. In this group we find a relatively high number of young people whose fathers have lower education levels and young people who live in Zagreb. It is interesting to note that among youth who live with their parents for financial reasons there are more employed and unemployed youth with secondary school or university qualifications, aged 18 or over. Relatively more often they live in smaller towns and their fathers mostly have secondary school qualifications.

Figure 2.2: Reasons for living with parents (%)




By far most young people (approx. 86%) get along with their parents, although they do sometimes differ in opinion. A relatively high share of youth also gets along with their siblings (69%). Disturbed family relations are characteristic of slightly less than 15% of respondents (figure 2.3).

The quality of relationship with family members is independent of gender and place of residence of young people, and to a statistically significant degree depends on their socio-professional status (for relationship with parents  $\chi^2$  is 76.09, and for relationship with siblings 80.63). The quality of young people's relationships with their parents is also influenced by the education level of their father ( $\chi^2= 56.39$ ) and the respondents' education level ( $\chi^2=56.00$ ), while the quality of relationships with siblings is additionally influenced by their age ( $\chi^2= 37.79$ ). Employed and

unemployed youth with higher education levels, whose fathers have some kind of secondary school or university qualifications get along with their parents more often. Unemployed youth are relatively more frequently represented also in the group that does not get along with parents, as well as younger respondents whose fathers have lower education levels. Students and youth aged 23 or over more frequently get along with their siblings. In the group of students who do not get along with their siblings are more frequently unemployed youth and minors.

Figure 2.3: Estimated quality of youth's relationships with their parents and siblings




Data shown in Figure 2.4 show that mothers have the biggest influence on important decisions in the lives of young people. In slightly below one third of cases this role belongs to fathers, and almost one fifth of young people are indecisive in this respect.


The influence of family on decisions taken by young people depends on their socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=142.06$ ), gender ( $\chi^2=125.05$ ), age ( $\chi^2=108.45$ ) and to a slightly lesser degree, on the respondents' education level ( $\chi^2=55.63$ ). Here employed and unemployed older respondents who have completed their education are more often indecisive, where the decisions of younger respondents who are still in school are more often influenced by family members, mostly father and mother. It is interesting to note that male respondents are statistically significantly more often

indecisive, where young females prevail in the group of young people whose decisions are influenced by others (mostly spouse). At the same time, young females are more represented in the group of youth whose decisions are influenced by their mother, and young males in the group whose decisions are influenced by their fathers.

*Figure 2.4: Estimated influence of family members on important decisions of young people (%)*



*Figure 2.5: Manner of taking important decisions (%)*




However, the described influence does not happen directly, without youth autonomy, because in a large number of cases young people participate in decision-making together with their parents or are even completely independent in this (Figure 2.5).

The level of independence in decision-making significantly depends on all analysed socio-demographic characteristics of youth, except gender. There is a strong influence of socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=291.10$ ), age ( $\chi^2=274.72$ ) and respondents' education level ( $\chi^2=207.08$ ), while the influence of place of residence ( $\chi^2=61.77$ ) and father's education level is more moderate ( $\chi^2=42.19$ ). As expected, the independence of youth grows with their age, and it is higher in the group of young people who have completed their education and are employed. It is interesting to see that parents significantly more often decide on everything in families where fathers have exceptionally low or exceptionally high education level.

Over one third of young people are planning to marry in future, while every sixteenth young person plans to avoid having a family. There is a relatively small share of youth who are planning to live in an unmarried relationship (Figure 2.6).

*Figure 2.6: Youth' projections regarding their own families (%)*




Plans for the future depend to a moderate but statistically significant degree on all analysed socio-demographic characteristics of youth: socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=78.00$ ), father's education level ( $\chi^2=56.24$ ), place of residence ( $\chi^2=54.87$ ), respondent's education level ( $\chi^2=53.54$ ), age ( $\chi^2=43.21$ ) and gender ( $\chi^2=35.53$ ). Students and employed youth whose fathers have higher education levels, who live in Zagreb and belong to older age groups are planning to enter a marriage or unmarried relationship. Independent life, without family obligations is more often planned by unemployed youth, minors whose fathers have lower education levels,

who live in big cities, are still in school or have three-year secondary school qualifications. Indecisive are more often younger males<sup>1</sup> who are still in school, whose fathers have secondary school or university qualifications, and live in towns or cities.

Since the overwhelming majority of young people in Croatia still see family and marriage as the best choice in their lives, it is interesting to see their perceived advantages of marriage over unmarried relationship (figure 2.7).

*Figure 2.7: Attitudes of youth on main advantages of marriage over unmarried relationships (%)*



We can see that almost two thirds of young people see marriage as an expression of responsibility – either among spouses or between partners and their children. Interestingly, less than one tenth of young people believe that marriage brings higher financial security, and social desirability of marriage is mentioned only by less than one fifth of young people. Every tenth young person does not have an opinion on this issue.


The only statistical difference among young people in these estimates is related to age ( $\chi^2=35.97$ ). Here minors more frequently mention responsibility towards children and social desirability of marriage. They are also relatively more often represented in the group that does not have an opinion on marriage. Youth aged 18-

<sup>1</sup> It is precisely indecisiveness that contributes to statistically relevant gender differences among youth with regard to their future plans.

22 are relatively more frequent in groups that point out responsibility among marriage partners and responsibility towards children, but also the financial security of marriage. However, the oldest age cohort (23-27) most frequently points out responsibility between partners (actually, this group contains one half of all respondents of this age group).

In contrast to responsibility that dominates in marriage, the main advantages of unmarried relationships, in the opinion of most young people, are simplicity and independence (figure 2.8). Since only a very small number of young people are planning to enter such a relationship, it does not surprise that almost one fifth of them do not think about advantages of such a relationship.

*Figure 2.8: Attitudes of young people on main advantages of unmarried relationship over marriage (%)*




In the opinion of youth on advantages of unmarried relationship over marriage there is a statistically significant difference with regard to place of residence ( $\chi^2=89.18$ ) and socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=61.72$ ). Here the independence of partners is more frequently pointed out by unemployed youth living in villages and smaller towns, where the ability to focus more on career is pointed out by students living in Zagreb. Pupils from Zagreb and smaller towns expect a smaller probability of conflicts in such relationships, whereas employed youth and students from large

cities point out more easy dissolution of such a relationship. Expectedly, pupils are more represented in the group of indecisive respondents.

The above mentioned data indicate that youth in Croatia still highly value traditional family values based on marriage and married families, which they are planning to set up in future as well. However, the best age for marriage is believed to be later in youth, i.e. 30 for males and 27 for females. Most respondents are planning to have two children (figure 2.9). 15% of the respondents are planning to have 3 children, and 12% only one child.

*Figure 2.9: Average best years for marriage for males and females, and desired number of children*



The estimated number of desired children, as well as the best marriage age for males and females, are under the strong influence of all analysed socio-demographic characteristics of youth (table 2.1).

Lower marriage age is preferred by younger males, whose fathers have lower education levels, who are still in school and live in rural areas. On the other hand, higher marriage age for females is preferred by women, older youth, employed and unemployed, with higher education levels. The same relations are true also for the estimate of the best marriage age for males.

A smaller number of children (up to two) is statistically relevantly more often preferred by males, in older age groups, whose fathers have higher education levels, and youth who have graduated from or are still at university, currently employed or

unemployed and living in urban areas (regional centres and Zagreb). Three or more children are often preferred by females, younger youth with lower education levels, living in rural areas, still in primary or secondary school, from families with fathers who have lower education levels.

*Table 2.1:* Statistically significant  $\chi^2$  values of tests on influence of socio-demographic characteristics of youth on estimated desirable marriage age for females and males and desired number of children ( $p=.000$ )

|                           | <b>Desirable marriage age for females</b> | <b>Desirable marriage age for males</b> | <b>Desired number of children</b> |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Gender                    | 45.22                                     | 52.88                                   | 25.02                             |
| Age                       | 133.69                                    | 164.51                                  | 45.73                             |
| Father's education level  | 214.93                                    | 345.53                                  | 64.13                             |
| Education level of youth  | 181.98                                    | 237.43                                  | 64.13                             |
| Socio-professional status | 169.92                                    | 179.27                                  | 65.47                             |
| Place of residence        | 234.95                                    | 225.55                                  | 81.31                             |

With regard to attitudes of Croatian youth it is realistic to expect setting up of families at an ever later age and domination of families with two children, which is strongly connected with the need of the youth to build a professional career. In other words, more focus on quality professional live and higher education level leads to higher marriage age and smaller number of children.


However, most young people will at some time enter into a marriage or unmarried relationship, so it is interesting to see what criteria they will be guided by in this (figure 2.10).

The above data show that almost 90% of youth highly value the personality i.e. psychological features of marriage partners and common interests. Two thirds of young people consider physical attractiveness an important criterion in the choice of a marriage partner, and every second young person considers partner's level of education important. Socially conditioned characteristics of marriage partners, as well as opinion of others (family members) on this choice is important to a smaller, but still significant, number of young people. Slightly over 40% of youth will be guided by family approval and religion, and slightly less than two fifths of young

people by economic standing and nationality. Least important to young people in the choice of a marriage partner are regional origin and virginity.

The researched socio-demographic characteristics of youth have least influence on the estimated importance of religious faith and national origin in the choice of a marriage partner. In both cases statistical differences have been determined in relation to place of residence ( $\chi^2$  for religious belief is 51.13, and for national origin 65.63). Place of residence also influences the estimated importance of regional origin ( $\chi^2=81.48$ ), virginity ( $\chi^2=52.20$ ), education level ( $\chi^2=56.13$ ), personality ( $\chi^2=126.22$ ) and common interests ( $\chi^2=53.12$ ) in the choice of a marriage partner. Here the importance of religious belief, national origin, common interests and personality in the choice of a marriage partner grows with the increase in urbanization of place of residence. On the other hand, the importance of regional origin, virginity and education level of a potential marriage partner decreases with the increase in urbanization of the environment.

*Figure 2.10: Ranking list of relevant factors for choice of marriage partner (%)*



The next feature that differs the youth significantly in the choice of a marriage partner is father's education level. This feature statistically significantly contributes to the estimated importance of common interests ( $\chi^2=132.39$ ), personality ( $\chi^2=116.11$ ), physical appearance ( $\chi^2=46.53$ ), education level ( $\chi^2=89.83$ ), family consent ( $\chi^2=46.07$ ), economic standing ( $\chi^2=50.32$ ) and regional origin ( $\chi^2=40.48$ ) of a potential marriage partner. In most cases the estimated importance of the above features of a potential marriage partner grows with father's education level, and decreases in relation to estimated importance of family consent for the chosen partner. The situation is similar also in the case of influence of the respondent's education level on the estimated importance of individual characteristics of a marriage partner, which statistically significantly contributes to the estimated importance of family consent ( $\chi^2=76.55$ ), common interests ( $\chi^2=65.47$ ), personality ( $\chi^2=62.73$ ), economic standing ( $\chi^2=50.08$ ) and education level ( $\chi^2=48.36$ ) of a potential marriage partner. The estimated importance of all the above characteristics of a potential marriage partner increases with the increase in the respondents' education level.

The socio-professional status contributes to the estimated importance of personality ( $\chi^2=96.62$ ), virginity ( $\chi^2=78.23$ ), family consent ( $\chi^2=57.95$ ), appearance ( $\chi^2=49.14$ ), education level ( $\chi^2=49.61$ ) and common interests ( $\chi^2=49.66$ ) of potential marriage partners. Students stand out here by high importance attached to common interests, education level and personality of a potential marriage partner, and pupils on value attached to virginity and physical appearance of a potential marriage partner. Employed youth more often than other youth consider family consent important, and unemployed youth also highly values the appearance of a potential marriage partner.

The estimated value of virginity ( $\chi^2=50.82$ ), economic standing ( $\chi^2=41.13$ ), common interests ( $\chi^2=35.21$ ) and regional origin ( $\chi^2=31.63$ ) statistically significantly also depends on age. Here the youngest cohort stands out in the group of respondents who highly value virginity and economic standing of a potential marriage partner, and the oldest cohort stands out in the group of young people who highly value regional origin and common interests of a potential marriage partner. The middle age cohort is more indifferent to these features than others.

Interestingly, gender has a statistically significant influence on just one estimated characteristic of a potential marriage partner – virginity ( $\chi^2=24.95$ ).  $\chi^2$  result of the test shows a weak but statistically significant influence. Here women are slightly more represented in the group of respondents who consider this characteristic either very important or totally unimportant.

Here it has to be pointed out that a summary analysis of the results shown in this part of research indicates the existence of a smaller share of youth who are not satisfied with their families, which is particularly reflected in their disturbed relationships with parents and other family members. Whether such a situation reflects on their behaviour in other social relations, especially in the company of peers, is shown in the following analysis.


Expectedly, most young people (87%) belong to a circle of friends and acquaintances where everyone knows everyone and with whom they frequently go out. Among those who do not have such a circle of friends (10%) – with 3% of respondents who did not answer this question – are mostly older respondents aged 23-27 ( $\chi^2=39.93$ ) and youth whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=52.71$ ). Other analysed socio-demographic characteristics of youth do not contribute significantly to relations with friends. Since this is a very important social network, which young people mostly choose independently, it does not surprise that 94% of respondents are very satisfied or satisfied with their friends. Only 6% of young people are indecisive in this respect. The only discriminative socio-demographic characteristic in this respect is again their age ( $\chi^2=36.72$ ), where older respondents are somewhat less satisfied with their friends.

The share of young trouble-makers with violent behaviour while in the company of peers is extremely small (figure 2.11). In this sense violent conflicts are most frequent in night clubs or bars, and the least number of conflicts are related to intolerant attitudes to other (different) groups. These results lead to the conclusion that despite the general opinion, youth in Croatia do not consider violence and violent behaviour patterns socially acceptable and normal expression of dissatisfaction or a manner of satisfying one's own needs.

With regard to the extremely small number of youth inclined to violent behaviour, detailed statistical analysis of interrelation of this behaviour and their

socio-demographic characteristics is not possible. It can only be suggested that there is a tendency towards a slightly higher inclination to violent behaviour in younger males living in urban environments. However, it has to be borne in mind that this is a tendency that, in this case, cannot be scientifically verified.

*Figure 2.11: Youth participation in violent conflicts (%)*



As it is well known, social networks are objective indicators of social relations that also tell us about who an individual has relations with, and which create a structure for exchange of social support. Social networks are therefore fields of formal and informal relations of an individual through which exchange of services, information and other goods is enabled, as well as a source of formal and informal social capital (Dobrotić, Lakija, 2012). This part of research includes the analysis of differences and intensity of informal social networks of youth in Croatia, which are based on family ties and friendship, bearing in mind that both family relationships and friendships are of indisputable importance for the welfare of individuals.

In this sense the results have shown that youth in Croatia still enjoy a high level of social network support, both in case of family relations and in case of friendships. The results also show that the role of peers, in comparison to other periods of development, is highest in adolescence. At the same time, the role of family remains significant in all periods of young people's lives. Like earlier research (Klarin, Proroković, Šimić-Šašić, 2010), this research has also shown that the influence of parents and peers depends on the quality of those relations. Good family relations in

this research have been described as relations with an appropriate level of participation of youth in important decision-making and relations with a high level of mutual respect among family members.

It has also been established that two-parent families are dominant in Croatia, and that a large majority of youth live in the household with one or both parents until late twenties. These families mostly have harmonious family relationships, where youth participate in taking important family decisions with their parent. Young people mostly consider their mother to be the person influencing their opinion, followed by fathers and other family members. With regard to the above characteristics of the family, we can say that in Croatia family is still the strongest and best support for youth in growing up, and that it still has high importance and value in their lives. In this sense the trend of prolonged stay in family home has been confirmed, since only every fifth young person aged up to 27 has founded their own family or lives independently.

Such a low share of independent youth, according to our analysis, is a consequence of at least two circumstances. The first refers to prolonged education, and the second to inability to become independent because of unfavourable financial circumstances. Namely, the results show that many employed as well as unemployed young people live with their parents although they would like to become independent if their financial circumstances allowed it. It seems that prolonged education does not result in the expected higher opportunities for youth on the labour market, which must be a consequence of the global crisis in Croatia (as well as in Europe). However, education is still a very important factor of social profile and differentiation in this group of young people.

Differences among youth in the quality of their family circumstances and their assessment of various aspects of marriage and family are mostly influenced by their socio-professional status, which is also generally closely connected with the education level of youth. Also, father's education level also has a relatively strong influence, and contributes to many aspects of family life. Differentiation of youth, naturally, is also influenced by age, although it turned out to be a somewhat weaker influence in comparison with the previously mentioned socio-demographic characteristics of this population. The same conclusion refers also to place of

residence that has a decreasing influence from year to year on differences in family circumstances and young people's assessment of the importance of family. Gender is a socio-demographic characteristic with least influence on differentiation of youth, which is an expected consequence of growing gender equality in Croatian society.

In this respect, the results of this analysis indicate a trend in which a higher education level of youth contributes to plans mostly being connected with career, and less to setting up of a family and parenthood. However, many young people (more than two thirds) are planning to have their own family in future, and in this they will mostly be guided by their individual choice of partner, choosing partners who will suit them in their psychological and physical (and not social) profile.

These will be modern – postmodern families, i.e. dynamic, fluctuating partnerships with structure, organisation, roles and functions significantly differing from families set up by their parents. Unfortunately, unless social circumstances change significantly in near future, they will mostly have only two or even less children, which is not sufficient for a demographic renewal of Croatia. Therefore this aspect of the Croatian society will see a higher degree of affirmation of individual choices and forms of family, with the tendency towards setting up of a larger number of married and unmarried families with a smaller number of family members. At the same time family based on marriage is still the prevailing form of family in Croatia, and in this sense retains an important place in the contemporary Croatian society.

It should also be pointed out that a significant number of young people (about a third) cherish traditional values. Those are young people who, for example, consider social characteristics such as religion and regional and national origin important for the choice of a marriage partner, and to whom it is also important that their choice is approved by family members as well. They are also planning to set up a family earlier, with a larger number of children. Compared to previous research (Bouillet, 2006b) this group of young people is getting ever smaller in Croatia.

In short, despite its ever more flexible and changeable form and structure, the family has still retained its function of support and care for its members, and this is also expected in future. However, the society will have to adapt its forms of support to young families, extending the models for support to parents who should not be brought into the dilemma of choosing between family and career. On the contrary, educated young generations should be enabled to develop their careers despite family obligations, which is a relevant issue for all contemporary family policies.

### **3. Education, Employment and Mobility**

In the contemporary world, education is one of the key resources that can ensure competences and skills that are needed for the fulfilment of professional goals and achievement of a satisfactory standard of living for a young person. The dominant model within social theories on status achievement defines educational aspirations as a cognitive state motivating or supporting youth for academic success (Khoo and Ainsley, 2005). According to this model, personal characteristics (the influence of 'significant others' on the perception of one's own potential) and social dimensions (quality of the education system and socioeconomic status of the primary family) represent significant factors in the fulfilment of educational aspirations.

One of the starting points in examining professional aspirations is the division of motivations for the fulfilment of these aspirations into extrinsic (material wealth, physical attraction, fame and popularity) and intrinsic (relationships with other individuals, personal growth and development, participation in the community). If we transfer intrinsic needs into the professional sphere, we can see that various authors speak of several basic psychological needs (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Deci and Ryan, 2000).

These needs are: a) autonomy, as a feeling that we ourselves are the ones deciding on our behaviour, on the basis of our personal interests and values; b) competence, as a feeling that we are behaving successfully and capably and c) relations with other individuals, as a sense of connection and harmony with people we consider important. When focusing on the aspirations of youth, we can begin with the arguments of Walberg and Greenberg (2006: 178) that aspirations are a capacity to identify and determine goals for the future, whereas present activities of the individual are oriented towards fulfilment of these goals. In this process, as was done by Fox and Faver (1981:445), professional aspirations can be divided into traditional and alternative aspirations. Traditional aspirations are defined with the help of an index measuring the desire to obtain the usual awards for academic achievements, which includes high income, quick career development, permanent employment, and recognition in one's profession. Alternative aspirations are measured with the help of an index evaluating the desire for intrinsic awards, such

as helping others, working with other people, and doing socially significant work in the scope of one's profession.

We have already discussed the links between socioeconomic and educational status of youth on the one hand, and the educational level of their parents in the first part of the paper; in this part, we will focus on some elements of educational path and success, on current experiences of youth in the labour market, and some aspects of their professional aspirations, together with potential obstacles in terms of their fulfilment. In addition, we will also analyse the issue of spatial mobility of youth.


Irrespectively of whether they had already completed their education or not, young people were asked which educational path they would chose if they could chose between vocational school or university/polytechnic. Only 23% of youth would chose education in vocational secondary schools, with the rest preferring university studies. This does not surprise; the problem of low attractiveness of vocational secondary schools has been recognized in Croatia in the past two decades. With regard to desired educational paths, age and residential status did not produce statistically significant differences among youth. With regard to the remaining characteristics, it turns out that youth preferring vocational schools tend to be male ( $\chi^2=17.57$ ), with completed three-year secondary school education ( $\chi^2=107.44$ ) and unemployed ( $\chi^2=101.67$ ), whose fathers mostly have three-year secondary education ( $\chi^2=83.90$ ). On the other end are girls, students, youth with academic education, whose fathers also have higher education levels.

The next question refers to the preferences in terms of the place of education. Specifically, young people were asked about their preferences regarding education in Croatia or abroad, and in public or the private sector (Figure 3.1).

The preferences expressed are in accordance with the current situation. In other words, two thirds of youth prefer education in educational institutions in Croatia, while only one third of youth would opt for studying abroad, and studying in the private sector respectively. Therefore, despite the recent increase in national and international mobility of students, Croatia is still a country with a low level of mobility, even when it comes to younger generations. It is a well known fact that the mobility of secondary school students (pupils) is even lower.

As for the preferences regarding the place of education, only one statistically significant difference was noted, with regard to the place of residence ( $\chi^2=82.61$ ). The desire to obtain education in a public educational institution in Croatia is the most frequent among youth from rural areas and small towns, while private institutions in Croatia are more frequently perceived as the best option among youth from major cities. On the other hand, youth from Zagreb most frequently opt for public education institutions abroad, while private institutions abroad tend to be the choice of youth from regional centres.

Figure 3.1: Preferred place of education (%)




Participation of youth in the labour market in the course of schooling was examined through youth involvement in practical training, re-qualification or traineeship. It turned out that 78% of youth never participated in any such form of training. With regard to practical training, there are differences among youth based on the level of education ( $\chi^2=41.95$ ) and their socioprofessional status ( $\chi^2=115.44$ ); youth with academic education and employed youth already had experience in practical training, unlike pupils and students. It is interesting that the situation with respondents who completed three-year (vocational) school is not different, in terms

of lack of practical training. This might help explain the low level of acquired skills needed for vocational work among youth who completed three-year vocational education, which is an issue that Croatia has been facing for years.

Since the introduction of the national secondary school leaving exam (“matura”) and the so-called Bologna reform process in Croatia there is significantly more talk about the dissatisfaction of youth and other participants in the education process than in the past. We therefore examined the level of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the quality of education in Croatia, irrespectively of whether the respondents completed their education or not, and according to which system (Figure 3.2).

Data show that there are almost 2.5 times more youth who are more or less satisfied in comparison to those who are dissatisfied. However, if we add over two fifths of respondents who are only to a certain degree satisfied with the quality of education in Croatia to the group of dissatisfied respondents, such a result can be considered an indicator of the need to improve the system.

Figure 3.2: (Dis)satisfaction of youth with the quality of education in Croatia (%)




Expected differences in the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the educational system among youth were obtained only with regard to place of residence ( $\chi^2=66.35$ ) and socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=30.17$ ). The highest level of satisfaction was exhibited by pupils from rural areas and small towns. Moderate

level of satisfaction and dissatisfaction was exhibited by unemployed youth residing in all types of settlements except small towns. The highest level of dissatisfaction was observed among unemployed youth and students residing in Zagreb. There are several ways these results can be interpreted in; however, what is symptomatic is the fact that pupils exhibit the highest level of satisfaction – as the group of youth with the lowest amount of experience when it comes to the functioning and quality of the education system. Furthermore, their curriculum is much more harmonized than, for example, university curricula.

The sub-sample of youth who are still in the process of education – pupils and students – includes 673 respondents, or 44.9% of the total sample of youth, and the following analysis refers only to this group of respondents<sup>2</sup>. Figure 3.3 presents data on youth inclusion in three educational levels: secondary school, undergraduate studies and graduate studies.

*Figure 3.3: Educational level of youth in the educational system (%)*




It is beyond dispute that educational achievements of youth are connected with motivation. In this research, young people were asked whether they go to school or university very eagerly, eagerly, sometimes eagerly/sometimes not eagerly, not

<sup>2</sup> All the variables used in the previous part of analysis are used here again as independent variables, except for the socio-professional status, which has been replaced by a new variable including three categories of respondents: pupils, students of undergraduate studies and students of graduate studies.

eagerly, or not at all eagerly (Figure 3.4 presents a summary of results). Results show that most respondents – over one half– attend school/university sometimes eagerly, and sometimes not eagerly (i.e. depending on the situation), while over one third attends school more or less eagerly, and one tenth not eagerly. The level of motivation to attend school or university varies based on gender ( $\chi^2=21.59$ ) and their current educational level ( $\chi^2=40.19$ ). Thus education institutions are most eagerly attended by girls, more specifically students at both levels of university studies, and the lowest motivation and/or indecisiveness in terms of attending school is displayed by young males going to secondary school.

The assumption is that the motivation for attending school/university is connected with the level of stress felt by youth in daily school or university activities. The responses mostly overlap with tendencies established through previous responses connected with motivation (Figure 3.4). It is interesting that no particular sociodemographic characteristic of youth resulted in differences in the experienced level of stress. More specifically, for over one half of youth, life at school/university is somewhat hard and stressful, for one third, it is very hard and stressful and only 14% of pupils or students do not experience stress.

Figure 3.4: Motivation for attending educational institution and perceived level of stress and effort (%)



The above presented results are comforting, because they show that the level of stress is higher than demotivation; i.e. youth attend school/university at least moderately eagerly, although they feel stressed out in the process. What worries, however, are data showing that obligations connected with the process of education do not produce stress or feeling of excessive effort in every seventh pupil or student only.

Data on sensitive issues in the education system or specific educational institutions can be collected by asking students directly, in which case obtained results have to be taken with reserve, or only as a possible indicator of irregularities in the system. In the context where an increasing number of corruption cases are reported in the education system (higher education system in particular), we wanted to find out to what extent pupils and students believe that marks or exams can be bought at their school/university. It remains unknown to what extent the obtained results are result of personal experience or hearsay and unreliable information. However, the responses are useful as an indicator of the perception of irregularities in the education system. The results are certainly disturbing – almost one half of youth believe that marks or exams are actually being bought in their educational institution to a certain extent. More specifically, approx. 8% of respondents believe that this is a frequent occurrence at their school/university; 19% believe it happens occasionally; 21% believe that this is a rare occurrence; 51% believe that it never happens. Among the sociodemographic characteristics that were used, age ( $\chi^2=17.89$ ) and the current education level ( $\chi^2=50.16$ ) produced differences in terms of perception (or knowledge) of corruption in educational institutions. Namely, students respond more frequently that marks and exams can be bought in their educational institution, while pupils – or the youngest age cohort – are at the other end of the scale.

Grade point average achieved in the previous school year can be perceived both as a cause and as a consequence of previously analysed indicators – motivation for attendance of educational institution and perceived level of stress. Grade point average of (in)sufficient (grade 1 or 2) was reported by only a handful of youth. 19% of youth fared slightly better (grade 2 or 3); 48% achieved grade point average of 3 to 4; while almost one third (32%) achieved grade point average between grades 4

and 5. In further analysis we added the respondents who achieved grade point average of 1-2 to those who obtained grade point average of 2-3. The results show that older youth ( $\chi^2=25.62$ ) from small towns ( $\chi^2=34.13$ ) currently students at graduate studies ( $\chi^2=38.99$ ) had the lowest grades, while pupils from Zagreb had the highest grades.


Under the assumption that the number of hours of studying per day correlates with the final success of an average pupil/student, it is interesting to look at how many hours per day are spent by youth studying. The results show that most respondents (31%) study for up to one hour per day; 27% study 1-2 hours per day; the same percentage studies 2-3 hours per day; one tenth 3-4 hours per day; and only 4% of respondents study for over four hours per day. In analysing statistically significant differences in the number of hours of studying, we put together all youth studying for 3 or more hours per day. The obtained results speak of differences among youth based on age ( $\chi^2=24.29$ ), father's level of education ( $\chi^2=34.16$ ), and the current level of education of respondents ( $\chi^2=37.87$ ). Thus respondents who study for up to one hour per day tend to be in the youngest age group, with fathers who have lower education levels, and attending secondary school or undergraduate studies. Their profile is similar to the profile of respondents who study for 1 to 2 hours per day; however, youth who spend slightly more time studying have fathers who completed three-year secondary school. The profiles of youth studying for 2-3 hours per day and those studying for over 3 hours per day are very similar. They include older youth who are university students, with highly educated fathers, and those who spend slightly more time studying in this group are students at graduate studies. To sum up, we can say that the number of hours of studying per day increases with the increase in the complexity of the educational level.

The previous analyses concentrated on efforts that pupils and students are investing on a daily basis into achieving educational success. Several questions that follow will focus on additional activities aimed at achieving better results. The first such indicator – use of private lessons in the course of last year – is shown in Figure 3.5.

Over two thirds of youth who are still in the education system did not use private lessons; one quarter had private lessons in natural sciences; one fifteenth in foreign

languages, while private lessons in humanities and social sciences were taken only by 1% of respondents, and private lessons in art by less than 1% of respondents. Only age ( $\chi^2=47.74$ ) and the current level of education of youth had a statistically significant impact on the use of private lessons in the course of last year, resulting in above average number of youngest respondents currently in secondary school who had private lessons last year.


*Figure 3.5: Private lessons taken in the course of last year (%)*



Since there are many reasons for the use of private lessons, we were interested in the extent to which these reasons are connected with the desire to obtain a passing grade, and to what extent motivated by desire for additional learning. The obtained results suggest that a significant majority of young people who decide to get private lessons do it out of necessity – as many as 71% of respondents state that they take private lessons because they would otherwise be unable to learn the required subject matter. There are two categories of responses that can be grounds for concern, although referring to a smaller number of youth. Namely, 6% of the respondents say it is impossible to pass a course of a particular teacher without taking private lessons and according to 9% of the respondents, a teacher gives lower grades if private lessons are not taken. On the other hand, only 11% of respondents wish to gain more

knowledge than is foreseen by the curriculum. Only two percent of responses point to the underlying desire of nurturing a talent in a given area. There are also respondents who take private lessons because everybody else does; i.e. because it is ‘in’ (approx. 1%).

Figure 3.6: Enrolment of youth in desired studies (%)



In further analysis of the reasons behind the use of private lessons, the categories of private lessons as a ‘trend’ and a method of nurturing a talent were not taken into account, because such responses were given by only a handful of youth. With regard to the remaining reasons behind the use of private lessons, there are differences among young people based on father’s education level ( $\chi^2=59.70$ ) and the current level of education of respondents ( $\chi^2=25.71$ ). The sub-group of youth who cannot learn the subject matter without the help of private lessons are youth in secondary schools, whose fathers have vocational education. Respondents most frequently stating that a passing grade cannot be obtained from a teacher without taking private lessons are students of graduate studies, whose fathers completed three-year secondary school. Youth most frequently getting lower grades without private lessons are students or pupils with highly educated fathers while youth who wish to

obtain additional knowledge through private lessons are most frequently students with fathers who have lower education levels.

Pupils, students and those who completed their studies (N=772) were asked whether they succeeded to enrol into the study of their choice, and the responses are shown in Figure 3.6.

Two thirds of former, current or future students managed to enrol into the desired field of study, or claim that they will do so. One tenth have chosen or will choose studies that can secure a job, although they are not motivated for this study. Every fifteenth respondent has accepted or would accept enrolment in any studies where there is a chance of enrolment.


Further analysis shows that with regard to enrolment into desired studies youth vary in terms of place of residence ( $\chi^2=24.97$ ) and socioprofessional status ( $\chi^2=24.43$ ). More specifically, youth who are currently pupils or students are most represented among those who managed to enrol into a desired study programme, or think that they will do so, while respondents from small towns are least represented in this group. However, more significant differences can be seen in the sub-group of youth who enrolled into a study programme with the desire to secure employment, although they were not motivated for these studies – these are unemployed respondents coming from small towns. The final category – students who enrolled into a field of study only because they fulfilled the entry criteria – includes unemployed youth from small towns, to whom studying is not only a way to improve their educational status, but also (at least temporary) way out of unemployment.

The assumption is that those with the highest levels of education would more easily find a job. Therefore, only students (N=323) were asked whether they expected problems in finding a job (Figure 3.7).

Almost three quarters of students prove to be more or less optimistic, because they believe that they will manage to find work soon after they complete their studies, or after a certain period of time. Others were more sceptical about the success in finding a job. Following up on these findings, we were interested in the extent to which students differ in terms of persuasion about their own high

employability. Statistically significant differences were obtained on the basis of age ( $\chi^2=18.37$ ) and place of residence ( $\chi^2=25.49$ ). Thus younger students most frequently believe that they would succeed in finding a job soon after graduation, as well as those from Zagreb. The profile of students who believe that they would be able to find a job after a certain period of time also includes respondents from Zagreb, however, this time these are older students. Finally, there are respondents who doubt their success in finding a job, and that category includes older respondents, with residence in major cities or smaller towns.

*Figure 3.7: Perception of students on how soon they would find a job after graduation (%)*




All young people, irrespectively of whether they are still in school, are looking for work or have managed to find it, have certain professional aspirations. In this research, concrete professional aspirations of youth were examined using a scale with 17 claims/aspirations (Figure 3.8).

Obtained results imply a high level of extrinsic motivation of youth (i.e. high share of traditional aspirations), and the aspiration of finding a secure job that can ensure one's livelihood is at the forefront, with four fifths of responses. Alternative aspirations – connected with additional education and training, and with working in

one's profession and working with people – are expressed by two fifths of young people. Socially useful work and entrepreneurship attracted only one third of respondents. It is interesting that scientific work attracts only 10% of respondents, just like the idea of continuing the family business, which suggests that only a smaller portion of youth have entrepreneurs in the family.

Figure 3.8: Professional aspirations of youth (%)




Factor analysis grouped professional aspirations of youth into four factors. The first factor is *dynamic work oriented towards people*, and it includes the desire to perform socially useful, creative and dynamic work in the company of other people, as well as participation in changes in the profession and professional development in Croatia. Youth differ in their aspirations towards this group of goals depending on their place of residence ( $F\text{-ratio}=6.45$ ) and the level of education ( $F\text{-ratio}=12.41$ ), in the sense that such professional aspirations are mostly present among academically educated youth from small towns. *Life-long learning*, as the second factor, encompasses not only obtaining of a diploma and continuing with education, but also professional development abroad, improving the knowledge of foreign languages and scientific work. With regard to acceptance of these professional goals,

youth are differentiated in such a way that higher aspirations towards these goals are exhibited by younger respondents (F-ratio=25.48), from Zagreb (F-ratio=18.26), highly educated youth (F-ratio=32.69), those with academically educated fathers (F-ratio=36.84) and students (F-ratio=100.48). *Job orientation for securing livelihood* (third factor) is based on elements of extrinsic motivation, because it includes finding a permanent and secure job, which would ensure one's livelihood and provide as much free time as possible. Youth attracted to this option mostly come from Zagreb (F-ratio=12.39), are students (F-ratio=7.80), with four-year secondary education (F-ratio=8.40) and with highly educated fathers (F-ratio=15.86). The *entrepreneurial type*, as the fourth factor, encompasses aspirations aimed at starting up own business or continuing the family business. Such aspirations are displayed by young men (F-ratio=12.23) and youth who completed three-year secondary school (F-ratio=9.37).

High youth unemployment rate and unfavourable conditions on the labour market in Croatia created a climate where working in the public sector is still the preferred option, while employment in the private sector is not particularly desired (especially employment by small entrepreneurs). Therefore, it is no surprise that almost two fifths of youth wish to work in public administration, while only one third believe that a job in the private sector can ensure fulfilment of their professional aspirations (Figure 3.9).


Figure 3.9: Youth's preferred employment sector (%)



Preferences in terms of employment sector have proven to be highly differentiated, because all the analysed sociodemographic characteristics of youth (with the exception of gender) have a statistically significant impact. In this situation, the profile of youth who wish to work in public administration most frequently includes the oldest respondents ( $\chi^2=74.52$ ), living in villages or small towns ( $\chi^2=84.69$ ), with completed four-year secondary school or academic education ( $\chi^2=83.36$ ), employed or unemployed ( $\chi^2=109.45$ ), and those whose fathers have three-year or four-year secondary school education ( $\chi^2=41.45$ ). Work in the private sector is preferred by youth in Zagreb, with completed primary or three-year secondary school, whose fathers have university education, and least preferred by unemployed youth. At the same time, youth who prefer working in the non-governmental sector live in major cities or in Zagreb, have higher education or primary school education, are pupils or students, and their fathers have university education or four-year secondary education. Working for international organizations mostly attracts the younger age cohort, with completed primary school or higher education institution, pupils or students, with residence in major cities or in Zagreb, whose fathers completed primary school education.

The following question refers to activities that only a smaller number of youth engaged in, as is clear from Figure 3.10, because the prerequisite for these activities is not only interest of young people and the support of their parents, but also additional financial support. Namely, these are activities financed by parents with the aim of improving their child's educational success or later employability. Almost four fifths of all young people state that their parents have not financed any of the specified activities. Out of the remaining respondents, one seventh took private lessons in order to achieve maximum success in a subject at school, and 3% – a modest, but nevertheless significant figure – participated in summer science schools. The latter figure shows that participation of youth in summer science schools is still quite low in Croatia, understandably so, because there are currently only about ten such schools in Croatia, with the total capacity of approximately 300 participants. Similarly, only about 3% of youth learned a foreign language abroad, while all other activities are negligible.

Figure 3.10: Activities financed by parents with the aim of improving the educational and professional success of youth (%)



With regard to the sociodemographic characteristics of youth, participation in the above activities is not highly differentiated, because only youth education level ( $\chi^2=23.46$ ) and father's education level ( $\chi^2=21.58$ ) show any influence here – in the sense that highly educated young people whose fathers have university education participated in such activities to a higher extent. These results point to eliteness of observed activities; i.e. what lies in the background are not only financial reasons. Part of the reason for participation in activities that might increase one's educational level and employability can also be found in the higher cultural capital of the family and, consequently, of young people as well.

The process of integration of youth into the society and the labour market involves many adjustments and compromises between what is desired and what is realistic. Some of the adjustments refer to ways of finding a job, and conditions under which certain jobs are considered acceptable. Table 3.1 gives an overview of factors that young people consider important in finding and accepting a job, based on the respondent's choice of most important factors.

*Table 3.1:* Key factors for finding a job and decision on accepting a job by young people (%)

| Finding a job           |      | Accepting a job                         |      |
|-------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------|------|
| Acquaintances / Friends | 32.6 | Reimbursement / Salary                  | 49.1 |
| Competence              | 26.0 | Job security                            | 32.2 |
| Educational level       | 20.9 | Job satisfaction                        | 15.3 |
| Political connections   | 11.4 | Possibility of working with nice people | 2.5  |
| Luck                    | 9.3  | Other                                   | 23.1 |
| Other                   | 16.2 |                                         |      |


With regard to finding a job, youth equally rely on their personal qualities - competence and education (approx. 47%), and on interventions of influential persons, i.e. liaisons and acquaintances, including political interventions (44%). Only every tenth respondent has a fatalistic attitude, believing that luck is the key to success. With regard to their sociodemographic characteristics, youth differ in attaching importance to specific channels of finding a job in the following way: acquaintances and friends are considered most important by employed youth ( $\chi^2=47.33$ ) and youth from Zagreb ( $\chi^2=63.16$ ), with completed three-year secondary school ( $\chi^2=49.02$ ), whose fathers have the same education level ( $\chi^2=66.79$ ), while competence is most appreciated by unemployed youth and pupils ( $\chi^2=41.00$ ). Students ( $\chi^2=68.73$ ) with completed four-year secondary school ( $\chi^2=44.45$ ), from small towns ( $\chi^2=59.68$ ), whose fathers have four-year secondary education or higher education ( $\chi^2=44.54$ ), believe that education level is very important. On the other hand, young respondents from major cities ( $\chi^2=57.85$ ), whose fathers completed primary or three-year secondary school ( $\chi^2=40.74$ ), believe that political connections are crucial, while pupils ( $\chi^2=52.43$ ) believe that such connections are least important.

As for reasons for accepting a job, domination of extrinsic motivation is obvious, because over four fifths of youth prefer high salaries and job security. Such attitudes are expected at times of economic crisis, so it is understandable that only approx. 18% of respondents state that they would be led by intrinsic motives in accepting a job (i.e. job satisfaction and a pleasant working atmosphere). High salary is the most important factor for younger respondents ( $\chi^2=22.69$ ), with completed primary or

three-year secondary school ( $\chi^2=49.68$ ), whose fathers have three-year secondary education or higher education ( $\chi^2=50.48$ ). On the other hand, youth appreciating job security have four-year secondary education, like their fathers (respondent's education  $\chi^2=43.62$ , father's education  $\chi^2=38.62$ ). However, students ( $\chi^2=50.65$ ) and respondents with completed higher education ( $\chi^2=57.44$ ), whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=82.90$ ), tend to value job satisfaction most.

The following data refer only to the sub-sample of employed youth - slightly less than one third of the sample (N=461). For a more comprehensive insight into the status of youth on the labour market, it is important to analyse the educational structure of employed youth first (Figure 3.11).

*Figure 3.11: Educational structure of employed youth (%)*




Employed youth mostly completed a four-year secondary school education, which is expected, because this number is very close to the total number of youth with completed four-year secondary school. The following two categories – employed youth with completed three-year secondary school, and youth with university education – are almost equal in their share in the labour market, which is also not surprising. The number of employed youth with completed three-year secondary school is very similar to the total number of youth with that educational level. On the other hand, the share of youth with university education is almost double in employed youth than in the total youth sample, which proves that their employability is noticeably higher; i.e. there is a higher demand for that group on the labour market.

Youth in Croatia have been hit very hard by the economic crisis, in particular with regard to high unemployment, which is persisting at the rate of over 30%

among youth population for the past twenty years. Faced with such unfavourable trends, youth frequently accept jobs outside their profession, as well as jobs that they would be reluctant to accept in economically more favourable conditions. Data obtained in our research confirm this, because as many as two fifths of employed youth do not work in their profession; 38% state that they work in their profession; 19% state that they work in their profession 'in a way'; 2% cannot determine whether they work in their profession or not, because they do not have a professional qualification. One could argue that highly educated young people ( $\chi^2=45.25$ ) are luckiest with regard to working in their profession, because they are best placed among all youth with respect to that indicator. On the other hand, youth with completed four-year secondary school are divided into those who work in their profession "in a certain way", and those who do not work in the profession that they were educated for.

Employed youth mostly work full time (41.22 hours weekly on average). Full distribution of respondent's weekly working hours is shown in Figure 3.12.

*Figure 3.12: Number of weekly working hours of employed youth (%)*




While employed youth most frequently work full working hours (41.22 hours per week on average), the share of youth with part-time employment is relatively small. Further analysis of average working hours of employed youth has shown that

the number of working hours differs only with regard to the type of settlement where the respondents live ( $\chi^2=36.60$ ). Thus it turns out that youth from small towns work the lowest number of hours per week; regular working hours predominate among youth from rural areas; while employees from Zagreb tend to work more than regular working hours.

In addition to the number of working hours, it is interesting to have a look at average monthly income of employed youth (Figure 3.13). Data show that it is concentrated in lower pay grades. Around one fifth of employed respondents have monthly income at the level of the statutory minimum wage (2,814.00 HRK), and as many as two fifths have salaries between the statutory minimum wage and 4,000 HRK. They are followed by a group with monthly income of up to 5,400 HRK (which is at the level of average salary in Croatia). Only every tenth young employed person has a salary exceeding 6,000 HRK. The calculation shows that the average salary of employed youth is 4,244 HRK per month.

*Figure 3.13: Average monthly income of employed youth – in HRK (%)*



Low average income of employed youth can to a certain extent be explained by their educational structure. Over two thirds are youth with completed three-year and four-year secondary school, with almost 7% without qualifications. However, one part of the explanation can certainly be found in a widespread practice whereby young employees, as employees with less work experience – regardless of their formal professional qualifications – tend to be distributed to less responsible and less paid jobs or tasks.


Given this unfavourable income structure, we wanted to analyse the characteristics of employee groups with highest and lowest salaries respectively. The results are logical: the lowest salaries are earned by employees with completed three-year secondary school ( $\chi^2=89.87$ ). Youth with completed four-year secondary school or with university degree are at the level of the national average, and highly educated youth predominate in the group with the highest salaries.

This part of the overview can be concluded by the analysis of the potential spatial mobility of youth. According to the research conducted so far, youth generally have a low tendency towards internal and external migration (Mendeš, 2006b). This research confirms such findings, because a significant majority of respondents (70%) are not willing to change residence within Croatia; one quarter would be willing, and approx. 5% are undecided. In addition to this, there is no significant difference among youth with regard to their sociodemographic characteristics in terms of their willingness to relocate.

Data on intended migration abroad are very similar to the data on potential mobility within Croatia. Slightly over one quarter of respondents wish to move out of Croatia, 70% do not want to move abroad, and approx. 3% are undecided. These results indicate a major change in comparison with the willingness to move abroad shown by respondents in 1999. Back then, 61% of youth expressed the desire to move abroad; one fifth did not consider that, and only 18% explicitly rejected it (Štimac Radin, 2002). Such a decrease in the desirability of living abroad can be interpreted by the change of political circumstances in the last decade, primarily with regard to the forthcoming accession of Croatia to the EU. However, we should add that the current global crisis has spilt over onto a number of developed countries, which certainly discourages young people from thinking about moving permanently abroad in the current situation. Differences among youth in terms of their willingness to move abroad can be observed with regard to place of residence: residents of major cities are significantly less inclined to leaving Croatia compared to residents of villages and small towns ( $\chi^2=18.03$ ).

If we focus only on youth who declare their willingness to relocate within Croatia (N=389) or to emigrate (N=401), it can be seen that the key reasons for internal and external migration overlap (Figure 3.14).

Figure 3.14: Comparative overview of key reasons for relocation in Croatia and moving abroad (%)



Main reasons for both relocation and emigration are of economic nature: improvement of the standard of living and easier employment. In addition, the generally unfavourable situation in Croatia would motivate one tenth of youth in Croatia to leave the country. On the other hand, desire for better education and enjoyment of cultural diversity are more pronounced in the decision to relocate within the country, than to emigrate. In brief, it is interesting that in terms of search for better living conditions Croatia, generally speaking, proves to be similarly attractive as foreign countries to one segment of youth.

Improvement in the standard of living and better education as reasons for relocation are connected with the socio-professional status of youth. Thus a higher standard of living is a more important motive to unemployed youth in comparison to pupils and students ( $\chi^2=20.17$ ). It is obvious that unemployed youth, in particular

those who have been unemployed for a longer period of time, are thinking more intensively about how to create employment opportunities, and one such opportunity is certainly to relocate to an environment providing better possibilities for finding a job. Pupils support relocation for the purpose of obtaining better education to a significantly higher degree ( $\chi^2=37.57$ ) than unemployed and employed youth. This particular finding is logical in terms of continuation of education and moving to a city to attend higher school or university to obtain a desired professional qualification.

Youth who would be prepared to emigrate in order to improve their standard of living vary depending on their place of residence ( $\chi^2=19.92$ ), with residents of Zagreb stating this reason more frequently than residents of major cities. Possibility of finding employment abroad, on the other hand, is a more frequent choice among youth from villages and small towns than among youth from Zagreb and major cities ( $\chi^2=20.09$ ). However, most interesting is the fact that those young people who accept internal relocation as a possibility also show a significant degree of readiness to move abroad ( $\chi^2=329.18$ ), which would suggest that potential internal and external migration among youth can be explained by their general readiness for spatial mobility.


Youth who expressed their willingness to move abroad were also asked about their preferred country of destination (Figure 3.15).

It is clear that slightly over two fifths of young people who would leave Croatia prefer Europe (naturally, its better developed parts); around one fourth prefer United States, while every tenth respondent prefers Australia. It is obvious that young respondents find the continent they already live in, i.e. countries that are geographically closer to Croatia, more attractive. The reason for this is certainly that emigration to such countries would enable maintenance of more direct links with family, friends and homeland in general.

On the basis of previously elaborated research results on the educational status of youth and their position on the labour market, as well as on their professional aspirations and planned spatial mobility, we can conclude that the observed trends do not significantly differ from trends established in other research on youth in Croatia. Thus almost eight tenths of youth have never done practical training or traineeship, and a two-thirds majority of young people agree that (independently of

their inclusion in the educational system) they would prefer to continue education at a Croatian public institution of higher education. It is therefore no surprise that youth are more or less satisfied with the education system in Croatia. Youth who are still in the education system are motivated for learning, because approx. 90% go to school or university more or less eagerly, although over four fifths feel a higher or lower level of stress in that institution.

*Figure 3.15: Desirability of destination countries (%)*



In the previous school year, almost one half of pupils and students achieved an average success (grade point average 3-4), and one third achieved very good success (grade point average 4-5). Most of them, on average, spent one to three hours studying per day, and the number of hours of studying increases with the complexity of the attended educational level. Responses on the use of private lessons in the previous school year show that only one third of youth who are still at school took private lessons last year, mostly because otherwise they would not have been able to acquire the subject matter. Similar to the latter finding is the fact that only one fifth of parents of all youth financed activities aimed at improving the educational success or employability of their children. The issue of getting into the study of choice has shown that two thirds of former, current or future students either managed to enrol, or claim that they will enrol into the desired study programme. In

addition, almost three quarters of current students are convinced that they will manage to find a job soon after graduation, or at least after a certain period of time after graduation.

Extrinsic (traditional) professional aspirations are significantly more pronounced among all youth than intrinsic (alternative) professional aspirations. In other words, youth find it much more important to get a secure job and to ensure one's livelihood than to working with people and participate in socially beneficial work. The preferred employment sector is closely connected with professional aspirations, because the majority of youth (two fifths) wish to work in public administration, while only one third would opt for employment in the private sector. As for perceived successfulness of individual channels for finding a job, two fifths of youth consider professional qualifications to be the most important aspect, and two fifths believe connections/acquaintances to be the key factor. With regard to key reasons for accepting a job, the findings again indicate dominance of extrinsic motivation, such as high salary and job security.

Two fifths of already employed youth have four-year secondary school qualifications, one fifth three-year secondary education, and one fifth a university degree. At the same time, almost 7% of youth have no qualifications. As many as two fifths of employed youth do not work in the profession they were educated for, and they are mostly employed full-time. Although employed youth work an average number of working hours per week, their income is below the national average.

Relatively unfavourable economic conditions in the country in the past several decades forced a certain number of young people to search for better prospects elsewhere in Croatia, or abroad. The results of this research show that currently over two thirds of young people do not wish to move to another location in Croatia, with slightly over one quarter of youth wishing to emigrate, which is less than approximately ten years ago. If we consider that main reasons for internal relocation and emigration are economic, and that the economic crisis – both in Croatia and in most of developed countries – is reducing opportunities for employment and achievement of a higher standard of living, this can probably explain the recent decrease of youth's readiness for internal and external migration. However, for a country that is generally threatened by depopulation, the fact that one quarter of youth are seriously considering emigration (although that does not mean that all of them would act on the stated intent) certainly is a worrying trend.

#### **4. Leisure time and risk behaviour**

Leisure time is an integral part of everyday life in contemporary society and to a large extent shapes lifestyles of individuals and groups. It is undisputable that leisure time plays an important role in the process of socialization of youth, and can also be seen as a 'school of life' (Rojek, 2010) helping individuals and groups to achieve optimum social integration and participation in civic culture. Research is dominated by the approach to leisure time as a residual category, i.e. the time individuals have at their disposal after performing socially mandatory work (Haworth, Veal, 2004). Within this discourse, in the period of rise of the so-called welfare state optimistic theses have been formulated on the contemporary society as a leisure society, but changes initiated by the expansion of the neo-liberal development model with growing pace of living show that today people live in societies that lack leisure time and are dominated by consumer culture (consumerism) (Miles, 2000; Rojek, 2005; Roberts, 2006). At the same time the functions of leisure time remain unchanged: rest and recuperation, fun and entertainment, and personal development, whereby leisure time is defined as time when individuals devote themselves to activities of their own choice (Dumazedier, 1974). Moreover, a pluralist approach to leisure time indicates that free selection of activities is conditioned by previous socialization influences and existing situational circumstances (Rojek, Shaw, Veal, 2006; Roberts et al 2009). On this basis – including social origin, education, gender, age and resources of the environment – various ways of spending leisure time are adopted by individuals and groups, implying also various lifestyles.


Leisure time of youth is expected to be a training field for desirable and long-term socialization effects, because here learning takes place in an informal way and in line with young people's interests. However, research results show that this time is mostly filled with activities primarily aimed at fun and entertainment, and confirm that youth are increasingly differentiated on the basis of social and class origin, social competences and cultural patterns (Roberts et al., 2009; Piggot, 2010; Rojek, 2010; Wilson et al, 2010, McDonald et al, 2011). The same applies to youth in Croatia as well, whereby it has been established that they have more leisure time and spend it more actively than older people (Ilišin, 2007). This situation makes leisure

time a part of everyday lives of young people that has a significant potential to be used as a school of life, in which young people can enrich their socio-cultural resources and develop a versatile personality.

Leisure time and youth lifestyle in this research have been researched through a set of variables giving basic insight into their everyday life. Here attention is on behaviour patterns (including potentially risky ones), as well as on attitudes providing additional information on young people's lifestyle and value system.

Figure 4.1 shows a hierarchy of leisure activities included in this research, which in terms of trends does not differ from earlier established affinities of youth in Croatia (Ilišin, 2007).

*Figure 4.1: Ranking list of leisure time activities of youth (%)*



Recent results therefore confirm that leisure time of youth is dominantly filled with socializing with friends and various media related contents, while intellectually and physically more demanding activities are significant part of leisure activities of only a smaller share of young people. It is indicative that a comparison with leisure time activities of youth in 2004 (Ilišin, 2007) shows that frequent socializing with

friends has decreased by 16%, and watching television by as much as 27%. Those changes suggest that young people today are ‘somewhere else’, i.e. that they have to a significant extent turned to some other activities.

There are differences among young people in their preferred activities, mostly connected with their age, socio-professional status and father’s education. Young people differ least with respect to watching television – concretely, all observed sub-groups of respondents engage equally frequently in this activity; standing out as especially passionate TV viewers are only youth from lower social circumstances, i.e. those whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=19.97$ ). Watching films is equally represented in all sub-groups: film lovers are particularly pupils, in contrast to unemployed youth ( $\chi^2=18.90$ ), whereas interest in watching films decreases with age ( $\chi^2=24.60$ ). Listening to music is also an activity decreasing in frequency with increase in age ( $\chi^2=36.82$ ) and increasing with father’s level of education ( $\chi^2=24.42$ ), whereas employed youth (together with youth from lower social origins) are least interested in this activity, especially in contrast to students ( $\chi^2=24.43$ ). Students spend the highest amount of time going out with friends, in contrast to employed youth ( $\chi^2=20.46$ ), and the least amount of time is spent in this activity by the oldest age group ( $\chi^2=31.14$ ), those living in rural areas ( $\chi^2=20.29$ ) and especially children of fathers with lower education levels ( $\chi^2=62.78$ ). It is intriguing that young people are mostly differentiated in terms of affinity to reading and sports, which is expected to a certain degree, since those are activities that are less widespread among young people. Gender differences (table 4.1) are particularly indicative, because they show that certain differences in division of interests between males and females are very persistent.

*Table 4.1: Gender differences with regard to reading books/newspapers and engaging in sports activities (%)*

| Gender       | Reading books                      |             |             | Sports activities                   |             |             |
|--------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
|              | Often                              | Sometimes   | Never       | Often                               | Sometimes   | Never       |
|              | $\chi^2=67.05$ ; $df=2$ ; $p=.000$ |             |             | $\chi^2=138.72$ ; $df=2$ ; $p=.000$ |             |             |
| Females      | 33.1                               | 57.2        | 9.7         | 17.5                                | 47.9        | 34.6        |
| Males        | 21.3                               | 54.1        | 24.6        | 42.8                                | 42.3        | 14.9        |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>27.0</b>                        | <b>55.7</b> | <b>17.3</b> | <b>30.5</b>                         | <b>45.0</b> | <b>24.5</b> |


Books and newspapers are mostly read by girls and students ( $\chi^2=34.78$ ) as well as young people living in smaller urban communities ( $\chi^2=33.83$ ). Interest in reading grows in a linear way with age ( $\chi^2=25.15$ ) and the level of education of both respondents ( $\chi^2=75.61$ ) and their fathers ( $\chi^2=64.30$ ). While a supportive social environment and maturity obviously play a significant role in development of the habit of reading, tendencies influencing interest in sports are not so clear. Results of the analysis namely show that the frequency of engagement in sports activities increases with increase in education level of both respondents ( $\chi^2=26.51$ ) and their fathers ( $\chi^2=63.07$ ), but in this case decreases with increase in age ( $\chi^2=30.35$ ). Furthermore, it has to be pointed out again that males and pupils are more inclined to sports ( $\chi^2=56.11$ ), especially in contrast to unemployed youth.

Strong orientation of youth towards mass media has been drawing the attention of researchers and scientists for decades. Today, the most intriguing of all media is the Internet, which has rapidly – at least in comparison with older electronic media – spread all over the world, with young people seeming to be most susceptible to it. Already in late 1980-ies ownership of a TV set stopped being a relevant indicator of the standard of living in Croatia, and a couple of years ago the same happened with the mobile phone. Results of this research indicate that something similar is happening with Internet access, at least with regard to young people: only 6% of young people do not have Internet access. It has to be borne in mind here that young people have Internet access in schools or at work, and not only at home. Generally, youth who do not have Internet access are above average young people from rural areas (villages) ( $\chi^2=23.46$ ) and those whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=187.29$ ), as well as youth with three-year vocational secondary education ( $\chi^2=27.50$ ) who are unemployed ( $\chi^2=33.62$ ). These characteristics once again confirm the socio-economic conditioning of access to all benefits of new technologies.

It is interesting to look at the position occupied by two favourite electronic media of two different technological generations in youth's leisure time – the long-term leader, television, and the Internet, as a contender for the leading position. It is not surprising that this fight for power ended in victory of the Internet over television (Figure 4.2), with young people using the Internet on average one hour

daily more than they watch television. It is therefore possible to assume that it is precisely the fascination with the Internet that is drawing young people away not only from other media but also from socializing with friends in real life (which they replace with a virtual form of socializing).


Figure 4.2: Average number of hours per day of watching TV and Internet use



It is indicative that the number of hours spent in front of the TV and computer screen respectively depends on almost identical socio-demographic characteristics of young people. Youngest respondents and respondents with lower education levels spend the highest amount of time on TV and the Internet (where  $\chi^2$  is between 92.78 and 31.29), more precisely pupils (as opposed to employed respondents). While time spent on the two media decreases with increase in age and level of education, TV use additionally decreases with increase in father's education ( $\chi^2=44.03$ ), and Internet use grows with the level of urbanization of place of residence ( $\chi^2=86.17$ ).

Reasons for domination of the Internet over television are not difficult to find, because the Internet is also an interactive medium. Figure 4.3 shows that most young people use the Internet also for communication purposes (social networks, email, Skype) and for information in the broadest sense, for watching videos and listening to music. At the same time, only about one tenth of young people also use it for practical purposes and there is an equally low interest in virtual life games.

Figure 4.3: Ranking list of Internet uses (%)



Which of the Internet purposes offered in the survey are preferred by young people depends mostly on their socio-professional status, age and education, and least on gender. Differences are numerous; here we only point out that with increase in age preoccupation with fun contents (videos, music, downloading films) decreases, as well as participation in social networks, while practical uses of the Internet, including information and professional purposes increase ( $\chi^2$  values are between 103.25 and 16.86). The results also show that students and pupils use the Internet for all the purposes listed, more frequently than unemployed and employed youth who use it more for practical purposes ( $\chi^2$  values range between 194.31 and 18.58). Most reasons for Internet use increase with increase in the father's level of education ( $\chi^2$  values are between 165.41 and 21.01) and urbanization of place of

residence ( $\chi^2$  values are between 55.97 and 18.50). The influence of the respondents' education level indicates that with increase in the level of education, the Internet is more frequently used for business, information and practical purposes, while the preoccupation with fun contents decreases. Finally, gender differences are reflected only in the fact that men play games and download music and/or films more often than women ( $\chi^2$  values range 106.81 and 18.46).

As for the TV programme, the results show that young people are mostly interested in relaxing and brief informative contents. Among the 15 offered broadcast types mostly viewed are comedies (48% of young people watch them several times a week or every day) and other TV series (46%), and news (42%), while the bottom of the list is occupied by religious broadcasts (2% watch them regularly, and 74% never), political debates (6%:61%) and Croatian folk music (10%:53%).

Factor analysis grouped television programmes into four factors: *informative-educational, films, music, series and sports programme*. The analysis of the variance shows that gender, socio-professional and residential status are the most discriminating factors in terms of selection of television programmes (F-ratios are between 285.78 and 11.78). Women prefer watching series, and men films and sports, while interest in informative-educational television programmes (F-ratio=80.38) grows with age, as well as with increase in respondents' educational level (F-ratio=22.23), which at the same time causes decreasing interest in films (F-ratio=10.41). Films are particularly popular among youth from smaller cities and pupils, while the latter are below average interested in informational and educational programmes (preferred by employed and unemployed youth). Unemployed youth have a higher interest than other groups – especially employed youth and students – in music television programmes, also preferred by youth from rural areas (F-ratio=13.12) and of lower social origin (F-ratio=10.37). It is obvious that maturing, increase in educational competences and taking on of professional obligations increase interest in more demanding television contents, alongside a parallel decrease of interest in entertaining television programmes. In addition to this, it seems that lack of entertainment in less urbanized communities is compensated by watching entertaining television programmes.


Everyday needs and interests of young people are also indirectly reflected in the structure of expenditure for certain things and activities. Young people mostly spend their money on clothes, footwear and fashion accessories (216 HRK monthly on average), going out to coffee bars and restaurants (202 HRK) and on telephone/mobile phone (117 HRK). Very little is spent on cinema and/or DVDs (35 HRK) and books (20HRK). This structure of expenses is expected and clearly indicates the priorities and habits of young people: they need appropriate 'gear' to present themselves well, they mostly go out to coffee bars with friends, and they keep their mobile phone always at hand and use it for various purposes. At the same time, although they like watching films, not much is spent on films, mostly because of their availability on television and the Internet. Almost the same is true of books, which can be borrowed from a library; and anyway, most young people live in households where books are odd decoration pieces and probably treated as an unnecessary cost.

In terms of the amount of money spent on various needs, youth mostly differ with regard to father's education level and socio-professional and residential status. Expenditure for clothes, coffee bars and telephone expectedly grows linearly with the increase in age, level of education of respondents and their fathers, and the level of urbanization of their place of residence ( $\chi^2$  values range between 224.39 and 53.37). Women spend more on clothes ( $\chi^2=33.06$ ) and books ( $\chi^2=38.18$ ) and men on going out to coffee bars ( $\chi^2=25.02$ ). Pupils spend least on each of the needs included in the survey, and on the other side are employed youth and students ( $\chi^2$  values range between 254.56 and 53.83). Since both pupils and students have to manage with the money provided by their parents, it can be concluded that students' parents are more generous, primarily because students to a significant extent come from families of higher socio-economic status. As regards employed youth, additional explanation is not necessary because, expectedly, they most likely also have their own financial resources, and can therefore more autonomously dispose of them as well.

Some of the data shown above have already indicated which values are supported by young people, and data presented in figure 4.4 can help give a more clear insight. It is important to know that respondents were asked to estimate as to

whether the offered phenomena are ‘in’ (fashionable) or not, regardless of whether that mattered to them personally. Although data primarily speak about their perception of their immediate and wider environment, it can also be assumed that they have also internalized the (un)importance of the observed phenomena, i.e. that they themselves also mostly strive towards what they consider to be ‘in’.

Figure 4.4: Ranking list of what is ‘in’ (%)



Data presented here mostly do not surprise, although a series of comments can be made in this respect, out of which only some will be presented here. For example, the top position of looking good and high placement of branded clothes indicate that

young people are under pressure – or even have acquired this without further questioning – to leave the best possible impression on the outside, and to build a certain image. It can be assumed that such an attitude is a result of aggressive media promotion of celebrity culture and celebrities as icons of style and beauty, and adoption of corporate advice on the importance of leaving a good outward impression on potential employers, colleagues and clients. It is indicative that taking responsibility is considered ‘in’ by only one half of young people, although they at the same time consider career development and acquisition of independence ‘in’, which is difficult to achieve without taking responsibility. This is also linked with the trend of some traditional values – such as loyalty (to partners, employers etc.) and founding a family – losing importance compared to professional goals, but also compared to some postmodern values, such as promotion of healthy lifestyle. In the triangle of traditional-modern-postmodern values, it is also interesting that young people estimated it more fashionable to be active in (institutional) politics in Croatia than on the civic scene, although in developed parts of the world youth are usually taken to be rather more distanced from formal politics in favour of civil society organizations and initiatives (Norris, 2004; Fahmy, 2006).

In the context of good appearance, it has to be pointed out that only 4% of youth are unsatisfied with their looks. Those who are happy with their appearance prevail (60%); and every fifth respondent is reasonably satisfied, while 15% are exceptionally satisfied with their appearance. Further analysis has shown that satisfaction with one’s appearance is independent of most analysed socio-demographic characteristics, which means that there is a noticeable homogeneity among youth in this respect. Analysis shows that a bit more satisfied with their appearance are young people whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=42.78$ ) and those who live in bigger cities ( $\chi^2=40.32$ ). A sufficient comment here is that dissatisfaction with own appearance is a source of frustration only for a small group of young people, which is certainly good news in the situation where most of them consider it important to look good and fashionable.

Factor analysis of 13 phenomena perceived either as ‘in’ or ‘out’ has yielded four recognizable factors: career, becoming independent, activism and healthy lifestyle. The analysis of variance has shown that there is the highest degree of

difference among young people in their consideration of what is 'in' or 'out' with regard to the level of education and residential status, while gender differences have no influence here. It is intriguing to note that focus on career includes the opinion that career development, good appearance and a university degree are fashionable ('in'). Namely, while it is expected for desire to achieve professional success to include acquisition of university education, it is not expected for attractive appearance to be more important for a successful career than, for example, finding a spouse. Orientation towards a career increases with increase in the level of education of the father (F-ratio=11.34) and the respondents themselves (F-ratio=7.19), and with the degree of urbanization of place of residence, with youth from Zagreb standing out in this respect (F-ratio=8.14). These attitudes are also expressed by students, in contrast to pupils and unemployed youth (F-ratio=6.71). Becoming independent, for orientation, is composed of loyalty, conclusion of marriage, realization of independence and taking responsibility. This is a mixture of traditional and modern values, and the perception of this mixture being 'in' grows linearly with age (F-ratio=18.59) and educational level of respondents (F-ratio=7.05), and decreases with increase in the level of urbanization of place of residence (F-ratio=7.96). In line with this, young people (in contrast to pupils) mostly advocate values of growing independent (F-ratio=8.62), which is expected, because with taking on of permanent social roles – such as the professional one – they have started the process of acquisition of full social maturity and independence (which also includes marriage as the next step). Orientation towards healthy living includes healthy eating, doing sports and wearing branded clothes<sup>3</sup>. These phenomena are considered fashionable mostly by highly educated respondents, in contrast to those with secondary school qualifications (F-ratio=8.46), and students, in contrast to the unemployed (F-ratio=6.06). As for pupils, it can be assumed that their attitudes are influenced by immediate participation in educational levels that are still enable to provide at least some conditions for healthy living (such as more regular sports activity), which dramatically decline after completion of secondary school edu-


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<sup>3</sup> It is indicative that the desirability of wearing branded clothes is also linked with the factors of career and activism, however to a somewhat lesser degree. At the same time, wearing branded clothes is not connected with the factor of growing independent.

cation. It is therefore only with acquisition of university education and employment that the awareness of true value of healthy living is generated, as well as necessary material conditions for more healthy eating and sports activities. However, the importance of branded clothes suggests that healthy living is to some extent also a fashionable thing. Finally, orientation towards activism includes political activity and participation in civil initiatives, as well as, surprisingly, marijuana use, which all observed sub-groups of youth consider equally (un)fashionable.

Young people's relationship towards health also includes care for their reproductive health, as well as their inclination to tobacco and alcohol use. Almost one third of young people believe that marijuana use is fashionable (figure 4.4), and about 30% of young people are tobacco users (smokers). However, slightly over one half of the respondents do not smoke at all, which indicates decreasing popularity of this habit among youth. It could be said that ever clearer public condemnation of smoking in Croatia, manifested in frequent advertising of its harmfulness in the media and banning smoking in public by law, is slowly contributing to the decrease in the share of smoking in youth.

*Figure 4.5: Frequency of alcohol and tobacco use (%)*




With regard to smoking, most differences among young people are related to their socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=88.12$ ) and father's education level ( $\chi^2=44.66$ ).

Statistically significant differences of medium intensity have been established also with regard to their age ( $\chi^2=23.62$ ) and place of residence ( $\chi^2=29.27$ ). It follows that older youth, whose fathers have lower education levels, living in major cities, smoke slightly more often. This can lead to the conclusion that smoking is still widespread among youth in Croatia, but there is a noticeable trend of its higher representation in social groups exposed to higher social under-privilegedness and youth groups growing up at times when smoking was still considered a socially accepted ‘ticket’ for adult world.

However, there are many more young alcohol users in Croatia than young smokers (figure 4.5). Almost one half of all youth uses alcohol once a week and more often, and only every fifth respondent does not use alcohol at all. The socio-demographic profile of young people who are more prone to alcohol use is very similar to young smoker’s profile, although in this case statistically significant relations have been found with all analysed respondents’ characteristics, especially age ( $\chi^2=151.51$ ), socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=145.8$ ), education level ( $\chi^2=131.90$ ) and place of residence ( $\chi^2=85.98$ ). Results show that employed and unemployed youth younger youth with lower education levels living in major cities are more prone to alcohol use. In addition, it is also more frequently used by males ( $\chi^2=35.42$ ) and youth whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=46.93$ ).

*Figure 4.6: Attitudes of young people on (un)acceptability of alcohol use (%)*



Bearing in mind that alcohol use is quite widespread among youth, their attitudes on acceptability of this psychoactive substance (ca. 48%) do not surprise, whereby a large majority of young people believe that alcohol is acceptable or necessary to belong to a group (figure 4.6).

Young people's attitudes on acceptability of alcohol use also depend on almost all analysed socio-demographic characteristics, except age. Attitudes are mostly influenced by respondents' place of residence ( $\chi^2=132.41$ ), and least by gender ( $\chi^2=35.19$ ). Again, higher acceptability of alcohol use was noticed in the group of males of lower educational status, from urban environments and unemployed youth whose fathers have lower education levels.

Described youth profiles indicate young people prone to excessive alcohol use, therefore also belonging to the risky behaviour group. Unfortunately, alcohol is still exceptionally acceptable addictive substance in Croatia, and results of this research indicate that this opinion is also shared by most young people. Alcohol tolerance and especially promotion of alcohol use in many social situations certainly contribute to this situation. On the other hand, a clearer message on unacceptability of a certain behaviour – judging by the effects of the anti-smoking campaign – can also contribute to decrease of the number of people practicing such behaviour. Therefore, a decrease in the share of young alcohol users is not to be expected until Croatian society determines itself more clearly in relation to alcohol use, since alcohol use in our culture is to some extent linked with customary behaviour, and is considered socially acceptable behaviour for adults.


In addition to excessive alcohol use, further potential health risks for young people can be found in the sphere of their sexual life. Namely, it is well known that dimensions of sexuality that influence sexual behaviour of young people are their need for sexual exploration, experimenting with various forms of sexual relations, fragmentary nature of their knowledge, illusion of invulnerability coupled with lack of communication skills, strong peer pressure and pressure of peer norms as well as hedonism as an important part of youth identity (Dabo et al, 2008).

Over 60% of young people in our sample are sexually active. Among them, 43% had sexual relations with several partners. However, sexual behaviour of youth is influenced by all analysed socio-demographic characteristics, especially age ( $\chi^2=$

534.80), socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=562.05$ ) and education ( $\chi^2=485.28$ ). Sexual experiences with several partners are more characteristic of older youth, employed and unemployed, and youth with higher education levels. In addition to this, there are more males in this group ( $\chi^2=23.43$ ), whose fathers have higher education levels ( $\chi^2=39.69$ ), and youth from smaller cities ( $\chi^2=52.01$ ).

Whether this belongs to the category of risky behaviour is presented in figure 4.7, showing that only one third of young people<sup>4</sup> regularly use birth control (contraceptives). All other forms of sexual relations, except for young people who are trying to conceive on purpose (less than 10% of the sample), can be characterized as risky behaviour in terms of reproductive health protection.

Figure 4.7: Birth control use among youth (%)



Birth control is slightly more often used by women ( $\chi^2=17.84$ ), youth with higher educational status ( $\chi^2=85.72$ ), pupils and students ( $\chi^2=41.48$ ), younger youth ( $\chi^2=45.96$ ) whose fathers have higher education levels ( $\chi^2=90.00$ ). We can see here that, although this behaviour is connected with all analysed socio-demographic characteristics of youth, use of birth control (contraceptives) is mostly influenced by their education level.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Only 59.2%, i.e. 889 respondents answered the question on birth control use.

<sup>5</sup> If we add here the fact confirmed in various studies that young people enter sexual relations very early nowadays, and that they only have incomplete and insufficient knowledge on this issue (Dabo et al, 2008), reproductive health risks become even bigger. Vranješ et al (2011) in their research, conducted on a sample of 579 girls aged 15-26, established that the average age for the first sexual encounter is 17.5. Complete knowledge of reproductive health was exhibited by only 34% of female

Results of this and other studies indirectly show the justification and need for introduction of health education into Croatian curricula. It seems that attempts aimed at higher representation of such contents in Croatian curricula in academic year 2012/2013 have yielded results, since health education has been introduced as a mandatory content into courses in all Croatian schools. However, it will still take some time to see what effect this novelty will have on youth behaviour in reality, since prevention in the field of reproductive health should not only be aimed at acquisition of knowledge and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy, but also at change of attitudes and adoption of sexually responsible behaviour among youth. In the meanwhile, many young people will still move in the field of moderate or even highly risky sexual behaviour, especially those growing up in socially underprivileged circumstances and environments.

Results of this research lead to the conclusion that at least 20% of young people are directly exposed to various risks by practicing unsafe sex, including the risk of premature parenthood. In this sense it is interesting to analyse their attitudes on abortion and sexual abstinence.

*Figure 4.8: Young people's attitudes on abortion (%)*




respondents, and the sources of information for 47% of respondents were professionals. Approximately 22% of respondents had three or more sexual partners, and 33% of them stated this about their partners as well.

It is interesting to note that banning of abortion is supported by slightly over two fifths of young people (figure 4.8), while more than one half of respondents do not support sexual abstinence (figure 4.9). If we put these indicators into the context of frequency of sexual relations in youth population, accompanied by insufficient use of birth control, a certain disproportion between declared attitudes and actual behaviour can be noted among young people in Croatia. This is probably a consequence of a certain degree of confusion among youth due to proclaimed attitudes of religious communities (especially of the Catholic Church, as the majority religious community in Croatia) and their sexual needs that occur much before they are ready to enter marriage.

Results of the analysis of influence of socio-demographic characteristics of youth on attitudes on abortion show that socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=108.68$ ), education level ( $\chi^2=90.41$ ) and age ( $\chi^2=82.37$ ) have the highest degree of influence. Legal banning of abortion is more frequently supported by employed and unemployed respondents with lower educational status and lower age (up to 22). Additionally, abortion is slightly more frequently supported by male respondents ( $\chi^2=27.64$ ) and youth from most urbanized communities ( $\chi^2=75.59$ ).


Figure 4.9: Youth's attitudes on sexual abstinence (%)



The same socio-demographic variables also influence youth's attitudes on sexual abstinence, with strongest influence of socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=150.81$ ), followed by education ( $\chi^2=125.32$ ), age ( $\chi^2=113.07$ ) and place of residence ( $\chi^2=61.85$ ). Virtues of sexual abstinence are mostly pointed out by youth of lower education levels, younger, still in school and living in rural areas. On the other hand, young people who have completed their education or are still students, older and living in urban areas more frequently consider such attitudes old-fashioned.

In short, the results of this analysis additionally indicate that responsibility towards protection of reproductive health is mostly related to the level of education and maturity. At the same time, more traditional values and beliefs contribute to a different sexual behaviour (at a younger age in the form of sexual abstention and at a later age in the form of a more ambivalent relationship towards unwanted consequences of sexual relations). Despite traditional values supported by one third of Croatian youth, the Croatian society is still becoming more tolerant towards behaviour and attitudes of groups and individuals. Prohibitions and opinions restricting young people and their behaviour are decreasing, and this tolerance is reflected in their sexual lives as well.

*Figure 4.10: Youth's attitudes towards homosexuals (%)*



However, the question is whether this tolerance extends to acceptability of homosexual relationships. Attitudes on this are presented in figure 2.9. The

conclusion drawn from figure 4.10 is that there is a strong differentiation among youth in this respect, with approximately equal number of young people who accept homosexuals, those who are indecisive in this respect and those who find homosexuality still unacceptable. Homosexuality is more acceptable to women ( $\chi^2=77.42$ ), youth with university education ( $\chi^2=87.05$ ), whose fathers have higher education levels ( $\chi^2=59.33$ ), older ( $\chi^2=57.42$ ) and from major cities ( $\chi^2=74.87$ ).

Therefore, even the social profile of youth who do not accept homosexuality indicates that education is the decisive factor that helps guide attitudes of youth towards higher tolerance and acceptance of diversity, as in the previous case where it influenced youth in the direction of more responsible sexual behaviour.

If we look at the previously interpreted research results we can say that, overall, leisure time and lifestyle of young people in Croatia today do not significantly differ from patterns established in earlier research in Croatia and abroad. Youth's leisure time is primarily occupied with fun and entertainment activities, with socializing with friends and media contents as the most important. The biggest change in this context has been brought about by the swift rise of the Internet, which is used by young people for many purposes, mostly information and communication. This has led to loss of popularity of television, which is mostly used for watching entertaining contents (series and films), although it still has an important information function as well. However, it seems that the Internet has changed even the way of socializing with friends, where part of the time spent with friends has been substituted by virtual socializing. Reading books (and newspapers) is least represented among leisure activities of young people, presenting a trend that has been going on for the last three decades.

In the opinion of the most young people, fashionable ('in') are phenomena from the private sphere contributing to development of a personal style (cultivating a good appearance, keeping fit through sports and wearing branded clothes). Particularly important in this context is a pragmatic orientation towards career, independence and healthy living. Loyalty, responsibility and setting up of a family are considered 'in' by every second young respondent, indicating a decrease in importance of traditional values. One third of respondents consider political and civic activism fashionable, thereby confirming persistence of distancing of youth

from the public sphere even in a consolidated post-socialist Croatia. In line with the above leisure time activities and supported values, money available to youth is mostly spent on clothes, going out to coffee bars and restaurants and telecommunication services.

As for addictive substances use, results show that less than one third of young people consider marijuana use fashionable, although this in itself does not say much about how many really use it. Results of this research on alcohol and tobacco use are in line with earlier findings of a research carried out on a sample youth population in Croatia (Bouillet, 2006a) and again indicate that most prominent among young generation is overuse of alcohol, while tobacco use comes second. The number of alcohol users over time is stable, and the number of youth who smoke is on a permanent slight decrease. Furthermore, research in various ways confirms that at least 15% of young people can be said to belong to a high risk behaviour group, since they consume alcohol once a week or more often, with a tendency to get intoxicated (Bouillet, Čale-Mratović, 2007). This research therefore is yet another one indicating a very high acceptability and widespread habit of alcohol use in Croatian society, while the acceptability of smoking is decreasing slowly but continuously.

With regard to reproductive health, it has to be reminded that one fifth of young people, despite the high share of sexually active persons, do not practice sexually responsible behaviour. Since the share of such behaviour decreases with the level of education and maturity of young people, it seems most important to educate them on time about consequences of risky sexual behaviour. Results also show a relatively low tolerance towards homosexuals, which is something that young people have in common with the rest of Croatian citizens (Ilišin, 2005a). It is indicative that there is a discernable group of young people in this context, who support a traditional value system, whose social profile is mostly determined by a lower education level, mostly rural place of residence and relatively low social origin. Although this group is still relatively numerous (approximately 30%), it is likely that with increase in the number of young people who attain higher levels of education in Croatia this group will start diminishing, which would in turn lead to an increased acceptance of diversity.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that leisure time behaviour patterns and values supported by youth and influencing their lifestyle are to a significant degree conditioned by their socio-demographic characteristics. Here entry into the world of labour or academic community, higher education level and higher level of psychosocial maturity, as well as living in urban communities, contribute to development of a more appropriate contemporary world view, although this is not to say that fashionable phenomena are not questionable either. The current process of alignment of young people with the requirements of contemporary society is reflected on one hand in the individualization of goals in life and pragmatic behaviour with tendency to fashion-consciousness, and on the other hand in increase in tolerance with a parallel weakening of traditional value systems, as well as growing importance of taking care of one's health, including appropriate eating habits, physical activity, responsible sexual behaviour and abstention from smoking and alcohol overuse.

## 5. Social Trust and Values

Societies with a high degree of social trust among individuals, and with widespread cooperation networks show a higher degree of economic development and are a favourable ground for development of democratic institutions (Putnam, 2003).

Social trust is a cultural dimension of the broader concept of social capital, which, according to R. Putnam (2003, 2008), also includes a structural dimension, consisting of horizontal links among individuals. Social capital is not unequivocal; it depends on the direction and intensity of factors it consists of, within or outside of a group, whereby two ideal types of social capital can be determined: bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam, 2008).


Bonding social capital is determined by predominance of high trust among members of a group, with a simultaneous low expression of trust towards non-members. That strengthens the common identity, or dedication to work towards a common goal. Trust predominating in such a case is called particularized or dense trust and is characteristic of groups where individuals engage in relatively frequent, personal and intensive interactions. Bridging social capital encompasses heterogeneous identities, and thus also general or thin trust shown to persons who are outside of the circle of known persons, or who are not members of the group that the individual identifies with. Democratic society implies widespread presence of bridging and inclusive social capital, characterized by establishment of links of trust with persons of diverse sociocultural backgrounds.

Social capital is rather difficult to measure; therefore social trust is frequently taken as a practical measure of social capital (Šalaj, 2007). In the following chapters we will examine the degree of trust among youth towards certain social groups, as well as their voluntary activities in their immediate community, in order to gain an insight into the structural dimension of their social capital. We already pointed out that the degree of bridging social capital, as one of the characteristics of a group or a community, is best reflected in the relationship towards the "other". With that in mind, we examined the level of expressed tolerance, in the narrow sense of a distance towards certain social or ethnic groups. Given the fact that it would be

impossible to separate values from this issue, we also focused on the most highly appreciated values, as well as certain dimensions of religious feelings of youth.

On a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 represents the lowest level, and 10 the highest), the respondents evaluated their level of trust towards certain social groups. Figure 5.1 shows the highest levels of trust in percentage points (9 and 10). Given the fact that the respondents are young, it is to be expected that dense or particularized trust would be more prominent, due to the important role of primary groups, in particular the family, which facilitates the transition to adulthood in circumstances marked by insecurity and risk.

Figure 5.1: Ranking of highest levels of trust expressed towards specific groups (%).



As expected, the respondents express the highest levels of trust towards persons who are close to them, including family members, friends and relatives. One quarter of youth have a high level of trust towards colleagues; one fifth towards neighbours; between 15% and 17% towards persons of another religious affiliation and towards those with different political persuasions. A reserved attitude expressed towards religious leaders is an interesting fact; it might point to a certain level of criticism expressed by youth towards institutional authority.

Figure 5.1 shows a clear differentiation between particularized and generalized trust, indicating that the probability of bridging social capital is significantly less

represented among youth. In order to find out how the variables are structured, the variable of trust towards religious leaders has been left out of further processing through factor analysis, for two reasons. The first reason is that religious leaders are representatives of predominantly hierarchized institutions (Offe and Fuchs, 2002), and thus do not correspond to the defined concept of social capital, which implies horizontal links of association. The second reason stems from the first, and pertains to vertical trust, which also does not correspond to the division of the aforementioned types of social capital in conceptual terms. The obtained latent structure of processed variables corresponds to the division between generalized and particularized trust. The first factor, *generalized trust*, consists of trust expressed towards persons of another religious affiliation and of different political persuasions, colleagues at work and neighbours. In short, this factor points to the latent connection between the perception of belonging to a socio-professional group and neighbourhood on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the perception of "others" – those who are different based on their ideological or cultural characteristics. The second factor, *particularized trust*, is clear in terms of content, since it consists of trust in family members, relatives and friends.

With regard to the factor of particularized trust, the respondents differ based on their socio-professional status and father's education level. Pupils show a significantly higher level of particularized trust than employed and unemployed youth ( $F\text{-ratio}=6.16$ ). In addition, respondents whose fathers have (not) completed primary education exhibit this type of trust to a significantly higher degree than youth whose fathers have four-year secondary school and higher education ( $F\text{-ratio}=13.39$ ). The factor of generalized trust is, on the other hand, linked with residential status ( $F\text{-ratio}=12.68$ ), so youth from rural areas and small towns are more inclined towards this type of trust than youth from major cities. In addition, there are significant differences among respondents from villages and those from the city of Zagreb; the latter express a lower level of generalized trust.

The structural dimension of social capital has been examined based on volunteer work experience over the past 12 months. Offe and Fuchs (2002) consider this type of work an important part of civic engagement, and consequently of social capital as well, as a potential for the creation of trust. They define volunteer work as

‘provision of services to recipients who need these services, which is motivated by the need for such services and the desire for its fulfilment, rather than primarily by material gain or instrumental career development’ (Offe and Fuchs, 2002:197). Volunteer work at an individual level can produce multiple benefits, not only because of the fact that by performing such work a person can gain knowledge and skills that might be useful to them in the future, but also because one's social network is widened and a sense of solidarity developed, thus contributing to the total amount of social trust in the community. Volunteer work can be conducted by participating in the work and activities of associations and institutions, or via personal informal engagement in the local community.

Civil society organizations in Croatia, in addition to having only small numbers of active members, are irregularly distributed throughout the country, and are particularly rare in settlements below 20,000 inhabitants (Bežovan, 2004). Because of this, volunteering is insufficiently present among general population, including youth in Croatia – and that is particularly true of formal volunteering through organizations. When it comes to the readiness of youth for volunteer work, previous research established that 40% of youth are willing to become involved, 20% are not interested in volunteer work, and 40% are indecisive and do not know (Mendeš, 2006a).


Data obtained in this research show that 13% of youth have had experience in volunteering in the past twelve months. Respondents whose fathers have four-year secondary school education are more inclined to engage in volunteer work ( $\chi^2=21.39$ ), as well as respondents from villages ( $\chi^2=23.17$ ), while there is a clear lack of interest among youth from major cities. These results can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, direct "face-to-face" contacts are more frequent in villages, favouring the development of voluntary informal activities. Secondly, lack of some forms of necessary infrastructure for everyday life in villages can also influence the willingness to provide a structural substitute in the form of volunteer work.

Volunteers from the sample were also asked to specify the activities they engaged in (Figure 5.2). One third of volunteers provided assistance to persons with special needs and senior citizens, and slightly over one quarter helped their peers in learning, which points to a significant share of informally structured volunteer work.

One quarter of respondents participated in organization of cultural events, while almost one fifth participated in organization of sports events. Public works in the local community attracted less than one fifth of volunteers, and every sixth volunteer was involved in religious activities. Although volunteering is also an opportunity to gain work experience (Mendeš, 2006a), a relatively low percentage of respondents volunteered in the business sector or in activities of civil society organizations.

As the main reason for voluntary engagement, 36% of volunteers mentioned altruistic motives, or commitment to helping others. Approximately one fifth of volunteers expressed a general desire for social engagement, while slightly over one tenth were motivated by a specific issue to be resolved. Less than 10% of young volunteers attributed the reasons for volunteering to family tradition, followed by motivation to apply certain knowledge in practice and desire to make new friends. Around 5% of respondents attributed the reason for volunteer work to religious convictions, and around 2% had a pragmatic reason in taking the opportunity to meet a prospective employer. Socio-political beliefs motivated volunteering in less than 1% of cases.

*Figure 5.2: Type of youth volunteering in the past 12 months (%)*



Generally speaking, volunteering is not widespread among youth. However, we can conclude that the predominant type of volunteer work among those who have

such an experience is informal in nature, and focused on persons who need some kind of assistance. Such a focus is also confirmed by clear motivation for volunteer work based on altruism.

According to Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005), the degree of bridging social capital in a society or within a group depends on the dominant values. We therefore further researched the hierarchy of youth values. Values can be defined as "a permanent belief according to which one style or purpose of life is individually or socially more acceptable than the opposite style or purpose" (Rokeach, 1973, according to Radin, 2007: 138). In this sense values guide activities, behaviour and problem solving of individuals.

The respondents were asked to select three values among offered that they appreciated most (Table 5.1).


*Table 5.1: Ranking of youth values – first, second and third choice (%)*

|    | <b>First choice</b>                                                         |      | <b>Second choice</b>                                                        |      | <b>Third choice</b>                                                         |      |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. | <i>Personal dignity (identity/ education)</i>                               | 42.8 | <i>Tolerance (respect for another opinion)</i>                              | 18.6 | <i>Correctness</i>                                                          | 20.2 |
| 2. | <i>Fighting spirit (fighting for the achievement of a goal)</i>             | 12.5 | <i>Fighting spirit (fighting for the achievement of a goal)</i>             | 17.6 | <i>Fighting spirit (fighting for the achievement of a goal)</i>             | 17.4 |
| 3. | <i>Altruism (being dedicated, helping others)</i>                           | 11.7 | <i>Altruism (being dedicated, helping others)</i>                           | 14.6 | <i>Tolerance (respecting different opinion)</i>                             | 14.4 |
| 4. | <i>Social prestige (social status, social significance)</i>                 | 8.8  | <i>Personal dignity (identity/ education)</i>                               | 13.8 | <i>Altruism (being dedicated, helping others)</i>                           | 11.8 |
| 5. | <i>Correctness</i>                                                          | 8.5  | <i>Correctness</i>                                                          | 11.6 | <i>Innovativeness of the spirit (creativity, acceptance of other ideas)</i> | 11.2 |
| 6. | <i>Tolerance (respecting different opinion)</i>                             | 8.3  | <i>Social prestige (social status, social significance)</i>                 | 11.3 | <i>Personal dignity (identity/ education)</i>                               | 9.6  |
| 7. | <i>Material wealth</i>                                                      | 4.3  | <i>Material wealth</i>                                                      | 7.3  | <i>Social prestige (social status, social significance)</i>                 | 7.2  |
| 8. | <i>Innovativeness of the spirit (creativity, acceptance of other ideas)</i> | 2.7  | <i>Innovativeness of the spirit (creativity, acceptance of other ideas)</i> | 4.1  | <i>Material wealth</i>                                                      | 6.2  |
| 9. | <i>Does not know / no response</i>                                          | 0.3  | <i>Does not know / no response</i>                                          | 0.9  | <i>Does not know / no response</i>                                          | 1.9  |

The results show that the most appreciated values among youth include a combination of the relation of others towards oneself (dignity), and the relation of oneself towards others (tolerance and correctness). These values are most acceptable

to youth at both the individual and social level and are also a desirable framework within which youth believe they can fulfil their interests and goals. If we apply the Rokeach division of values (Rokeach, 1973, according to Ilišin, 2011), which includes terminal values (desirable existential goals) and instrumental values (desirable modes of behaviour), we can say that personal dignity prevails among our respondents as a desirable existential goal, together with tolerance and correctness as desirable modes of behaviour. In addition, in all the three choices, the value of having a fighting spirit appeared in second place; this represents, among other things, the desirability of active and independent mode of achieving goals.

*Figure 5.3: Ranking of youth values (%)*



The ranking list of values obtained as the sum of all three choices shows that personal dignity is the only value pointed out by the majority (two thirds) of youth (Figure 5.3). This result indicates a developed self-awareness regarding the importance of one's own integrity, which is closely connected with self-respect, as a basis of many decisions in life that young people are facing, or are about to face. Fighting spirit is selected by slightly less than one half of youth, suggesting that young people are ready to fight for what they consider important (in order to achieve that). Next are values representing relations with others and towards others, such as


tolerance, correctness and altruism. Values related to social status do not seem to be particularly widespread among youth, and the same can be said of materialistic value orientation, or focus on acquisition of wealth, which is in slight contradiction to the dominant spirit of consumerism. Furthermore, the value of innovativeness, which particular quality is frequently connected with youth as a creative resource of the society, is visibly poorly ranked.

Young people also differ with regard to the values of altruism, acquisition of wealth, prestige and dignity. Women are more inclined to appreciate the value of altruism than men ( $\chi^2=30.65$ ), while men prefer enrichment ( $\chi^2=44.42$ ). Acquisition of wealth is more highly valued by pupils in comparison to students ( $\chi^2=19.64$ ), by the youngest age cohort in comparison to older respondents ( $\chi^2=17.61$ ), and the least educated in comparison to the respondents with university education or two-year post-secondary education ( $\chi^2=33.85$ ). With regard to prestige, important differentiating aspects are age ( $\chi^2=22.82$ ) and education level ( $\chi^2=35.76$ ), in the same way as for acquisition of material wealth – concretely, the importance of social prestige decreases with the increase in age and education level of youth. In addition, unemployed youth show above average appreciation of social prestige in comparison to students ( $\chi^2=35.35$ ), and residents of villages in comparison to youth from Zagreb and major cities ( $\chi^2=33.73$ ). With regard to dignity, the only statistically significant difference is generated by socioprofessional status ( $\chi^2=44.72$ ), where personal dignity is most appreciated by employed respondents, and least by unemployed respondents, which points to the importance of employment for the perception and development of a sense of personal dignity and identity, particularly in the process of growing up.

Personal dignity – as the most important value to young people – is particularly vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of individual characteristics of a person. We asked the respondents whether they had ever felt discriminated against on the grounds of gender, economic status, religious affiliation, ethnic belonging, educational level, party affiliation, regional origin, or rural or urban origin. More than 80% of respondents have never felt discriminated against on the basis of any of the aforementioned characteristics. However, there are differences among young people, mostly with regard to age, and therefore also life experience. Namely, the

youngest respondents, as expected, felt significantly less discriminated against than the other two older groups – on the basis of the economic status ( $F\text{-ratio}=14.23$ ), religious affiliation ( $F\text{-ratio}=8.43$ ), ethnic affiliation ( $F\text{-ratio}=9.82$ ), party affiliation ( $F\text{-ratio}=8.11$ ), and educational level ( $F\text{-ratio}=10.91$ ). In addition, it does not surprise that sexual discrimination is experienced to a significantly higher extent by women ( $t=8.96$ ).

Figure 5.4: Ranking list of acceptance of various social groups as potential neighbours (%)



Along with human dignity and fighting spirit, tolerance (figure 5.3) has also turned out to be a relatively important value for young people. However, when we analyse this issue on specific practical examples, a different perspective arises. Namely, the respondents were asked to grade, on a five-point scale, how good or bad they would feel about the idea of certain groups and families coming to their neighbourhood. Figure 5.4 presents the sum of percentages for the two degrees of positive feelings towards individual groups. These data indirectly indicate the level

of tolerance towards different groups that might hypothetically live in the immediate neighbourhood.

Tolerance stems from personal acceptance of the other, where an important role in the acceptance of difference is played by the affective component, in which these differences are not assigned negative or threatening characteristics (Iglič, 2010). Thus families from the West and families from Bosnia and Herzegovina are well accepted as potential neighbours, as well as students and retired persons. On the other hand, less than one half of the respondents are ready to accept a Roma family, a family from Eastern Europe, China and the Balkans, or sexual minorities. Individual groups of respondents vary with regard to acceptance of a homosexual family. Men ( $t=4.09$ ), members of the youngest cohort ( $F\text{-ratio}=15.61$ ) with completed primary school ( $F\text{-ratio}=9.68$ ), whose fathers have lower education levels ( $F\text{-ratio}=11.44$ ), prove to be less receptive to the idea of a homosexual family settling in the neighbourhood. With regard to families from Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the oldest age cohort are significantly more intolerant in comparison to others ( $F\text{-ratio}=12.76$ ), and the same can be said of residents of smaller towns in comparison to village inhabitants ( $F\text{-ratio}=7.07$ ), and employees and pupils in comparison to unemployed youth ( $F\text{-ratio}=8.36$ ). Unemployed youth and pupils display higher tolerance ( $F\text{-ratio}=11.21$ ) in comparison to students and employed youth with regard to a family from Eastern Europe ( $F\text{-ratio}=11.21$ ). Acceptance of families from Western Europe, on the other hand, varies with regard to respondents' residential status, where residents of major cities are less tolerant than those from rural areas ( $F\text{-ratio}=7.17$ ).


A similar pattern for dividing groups from – conditionally speaking – the East and the West into desirable and undesirable ones is also visible in relation to expression of (in)tolerance or (non-)acceptance of individual ethnic groups. Results shown in Figure 5.5 are compatible with the results of researches on youth conducted in 1999 and 2004 (Baranović, 2002; Radin, 2005), when least accepted were the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, while most accepted were Western Europeans and Americans.

Although Croatia, alongside Ukraine, is one of the most multicultural European countries, with 22 officially recognized national minorities (Mesić and Bagić, 2011),

the total minority population is relatively low amounting to only 8.14 percent of the population. According to the 2011 Census, no minority has more than half a percent, except Bosniak (0.76%) and Serb minority whose pre-war share of 12.16% has decreased to 4.36% of the population<sup>6</sup>. Social distance towards this particular national minority in Croatia is continuously stable (Baranović, 2002; Radin, 2005) and relatively high, as can be seen from figure 5.4 as well.

Ethnic distance is measured by the Bogardus social distance scale, with 8 degrees of closeness, where 1 is the lowest degree (no desire to have any relations with), and 8 the highest degree (desire to be in a close relationship like marriage, etc.)

*Figure 5.5: Average values of acceptance of ethnic groups on the scale from 1 to 8*



Results presented in figure 5.5 can be interpreted taking into account the situational factor of the war, and the resulting feeling of threat. According to some research, the feeling of being endangered and threatened by a group can help explain the ethnic distance (Hello, Scheepers and Slegers, 2006). When applied to Croatia,

<sup>6</sup> Croatian Bureau of Statistics:  
[http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/census2011/results/htm/usp\\_03\\_HR.htm](http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/census2011/results/htm/usp_03_HR.htm)

that factor can explain the distance towards Serbs, Montenegrins, and even Bosniaks, given the relatively recent war conflicts. On the other hand, low positioning of Albanians and the Roma is most likely caused by the hierarchical principle. This principle attributes higher value to nations of Western Roman-Catholic provenance in relation to nations from Eastern, Orthodox and Islamic societies (Baranović, 2002). It needs to be said, however, that hierarchization of cultures and peoples based on the North/South and the East/West division is widespread in many European societies (Baranović, 2002), which additionally strengthens the stability of this division and its preservation in the Croatian society.

As can be seen from figure 5.5, where on the predefined scale 4 is the average, only Croats are within the field of acceptance. In most cases, the average score is below 4, and predominantly in the range between 3 and 4. Youth show the highest social distance towards Serbs, Albanians and the Roma, with scores between 2 and 3. Although differences among youth in terms of expressed ethnic distance are not considerable, they are nevertheless worth mentioning. Depending on their residential and socio-professional status and education, respondents vary in their evaluation of four ethnic groups. Bosniaks (F-ratio=11.93), Hungarians (F-ratio=13.87) and Germans (F-ratio=11.30) are more accepted by respondents from both ends of the rural-urban continuum; i.e. residents of villages and of Zagreb. Macedonians (F-ratio=10.50), on the other hand, are better accepted by respondents from villages, in comparison to respondents from towns and major cities. Generally speaking, it is interesting that youth in regional urban centres (Split, Osijek and Rijeka), in comparison to residents of Zagreb, small towns and villages, express a higher level of non-acceptance towards these four groups. Hungarians (F-ratio=11.64) and Americans (F-ratio=6.57) are significantly better accepted by unemployed youth, than by employed youth and pupils. Respondents with completed primary school education are significantly more tolerant towards Albanians (F-ratio=6.79), Bosniaks (F-ratio=7.20) and Montenegrins (F-ratio=11.07), than respondents with completed secondary school. These results are somewhat surprising, given that research in this area indicates that tolerance increases with increase in the level of education (Hello, Scheepers and Slegers, 2006). Towards the majority ethnic group – the Croats – who are also the most accepted group, respondents from small towns

display significantly higher non-acceptance ( $F\text{-ratio}=25.96$ ) than residents of Zagreb, and the same attitude is held by unemployed and employed youth ( $F\text{-ratio}=6.81$ ) in comparison to students and pupils.

The value background of strongly expressed ethnic distance can be placed in the framework of nationalism, or one of its dimensions – national exclusivism – which significantly increased after the end of war activities in 1996, as the consequence of these activities, and has remained more or less unchanged since (Sekulić, 2011). National exclusivism, according to Sekulić, includes the idea that members of various nations cannot live together, and ethnic distance, in this sense, is one of its possible manifestations. Value orientation of national exclusivism is part of a larger value set of traditionalism, the importance and acceptance of which grew in the course of the transition period, with the resulting ‘re-traditionalization’ of the Croatian society. Consequentially, this process left its mark on Croatian youth and led to the ‘polarization between traditionally oriented and modern-oriented Croatian youth’ (Ilišin, 2008: 225).

In addition to nationalism, traditionalism – according to Sekulić (2011) – also contains the dimension of religiosity, which has also consolidated its high position on the scale of social values over the past two decades. Additionally, religious practice has a special place in the context of social capital. People who attend Mass more frequently, for example, simply know more people than those who do not (Putnam, 2008), (according to research carried out in USA) indicating a higher level of community integration and the creation of a wider spectrum of opportunities for social engagement outside of the church circle as well. However, in order to examine the role of religiosity in the construction of social capital or social trust in Croatia, research of a wider scope would be necessary, precisely due to the specific role of religiosity in the transition period.

Young respondents mostly define themselves as Catholic (90.4%), atheists and those without confession (6.4%), Orthodox Christian (2.6%) and Muslim (0.5%). We examined two dimensions of religiosity: religious beliefs and religious practice. Religious beliefs in this context mean the degree of acceptance of Church beliefs as the foundation of the dogmatic system, primarily in the Christian religion (table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Religious beliefs of youth (%)

| Beliefs                                           | Believe | Doubt | Do not believe |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------|-------|----------------|
| There is a God                                    | 78.7    | 11.0  | 10.3           |
| God created the world                             | 62.4    | 22.2  | 15.4           |
| There are heaven and hell                         | 62.3    | 24.2  | 13.5           |
| God is a source of moral prescriptions and duties | 55.7    | 24.9  | 19.4           |

The majority of youth believes in all four Christian truths outlined above. In general, the presented results are very similar to those from the national research on youth conducted in 1999 (Marinović Jerolimov, 2002); therefore, we can conclude that the dimension of believing as part of religiosity has remained stable in the course of a thirteen-year period. Although almost 80% of youth believe in the existence of God, doubt is increasing as regards certain Christian dogmas, although it does not prevail in general. The respondents undoubtedly accept and believe the dogmas; however, there is also a significant share of youth who doubt or do not believe in God's creation of the world and the existence of heaven and hell (around two fifths), or in the idea that moral prescriptions are provided by God (around 45%).

Youth are differentiated (Table 5.3) with regard to all the specified Christian truths, in relation to several characteristics. With regard to belief in the existence of God, male respondents experience significantly more doubt than women, as well as students in comparison to employed and unemployed youth. Differences on the basis of place of residence are consistent – respondents from villages believe to a significantly higher degree, while respondents from major cities and Zagreb exhibit a lower tendency to believe in statements describing Christian truths. More pronounced belief in God's creation of the world, as well as the existence of heaven and hell, is connected with the education level of the respondent's father, whereby completed four-year secondary school proves to be significant in this context.

Table 5.3: Acceptance of Christian beliefs with regard to youth characteristics (%)

| Youth characteristics                       | There is a God       | God created the world | There are heaven and hell | God is a source of moral prescriptions and duties |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Gender</i>                               | $\chi^2=17.20; df=1$ | $\chi^2=16.84; df=1$  |                           |                                                   |
| Male                                        | 37.8                 | 29.1                  |                           |                                                   |
| Female                                      | 40.9                 | 33.3                  |                           |                                                   |
| <i>Place of residence</i>                   |                      | $\chi^2=20.99; df=3$  | $\chi^2=20.69; df=3$      | $\chi^2=29.30; df=3$                              |
| Village                                     |                      | 26.5                  | 26.3                      | 23.1                                              |
| Small town                                  |                      | 16.3                  | 15.9                      | 13.3                                              |
| Major city                                  |                      | 9.3                   | 9.3                       | 8.5                                               |
| Zagreb                                      |                      | 10.3                  | 10.7                      | 10.8                                              |
| <i>Socio-professional status</i>            | $\chi^2=33.17; df=3$ |                       |                           |                                                   |
| Employed                                    | 23.8                 |                       |                           |                                                   |
| Unemployed                                  | 21.5                 |                       |                           |                                                   |
| Pupil                                       | 18.2                 |                       |                           |                                                   |
| Student                                     | 15.2                 |                       |                           |                                                   |
| <i>Education of respondent</i>              |                      | $\chi^2=22.42; df=3$  |                           |                                                   |
| Primary school                              |                      | 16.9                  |                           |                                                   |
| Three-year secondary school                 |                      | 11.6                  |                           |                                                   |
| Four-year secondary school                  |                      | 25.8                  |                           |                                                   |
| Undergraduate studies or higher             |                      | 8.1                   |                           |                                                   |
| <i>Father's education</i>                   |                      | $\chi^2=38.39; df=3$  | $\chi^2=20.14; df=3$      |                                                   |
| Primary school                              |                      | 3.5                   | 2.1                       |                                                   |
| Three-year secondary school                 |                      | 15.7                  | 14.5                      |                                                   |
| Four-year secondary school                  |                      | 32.6                  | 35.0                      |                                                   |
| Two-year post-secondary education or higher |                      | 10.5                  | 10.6                      |                                                   |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                | 78.7                 | 62.4                  | 62.3                      | 55.7                                              |

We furthermore examined how frequently youth engage in certain religious practices (Table 5.4). The sum of responses regularly and frequently shows that the majority of youth celebrate religious holidays. More than one third of respondents pray; one quarter go to Mass in church; every sixth goes to confession, and every tenth to pilgrimages.

Table 5.4: Religious practices of youth (%)

| Religious practice             | Regularly | Frequently | Sometimes | Never |
|--------------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------|
| Celebrating religious holidays | 65.9      | 15.8       | 9.8       | 8.5   |
| Prayer                         | 15.4      | 19.5       | 41.4      | 23.7  |
| Going to Mass                  | 11.0      | 14.7       | 51.2      | 23.0  |
| Going to confession            | 6.9       | 9.5        | 49.6      | 34.0  |
| Going to pilgrimages           | 3.2       | 6.1        | 29.8      | 61.0  |

Majority celebration of religious holidays is no surprise, since that is part of tradition for many families and the wider community, frequently including socializing and exchange of gifts. However, apart from the celebration of religious holidays, the intensity of religious practice, generally speaking, remains relatively low. Still, certain groups of respondents display a higher tendency towards religious practice, which is most clearly visible in relation to age cohorts and residential status (place of residence).

Women and respondents from the youngest cohort (F-ratio=12.64; F-ratio=7.95) display a significantly higher tendency of going to Mass ( $t=3.79$ ) and prayer ( $t=6.69$ ) than the older respondents. The same tendency can be observed among residents of villages (F-ratio=9.51; F-ratio=16.79) in comparison to residents of Zagreb and of smaller towns, with the latter engaging in such practices significantly less than the residents of Zagreb. Confession is more frequent among the youngest respondents (F-ratio=8.91) and residents of Zagreb (F-ratio=7.93) in comparison to residents of smaller towns, and among pupils (F-ratio=6.91) in comparison to employees and students. The oldest cohort of respondents (F-ratio=9.96), as well as residents of major cities (F-ratio=10.84), are significantly less interested in celebration of religious holidays.

Generally, social trust observed through the bridging social capital of youth, as the total sum of interpersonal trust and association with the aim of improving the life of the community, is something we can evaluate as relatively low. Youth mostly trust family members and friends, while the highest degree of distrust is shown

towards persons of different political persuasions. Higher expression of particularized trust or social capital by pupils is something that is expected, given the fact that pupils are dependant on their primary group or older family members in many aspects. It is interesting that respondents whose fathers have lower education levels exhibit this type of social capital, while young people from villages generally have more bridging social capital. Volunteering as work for the benefit of others and the community is not particularly widespread among youth, nor is the structural dimension of social capital. In order to increase volunteering, youth should be educated about positive effects of such work at the individual and social level. On the other hand, structural prerequisites for youth activities contributing to the life of the community should be created, in particular outside of Zagreb.

In order to generate generalized social trust, which implies establishment of cooperation and trust with persons of different ideological or cultural characteristics or value systems, an appropriate value framework is needed. The research established clearly that personal dignity is the most appreciated value among young people. However, we should be aware of the unpredictability of an individual's behaviour despite the behavioural component (in addition to the cognitive and affective component) contained in values (Ilišin, 2011). In addition to dignity as a terminal value, fighting spirit and tolerance stand out as desirable instrumental values. However, when it comes to expression of acceptance of certain social or ethnic groups, the expressed degree of tolerance is very low, especially towards the Roma, homosexual couples and families from Balkan countries (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina). In addition, the expressed ethnic distance is relatively strong towards the Roma, Albanians and Serbs, while the peoples of the Western provenance, such as Germans and Americans, are on the borderline of acceptance. It is interesting that the respondents can be differentiated according to their place of residence, where youth from villages tend to be significantly more tolerant towards certain ethnic groups than youth from small towns and major cities (excluding Zagreb).

With the aim of increasing the bridging social capital, and thus generalized social trust, it is important to act at the structural and cultural level. Youth organizations that young people can become involved in, as well as national policies

for social integration of youth, can significantly contribute to increasing the civic engagement of young people. This role in the process of youth socialization can be played by school and family through, on the one hand, enabling and supporting participation at school through student groups or at university through student associations and, on the other hand, by supporting adoption of values of association, tolerance and acceptance of differences. Family has an important role in this process, by, among other things, encouraging young people to dedicate a portion of their leisure time to building a community they would like to live in.

## **6. Politics, development and democracy**

There are at least two reasons to research the attitude of youth to politics; on the one hand, an insight into political views and participation of youth is necessary to understand the problems and potentials of youth in their integration into the political and social life of their community. On the other hand, their involvement in political institutions and processes is considered a prerequisite for their later involvement as active citizens in their adulthood. Relation of youth to politics is viewed from the point of view of political culture, which is understood as the relation of the individual to political values, institutions and participation. In this context, emphasis is placed on civic (democratic) political culture as a type of political attitude appropriate to a democratic system (Almond, Verba, 2000). From this point of view, distancing of young people from politics can be seen as a danger to representative democracy and democratic processes in contemporary society in general (Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001) and in the so-called new democracies in particular (Adnanes, 2004).


Political views and behaviour of an individual or a group are influenced by the overall social and political context (Anderson, Heath, 2003); for youth, influences of the life cycle and specific generational experience are important as well (Braungart/Braungart, 1989). These combined influences result in recognisable patterns of young people's political behaviour, observable particularly in comparison with those of the older generation (Ilišin, 1999; Norris, 2004; Fahmy, 2006). Firstly, young people distance themselves from politics, especially institutionalised (conventional, formal) politics, which is manifested in weak interest in politics and below-average participation in political institutions and processes. Secondly, if and when they do get involved, they are more inclined to non-institutional political activities ranging from different forms of protest to engagement in civic organisations and actions. Thirdly, young people tend towards more radical political views and are potentially more subject to various forms of political manipulation and instrumentalisation. Reasons for this attitude of youth to politics are to be found in their lack of experience and other resources, in accordance with their particular stage in the life cycle, their greater orientation to alternative

forms of involvement and deficient concept of politics which is associated with lower levels of political interest, knowledge and trust (Henn and others, 2007).

The above mentioned tendencies have already been observed in Croatian youth (Ilišin, 1999, 2005b), who exhibit lower levels of interest in politics, participation and trust than the older generation. At the same time, young people tend to be more liberal and tolerant, which is an important potential for the development of democratic society.

This research focuses on certain aspects of young people's attitude to politics and democracy in a society characterised by important development problems. This necessarily affects the sphere of politics as well and, consequently, political views of all citizens, including youth.

*Figure 6.1: Youth's interest in politics at different levels (%)*



One of the prerequisites for acquisition of political competence is certainly interest in politics. Data obtained in the research (Figure 6.1) confirm the already familiar tendency – that young people are more likely not to, than to take interest in politics.

Expectedly, youth's interest in politics decreases with the distance to their local environment. It is interesting to note that respondents are more interested in EU politics than politics in the Balkan region. This is probably enhanced by Croatia's upcoming accession to the EU, perceived as a political departure from the Balkans, independently of the fact that, even as an EU member state, Croatia will remain not only geographically but also in other ways closest to the Balkan region.


Respondents differ considerably with regard to observed political interests. Most significant and most numerous differences are the result of respondents' education level ( $\chi^2$  values range from 67.40 to 115.68), age ( $\chi^2$  from 107.74 to 84.39), socio-professional status ( $\chi^2$  from 115.21 to 79.71) and father's education level ( $\chi^2$  from 81.36 to 36.04). Interest in politics – in Croatia and globally – increases linearly with the respondents' age and education as well as their fathers' education level, whereby students show most and pupils least interest. Above average interest in world politics is exhibited by males ( $\chi^2=16.97$ ) and residents of Zagreb ( $\chi^2=37.00$ ), who are also more interested in politics in the Balkan region ( $\chi^2=38.63$ ). The observed trends clearly show that a greater interest in politics is stimulated by higher education level, maturity and better socialization conditions, which is well known from previous research.

It is logical to assume that those who are more interested in politics more often seek information about political events and developments, whereby this research focuses not so much on frequency, but on types of information sources about political developments (Figure 6.2).

Most young people use television and the Internet as sources of information about political affairs. It is intriguing, however, that although the Internet is the most important source of all kinds of information for young people, it loses its importance with regard to information on political developments in particular. Here television is more important source of information than the Internet, while all other sources are only auxiliary, including daily newspapers (the main purpose of which is actually political reporting), not to mention the collapse of the radio as an information source – young people turn more often even to their parents and friends for that purpose.

Youth are quite homogeneous in their choice of source of political information, with greatest differences with regard to the Internet ( $\chi^2$  ranging from 81.84 to 20.53). Internet use as the source of information about politics increases with the respondents' age, education and social origin. Students use it more often than pupils. Use of daily newspapers for information also increases with age ( $\chi^2=46.26$ ) and education level ( $\chi^2=42.74$ ), especially in the case of employed youth ( $\chi^2=109.18$ ). More frequent use of television for information purposes is linked only to lower education level of respondents' fathers ( $\chi^2=25.42$ ), and use of radio to youth employment status ( $\chi^2=21.66$ ). Students talk with their friends about politics more often than pupils ( $\chi^2=47.34$ ). The frequency of such conversations increases with the increase in the respondents' education level ( $\chi^2=23.39$ ). Conversations about politics in the family increase in frequency with the increase in the education level of the respondent's father ( $\chi^2=26.98$ ).


Figure 6.2: Ranking list of information sources about politics (%)



Although to a somewhat lesser extent than in the analysis of the (lack of) interest of youth in politics, it was established that the choice of source of information about daily politics is conditioned by youth's social competences. It can be seen that

interest in politics and use of different sources of information about political developments are interconnected, i.e. that they interact.

*Figure 6.3: Frequency of conversations about politics between youth and their parents (%)*




Conversations about politics in the family are not an important source of information and it is possible to assume that this is also true with regard to the frequency of conversations about politics between young people and their parents (Figure 6.3). However, regardless of how frequent such discussions are, they are important, inasmuch as it is known that the family (especially the parents) is the most important socialization factor in childhood and early youth. This leads to the assumption that such conversations contribute to convergence of political views of young people and their parents (Figure 6.4).

As can be seen, almost every third respondent never discusses politics with their parents, and every fourth cannot decide, whether their political views are aligned with the views of their parents. The majority of respondents (three fifths) actually discuss politics with their parents occasionally, and an equal number of respondents estimate that there is a certain extent of alignment in their political beliefs. Less than every tenth respondent talks frequently about political issues with parents, and the same number of respondents estimate that their views are to a significant extent aligned with the views of their parents. It is interesting to mention, within the context of looking for a potential conflict of political opinions between generations,

that only every seventeenth respondent believes there is complete lack of correspondence between their political views and the views of their parents. In other words, the transmission of parental political views and beliefs to their children seems to be of a relatively low intensity, but steady, resulting in partial correspondence of political opinions of youth and their parents.

Figure 6.4: Level of correspondence of political views and beliefs of youth and their parents (%)



Analysis by sociodemographic characteristics showed that only gender does not influence the frequency of political conversations between young people and their parents and the perception of (non)concurrence of their political views and beliefs. On the other hand, in both cases (Tables 6.1 and 6.2), age and education discriminate respondents most.

It is indicative to know that the direction of influence of sociodemographic characteristics is identical. Actually, with increase in the respondents' age, educational level, father's education level ( $\chi^2$  amounting to 80.91 and 39.94) and urbanization level of their place of residence ( $\chi^2$  amounting to 33.15 and 67.98), there is a decrease in the number of respondents who never talk about politics with their parents and those who cannot assess whether their political views are concurrent, while the number of those who agree politically with their parents

increases. Additionally, pupils most rarely discuss political issues with their parents ( $\chi^2=66.73$ ) and most frequently cannot assess the extent to which their political beliefs are concurrent with their parents' views ( $\chi^2=116.34$ ). On the other end of the scale are students, who above average discuss political issues with parents and are able to assess concurrence of their political beliefs with their parents' views.

*Table 6.1: Frequency of conversations about politics between youth and their parents with regard to age and education level (%)*

| Youth's characteristics             | Very frequently or frequently       | Sometimes or rarely | Never       |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| <i>Age</i>                          | $\chi^2=130.40$ ; $df=4$ ; $p=.000$ |                     |             |
| 14 – 17                             | 9.3                                 | 39.2                | 51.5        |
| 18 – 22                             | 6.8                                 | 69.9                | 23.3        |
| 23 and over                         | 9.7                                 | 68.6                | 21.8        |
| <i>Respondent's education level</i> | $\chi^2=181.03$ ; $df=6$ ; $p=.000$ |                     |             |
| Primary school and lower            | 9.0                                 | 35.1                | 55.9        |
| Three-year secondary school         | 6.6                                 | 62.2                | 31.1        |
| Four-year secondary school          | 6.7                                 | 71.9                | 21.4        |
| Undergraduate degree and higher     | 16.3                                | 67.5                | 16.3        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                        | <b>8.5</b>                          | <b>60.7</b>         | <b>30.8</b> |

*Table 6.2: Perception of (non)concurrence of political views and beliefs of youth and their parents with regard to age and education level (%)*

| Youth's characteristics             | Complete or partial concurrence     | Complete or partial non-concurrence | Cannot estimate |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Age</i>                          | $\chi^2=75.35$ ; $df=4$ ; $p=.000$  |                                     |                 |
| 14 – 17                             | 40.5                                | 21.3                                | 38.2            |
| 18 – 22                             | 50.9                                | 28.5                                | 20.5            |
| 23 and over                         | 50.7                                | 33.9                                | 15.5            |
| <i>Respondent's education level</i> | $\chi^2=100.09$ ; $df=6$ ; $p=.000$ |                                     |                 |
| Primary school and lower            | 41.1                                | 19.9                                | 39.0            |
| Three-year secondary school         | 38.5                                | 37.4                                | 26.7            |
| Four-year secondary school          | 51.3                                | 30.8                                | 18.0            |
| Undergraduate degree and higher     | 62.9                                | 25.4                                | 14.7            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                        | <b>47.9</b>                         | <b>28.4</b>                         | <b>23.7</b>     |

The outlined tendencies point to the fact that politics becomes a family topic when adequate conditions are fulfilled, namely a stimulative socio-cultural

environment and maturity of youth. In other words, there is a visible influence of the life cycle together with social origin and competences acquired through education. Another important insight is that more intense political conversations within the close family circle lead to a somewhat higher concurrence of political views and beliefs of young people and their parents.

Young people also seem to be rather incapable of positioning themselves on the ideological left-right scale. It remains to be discussed to what extent they are in this respect and with regard to their proclaimed political orientation similar to their parents. It was namely established that on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 (with 1 signifying the extreme left-wing, and 10 the extreme right-wing position) every second respondent does not know where they belong to. As far as the remaining respondents are concerned, 9% of them see themselves on the left, 31% in the centre, and 10% on the right. This results in an average value of 5.58 and shows a slight centre-right inclination.

In terms of ideological self-positioning, young people are far from being a homogeneous group, because they differ with regard to every observed sociodemographic characteristic (with  $\chi^2$  values ranging from 68.34 to 32.12), with the exception of gender. As expected, the number of young people who cannot align themselves with a certain ideological group decreases with age and education, but increases among pupils in particular. At the same time, left-wing inclination increases with age, education level of respondents and their fathers and the urbanization level of their place of residence, and is above average represented among employed youth and students. Ideologically more to the right inclined youth display quite opposite characteristics: these are pupils and youngest respondents with lower education levels, coming from families of lower social status. The indicated profiles are in accordance with earlier established trends in Croatia and world-wide, namely that more educated urban population from the so-called middle classes tends to leftist ideology, while population with lower education levels and social origin from rural areas tends to right-wing ideology.

Figures on youth preferences with regard to political parties are somewhat similar to the above figures, because, once again, every second respondent (approx. 53%) could not identify with any of over 100 political parties registered in Croatia.

Responses given by the rest referred to 15 political parties, out of which only two reached “the election threshold level”: the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ (12%) and the SDP /Social-Democratic Party/ (17%). Since 18% of all responses<sup>5</sup> account for the remaining parties, only supporters of the HDZ and the SPD as well as indecisive respondents were analysed further. Specifically, support for the SDP grows with increase in respondents’ educational level ( $\chi^2=43.76$ ) and age ( $\chi^2 = 20.23$ ), while the number of HDZ supporters and indecisive respondents simultaneously decreases.

When we compare the figures about where young people see themselves on the ideological left-right scale and about their preferences with regard to political parties, we notice a certain discrepancy. On the ideological scale, youth are of slight centre-right inclination, but the centre-left party has the most supporters. These trends indicate that political parties are no longer recognisable ideologically, which may be particularly confusing for youth whose political competences are mostly deficient.

The purpose of elections is to enable citizens to express their political will by voting for the political party whose programme they think best meets their needs and satisfies their interests. In short, who will come to power depends on the will of the voters, and this is the key motivation for going to the polls. Many election surveys have shown that young people are more inclined to abstain from voting. Results of this research confirm this tendency among young people, although not as a dominant one. According to answers given by respondents who had the right to vote by the end of 2011, at the time of the last parliamentary elections<sup>6</sup>, 32% of them had voted in all elections since they became eligible to vote, 28% in most of the elections, 27% in several elections, while 13% had never exercised their right to vote. It is obvious, therefore, that most young people perform their civic duty on a relatively regular basis after all, but that as many as two fifths of them abstain quite often as well.

Youth’s voting in elections is related to both their own education level ( $\chi^2=57.59$ ) and their father’ education level ( $\chi^2=54.19$ ), with age ( $\chi^2=93.24$ ) and with their socio-professional status ( $\chi^2=92.66$ ). Such trends are expected: going to the polls

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<sup>5</sup> The Croatian Labour Party/Hrvatski laburisti/ has most supporters in this group (3.0%)

<sup>6</sup> Those who were 18 or more in 2011 were derived from the sample, which includes 1073 respondents (71.5% of the entire sample). For the sake of information, the oldest respondents over 18 had opportunity to participate in as much as seven elections by 2012 (three times in parliamentary elections and twice in presidential and local elections).

increases with age and higher education background of youth as well as the education level of their fathers, whereby employed youth most often vote in elections.

Many citizens, including youth, decide not to vote because they feel that they cannot influence the way government institutions work. Judging by the perceptions expressed by youth in this research, this discouraging reason is strongly present. Only 17% of youth believe that their vote will significantly or up to a certain extent influence the way national institutions are run, while 19% feel the same about local government bodies. One third believe this influence to be only slight at both local and national level, while 37% of respondents believe that they cannot influence national government at all, and 33% feel the same about the local government. It is obvious, therefore, that young people find their vote to be of minor influence, whereby, in case of the local government, the influence is perceived to be slightly stronger.

Young people are quite homogeneous in sharing this sense of political (civic) helplessness: the only influential sociodemographic characteristic is age – respondents over 23 believe to have most influence on national ( $\chi^2=16.56$ ) and local ( $\chi^2=18.03$ ) government bodies, while least influence is believed to be held by respondents between 18 and 22, precisely those who have just started exercising their voting right and whose perhaps great expectations clashed with the reality (for example, the party they voted for did not win the elections, or the politicians they voted for did not meet their expectations when they came to power).

Beside such disappointments that also other citizens may be exposed to, young people may be additionally disappointed by the way their generation is represented in political institutions and processes. According to results of this research, this is exactly the case: only 13% of the youth replied that they feel well represented and/or represented to a certain extent by their peers who actively participate in politics, 31% feel underrepresented, 46% feel that they are not represented at all, while 11% cannot decide. In short, most young people believe that interests of their generation are poorly represented in the sphere of politics. This dissatisfaction with political representation of their generation, nevertheless, decreases with increase in the age ( $\chi^2=27.83$ ) and education level ( $\chi^2=25.68$ ) of respondents and of their fathers ( $\chi^2=33.81$ ). The oldest and the most educated group of young people shares this somewhat greater feeling of satisfaction with respondents living in small towns ( $\chi^2=34.14$ ), to the opposite of

young people from major cities. If we link these findings with the perception of personal influence on authorities, we notice that a higher level of social competence contributes to a slight growth in political self-confidence.


It is logical to assume that the previously expressed disappointment with personal influence on government institutions and with the representation of the younger generation in politics also reflects the (dis)satisfaction of youth with the state of democracy in Croatia. Figures obtained in this research show that young people are for the most part moderately satisfied: 26% of them are very satisfied and/or satisfied, 53% are satisfied to a certain extent, while 21% are dissatisfied and/or very dissatisfied. It is obvious that young people are slightly more satisfied with democratic processes than with their civic influence. Interestingly enough, this is conditioned by the same sociodemographic characteristics, but in the opposite direction. In short, the youngest ( $\chi^2=36.58$ ), least educated ( $\chi^2=45.21$ ) respondents whose fathers have lower education levels ( $\chi^2=24.31$ ) are most satisfied with the state of democracy. Since the dissatisfaction of the youth with democratic processes increases in parallel with their age and educational level, it comes as no surprise that pupils, too, are among the most satisfied, and employed youth among the least satisfied ( $\chi^2=27.83$ ). This proves that critical awareness of young people increases with social competence, which is probably the consequence of their greater political knowledge and expectations.

All citizens are responsible for the development of democracy, but in particular institutions and stakeholders with much greater social and political power and responsibility. The degree to which people trust certain social and political institutions is therefore extremely important. According to research conducted so far (Ilišin, 2005b; Sekulić, Šporer, 2010), this trust is relatively low, especially among youth. The results of this research confirm the continuation of already familiar trends (Figure 6.5),

It is indicative that none of the observed institutions has the trust of the majority of young people, as well as that most trusted are the two repressive institutions. Trust enjoyed by the institutions at the top of the list (the police and the judiciary) is probably associated with their recent efforts in fight against crime and corruption, which also included police and court prosecution. A lot of media attention to police actions and trials has brought these institutions into the spotlight, which probably resulted in a growing trust in them, regardless of objections by observers about final effects of their

efforts. Other state administration bodies do not do so well. The least trusted are the highest bodies of representative and executive power at the national level, together with political parties, which, according to research conducted in Croatia and world wide, are most often ‘predestined’ to be at the bottom of such ranking lists. It would seem that, in comparison to political bodies, the civic sector (organisations, the media, religious leaders, and trade unions) enjoy more trust, but not enormously.

Figure 6.5: Ranking list of youth’s trust in institutions – degrees ‘high’ and ‘to a certain extent’ (%)




Factor analysis classified the observed institutions in two groups. The first factor may be called *political institutions* (Croatian Parliament, Government, State Election Board, State Attorney’s Office, local government bodies). Almost every observed

youth sub-group expressed the same amount of (dis)trust in these institutions. There is some influence only of the father's education level ( $F\text{-ratio}=7.96$ ), in the sense that respondents whose fathers have lower education levels show more trust in these institutions. The situation is similar with the other factor – *civic and repressive institutions* (the media, the judiciary, the police, trade unions, State Audit Office, NGO's, religious leaders). Young people, whose fathers have lower education levels, show most trust in these institutions as well ( $F\text{-ratio}=8.74$ ). These findings lead to the conclusion that (dis)trust in different institutions varies slightly with regard to individual differences between young people, but it can be assumed that it is changing under the influence of developments on the Croatian political and social scene. It is interesting to note higher levels of trust in all observed institutions shown by young people from families of lower social status, indicating diffused support to authorities represented by institutions.

(Dis)trust in institutions governing Croatian society is probably associated with the perception of their (un)successfulness in solving social problems. Figure 6.6 shows the problems young people find particularly disturbing in Croatian society today.

Social and economic problems as well as existential problems are at the top of the list, as problems perceived by most young people as extremely disturbing. Such trend is mostly expected in times of crisis, proving at the same time that youth are well aware of the social reality they live in. One third to over two fifths of respondents emphasise a spectrum of different problems, including fear of health problems, legal insecurity, growing crime levels and environmentally irresponsible behaviour. The least feared, (by every fourth respondent) are permanent emigration of Croatian citizens (as Croatia has already experienced huge emigration waves in its more recent and remote past, especially economic emigration), climate change (threatening not only Croatia) and terrorism (so far, Croatia has mostly been spared of this threat). In short, the more present certain problems are in Croatian society, the greater they appear to young people. With regard to the economic and financial crisis that has hit Europe and the USA, Croatia is no exception in terms of unfavourable economic trends, but it is more specific in that it belongs to a group of economically highly vulnerable countries that will not come out of the crisis so soon. Young people, therefore, mostly focus on problems that threaten not only their present, but also their immediate future.

Figure 6.6: Ranking list of problems perceived in Croatian society – degree ‘very disturbing’ (%)



There is a moderate agreement in the way young people look at social problems. Factor analysis and the analysis of variance showed that fears of mostly *global threats* (this factor includes spreading of HIV, of chronic and professional diseases, terrorism, climate change, permanent emigration, environmental pollution and street crime) depend on residential status only ( $F\text{-ratio}=9.95$ ), whereby such fears decrease with increase in the urbanization level of their place of residence. However, the perception of *socioeconomic problems* (the factor includes unemployment, poverty, job insecurity, inefficient suppression of corruption, incorrect application of laws and criminality) depends noticeably more on different characteristics of respondents, i.e. on age ( $F\text{-ratio}=15.48$ ), social-professional status ( $F\text{-ratio}=16.20$ ) and education level of respondents ( $F\text{-ratio}=19.00$ ) and of their fathers ( $F\text{-ratio}=17.16$ ). This trend is expected:

concern about socio-economic problems grows linearly with age and education level of young people and their fathers, in that they are above average pointed out by students and employed youth and below average by pupils.


Detection of problems should be followed by actions aimed at mitigating or resolving such problems. Therefore, this research also included the question about goals that the Croatian government should focus on. The opinion on what needs to be done in Croatian society to improve the life of citizens is, for the most part, associated with the perception of existing social problems. At the same time, it also tells us something about political values of youth. The answers (Figure 6.7) are mostly complementary to the previously presented perception of social problems.

At the top of the list of political priorities are reduction of unemployment, fight against crime and corruption as well as economic growth and development, which confirms the compatibility with the perception of social problems. However, most young people also find social justice, human rights and improvement of the social status of youth and women very important. This means that, in spite of the democratisation of Croatian society, satisfactory results in combating different forms of inequality – social, gender-based or generational – have not been achieved yet.

A significant number of young people (from one third to over two fifths) mention a wide range of goals, from demographic renewal to the EU integration. It is a mixture of traditional, symbolic, modern and post-modern values, indicating the specific situation Croatia has been facing since its independence. Support to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and spiritual renewal are very important only to every fourth respondent, which proves that values based on the national sentiment and tradition are not so widespread.

The factor analysis grouped political priorities in three factors. The first one represents *values of social development, equality and justice*, as it includes the following goals: securing social justice and human rights, reducing unemployment and corruption, improving the position of youth and women, and economic development and environment protection. The analysis of variance shows that support to these values increases linearly with age (F-ratio=28.11), education level of respondents (F-ratio=27.67) and their fathers (F-ratio=22.30) and with urbanization of their place of residence (F-ratio=8.63). Once again, on the one side are students and employed youth

Figure 6.7: Ranking list of political goals the Croatian government should primarily focus on – degree ‘very much’ (%)



who above average support these goals, and on the other side are pupils who support them least ( $F\text{-ratio}=25.43$ ). The profile of young people who particularly emphasise the values of social development, justice and equality is conspicuously similar to the profile of those who point out socioeconomic problems and are less satisfied with the


state of democracy in Croatia. This indicates a consistence in political views of the socially more competent youth. The second group of goals includes spiritual renewal, strengthening of military power, support to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, co-operation with the ICTY, population growth and the dignity of the Homeland War, so it could be said that this factor represents *traditional and symbolic values*. These values are uniformly represented among all observed sub-groups of youth, meaning that the acceptance of political traditionalism and symbolism is well-spread among at least one third of the young generation in Croatia today. The third factor (group of goals) may be called *values of cooperation and integration* as it includes the following goals: Croatia's accession to the EU, harmonious co-existence between Croats and ethnic minorities, good neighbourly relations and development of regions and private entrepreneurship. Young people are not homogeneous in this case and their profile is similar to the profile of respondents who preferred the values such as social development, justice and equality. Specifically, the acceptance of cooperation and integration increases with increase in respondents' age (F-ratio=9.91) and their education level (F-ratio=18.21) as well as their fathers' education level (F-ratio=14.22). When these results are considered in an integrated way they clearly indicate that social competence also contributes to a more complex perception of political goals.

The above findings leave no doubt that youth are mostly preoccupied with socio-economic issues, i.e. that they are aware of the difficulties Croatia is faced with. Most of them probably associate current problems with the future, wondering how long will the present situation last and how will this affect their individual chances in life. According to the results of this research, despite all this young people are optimistic about Croatia's economic future and about their personal future in the next 10 years (Figure 6.8).

Data illustrate the well-known disbalance between social and personal optimism/pessimism, characterised by the superiority of personal over social optimism (Ilišin, 2011). This continuing trend indicates that, with regard to their personal future, young people draw their optimism from the hope that "time is on their side", that is, from the expectation that there is enough time for them to achieve their goals in life. This explains a certain disregard for future economic trends that will, by the obvious logic, significantly affect life chances of individuals. The results obtained in this

research show that personal optimism expressed by young people is twice as high as their optimism about Croatia's economic future.

Figure 6.8: Personal and social optimism / pessimism of youth (%)



A comparison by sociodemographic characteristics showed that young people differ less with respect to social optimism than to personal optimism. It has been established, namely, that moderate optimism about economic future prevails in almost all youth sub-groups, where youth and vitality seem to be a strong defence against dire forecasts by economic and other analysts. This is good news from the point of view of the society, because it shows that young people did not succumb to the overall mood of despondency and hopelessness. However, since the displayed social (economic) optimism is not the prevailing mood of the majority and contains a good deal of restraint, protracted negative economic trends may easily reduce already low reserves of that optimism. The present reserves of social optimism are somewhat greater only among students ( $\chi^2=38.82$ ), out of whom 61% of them expect that things will improve, unlike 49% of unemployed youth. It may be assumed that the latter difference is based on different personal experiences. Students' current situation and resources they can count on in future are more advantageous than the current situation of unemployed

youth, who are already faced with devaluation of some of their personal resources due to unfavourable economic circumstances.

When it comes to how they see their own future, youth's optimism mostly decreases with increase in their age ( $\chi^2=40.01$ ) and education level ( $\chi^2=25.13$ ), and grows with increase in their fathers' education level ( $\chi^2=31.64$ ). Results suggest that personal optimism of young people slightly decreases with experience and knowledge they acquire, but that the awareness of their family resources helps them to stay optimistic.

The presented and interpreted research results about the attitude of youth to politics confirm that youth in Croatia do not differ in terms of tendencies from earlier young generations, as well as from young people in other contemporary societies. Such a conclusion is derived from the insight that young people do not show much interest in political developments, that they are mostly dissatisfied with generational political representation, with the ability to influence government bodies and the state of democracy in the country. They also do not exercise their right to vote often enough, whereby most of them show preferences for none of the political parties and cannot align themselves ideologically. Youth are particularly concerned about socio-economic difficulties facing Croatian society and expect the Croatian government to start solving these problems first. In spite of everything, they are moderately optimistic about Croatia's economic future and very optimistic about their own personal future.

Further analysis also confirmed the already familiar trends. On the other side, it also provided some new insights. The novelty according to this research is that, after continuous weakening of the influence of gender on political views and youth participation, as indicated by research carried out in the last decade (Ilišin, 2005b), this influence has disappeared almost completely. Without gender-related differences in the attitude of youth to politics, it can optimistically be expected that this will result in higher participation of women in political decision-making in the forthcoming period, when the young generation of today obtains political leverage in Croatian society. At the same time, a differentiation of youth into two recognisable groups it is noticeable (expectedly): on the one side are relatively older, most educated young people whose fathers have university education, as well as students and employed youth; and on the

other side are pupils, the youngest respondents, with lower education levels and those whose fathers have lower education levels. The line separating the above mentioned groups is social competence, which is primarily a consequence of maturity, socialisation conditions and educational achievements, as well as of concrete situational circumstances. In this context, pupils (the youngest age cohort) stand out as a problematic group, because of very low political awareness. Previous research has already indicated that secondary school pupils are to a significant extent characterised by political views that are incompatible with democratic political culture (Bagić, 2011) and a relatively low level of political knowledge (Bagić, Šalaj, 2011). This is particularly noticeable among students of three-year vocational schools. Since this research again indicated a significant influence of youth's education level, it can be concluded that the observed deficiencies in youth's political awareness and participation can be reduced, at least partially, through interventions in the curriculum in the direction of enhancing political (civic) education contents. This is especially important for societies with a deficient democratic tradition, whose democratic development may come into question if their young generations are not adequately prepared for the role of active citizens.

## **7. Croatia and the European Union**

Understanding youth's attitudes towards the European Union i.e. its institutions and integration processes is indispensable for our understanding of the relationship of young people towards politics both in member states and in countries that strive toward membership. This is particularly true of Croatia. After a decade of turbulent negotiations and preparation, the country has finally come close to fulfilling its objective – the accession to the EU. The accession date is scheduled for mid 2013, but in the meantime the country has to undergo the monitoring process and wait for all member states to ratify Croatia's EU Accession Treaty. However, even after Croatia's accession to the EU, the interest of researches in the topic of the European integration will not dwindle, because the EU membership itself is an extremely dynamic process. This dynamism comes from the fact that it is a unique phenomenon in history, bringing into existence a new form of political community and leading to a new understanding of politics (Grubiša, 2005). European integration is constantly tested either due to some (un)expected global impacts or due to the dynamics of relations within the EU. This is clearly demonstrated by current trends caused by the financial and economic crisis that is increasingly turning into a political crisis as well. Regardless of these problems, the EU – as a project of political elites – has from the very beginning been criticised for its “democratic deficit” (Hix, Goetz, 2000; Davies, 2003) and the related “educational deficit” (Grubiša, 2005) i.e. insufficient amount of information and knowledge about events in and surrounding this association.


Present experience and scientific insights suggest that the relationship of citizens toward EU institutions and integration process depends on the interplay between the three elements: economic, social and political trends in a particular country (whether a member state or candidate country) and in the European Union, as well as on the relations of a member state or a candidate country with the EU and/or some of its member state. This dynamics of relationships is accompanied by cyclic spreading of Euroscepticism either in the form of re-examination or of opposition to the process of European integration (Blanuša, 2011). Young people represent the population segment that is more likely to change their attitudes, and studies carried out

in Croatia so far (Ilišin 2005; Blanuša, Šiber, 2011) have shown that these changes mostly move in the direction of growing Euroscepticism with a steady, although weak increase in the so-called anti-European sentiment.

As the EU is currently facing one of its severest crises (after a failed attempt at adopting a European Constitution) in the sixty years of its existence, and as Croatia too is going through a period of crisis the end of which cannot be predicted, it can be assumed that such trends are also reflected in the attitudes of citizens towards the process of European integration, especially in the attitudes of young people.

Although Croatia's accession to the EU was endorsed at a referendum at the beginning of 2012, the issue of youth support the country's EU accession still remains a topical. Results show that the majority of respondents are in favour of Croatia's accession to the EU, while every fifth respondent is opposed to it (Figure 7.1). Indifferent respondents (nearly one third) constitute a group of young people out of whom it is easy to recruit anti-Europeans or Europhiles, depending on developments in Croatia and the EU in near future. In any case, the number of respondents who support Croatia's accession to the EU is nearly twice as high as the number of those who are opposed to it.

*Figure 7.1: Youth's (dis)approval of Croatia's accession to the EU (%)*



(Dis)approval of Croatia's accession to the EU is connected with the respondents' education level as well as with the education level of their fathers

(Figure 7.1), degree of urbanization of their place of residence ( $\chi^2=62,14$ ) and respondents' age ( $\chi^2=25,46$ ). It is no surprise that support to Croatia's EU accession increases with the respondents' education level and age, and that children of fathers with lowest education levels are above average opposed to accession. A somewhat disturbing trend can be observed among the youngest respondents as they have demonstrated the lowest degree of support to Croatia's accession to the EU, since they are the ones who are most likely going to spend the better part of their lives in Croatia as an EU member state.


*Table 7.1: (Dis)approval of Croatia's accession to the EU by education level of youth and their fathers (%)*

| Education level                     | Completely and mostly approve      | Neither approve nor disapprove | Completely and mostly disapprove |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Respondent's education level</i> | $\chi^2=41.99$ ; $df=6$ ; $p=.000$ |                                |                                  |
| (Non)completed primary school       | 48.3                               | 24.1                           | 27.6                             |
| Three-year secondary school         | 40.1                               | 28.9                           | 31.0                             |
| Four-year secondary school          | 42.1                               | 39.7                           | 18.2                             |
| Undergraduate degree and higher     | 52.2                               | 29.6                           | 18.2                             |
| <i>Father's education level</i>     | $\chi^2=29.37$ ; $df=6$ ; $p=.000$ |                                |                                  |
| (Non)completed primary school       | 37.9                               | 25.8                           | 36.3                             |
| Three-year secondary school         | 50.3                               | 32.5                           | 17.2                             |
| Four-year secondary school          | 40.3                               | 36.4                           | 23.3                             |
| Post-secondary education and higher | 53.1                               | 24.4                           | 22.5                             |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                        | <b>44.7</b>                        | <b>32.8</b>                    | <b>22.5</b>                      |

The following data show positive and negative expectations young people have of Croatia's accession to the EU (Figures 7.2 and 7.3), which certainly also has an impact on the (dis)approval of Croatia's accession to the EU as analysed above.


In brief: the majority of young people expect favourable effects of Croatia's accession to the EU. Such positive expectations are somewhat higher in the field of socio-cultural integration than with regard to increase in democratic standards. The lowest expectations are expressed with regard to economic upturn.

Figure 7.2: Youth's perception of favourable impacts of Croatia's accession to the EU – fully or mostly agree (%)



Youth's fears with regard to Croatia's EU accession are compatible with the expressed hopes. Thus, young people fear negative social and economic consequences much more than any threat to the sovereignty and identity of their country and nation. It can also be observed that the majority of young people fear all of the possible negative impacts. However, the figures are lower (by 17 – 19%) in comparison to the level of hope expressed by the respondents. In other words, optimism regarding Croatia's European future is still much more present among young people than pessimism. It is important to mention that a comparison with the results of some earlier studies (Ilišin, Mendeš, 2005) shows that the past 15 years have seen a continuous decrease of hopes and increase in fears among young people concerning Croatia's integration into the EU. Therefore, a question may be raised whether the trend will continue, or whether it has reached its peak.


Figure 7.3: Youth's perception of downsides of Croatia's accession to the EU – complete agreement and agreement for the most part (%)



Protracted negotiations between Croatia and the EU are a consequence of a number of problems that burdened the Croatian society and are mostly resolved now. This should also be confirmed by monitoring results that will precede the signing of the Accession Treaty. A decade of negotiating and periodical reports on Croatia's success/failure in fulfilling the criteria for joining the EU provided a fertile ground for frustrations and dissatisfaction of the Croatian public, as well as for rhetorical rivalry among political stakeholders, who highlighted various reasons for the slow integration rate. Figure 7.4 shows what circumstances young people think made the negotiating process more difficult.

Again, the majority of young people think that all of the listed circumstances made the process of preparation for EU accession more difficult. It is obvious that they consider the EU to be somewhat more responsible for this than Croatia. This is a new moment in the research, because in the previous years the perception of responsibility was more equally distributed to both sides, with a mild tendency to look on Croatia as 'the more guilty party' (Ilišin, Mendeš, 2005).

Figure 7.4: Perception of circumstances which make Croatia's accession to the EU more difficult – levels ranging from very much to mostly (%)




Factor analysis of young people's views about possible consequences of Croatia's integration into the EU and aggravating circumstances of that process produced four latent dimensions. The first factor, i.e. a group of related views, can be called *the euro-optimistic orientation*, because it involves all views about desirable consequences of integration. The analysis of variance showed that young people who completed vocational school ( $F\text{-ratio}=5.96$ ) express least hope in positive consequences. On the other hand, respondents with university education are the biggest optimists. The second factor consists of all views concerning possible negative consequences of joining the EU, and could, therefore, be called *the euro-pessimistic orientation*. Here youth are very homogeneous, without differentiation with regard to sociodemographic characteristics used. This means, practically, that

fears of consequences of EU – integration are uniformly distributed among all observed segments of youth. The third factor encompasses some of the perceived aggravating circumstances with the common denominator of *Croatia's lack of preparation for integration* (insufficient level of democratization, economic underdevelopment, unsatisfying observance of human rights, government's inability to comply with EU standards and EU's dissatisfaction with Croatia's co-operation with the ICTY). This group of views is uniformly distributed among youth – only increase in education level is related to increase in acceptance of the stated views (F-ratio=6.68). The fourth factor may be termed *imposed barriers*, consisting of the following views: the EU unjustly imposed too strict accession requirements and criteria on Croatia, whereby there are influential groups in Croatia whose interest is to keep Croatia out of the EU. In this case, young people are somewhat more differentiated: the youngest respondents (F-ratio=15.73), pupils (F-ratio=9.46) and those who completed primary school only (F-ratio=16.20) show the lowest degree of acceptance of the views regarding imposed barriers. Respondents between 18 and 22, who completed four-year secondary school and are currently students, represent the opposite pole. It is obvious here that students are mostly dissatisfied with the EU's attitude towards Croatia in the course of the accession process. The background to this might be their higher self-confidence, which makes them more reluctant to follow 'dictates' from outside.

It is logical to assume that recent developments in the EU, as well as the history of relationships between Croatia and the EU affect young people's (dis)trust in EU institutions. Data in Figure 7.5 show that trust in EU institutions is higher than in Croatian authorities (Figure 6.5), but still quite low.

The most important result is that every second respondent actually holds no particular view. This may partly be a consequence of a lack of information about the functioning of EU institutions, especially with regard to decision-making and instruments which, currently, do not relate immediately to relations between Croatia and the EU. Judging by the expressed (dis)trust, there is a high degree of concurrence in opinion among youth, independent of differences in sociodemographic characteristics.

Figure 7.5: Youth's (dis)trust in EU institutions (%)



Based on the presented results, it may be concluded that young people moderately support Croatia's EU integration. The support is twice as high as the opposition to it and higher also than their trust in EU institutions. The lack of more pronounced Euro-optimism may be associated with the confusing situation young people find themselves in, because most of them simultaneously expect both desirable and undesirable consequences of Croatia's EU accession. For the time being, hopes slightly prevail over fears, what is the likely basis of their moderate support to Croatia's EU integration. Young people are more likely to blame the EU for Croatia's lengthy and thorny path towards the EU than local actors and unfavourable circumstances. However, this did not result in lower trust in EU institutions, but rather in Croatian political institutions.

As expected, an important result lies in a significant concurrence in youth's attitudes towards the EU, since the relationship between Croatia and the EU is basically a political issue. And with regard to politics, as indicated in the previous analysis, there is a tendency towards homogenization of young people's views. Differences in youth's attitudes towards the EU are only sporadic, and it can be observed quite clearly that support to Croatia's EU accession increases slightly with increase in youth's social competences. In this context, the educational achievements have the most important influence on strengthening the youth's pro-European attitude.



## CONCLUSIONS

A sociological profile of today's youth in Croatia can be outlined on the basis of results of this research, the aim of which was to establish and analyse attitudes and behavioural patterns of youth in Croatian society, which is going through a period of crisis and significant changes. In addition to insights on youth, research results enable insight into some phenomena and processes of the contemporary society at the local and global level.

In this research, youth is the population aged 14-27. Most of them are still at school, and the number of unemployed youth (about one quarter) is close to the number of employed youth (less than one third), which is not surprising under unfavourable economic circumstances marked, among other things, also by a steady increase in unemployment. Most young people live in a joint household with parents and families with an average of 3.43 members. Thanks to this circumstance, youth live in relatively favourable socio-economic circumstances, since about 90% of them live in a family flat/house with the average of 3 rooms, one car and one PC with Internet connection. However, average monthly expenses are not in accordance with this standard, because most families have expenditure (i.e. income) amounting to more or less the average Croatian salary, which in all likelihood is not sufficient to keep the quality of life reached in pre-crisis years. From such relatively meagre finances parents set aside a sum for autonomous disposal by young people, whereby most of this money is spent on clothes and footwear, going out (to coffee bars) and telecommunication services. Insufficient finances are also the decisive practical reason for living with parents in most cases, since financial limitations are stated as the main reason for living with parents by those young people who would like to become independent, but still remain in the family home. That such a decision is rational enough is also witnessed by mostly under-average salaries of employed youth, prevailing among those young people who became independent and live in rented flats. Due to additional costs their quality of life deteriorates in relation to youth who remain in the parental home.

Family is not important only in terms of material support, but also in terms of emotional and social support. Because of this, family is expectedly the social group they trust most and with whose members they have especially good relations. Indeed, young people state that a consensual atmosphere prevails in their families, with noticeable confidence in young people's independent decision-making, although there are also some topics avoided in the communication between parents and youth (e.g. politics). Most young people live in families of between 3 and 4 members, and they would like to set up similar families (with two children). Such plans are by far insufficient for demographic renewal of Croatia, with a shrinking and rapidly ageing population. Most young people's plans for their future family life overlap with the existing knowledge about the family as one of the most stable and strongest social structures in Croatia, and likely to remain such in future as well. Young people believe that desirable average marriage age is 27 for women and 30 for men, which certainly indicates a trend to delay assuming permanent social roles. Youth believe that good foundations for marriage are common interests and compatibility of character, and they expect a high level of partner's responsibility, in mutual relations as well as with regard to their offspring. However, about two fifths of young people are still prepared to respect traditional pressures with regard to belonging to the same religious community or obtaining the consent of the family.

According to the synchronised pattern of growing up, i.e. acquisition of social maturity, before setting up of a family young people should complete their education and get a job. With regard to the fact that approx. 45% of the sample in this research are youth attending secondary school or university, it is important to note that most of them consider attending school moderately to very stressful, but that this is not demotivating, because there is a relatively high share of youth who like going to school or university. The achieved educational results are relatively satisfactory, because almost four fifths of them achieve good, very good or excellent success, as a result of studying for between one and three hours a day. Most respondents did not have to take private lessons, but a problem is that almost half of them suspect existence of corruption in their education institution. At the same time, all young people, regardless of whether they are still in school or whether they have completed their education, choose education institutions in Croatia (mostly public) as desirable

institutions for education, which is in line with the findings that almost 80% of respondents are more or less satisfied with the quality of education in Croatia.

Parents of almost four quarters of young people have not financed any activities that could increase their children's educational success (and consequently also success in employment), and a similar share of youth have not participated in any additional professional training. To young people this probably does not seem to be a problem because they believe that connections and acquaintances are equally important for employment as expertise. In choosing a job most young people would be led by extrinsic motives: amount of salary and workplace safety. Getting a job – a secure job – in order to secure their livelihood is actually the main professional goal of young people, and all other professional aspirations come second or third. This could explain why the majority of young people prefer the public sector (domestic or foreign) for employment, in contrast to one third who prefer the private sector. Regardless of the ever more difficult employment, most young people are not prepared to be spatially mobile, and one quarter of youth who are considering relocation within Croatia are at the same time considering leaving Croatia (mostly to developed European countries). In contrast to lack of readiness for inward and outward mobility, the desire for upward social mobility is much more prominent. Namely, as much as two thirds of young people, given the choice, would decide to study. Only a portion of them have realized or will realize this ambition, which must be a cause of frustration for those to whom university education will remain only a dream, but it is undisputable that most young people believe that advancement on the educational scale has bigger influence on opportunities in life than changing the place of residence and work.

Out of one third of already employed youth, two fifths would have a valid reason to look for a better job in some other city or country, because they are not working in their profession (for which they were educated). The becomes worse if we consider that a full time monthly salary of youth is about 4.244 HRK, which is approx. 30% less than the average Croatian salary. The above data confirm once again that youth have insufficient financial means at their disposal to be fully independent, so that those young people (one third) who would like to leave the

family home cannot do it, and are not even thinking about leaving for complete uncertainty of other parts of Croatia or the world.

Regardless of the type and quantity of obligations that young people have, leisure time is an important part of their everyday lives, i.e. their lifestyle (defined by what individuals do, what they spend time, energy and money on, what entertainment they engage in, how they create habits, how they care for their health and appearance etc.) According to the results of this research, youth's leisure time is mostly filled with music, the Internet, television and socializing with friends. The Internet is so present that it does not only suppress other media, but slowly also reduces immediate contact with friends. Still, 90% of youth move in the circle of inter-connected acquaintances and friends with whom they develop satisfactory relationships. In any case, fun and entertainment dominate over more demanding activities, and the predictable victim of our age is reading books, since only one quarter of youth have developed this cultural need, while most young people live in homes with only a symbolic number of books.

In entertainment and fun with peers, young people can also develop behaviour patterns that can be recognized as risky. Particularly widespread (in three quarters of young people) is use of alcohol (in various intensities), while smoking is stagnating at 30%. Over one half of young people do not support sexual abstinence and about three fifths of them are sexually active. Only one third of youth regularly use contraceptive methods, although at the same time two fifths believe that abortion should be outlawed or limited strictly to medically justified cases. Tendency to violent behaviour remains low (only every twentieth young person has participated in a conflict), and marijuana use is considered modern by slightly over three quarters of youth. Such findings once again indicate a worrying level of tolerance towards alcohol use in Croatian society, and of shortcomings in preparedness of young people for responsible sexual behaviour.

Values supported by young people are always interesting and indicative for the 'state of mind' of a society. Young people in Croatia consider a number of phenomena fashionable ('in'), especially good personal appearance (with which they are, luckily, mostly satisfied) and career development, together with acquisition of university education and independence. However, they also consider wearing

branded clothes and healthy living 'in', showing tendency to fashionableness and a sort of glorification of visual impression. Here they consider appearance more important for career development than, for example, for finding a marriage partner, which is certainly a significant change in comparison with previous generations.

Although young people consider career to be very much 'in', this is not connected with social prestige as a value (important to only one quarter of respondents), or to enrichment, which is important to only one fifth of young people. On the other hand, most young people (two thirds) point out personal dignity, which includes identity and education, as very important to young people (and obviously incorporated into career development). Highly placed (although below 50%) are fighting spirit, tolerance, correctness and altruism, which all together indicate that young people mostly value characteristics that are integral to developed personality (which shows a high level of self-awareness) as well as respect by other people.

Despite a relatively high appreciation of tolerance, young people have turned out to be quite intolerant, especially towards homosexuals and some ethnic groups. At the same time, majority of them trust various groups of people – from family, colleagues to religious leaders. It is interesting to note that religious leaders are at the bottom of the scale of social trust, whereas at the same time 94% of young people declare themselves members of a religious community (predominantly Catholic). Most young people profess basic religious beliefs, but only a minority participate in religious ceremonies – most of them participate only in celebration of religious holidays ( mostly in the form of family gatherings). It is perhaps the very discrepancy between religious beliefs and religious practices that can help at least partially explain the relatively low level of trust towards religious leaders, as well as some attitudes and behaviours established in this research that are incongruent with religious norms.

One of the surprising results obtained in this research is that young people consider active engagement in politics and participation in civic action equally 'in' (one third each), because research so far has indicated higher inclination of youth to non-institutional political engagement. However, it seems that here and now the experience of living in a non-consolidated democracy has 'depleted' the willingness of young people to be politically active at all, formally or informally. This is

confirmed by the fact that only every seventh respondent has participated in some form of voluntary work in the previous year. Those rare volunteers have mostly tried themselves at completely informal work (e.g. helping elderly or infirm, or peers in studying) than in activities linked to the life of the local and/or religious community, or activities sponsored by an association and/or economic operator. This low level of willingness to volunteer shows that a low level of youth participation in formal politics in Croatia today is not compensated by a higher engagement in the civil society.

This research has also once again confirmed that politics as an inseparable part of social life is only on the margins of young people's interest. Youth not only lack interest in what is going on in politics, but also do not regularly vote at elections, are mostly unable to estimate whether their political beliefs coincide with those of their parents or position themselves at the ideological scale (right-left), and most of them do not have any defined party preferences. The reason for the latter can probably be sought in the low level of trust enjoyed by political actors (the parties, Government, Parliament), of which only EU institutions enjoy a bit more trust. Therefore youth mostly trust repressive authorities (the police and judiciary). This is probably one of the consequences of the fight against crime and corruption in Croatian society, which most young people at the same time point out as one of the political priorities for the government. In addition to this, young people expect from the government to focus more on reduction of unemployment, stimulation of economic growth, ensuring social justice and human rights, and improving position of youth and women. Most frequently voiced demands towards the government coincide with young people's perception of the biggest problems of Croatian society, which are unemployment and lack of job safety, increase in poverty, and crime and corruption. It is obvious that, although young people are not interested in politics, they have the ability to realistically see the existing social problems and identify areas to which authorities should primarily direct their efforts in governing a society burdened with numerous development difficulties.

Youth mostly get their information on politics from television and the Internet, so it is only logical that they are well informed about problems and expectations of other citizens, which in the process they internalize as their personal opinion as well.

They estimate their influence on authorities as minor, as well as the representation of their generation in politics. However, despite this lack of trust in institutions and delay in dealing with existing social problems – if we can judge by the fact that in research the same problems have been on top of the list for a number of years now and by the widespread feeling of personal civic powerlessness, youth are still more satisfied than dissatisfied with democracy in Croatia.

The concerns with regard to socioeconomic difficulties extend also to perceived future of Croatia in the EU. Concretely, although young people overall expect more positive than negative consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU, least hopes and most fears are expressed precisely with regard to (in)adequate conditions for economic development of the country and improvement of the standard of living. On the other hand, young people mostly expect positive socio-cultural effects and have least fears with regard to possible threats to national sovereignty and identity. These hopes and fears (with slightly less of the latter) with regard to Croatia's EU accession result in a moderate support for accession, whereby the support is still twice higher than disapproval. All the above indicates that there is no euphoria among young people with regard to the upcoming realization of Croatia's long-desired EU accession, but that there is a relatively stable support based on hopes overriding fears. The combination of positive and negative expectations could at the same time act as a safeguard against disappointment if the crisis in Croatia and the EU continues on for too long.

Despite the difficult reality and some gloomy research results, young people are still optimistic. Certainly, this optimism is more prominent with regard to personal than social (more precisely, economic) future of Croatia, but in both cases it represents the majority sentiment. This is certainly a result that can help ease fears that young people will be overwhelmed by the feeling of lack of perspective and lethargy when faced with reality. Research results suggest that young people are actually still predominantly oriented on pragmatic adaptation to requirements of the environment for the purpose of personal prosperity, by relying on individual and family resources, without worrying too much about large topics and problems of the society. This is the 'mainstream' of the young generation today, within which, as always – as also indicated by some findings of this research, as well as devel-

opments among students over the last couple of years – there are also individuals and groups whose critical opinion, ambitions and respective behaviour patterns surpass purely instrumental acceptance of given social circumstances and imposed goals and models. It remains to be seen whether the critical spirit of those young people will be able to avoid the faith of the previously more influential “flower children”, who at a certain time – at dawn of the victorious sweep of neo-liberalism, which today is subject to serious re-examination – “withered and died in the desert of unemployment and economic crisis” (Brake, 1984: 95).

This concise and somewhat critically intoned sociological portrait of Croatian youth today should also be complemented with findings of another type – those speaking about the inter-generational differentiation of youth. Since youth are a relatively large social group, as is well known, this means that internal stratification of the group is inevitable, reflecting variations in their attitudes and behaviour patterns.

These variations in youth population should primarily be viewed from the point of view of the life-cycle, which, concretely, means analysis of influence of age closely connected with socio-professional status and level of education. Therefore this research is among many showing that maturity level, situational circumstances and educational achievements are factors that mostly differentiate young people. In short, the older and more educated they are, especially in case of students or employed youth, the more socially competent they are. This concretely means that their attitudes are more clearly defined, with the tendency to deviate from traditional discourse, and their behaviour patterns more based on selective choice of available resources and contents in various fields of everyday life. On the other side are adolescents with lower education level and secondary school students, whose attitudes are more traditional, fluid and less developed, and their behaviour patterns more fraught with risks and orientation to undemanding contents and activities.

Another significant influence is that of social origin, i.e. father's education level on youth. This influence to a large degree overlaps with the influence of youth's own education level. Although this influence decreases as they get more independent, it still remains permanently present through youth's achievements. The trends are already familiar: higher social origin enables better access to resources for

realization of more ambitious goals in life, and enhances the type of socialization that stimulates development of a critical relationship towards oneself, others and wider community. On the other end of the social scale based on father's educational status is youth with lowest social origin, with only meagre family resources at disposal, who are therefore forced to attain qualifications as soon as possible and get a job, and who are, especially in this period of poor economy, are most at risk of unemployment.

The research has also indicated weakening of the influence of degree of urbanization of youth's environment. Although youth from urban communities still have more benefits at their disposal, spreading availability of secondary school education and of new technologies is helping young people in rural areas to overcome some limitations of their environment. At the same time, some elements of quality of life indicate certain advantages for living in rural areas for young people in comparison to living in cities.

Gender differences have least influence and are present only occasionally and inconsistently. These are clear indications of results of socialization based on promotion of gender equality rather than gender stereotypes. Indeed, in every new research of youth in Croatia gender differences are decreasing, which certainly indicates weakening of influence of patriarchal tradition. But this certainly does not mean that gender differences have disappeared completely. On the contrary, research of gender (in)equality in Croatia clearly shows that – in contrast to education – labour, politics and family are still marked by strong gender inequality (Kamenov, Galić, 2011). In this respect most persistent are gender relations in the family. Since most young people wish to set up their own family, it can be assumed that the model of unequally distributed family obligations, traditionally justified by a „natural“ division of labour and abilities, will be further perpetuated, but with decreased scope and intensity. Promotion of gender equality has started undermining even the last bastions of gender inequality, therefore the assumption that changes will occur in the above mentioned direction.

Finally, regardless of any particular field of young people's lives, it has to be reminded that the influence of age and belonging to any of the socio-professional sub-groups observed here is of temporary nature, in the same way that direct

influence of social origin decreases with time. Therefore, educational achievement has to be highlighted as a resource with long-term influence (bearing in mind that it capitalizes on advantages of higher social origin) and therefore as a resource with the highest potential to help young people to realize their goals in life, but also to empower them to successfully resist limitations of tradition and the mermaid call of fashionable ways of thinking and acting.

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## ANNEX

### Questionnaire with percentages

*July 2012*

|                                         |  |
|-----------------------------------------|--|
| <b>IDNUM (Questionnaire Serial No.)</b> |  |
|-----------------------------------------|--|

**T1BEGIN.** Interview start time : \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ Interview end time: \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

The Institute for Social Research (Institut za društvena istraživanja) from Zagreb is conducting a youth survey in Croatia within the framework of a research programme financed by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The goal of this study is to explore youth attitudes and behaviour in a transition country such as Croatia. You have been selected for this study on the basis of a random sample. Your responses will be treated as confidential, which means that nobody will know your name or have insight into your responses. Do you have any questions?

Can we start? Thank you!

#### County

|                       |      |
|-----------------------|------|
| Krapina-Zagorje       | 1.4  |
| Sisak-Moslavina       | 6.6  |
| Karlovac              | 1.5  |
| Varaždin              | 5.7  |
| Koprivnica-Križevci   | 4.9  |
| Bjelovar-Bilogora     | 2.7  |
| Primorje-Gorski Kotar | 9.6  |
| Lika-Senj             | 0.7  |
| Virovitica-Podravina  | 0.8  |
| Požega-Slavonia       | 0.8  |
| Brod-Posavina         | 2.5  |
| Zadar                 | 3.3  |
| Osijek-Baranja        | 12.5 |
| Šibenik-Knin          | 2.0  |
| Vukovar-Syrmia        | 1.9  |
| Split-Dalmatia        | 12.2 |
| Istria                | 2.6  |
| Dubrovnik-Neretva     | 1.0  |
| Međimurje             | 0.9  |
| City of Zagreb        | 17.9 |

#### Settlement

|                    |      |
|--------------------|------|
| 1. Village         | 40.4 |
| 2. Town            | 28.9 |
| 3. Regional centre | 12.8 |
| 4. Zagreb          | 17.9 |

#### How many persons live in your household, including you?

|   |      |
|---|------|
| 1 | 9.4  |
| 2 | 22.8 |
| 3 | 31.1 |
| 4 | 27.0 |
| 5 | 7.4  |
| 6 | 2.0  |
| 7 | 0.3  |

#### Data for the selected household member (respondent)

| Gender    |      |
|-----------|------|
| 1. Male   | 50.8 |
| 2. Female | 49.2 |

| Age (M=20.89)  |      |
|----------------|------|
| 1. 14-17       | 28.5 |
| 2. 18-22       | 35.7 |
| 3. 23 and over | 35.8 |

## A) LEISURE TIME AND LIFESTYLE

### A1. How often do you engage in the following activities?

|      |                          | Often<br>1 | Sometimes<br>2 | Never<br>3 | No answer<br>0 | M    |
|------|--------------------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|------|
| A1.1 | Listening to music       | 80.0       | 19.7           | 0.3        | 0              | 1.20 |
| A1.2 | Going out with friends   | 66.9       | 31.8           | 1.2        | 0.1            | 1.34 |
| A1.3 | Reading books/newspapers | 26.7       | 54.9           | 17.1       | 1.4            | 1.90 |
| A1.4 | Sports activities        | 30.1       | 44.3           | 24.1       | 1.5            | 1.94 |
| A1.5 | Watching TV              | 54.3       | 42.5           | 2.8        | 0.4            | 1.48 |
| A1.6 | Watching films           | 52.0       | 45.9           | 2.8        | 0.2            | 1.50 |

### A2. How many hours per day do you spend watching TV, on average? (M=2.48)

|    |                   |      |
|----|-------------------|------|
| 1. | Up to 1 hour      | 24.4 |
| 2. | Up to 2 hours     | 30.9 |
| 3. | 3 hours           | 21.6 |
| 4. | 4 hours and more  | 14.1 |
| 5. | Does not watch TV | 7.7  |
| 6. | Does not know     | 1.3  |

### A3. How often do you watch the following TV programmes?

|        |                                  | Every<br>day<br>1 | 2-3<br>times<br>per<br>week<br>2 | Once<br>a<br>week<br>3 | Less<br>than<br>once a<br>week<br>4 | Never<br>5 | No<br>answer<br>0 | M    |
|--------|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------------|------|
| A3.1.  | Croatian folk music shows        | 4.2               | 6.0                              | 10.9                   | 25.4                                | 52.6       | 0.9               | 4.17 |
| A3.2.  | Croatian pop music shows         | 5.9               | 12.2                             | 21.1                   | 31.4                                | 28.8       | 0.6               | 3.66 |
| A3.3.  | Foreign music shows              | 8.7               | 21.5                             | 20.8                   | 29.2                                | 19.6       | 0.2               | 3.30 |
| A3.4.  | Croatian films                   | 1.2               | 5.7                              | 14.6                   | 49.2                                | 27.5       | 1.8               | 3.98 |
| A3.5.  | Foreign films with social topics | 0.9               | 8.4                              | 27.9                   | 37.2                                | 24.3       | 1.3               | 3.77 |
| A3.6.  | Foreign action films             | 5.9               | 24.4                             | 36.5                   | 26.2                                | 7.3        | 0.4               | 3.06 |
| A3.7.  | Foreign thrillers                | 5.4               | 25.8                             | 37.5                   | 24.3                                | 6.8        | 0.2               | 3.01 |
| A3.8.  | History/scientific documentaries | 1.7               | 8.6                              | 27.2                   | 37.0                                | 24.6       | 0.8               | 3.75 |
| A3.9.  | TV series                        | 19.6              | 26.8                             | 23.1                   | 19.0                                | 11.0       | 0.4               | 2.75 |
| A3.10. | News                             | 16.1              | 26.0                             | 19.3                   | 24.1                                | 14.1       | 0.4               | 2.94 |
| A3.11. | Political debates                | 0.9               | 4.9                              | 9.7                    | 22.1                                | 61.0       | 1.4               | 4.39 |
| A3.12. | Sports / sports talk shows       | 10.3              | 17.8                             | 17.5                   | 23.4                                | 30.3       | 0.6               | 3.46 |
| A3.13. | Religious programmes             | .3                | 1.7                              | 7.7                    | 14.5                                | 73.5       | 2.3               | 4.63 |
| A3.14. | Comedies                         | 16.7              | 31.8                             | 25.3                   | 15.3                                | 10.7       | 0.3               | 2.72 |
| A3.15. | Game shows and quizzes           | 1.1               | 6.2                              | 19.4                   | 26.9                                | 45.6       | 1.0               | 4.11 |

**A4. Do you have Internet access?**

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| 1. Yes | 94.1 |
| 2. No  | 5.9  |

**A5. How many hours a day on average do you spend on the Internet? (M=3.38)**

|                     |      |
|---------------------|------|
| 1. Up to 1 hour     | 14.4 |
| 2. Up to 2 hours    | 24.6 |
| 3. Up to 3 hours    | 21.8 |
| 4. 4-5 hours        | 21.1 |
| 5. 6 hours and more | 9.9  |
| 6. Does not know    | 8.0  |

**A6. What purposes do you mostly use the Internet for?**

|                                                                       |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| A. For work                                                           | 20.4 |
| B. Reading news online / getting information                          | 61.9 |
| C. Looking up information (for school / work / out of curiosity etc.) | 62.4 |
| D. Communication with acquaintances / relatives via chat or Skype     | 53.9 |
| E. E-mail                                                             | 60.3 |
| F. Watching videos / listening to music                               | 66.3 |
| G. Downloading films / books                                          | 43.7 |
| H. Video games                                                        | 30.2 |
| I. Virtual life games                                                 | 8.9  |
| J. On-line shopping / paying bills / making reservations              | 10.7 |
| K. Access to social networks like Facebook / Myspace / Hi5 / G+       | 76.9 |
| L. On-line bank account control                                       | 7.1  |
| M. Other                                                              | 4.6  |

**A7. How much money on average do you spend on each of the following activities PER MONTH?**  
(In HRK)

|       |                                                  | 0    | Up<br>to 50 | 51-<br>100 | 101-<br>150 | 151-<br>200 | 201-<br>300 | Over<br>300 | Does<br>not<br>know | M      |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|
| A7.1. | Watching films (Cinema / buying DVDs etc.)       | 58.2 | 20.1        | 12.0       | 2.2         | 3.7         | 0.7         | 0.3         | 2.9                 | 34.71  |
| A7.2. | Going to coffee bars / bars / restaurants / pubs | 5.8  | 14.7        | 21.4       | 6.8         | 17.2        | 14.5        | 16.5        | 3.1                 | 201.96 |
| A7.3. | Clothes / footwear / accessories                 | 7.2  | 7.9         | 22.1       | 4.5         | 18.8        | 13.8        | 18.1        | 7.6                 | 216.28 |
| A7.4. | Phone cards / telephone bill                     | 8.0  | 24.7        | 31.4       | 13.0        | 13.4        | 4.8         | 3.0         | 1.7                 | 116.70 |
| A7.5. | Buying books                                     | 73.3 | 11.6        | 7.8        | 0.9         | 1.1         | 0.6         | 0.3         | 4.3                 | 20.00  |
| A7.6. | Other                                            | -    | 19.9        | 13.9       | 14.4        | 19.9        | 7.2         | 24.7        | -                   | 218.62 |

**A8. Which of the following is in your opinion fashionable ('in') or unfashionable/old-fashioned ('out')?**

|               |                                                | 'In' | Not quite<br>'in' | 'Out' | Don't<br>know | M    |
|---------------|------------------------------------------------|------|-------------------|-------|---------------|------|
|               |                                                | 1    | 2                 | 3     | 0             |      |
| <b>A8.1.</b>  | Being faithful (to partner, friends, employer) | 53.0 | 24.0              | 18.2  | 4.7           | 1.63 |
| <b>A8.2.</b>  | Taking responsibility                          | 49.1 | 27.4              | 19.5  | 4.0           | 1.69 |
| <b>A8.3.</b>  | Being independent                              | 73.7 | 13.7              | 10.3  | 2.2           | 1.35 |
| <b>A8.4.</b>  | Graduating from university                     | 76.6 | 13.0              | 8.8   | 1.6           | 1.31 |
| <b>A8.5.</b>  | Having a career                                | 80.3 | 11.6              | 6.3   | 1.8           | 1.25 |
| <b>A8.6.</b>  | Being active in politics                       | 34.8 | 29.2              | 28.8  | 7.3           | 1.94 |
| <b>A8.7.</b>  | Participating in civic actions / initiatives   | 32.6 | 34.2              | 25.2  | 7.9           | 1.92 |
| <b>A8.8.</b>  | Getting married                                | 45.5 | 27.8              | 23.4  | 3.4           | 1.77 |
| <b>A8.9.</b>  | Looking good                                   | 81.2 | 14.0              | 3.1   | 1.7           | 1.21 |
| <b>A8.10.</b> | Wearing branded clothes                        | 60.2 | 23.1              | 13.8  | 3.0           | 1.52 |
| <b>A8.11.</b> | Healthy eating                                 | 52.9 | 30.2              | 13.6  | 3.3           | 1.59 |
| <b>A8.12.</b> | Marijuana use                                  | 28.8 | 26.0              | 32.5  | 12.8          | 2.04 |
| <b>A8.13.</b> | Doing sports                                   | 62.0 | 25.4              | 10.4  | 2.2           | 1.47 |

**A9. Do you smoke?**

|                               |      |
|-------------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes, regularly (every day) | 29.5 |
| 2. Occasionally               | 14.5 |
| 3. No (I am a non-smoker)     | 54.3 |
| (9) No answer                 | 1.3  |

**A10. Do you use alcohol?**

|                               |      |
|-------------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes, regularly (every day) | 2.0  |
| 2. Yes, several times a week  | 10.0 |
| 3. Only on week-ends          | 32.7 |
| 4. Rarely                     | 32.4 |
| 5. No, almost never           | 22.3 |
| (9) No answer                 | 0.6  |

**A11. In your opinion, alcohol is:**

|                                       |      |
|---------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Acceptable                         | 48.6 |
| 2. Necessary to be accepted by others | 14.5 |
| 3. Unacceptable                       | 27.3 |
| 4. Don't know / No answer             | 9.6  |

**A12. How satisfied are you with your appearance?**

|                             |      |
|-----------------------------|------|
| 1. Very satisfied           | 14.5 |
| 2. Satisfied                | 60.5 |
| 3. Satisfied to some extent | 21.5 |
| 4. Dissatisfied             | 2.5  |
| 5. Very dissatisfied        | 1.0  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer   | -    |

**A13. Which of the following statements best describes your sexual experience?**

|                                                        |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. I have not have had sexual intercourse yet          | 20.2 |
| 2. I have had sexual intercourse with one partner      | 18.3 |
| 3. I have had sexual intercourse with several partners | 43.2 |
| (9) No answer                                          | 18.4 |

**A14. Do you use birth control?**

|                                                                   |      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes, as a rule                                                 | 33.8 |
| 2. Yes, sometimes                                                 | 18.1 |
| 3. No, never                                                      | 7.2  |
| 4. I am not informed about birth control, I don't know what it is | 0.1  |
| (9) No answer                                                     | 40.8 |

**A15. What do you think about sexual abstinence in this day and age?**

|                                            |      |
|--------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Value/ virtue for both genders          | 23.3 |
| 2. Value/ virtue for girls                 | 3.8  |
| 3. Psychological burden / burden for youth | 16.0 |
| 4. Outdated concept                        | 37.4 |
| 5. Other, what?                            | 19.3 |
| 6. Don't know / No answer                  | 0.1  |

**A16. How acceptable are in your opinion homosexuals and lesbians (gay men and women)?**

|                                        |      |
|----------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Completely acceptable               | 11.1 |
| 2. Mostly acceptable                   | 20.6 |
| 3. Neither acceptable nor unacceptable | 31.7 |
| 4. Mostly unacceptable                 | 18.6 |
| 5. Completely unacceptable             | 18.0 |

**A17. What is your opinion on abortion?**

|                                                                          |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Abortion should be completely banned by law                           | 12.4 |
| 2. Abortion should be banned by law, except in medically justified cases | 28.7 |
| 3. Abortion should be legal                                              | 38.9 |
| 4. Don't know, don't have an opinion                                     | 20.0 |

## B) RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

**B1. Please imagine a scale with values ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for people who you trust least, and 10 for people who you trust most. Where on this scale would you put the following people?**

|              |                                                 | 1    | 2    | 3   | 4   | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | Don't know | M    |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------|------|------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|------|
| <b>B1.1.</b> | Your family members                             | 0.7  | 2.02 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 1.1  | 0.7  | 2.7  | 5.9  | 11.1 | 75.7 | 0.2        | 9.42 |
| <b>B1.2.</b> | Your relatives                                  | 1.2  | 1.4  | 0.9 | 1.5 | 6.2  | 8.1  | 10.7 | 15.5 | 25.2 | 28.7 | 0.5        | 8.10 |
| <b>B1.3.</b> | Your friends                                    | 0.6  | 0.5  | 0.7 | 0.9 | 2.9  | 3.0  | 9.5  | 20.8 | 27.8 | 33.1 | 0.1        | 8.55 |
| <b>B1.4.</b> | Your neighbours                                 | 6.1  | 5.4  | 5.9 | 6.9 | 14.1 | 10.7 | 12.5 | 17.4 | 13.6 | 6.3  | 1.0        | 6.15 |
| <b>B1.5.</b> | Your colleagues from work / school / university | 2.8  | 1.8  | 2.5 | 5.2 | 11.7 | 10.8 | 15.5 | 21.2 | 17.3 | 9.3  | 2.0        | 6.98 |
| <b>B1.6.</b> | People of other religions                       | 3.1  | 3.6  | 2.9 | 4.9 | 15.5 | 12.0 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 12.8 | 4.5  | 12.5       | 6.40 |
| <b>B1.7.</b> | People with different political persuasions     | 4.5  | 3.7  | 3.7 | 6.5 | 14.1 | 11.8 | 13.1 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 4.3  | 15.4       | 6.14 |
| <b>B1.8.</b> | Religious leaders                               | 10.1 | 6.7  | 5.2 | 5.2 | 12.5 | 9.4  | 10.6 | 11.2 | 12   | 5.0  | 12.2       | 5.69 |

**B2. How would you feel if one of the following families moved into your neighbourhood?**

|               |                                                                                         | Very good<br>1 | Good<br>2 | Not interested<br>3 | Bad<br>4 | Very bad<br>5 | Don't know<br>0 | M    |
|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|---------------------|----------|---------------|-----------------|------|
| <b>B2.1.</b>  | Roma family                                                                             | 1.5            | 21.2      | 32.4                | 18.3     | 20.4          | 6.2             | 3.37 |
| <b>B2.2.</b>  | Homosexual family                                                                       | 2.8            | 24.0      | 35.1                | 16.4     | 16.4          | 5.4             | 3.21 |
| <b>B2.3.</b>  | Group of students                                                                       | 20.5           | 49.4      | 21.7                | 3.1      | 2.2           | 3.1             | 2.15 |
| <b>B2.4.</b>  | Retired couple                                                                          | 8.1            | 47.6      | 33.0                | 4.9      | 2.8           | 3.6             | 2.44 |
| <b>B2.5.</b>  | Family from Bosnia and Herzegovina                                                      | 11.8           | 50.7      | 30.6                | 2.1      | 1.1           | 3.6             | 2.27 |
| <b>B2.6.</b>  | Family from China                                                                       | 6.0            | 40.1      | 35.9                | 8.0      | 4.4           | 5.5             | 2.63 |
| <b>B2.7.</b>  | Family from Eastern Europe                                                              | 7.0            | 42.9      | 38.2                | 4.0      | 2.4           | 5.5             | 2.49 |
| <b>B2.8.</b>  | Family from Western Europe                                                              | 10.1           | 48.4      | 34.0                | 1.9      | 1.3           | 4.3             | 2.33 |
| <b>B2.9.</b>  | Family from the US                                                                      | 12.8           | 49.4      | 30.4                | 2.3      | 1.2           | 3.8             | 2.27 |
| <b>B2.10.</b> | Family from a Balkan country (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria) | 6.6            | 38.7      | 35.9                | 7.9      | 5.2           | 5.8             | 2.64 |

**B3. Have you ever felt discriminated against on one of the following grounds? How often?**

|              |                                                                         | Very often<br>1 | Often<br>2 | Some times<br>3 | Rarely<br>4 | Never<br>5 | Do not know<br>0 | M    |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|------------------|------|
| <b>B3.1.</b> | Your gender (male/female)                                               | 0.8             | 1.9        | 6.9             | 9.8         | 80.1       | 0.5              | 4.67 |
| <b>B3.2.</b> | Your economic background (poor / wealthy)                               | 0.2             | 2.5        | 5.4             | 9.2         | 81.5       | 1.2              | 4.71 |
| <b>B3.3.</b> | Your religion (Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim etc).                         | 0.3             | 1.4        | 3.9             | 6.4         | 86.7       | 1.3              | 4.80 |
| <b>B3.4.</b> | Your ethnic origin                                                      | 0.2             | 1.4        | 3.1             | 6.1         | 87.3       | 1.9              | 4.82 |
| <b>B3.5.</b> | Your education level (eight-year primary school, secondary school etc.) | 0.3             | 1.8        | 4.2             | 7.4         | 85.2       | 1.1              | 4.77 |
| <b>B3.6.</b> | Your political party affiliation                                        | 0.4             | 1.4        | 2.6             | 5.3         | 86.8       | 3.6              | 4.83 |
| <b>B3.7.</b> | Your regional origin                                                    | 0.7             | 1.3        | 3.4             | 7.0         | 85.8       | 1.9              | 4.79 |
| <b>B3.8.</b> | Your country/city origin                                                | 0.5             | 1.8        | 5.4             | 8.6         | 82.4       | 1.3              | 4.73 |

**B4. Which three of the offered values do you value most?**

|                                                                             | First<br>B4.1 | Second<br>B4.2 | Third<br>B4.3 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| 1. Personal dignity (identity / education)                                  | 42.8          | 13.8           | 9.6           |
| 2. Social prestige (social status, social standing)                         | 8.8           | 11.3           | 7.2           |
| 3. Altruism (commitment, helping others)                                    | 11.7          | 14.6           | 11.8          |
| 4. Material wealth                                                          | 4.3           | 7.3            | 6.2           |
| 5. Tolerance (acceptance and respect for different opinions)                | 8.3           | 18.6           | 14.4          |
| 6. Fighting spirit (fighting to achieve a goal)                             | 12.5          | 17.6           | 17.4          |
| 7. Correctness                                                              | 8.5           | 11.6           | 20.2          |
| 8. Innovativeness of spirit (creating ideas, acceptance of ideas of others) | 2.7           | 4.1            | 11.2          |
| 9. Don't know / No answer                                                   | 0.3           | 0.9            | 1.9           |

**B5. Have you engaged in voluntary work over the last 12 months, i.e. have you done any unpaid work voluntarily?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes                    | 13.1 |
| 2. No                     | 84.6 |
| 3. Don't know / No answer | 2.4  |

**B6. Which of the following activities have you worked on voluntarily / volunteered in the last 12 months?**

|                                                               |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| A. Public works in the local community                        | 17.4 |
| B. Assisting persons with special needs / senior citizens     | 30.2 |
| C. Organization of sports events                              | 19.3 |
| D. Organization of cultural events (festivals, concerts etc.) | 25.2 |
| E. Peer assistance in studying                                | 26.9 |
| F. Religious activities                                       | 15.6 |
| G. In the business sector (a company)                         | 9.1  |
| H. NGO activities                                             | 6.9  |
| I. Other                                                      | 5.2  |

**B7. What is your main reason for volunteering?**

|                                                                  |      |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Desire for activity / social engagement                       | 19.2 |
| 2. Desire to solve a concrete problem                            | 10.4 |
| 3. Commitment to helping others                                  | 31.2 |
| 4. Family tradition                                              | 7.8  |
| 5. Religious convictions                                         | 4.5  |
| 6. Desire to make new friends                                    | 4.8  |
| 7. Desire for practical implementation of professional knowledge | 6.5  |
| 8. Desire to meet potential future employers                     | 1.6  |
| 9. Social and political beliefs                                  | 0.7  |
| 10. Other                                                        | 10.5 |
| 11. Don't know / No answer                                       | 2.8  |

**B8. What is your religion?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Christian Catholic     | 88.8 |
| 2. Christian Orthodox     | 2.6  |
| 3. Muslim                 | 0.5  |
| 4. Atheist                | 3.2  |
| 5. No religion            | 3.2  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer | 1.8  |

**B9. Do you believe, doubt or not believe in the following?**

|                                                         | <b>I believe<br/>1</b> | <b>I doubt<br/>2</b> | <b>I do not<br/>believe<br/>3</b> | <b>M</b> |
|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|
| 1. There is a God.                                      | 78.7                   | 11.0                 | 10.3                              | 1.32     |
| 2. There are heaven and hell.                           | 62.3                   | 24.2                 | 13.5                              | 1.51     |
| 3. God created the world.                               | 62.4                   | 22.2                 | 15.4                              | 1.53     |
| 4. God is the source of moral prescriptions and duties. | 55.7                   | 24.9                 | 19.4                              | 1.64     |

**B10. How often do you:**

|                                 | <b>Regularly<br/>1</b> | <b>Often<br/>2</b> | <b>Sometimes<br/>3</b> | <b>Never<br/>4</b> | <b>M</b> |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------|
| 1. Go to church to Mass         | 11.0                   | 14.7               | 51.2                   | 23.0               | 2.86     |
| 2. Pray                         | 15.4                   | 19.5               | 41.4                   | 23.7               | 2.73     |
| 3. Go to confession             | 6.9                    | 9.5                | 49.6                   | 34.0               | 3.11     |
| 4. Celebrate religious holidays | 65.9                   | 15.8               | 9.8                    | 8.5                | 1.61     |
| 5. Go on a pilgrimage           | 3.2                    | 6.1                | 29.8                   | 61.0               | 3.48     |

**B11. The following table lists various relationships one can have with people of different nationalities. If you could decide, which of these relations would you accept?**

|                 | I don't want to have any relationship with them | That they live permanently in my country | That they live in my neighbourhood | To have them as colleagues at work | To have them as superiors at work | To socialize with them and visit them | That they hold top positions in political life | In-laws or family (marriage etc.) | M    |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|
|                 | 1                                               | 2                                        | 3                                  | 4                                  | 5                                 | 6                                     | 7                                              | 8                                 |      |
| 1. Albanians    | 33.5                                            | 35.4                                     | 11.7                               | 5.7                                | 2.2                               | 9.1                                   | 0.7                                            | 1.7                               | 2.46 |
| 2. Americans    | 8.2                                             | 28.1                                     | 13.0                               | 16.0                               | 4.6                               | 20.4                                  | 2.6                                            | 7.1                               | 3.88 |
| 3. Bosniaks     | 15.7                                            | 33.4                                     | 16.2                               | 6.3                                | 3.1                               | 17.8                                  | 1.5                                            | 5.9                               | 3.37 |
| 4. Montenegrins | 21.5                                            | 32.6                                     | 14.7                               | 6.4                                | 4.0                               | 15.3                                  | 1.7                                            | 3.9                               | 3.11 |
| 5. Croats       | 1.1                                             | 18.8                                     | 12.1                               | 7.8                                | 4.7                               | 14.5                                  | 1.7                                            | 39.3                              | 5.43 |
| 6. Hungarians   | 14.1                                            | 31.6                                     | 16.5                               | 11.9                               | 4.0                               | 15.7                                  | 1.1                                            | 5.0                               | 3.37 |
| 7. Macedonians  | 17.5                                            | 34.3                                     | 14.5                               | 9.4                                | 2.0                               | 16.7                                  | 1.1                                            | 4.5                               | 3.21 |
| 8. Germans      | 6.6                                             | 27.4                                     | 15.8                               | 15.0                               | 6.9                               | 17.0                                  | 4.2                                            | 7.0                               | 3.91 |
| 9. Roma         | 48.0                                            | 29.6                                     | 8.4                                | 3.5                                | 1.4                               | 6.9                                   | 0.7                                            | 1.4                               | 2.11 |
| 10. Russians    | 16.9                                            | 34.0                                     | 15.0                               | 10.9                               | 4.7                               | 13.6                                  | 1.3                                            | 3.6                               | 3.16 |
| 11. Slovenes    | 18.4                                            | 33.2                                     | 15.9                               | 8.9                                | 2.8                               | 15.7                                  | 1.3                                            | 3.9                               | 3.16 |
| 12. Serbs       | 28.5                                            | 30.3                                     | 12.7                               | 5.0                                | 3.0                               | 13.3                                  | 1.8                                            | 5.4                               | 2.98 |
| 13. Italians    | 11.5                                            | 30.4                                     | 15.0                               | 8.9                                | 4.8                               | 19.5                                  | 2.7                                            | 7.3                               | 3.71 |

### C) FAMILY AND FRIENDS

**C1. Who do you live with at the moment? Do you live alone, with parents, with partner or friends/relatives?**

|                             |      |
|-----------------------------|------|
| 1. Alone                    | 9.3  |
| 2. With both parents        | 61.5 |
| 3. With mother              | 12.1 |
| 4. With father              | 2.8  |
| 5. With partner or spouse   | 11.4 |
| 6. With friends / relatives | 1.9  |
| 7. Other                    | 0.3  |
| 8. Do not know / No answer  | 0.7  |

**C2. Which of the following statements best describes your situation?**

|                                                                              |      |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. I live with my parents because it is the simplest solution for our family | 55.6 |
| 2. I would live alone if financial circumstances allowed it                  | 32.9 |
| 3. I would like to live alone but my parents disagree                        | 4.1  |
| 4. Other                                                                     | 4.5  |
| 5. Don't know / No answer                                                    | 2.9  |

**C3. Which of the following statements best describes your relationship with your parents?**

|                                                                    |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. We get along very well                                          | 30.9 |
| 2. We get along, although sometimes we have differences in opinion | 54.7 |
| 3. In general, we do not get along, we often argue                 | 11.8 |
| 4. Very conflictual relationship                                   | 1.5  |
| 5. My parents are not alive                                        | 0.5  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer                                          | 0.6  |

**C4. Which of the following statements best describes your relationship with your siblings?**

|                                                                    |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. We get along very well                                          | 29.0 |
| 2. We get along, although sometimes we have differences in opinion | 37.9 |
| 3. In general, we do not get along, we often argue                 | 12.7 |
| 4. Very conflictual relationship                                   | 1.7  |
| 5. I don't have any siblings                                       | 17.5 |
| 6. Don't know / No answer                                          | 1.2  |

**C5. Who, among your family members, has most influence on your important decisions?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Father                 | 27.2 |
| 2. Mother                 | 43.4 |
| 3. Brother                | 1.6  |
| 4. Sister                 | 2.2  |
| 5. Grandfather            | 0.2  |
| 6. Grandmother            | 0.4  |
| 7. Somebody else          | 19.0 |
| 8. Don't know / No answer | 6.0  |

**C6. How do you take important decisions?**

|                                                                      |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. My parents decide about everything                                | 6.1  |
| 2. My parents and I take decisions jointly                           | 45.4 |
| 3. I am free to take decisions independently, I decide independently | 45.9 |
| 4. Don't know / No answer                                            | 2.6  |

**C7. How do you see yourself in the future?**

|                                            |      |
|--------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Married, with own family                | 76.3 |
| 2. In unmarried relationship, with partner | 5.8  |
| 3. Without partner and family obligations  | 6.1  |
| 4. Don't know / No answer                  | 11.8 |

**C8. What, in your opinion, is the MAIN ADVANTAGE of marriage over unmarried relationship?**

|                                                                       |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Marriage guarantees more responsibility among partners             | 44.2 |
| 2. Marriage guarantees more responsibility towards children           | 20.1 |
| 3. Higher financial security of spouses                               | 7.4  |
| 4. In Croatia, marriage is respected more than unmarried relationship | 17.7 |
| 5. Other                                                              | 10.5 |
| 6. Don't know / No answer                                             | 0.1  |

**C9. What, in your opinion, is the MAIN ADVANTAGE of unmarried relationship over marriage?**

|                                                     |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Higher independence of partners                  | 20.0 |
| 2. More room for partners to focus on their careers | 8.9  |
| 3. Less likelihood of conflicts among partners      | 7.3  |
| 4. Easier for partners to solve their disagreements | 9.1  |
| 5. Easier for partners to end their relationship    | 35.7 |
| 6. Other                                            | 0.1  |
| 7. Don't know / No answer                           | 18.9 |

**C10. What, in your opinion, is the best marriage age for women? (M=26.96)**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. 17-20                  | 2.3  |
| 2. 21-24                  | 10.6 |
| 3. 25                     | 24.5 |
| 4. 26-29                  | 27.8 |
| 5. 30                     | 20.9 |
| 6. Over 30                | 3.6  |
| 7. Don't know / No answer | 9.2  |

**C11. What, in your opinion, is the best marriage age for men? (M=29.51)**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. 17-20                  | 0.8  |
| 2. 21-24                  | 3.4  |
| 3. 25                     | 8.7  |
| 4. 26-29                  | 26.2 |
| 5. 30                     | 32.3 |
| 6. Over 30                | 19.7 |
| 7. Don't know / No answer | 8.7  |

**C12. How many children would you like to have? (M=2.17)**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. 0                      | 0.1  |
| 2. 1                      | 12.3 |
| 3. 2                      | 50.8 |
| 4. 3                      | 15.1 |
| 5. 4 and more             | 4.9  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer | 16.8 |

**C13. If you are (or were) single, how important in your opinion are the following factors for the choice of marriage partner?**

|         |                   | Very<br>impor-<br>tant<br><br>1 | Impor-<br>tant<br><br>2 | Neither<br>important<br>nor un-<br>important<br><br>3 | Irrele-<br>vant<br><br>4 | Completely<br>irrelevant<br><br>5 | No<br>answer<br><br>0 | M    |
|---------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|------|
| C13.1.  | Religion          | 12.9                            | 31.2                    | 23.4                                                  | 22.5                     | 9.2                               | 0.8                   | 2.84 |
| C13.2.  | Economic standing | 6.9                             | 30.3                    | 37.0                                                  | 20.9                     | 4.3                               | 0.7                   | 2.85 |
| C13.3.  | Family approval   | 10.1                            | 34.3                    | 29.3                                                  | 16.8                     | 8.9                               | 0.7                   | 2.80 |
| C13.4.  | Virginit          | 2.4                             | 7.7                     | 21.9                                                  | 36.6                     | 29.8                              | 1.7                   | 3.85 |
| C13.5.  | Personality       | 47.4                            | 40.5                    | 7.3                                                   | 3.7                      | 0.5                               | 0.6                   | 1.69 |
| C13.6.  | Appearance        | 23.2                            | 49.9                    | 22.3                                                  | 3.4                      | 0.9                               | 0.4                   | 2.09 |
| C13.7.  | Education level   | 11.4                            | 42.9                    | 32.0                                                  | 11.3                     | 2.2                               | 0.3                   | 2.50 |
| C13.8.  | Common interests  | 50.2                            | 38.1                    | 8.6                                                   | 2.2                      | 0.6                               | 0.2                   | 1.65 |
| C13.9.  | Regional origin   | 4.5                             | 18.8                    | 31.7                                                  | 28.0                     | 15.7                              | 1.3                   | 3.32 |
| C13.10. | National origin   | 7.2                             | 25.8                    | 30.8                                                  | 23.0                     | 12.0                              | 1.5                   | 3.07 |

**C14. Let us switch to another topic. Do you belong to a circle of friends or acquaintances in which everyone knows everyone and with whom you often go out?**

|                          |      |
|--------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes                   | 87.2 |
| 2. No                    | 10.3 |
| 3. Don't know /No answer | 2.5  |

**C15. How satisfied are you in general with your friends?**

|    |                                    |      |
|----|------------------------------------|------|
| 1. | Very satisfied                     | 46.1 |
| 2. | Satisfied                          | 47.8 |
| 3. | Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied | 5.7  |
| 4. | Dissatisfied                       | 0.2  |
| 5. | Very dissatisfied                  | 0.2  |

**C16. Have you participated in any of the violent conflicts listed below over the last 12 months?**

|               |                                                        | Yes | No   | No answer |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----|------|-----------|
| <b>C16.1.</b> | With other young people in my neighbourhood            | 5.1 | 94.5 | 0.4       |
| <b>C16.2.</b> | With other young people in a nightclub or coffee bar   | 5.6 | 94.0 | 0.4       |
| <b>C16.3.</b> | In a sports hall, football stadium etc.                | 3.6 | 95.6 | 0.8       |
| <b>C16.4.</b> | At school / university                                 | 4.2 | 94.9 | 0.9       |
| <b>C16.5.</b> | With young people of different political opinions      | 0.7 | 98.6 | 0.7       |
| <b>C16.6.</b> | Conflicts with the police (e.g. during demonstrations) | 1.9 | 97.3 | 0.8       |

**D) WORRIES AND ASPIRATIONS****D1. Would you like to relocate / move to another city / village in Croatia?**

|    |                        |      |
|----|------------------------|------|
| 1. | Yes                    | 25.9 |
| 2. | No                     | 68.9 |
| 3. | Don't know / No answer | 5.2  |

**D2. What is the MAIN REASON for which you would move/relocate?**

|    |                                                   |      |
|----|---------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. | Improvement of the standard of living             | 44.4 |
| 2. | Higher cultural diversity                         | 8.7  |
| 3. | Better education                                  | 9.4  |
| 4. | Easier employment                                 | 24.6 |
| 5. | Better opportunities for starting my own business | 3.2  |
| 6. | Being close to people I care for                  | 2.7  |
| 7. | Escape from conflicts in my city or village       | 2.3  |
| 8. | Don't know / No answer                            | 2.9  |
| 9. | Other                                             | 1.9  |

**D3. How strong is your desire to leave Croatia?**

|    |                        |      |
|----|------------------------|------|
| 1. | Very strong            | 8.1  |
| 2. | To a certain degree    | 18.7 |
| 3. | Not so strong          | 31.6 |
| 4. | None                   | 38.6 |
| 5. | Don't know / No answer | 3.1  |

**D4. Where would you prefer to move to?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Australia              | 10.1 |
| 2. Italy                  | 2.6  |
| 3. Germany                | 19.6 |
| 4. Austria                | 2.6  |
| 5. Other EU countries     | 21.3 |
| 6. USA                    | 18.0 |
| 7. Canada                 | 6.4  |
| 8. Other                  | 12.0 |
| 9. Don't know / No answer | 7.4  |

**D5. What is the MAIN REASON for which you would move out of Croatia?**

|                                                      |      |
|------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Improvement of the standard of living             | 44.1 |
| 2. Higher cultural diversity                         | 4.9  |
| 3. Better education                                  | 6.5  |
| 4. Easier employment                                 | 28.4 |
| 5. Better opportunities for starting my own business | 0.9  |
| 6. Being close to people I care for                  | 3.5  |
| 7. Escape from unfavourable situation in Croatia     | 10.5 |
| 8. Other                                             | 0.6  |
| 9. Don't know / No answer                            | 0.6  |

**D6. How do you see your future in 10 years?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Better than now        | 77.1 |
| 2. Same as now            | 14.3 |
| 3. Worse than now         | 3.2  |
| 4. Don't know / No answer | 5.4  |

**D7. Please indicate in the following answers how important to you are the following professional goals in life ?**

|                                                                   | Very important | Mostly important | Mostly unimportant | Completely unimportant | M    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|------|
|                                                                   | 1              | 2                | 3                  | 4                      |      |
| 1. Professional development abroad                                | 15.1           | 30.9             | 38.1               | 16.0                   | 2.55 |
| 2. Having a job which would give me as much free time as possible | 44.4           | 46.0             | 7.8                | 1.9                    | 1.67 |
| 3. Securing livelihood                                            | 75.4           | 18.6             | 5.8                | 0.3                    | 1.31 |
| 4. Continuing education                                           | 45.1           | 30.7             | 18.0               | 6.1                    | 1.85 |
| 5. Graduating from university                                     | 48.8           | 23.3             | 18.9               | 9.0                    | 1.88 |
| 6. Getting a job                                                  | 79.2           | 14.9             | 5.0                | 0.9                    | 1.28 |
| 7. Finding a permanent and secure employment                      | 80.3           | 15.0             | 4.0                | 0.7                    | 1.25 |
| 8. Starting my own business                                       | 28.9           | 31.7             | 31.3               | 8.1                    | 2.19 |
| 9. Continuing family business                                     | 10.6           | 21.8             | 37.9               | 29.7                   | 2.87 |
| 10. Working in my profession                                      | 44.5           | 38.5             | 13.3               | 3.7                    | 1.76 |
| 11. Participating in changes in my profession                     | 26.2           | 36.2             | 31.1               | 6.5                    | 2.18 |
| 12. Doing creative and dynamic work                               | 43.6           | 37.0             | 17.7               | 1.6                    | 1.77 |
| 13. Doing socially beneficial work                                | 33.7           | 44.2             | 20.0               | 2.1                    | 1.91 |
| 14. Working with people                                           | 42.1           | 41.8             | 14.0               | 2.1                    | 1.76 |
| 15. Improving foreign language skills                             | 40.4           | 35.8             | 18.6               | 5.2                    | 1.89 |
| 16. Professional development in Croatia                           | 25.9           | 41.6             | 26.4               | 6.1                    | 2.13 |
| 17. Doing scientific work                                         | 10.2           | 25.8             | 40.0               | 24.1                   | 2.78 |

## **E) EDUCATION AND PROFESSION**

### **E1. What education level are you currently in?**

|                                     |      |
|-------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Secondary school                 | 24.8 |
| 2. Undergraduate studies            | 20.0 |
| 3. Graduate / doctoral studies      | 6.6  |
| 4. Do not go to school / university | 44.3 |
| (9) No answer                       | 4.3  |

### **E2. Would you say that you go to school / university: very eagerly; eagerly; sometimes eagerly, sometimes not; reluctantly or very reluctantly?**

|                                     |      |
|-------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Very eagerly                     | 7.2  |
| 2. Eagerly                          | 30.4 |
| 3. Sometimes eagerly, sometimes not | 50.6 |
| 4. Reluctantly                      | 9.0  |
| 5. Very reluctantly                 | 1.4  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer           | 1.3  |

**E3. In your opinion, what is everyday life in your school / university like?**

|                                         |      |
|-----------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Very hard and stressful              | 7.4  |
| 2. Hard and stressful                   | 21.3 |
| 3. Hard and stressful to some extent    | 55.7 |
| 4. Easy and not particularly stressful  | 12.0 |
| 5. Very easy and completely stress-free | 1.9  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer               | 1.8  |

**E4. What was your grade point average last year?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. 1-2                    | 0.1  |
| 2. 2-3                    | 18.6 |
| 3. 3-4                    | 47.9 |
| 4. 4-5                    | 31.7 |
| 5. Don't know / No answer | 1.7  |

**E5. Do you think that grades and exams are being bought at your school / university?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes, often             | 5.9  |
| 2. Yes, sometimes         | 15.3 |
| 3. Yes, but very rarely   | 16.7 |
| 4. No, never              | 41.3 |
| 5. Don't know / No answer | 20.8 |

**E6. How many hours do you spend studying per day?**

|                               |      |
|-------------------------------|------|
| 1. Up to 1 hour               | 28.3 |
| 2. 1-2 hours daily on average | 24.4 |
| 3. 2-3 hours daily on average | 24.7 |
| 4. 3-4 hours daily on average | 9.5  |
| 5. More than 4 hours daily    | 3.7  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer     | 9.4  |

**E7. Which private lessons did you take last year? (Multiple choice possible)**

|                                                                          |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| A. Private lessons in a foreign language                                 | 7.4  |
| B. Private lessons in natural sciences (mathematics, physics, chemistry) | 24.8 |
| C. Private lessons in humanities or social sciences                      | 1.1  |
| D. Private lessons in art (e.g. music)                                   | 0.7  |
| E. Did not take private lessons last year                                | 70.3 |

**E8. What is the MAIN REASON why you took private lessons?**

|                                                                               |      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Without private lessons I cannot learn the required material               | 68.6 |
| 2. You cannot get a pass with the teacher if you do not use private lessons   | 6.3  |
| 3. The teacher gives lower grades if you do not take private lessons          | 9.0  |
| 4. This is the trend, everyone takes private lessons                          | 0.6  |
| 5. Desire to acquire more knowledge than offered by your school or university | 10.6 |
| 6. Desire to nurture your talent in a certain area                            | 1.9  |
| 7. Don't know / No answer                                                     | 3.0  |

**E9. Which of the following statements related to your choice of university / higher education institution best describes your situation?**

|                                                                                                                                                                  |      |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. I am studying (studied / will study) the study programme I wanted to enrol into                                                                               | 65.2 |
| 2. I have chosen/will choose a study programme which will secure me a job, although that does not correspond to my wishes                                        | 10.8 |
| 3. I have chosen / will choose a study programme for which I believe that I have a realistic chance of enrolment into, although that is not what I wish to study | 6.9  |
| 4. Don't know / No answer                                                                                                                                        | 17.2 |

**E10. How satisfied are you generally with the quality of education in Croatia?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Very satisfied         | 4.9  |
| 2. Satisfied              | 34.6 |
| 3. Moderately satisfied   | 41.8 |
| 4. Dissatisfied           | 12.1 |
| 5. Very dissatisfied      | 3.0  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer | 3.6  |

**E11. If you could choose, where would you prefer to get your education?**

|                                                    |      |
|----------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. In a public educational institution in Croatia  | 40.7 |
| 2. In a private educational institution in Croatia | 17.0 |
| 3. In a public educational institution abroad      | 14.1 |
| 4. In a private educational institution abroad     | 13.7 |
| 5. Don't know / No answer                          | 14.5 |

**E12. If you could choose, which of the following educational paths would you prefer?**

|                                                                             |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Vocational secondary school (education for a mechanic, electrician etc.) | 19.9 |
| 2. University or applied sciences university (polytechnic)                  | 67.0 |
| 3. Don't know / No answer                                                   | 13.0 |

**E13. Have you ever participated in a practicum / additional qualification / internship?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes                    | 18.4 |
| 2. No                     | 77.9 |
| 3. Don't know / No answer | 3.6  |

**E14. Do you believe that you will be able to find a job soon after graduation from an undergraduate / graduate / postgraduate study programme?**

|                                                                            |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes, I believe I will be able to find a job soon after graduation       | 16.6 |
| 2. Yes, I believe I will be able to find a job after some time             | 51.0 |
| 3. No, I do not believe I will be able to find a job soon after graduation | 25.0 |
| 4. Don't know / I hope                                                     | 7.4  |

**E15. Are you currently employed full time, or work part time / occasionally?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Yes                    | 28.9 |
| 2. No                     | 70.1 |
| 3. Don't know / No answer | 1.0  |

**E16. How many hours a week do you work on average? (M= 40.37)**

|                |      |
|----------------|------|
| 1. 1-20        | 8.0  |
| 2. 21-39       | 8.0  |
| 3. 40          | 54.8 |
| 4. 41-59       | 23.8 |
| 5. 60 and more | 5.4  |

**E17. Do you work in your profession, i.e. on a job that you have been or are being educated for?**

|                                                                |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. I have no professional qualification                        | 1.9  |
| 2. Yes, I work in the profession I was / am being educated for | 37.3 |
| 3. Yes, in a way                                               | 18.7 |
| 4. No, I do not work in the profession I was educated for      | 40.9 |
| 5. Don't know / I hope                                         | 1.2  |

**E18. Which of the following sectors would you like to work in?**

|                                                        |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Public administration                               | 38.7 |
| 2. Private sector                                      | 31.7 |
| 3. NGOs                                                | 4.5  |
| 4. International organizations (World Bank, OESC etc.) | 10.9 |
| 5. Other                                               | 14.2 |

**E19. I will present to you a list of 5 factors that people in Croatia consider important in finding a job. These are: acquaintances/friends, expertise, education level, political connections, luck. Please rank these factors in the order of their importance to you, by ranking the factor which you consider most important first, the next important factor second etc.**

|      | Element                 | Ranking |      |      |      |      |
|------|-------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|
|      |                         | 1.      | 2.   | 3.   | 4.   | 5.   |
| E19A | Acquaintances / Friends | 32.6    | 19.0 | 21.1 | 18.5 | 8.9  |
| E19B | Expertise               | 26.0    | 26.9 | 21.6 | 16.6 | 8.9  |
| E19C | Education level         | 20.9    | 24.4 | 20.1 | 22.6 | 12.0 |
| E19D | Political connections   | 11.4    | 18.9 | 14.6 | 24.2 | 30.8 |
| E19E | Luck                    | 9.3     | 11.2 | 22.8 | 18.2 | 38.5 |
| E19F | Other                   | 16.2    | 5.8  | 11.3 | 19.2 | 47.4 |

**E20. Let me present another 4 factors considered important in deciding on taking a job. These are: income/salary, job security, working with people you like, job satisfaction. As in the previous question, please rank these factors in the order of their importance to you, so that you rank the factor which you consider most important first, the next important factor second, etc.**

|      | Element                      | Ranking |      |      |      |     |
|------|------------------------------|---------|------|------|------|-----|
|      |                              | 1.      | 2.   | 3.   | 4.   | 5.  |
| E20A | Income / Salary              | 49.1    | 33.7 | 11.2 | 4.9  | 1.1 |
| E20B | Job security                 | 32.2    | 36.7 | 20.8 | 10.0 | 0.3 |
| E20C | Working with people you like | 2.5     | 8.8  | 28.0 | 61.8 | 1.8 |
| E20D | Job satisfaction             | 15.3    | 20.5 | 42.6 | 20.8 | 0.7 |
| E20E | Other                        | 23.1    | 5.6  | 8.6  | 62.7 | -   |

**E21. Which of the following activities have your parents financed for the purpose of increasing your education success or employability? (Multiple choice possible)**

|                                                                                                                                                     |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Summer science schools                                                                                                                           | 3.4  |
| 2. Private lessons in order to achieve excellent success at school (maximum grade – 5) in this subject at mid-term or at the end of the school year | 15.9 |
| 3. Learning foreign languages abroad                                                                                                                | 3.3  |
| 4. Private secondary school                                                                                                                         | 0.9  |
| 5. Education abroad for one or more school years in the course of secondary schooling                                                               | 0.4  |
| 6. Private applied sciences university (polytechnic)                                                                                                | 1.7  |
| 7. None of the above                                                                                                                                | 78.0 |

## F) DEMOCRACY AND POLITICS

**F1. How often do you discuss politics with your parents?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Very often             | 1.7  |
| 2. Often                  | 6.8  |
| 3. Sometimes              | 30.1 |
| 4. Rarely                 | 29.8 |
| 5. Never                  | 30.3 |
| 6. Don't know / No answer | 1.3  |

**F2. How much are YOU personally interested in political affairs? Estimate your interest on the following scale:**

|              |                         | Very<br>interested<br>1 | Interested<br>2 | Neither<br>interested<br>nor<br>disinterested<br>3 | Not<br>interested<br>4 | Absolutely<br>not<br>interested<br>5 | No<br>answer<br>0 | M    |
|--------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------|
| <b>F2.1.</b> | World politics          | 2.7                     | 16.1            | 29.8                                               | 27.2                   | 23.4                                 | 0.7               | 3.55 |
| <b>F2.2.</b> | Politics on the Balkans | 2.1                     | 17.1            | 32.8                                               | 24.4                   | 22.9                                 | 0.7               | 3.51 |
| <b>F2.3.</b> | Politics in Croatia     | 4.8                     | 31.3            | 30.1                                               | 15.0                   | 18.1                                 | 0.7               | 3.12 |
| <b>F2.4.</b> | EU politics             | 3.6                     | 23.8            | 31.4                                               | 19.5                   | 20.9                                 | 0.8               | 3.33 |

**F3. To what extent are your political views and beliefs aligned with those of your parents?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Very much              | 8.6  |
| 2. To some degree         | 39.3 |
| 3. Slightly               | 22.4 |
| 4. Not at all             | 6.0  |
| 5. Don't know / No answer | 23.7 |

**F4. If elections for the Croatian Parliament were to be held now, which political party would you vote for?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. HDZ                    | 12.1 |
| 2. SPD                    | 16.6 |
| 3. Another party          | 18.8 |
| 4. Don't know / No answer | 52.5 |

**F5. If you can remember, how many times have you voted since you obtained the right to vote?**

|                                                           |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. In all elections since I've obtained the right to vote | 24.5 |
| 2. In most elections                                      | 21.4 |
| 3. In a few elections                                     | 18.9 |
| 4. Never                                                  | 32.0 |
| 5. Don't know / No answer                                 | 3.3  |

**F6. In your opinion, how much influence does your vote have on running of the institutions?**

| Government / Scale                                                   | A lot<br>1 | Some<br>2 | A little<br>3 | None<br>4 | No<br>answer<br>0 | M    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-------------------|------|
| On national institutions<br>(Parliament and Government)              | 2.2        | 15.2      | 33.1          | 37.1      | 12.4              | 3.42 |
| On local institutions (county, city<br>and municipal administration) | 3.0        | 16.4      | 34.5          | 32.7      | 13.5              | 3.37 |

**F7. What are your main sources of information with regard to current political events?**

|                                             |      |
|---------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. The Internet                             | 54.2 |
| 2. Television                               | 74.7 |
| 3. Daily newspapers                         | 31.7 |
| 4. Radio                                    | 14.5 |
| 5. Discussions in the family                | 25.4 |
| 6. Discussions with friends / acquaintances | 22.4 |
| 7. Other                                    | 1.6  |

**F8. Your political beliefs in general**

When people talk about their political beliefs, they mostly speak about the left wing and right wing and in line with this mostly support left-wing or right-wing political parties. With regard to the notions of '**left**' and '**right**' in connection with your political beliefs and opinions, where would you place yourself on the following scale? (**M = 5.58**)

| 1               | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5    | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10               |
|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| 1.5             | 1.6 | 5.7 | 7.2 | 10.5 | 8.2 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 1.6 | 3.8              |
| <b>Far left</b> |     |     |     |      |     |     |     |     | <b>Far right</b> |

**F9. To what extent do you feel represented by young people active in politics?**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Very much              | 0.5  |
| 2. To some extent         | 11.1 |
| 3. A little               | 30.8 |
| 4. Not at all             | 46.4 |
| 5. Don't know / No answer | 11.2 |

**F10. How much do you trust the following institutions in general? Do you trust these institutions very much, to some extent, a little, or not at all?**

|                |                                                                                             | Very<br>much<br>1 | To some<br>extent<br>2 | A little<br>3 | Not at<br>all<br>4 | Don't<br>know<br>0 | M    |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|------|
| <b>F10.1.</b>  | Political parties                                                                           | 1.5               | 15.5                   | 34.4          | 42.2               | 6.4                | 3.25 |
| <b>F10.2.</b>  | State Election Board                                                                        | 4.3               | 18.7                   | 36.0          | 31.3               | 9.6                | 3.04 |
| <b>F10.3.</b>  | Croatian Parliament                                                                         | 4.1               | 16.5                   | 34.6          | 38.1               | 6.8                | 3.14 |
| <b>F10.4.</b>  | Government                                                                                  | 3.7               | 16.0                   | 35.1          | 38.6               | 6.6                | 3.16 |
| <b>F10.5.</b>  | Local government bodies / Mayor /<br>Municipal Council / County Prefect<br>/ County Council | 3.0               | 22.9                   | 38.9          | 28.4               | 6.7                | 2.99 |
| <b>F10.6.</b>  | Attorney's Office                                                                           | 4.5               | 22.1                   | 37.7          | 27.4               | 8.3                | 2.96 |
| <b>F10.7.</b>  | Police                                                                                      | 10.2              | 36.8                   | 31.8          | 16.9               | 4.2                | 2.58 |
| <b>F10.8.</b>  | State Audit Office                                                                          | 5.1               | 21.3                   | 36.8          | 24.9               | 11.9               | 2.93 |
| <b>F10.9.</b>  | Religions leaders                                                                           | 9.3               | 22.5                   | 30.0          | 28.1               | 10.1               | 2.86 |
| <b>F10.10.</b> | Judiciary                                                                                   | 6.2               | 29.0                   | 39.8          | 19.0               | 5.9                | 2.76 |
| <b>F10.11.</b> | Media                                                                                       | 6.6               | 27.3                   | 38.0          | 23.4               | 4.7                | 2.82 |
| <b>F10.12.</b> | Trade unions                                                                                | 4.9               | 24.3                   | 37.2          | 23.0               | 10.6               | 2.88 |
| <b>F10.13.</b> | NGOs                                                                                        | 5.9               | 28.1                   | 33.4          | 21.7               | 9                  | 2.80 |

**F11. How are you satisfied with the state of democracy in Croatia in general?**

|    |                      |      |
|----|----------------------|------|
| 1. | Very satisfied       | 3.5  |
| 2. | Satisfied            | 22.2 |
| 3. | Moderately satisfied | 53.3 |
| 4. | Dissatisfied         | 18.4 |
| 5. | Very dissatisfied    | 2.6  |

**F12.** To what extent should the Croatian government focus on the realization of each of the following objectives?

|                                                                        | <b>Very<br/>much<br/>1</b> | <b>To some<br/>extent<br/>2</b> | <b>A little<br/>3</b> | <b>Not at<br/>all<br/>4</b> | <b>M</b> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|----------|
| 1. Fight against crime and corruption                                  | 73.4                       | 19.8                            | 6.4                   | 0.4                         | 1.34     |
| 2. Spiritual renewal                                                   | 23.9                       | 33.1                            | 32.4                  | 10.6                        | 2.30     |
| 3. Economic growth and development                                     | 71.0                       | 22.5                            | 5.9                   | 0.7                         | 1.36     |
| 4. Strengthening of military power and national security               | 33.7                       | 35.0                            | 26.9                  | 4.4                         | 2.02     |
| 5. Prosecution of war crimes and co-operation with the ICTY            | 33.4                       | 35.4                            | 23.1                  | 8.2                         | 2.06     |
| 6. Preservation of natural environment                                 | 41.5                       | 39.2                            | 17.7                  | 1.6                         | 1.79     |
| 7. Securing human rights and freedoms                                  | 62.5                       | 28.0                            | 8.1                   | 1.4                         | 1.48     |
| 8. Social justice and security for all                                 | 64.4                       | 26.7                            | 7.8                   | 1.1                         | 1.46     |
| 9. Improved position of women                                          | 53.7                       | 33.0                            | 11.2                  | 2.0                         | 1.62     |
| 10. Improved position of youth                                         | 68.5                       | 23.6                            | 6.9                   | 1.0                         | 1.40     |
| 11. Fostering population growth                                        | 46.8                       | 34.6                            | 15.5                  | 3.0                         | 1.75     |
| 12. Support to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina                        | 25.4                       | 39.3                            | 27.0                  | 8.3                         | 2.18     |
| 13. Development of private entrepreneurship                            | 45.2                       | 37.6                            | 14.9                  | 2.3                         | 1.74     |
| 14. Development of regions and decentralization                        | 44.3                       | 40.6                            | 13.4                  | 1.7                         | 1.72     |
| 15. Preparation for Croatia's accession to the EU                      | 38.3                       | 36.3                            | 18.1                  | 7.2                         | 1.94     |
| 16. Harmonious co-existence of Croats and ethnic minorities in Croatia | 32.4                       | 43.9                            | 20.8                  | 2.9                         | 1.94     |
| 17. Reduction of unemployment                                          | 77.6                       | 15.3                            | 5.8                   | 1.3                         | 1.31     |
| 18. Improvement of relations with neighbouring countries               | 36.7                       | 41.8                            | 18.8                  | 2.7                         | 1.87     |
| 19. Protection of the dignity of the Homeland War                      | 44.4                       | 37.5                            | 15.5                  | 2.5                         | 1.76     |

## G) GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

| Scale of alarm caused by the following problems:                     | Very alarming<br>1 | Moderately alarming<br>2 | Slightly alarming<br>3 | Not alarming at all<br>4 | Do not know<br>5 | No answer<br>0 | M    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|------|
| 1. Increase in poverty                                               | 68.4               | 20.6                     | 7.0                    | 3.1                      | 0.5              | 0.5            | 1.44 |
| 2. Unemployment                                                      | 79.4               | 13.9                     | 5.2                    | 0.6                      | 0.5              | 0.4            | 1.26 |
| 3. Environment pollution                                             | 31.1               | 35.6                     | 24.7                   | 7.1                      | 0.6              | 0.9            | 2.08 |
| 4. Terrorist threat                                                  | 22.2               | 20.5                     | 28.9                   | 22.4                     | 4.8              | 1.2            | 2.55 |
| 5. AIDS /HIV threat                                                  | 23.6               | 22.9                     | 32.1                   | 15.7                     | 4.3              | 1.4            | 2.42 |
| 6. Incidence of chronic diseases (cancer, heart diseases)            | 31.8               | 27.4                     | 29.0                   | 8.0                      | 3.1              | 0.8            | 2.14 |
| 7. Laws not implemented properly                                     | 42.8               | 32.3                     | 18.1                   | 3.4                      | 2.3              | 1.1            | 1.81 |
| 8. Job insecurity                                                    | 63.5               | 22.9                     | 9.3                    | 1.9                      | 2.0              | 0.5            | 1.48 |
| 9. Workplace safety (threats to life and health at workplace)        | 37.9               | 34.5                     | 19.3                   | 5.0                      | 2.5              | 0.8            | 1.91 |
| 10. Risk of permanent emigration of Croatian citizens working abroad | 25.6               | 26.2                     | 25.9                   | 16.9                     | 4.1              | 1.2            | 2.36 |
| 11. Street crime                                                     | 37.3               | 29.3                     | 23.9                   | 3.5                      | 2.3              | 0.6            | 2.00 |
| 12. Various criminal activities and smuggling                        | 41.2               | 31.4                     | 19.2                   | 5.0                      | 2.6              | 0.6            | 1.88 |
| 13. Climate change                                                   | 23.6               | 30.4                     | 28.4                   | 13.7                     | 2.9              | 1.1            | 2.34 |
| 14. Inefficient fight against corruption                             | 48.3               | 30.0                     | 15.6                   | 3.8                      | 1.5              | 0.8            | 1.74 |

**G1. How alarming are in your opinion the following problems for the Croatian society?**

**G2. How, in your opinion, is the economic situation of people in Croatia going to develop over the next 10 years?**

|                                |      |
|--------------------------------|------|
| 1. Will improve significantly  | 4.6  |
| 2. Will improve to some extent | 48.1 |
| 3. Will not change             | 27.7 |
| 4. Will be somewhat worse      | 6.8  |
| 5. Will be much worse          | 4.4  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer      | 8.4  |

## H) INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY

**H1. Do you agree with Croatia's accession to the EU?**

|                                 |      |
|---------------------------------|------|
| 1. I completely agree           | 10.8 |
| 2. I mostly agree               | 30.9 |
| 3. I neither agree nor disagree | 30.7 |
| 4. I mostly disagree            | 11.2 |
| 5. I completely disagree        | 9.8  |
| 6. Don't know / No answer       | 6.6  |

**H2. Please estimate why and to what extent is Croatia's accession to the EU desirable.**

| <b>Croatia's accession to the EU is desirable because it enables:</b> | <b>I completely agree<br/>1</b> | <b>I mostly agree<br/>2</b> | <b>I mostly disagree<br/>3</b> | <b>I completely disagree<br/>4</b> | <b>M</b> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Better and faster economic development                             | 25.9                            | 51.5                        | 16.4                           | 6.1                                | 2.03     |
| 2. Faster democratisation of society                                  | 23.7                            | 49.7                        | 20.2                           | 6.4                                | 2.09     |
| 3. Higher living standard                                             | 25.5                            | 44.5                        | 21.6                           | 8.5                                | 2.13     |
| 4. Better protection of human and minority rights                     | 23.0                            | 49.0                        | 21.5                           | 6.4                                | 2.11     |
| 5. New insights into culture and religion of other peoples            | 29.2                            | 51.3                        | 13.7                           | 5.8                                | 1.96     |
| 6. Better employment opportunities                                    | 33.6                            | 44.5                        | 16.2                           | 5.8                                | 1.94     |
| 7. Better education                                                   | 31.4                            | 48.7                        | 14.5                           | 5.5                                | 1.94     |
| 8. Better military protection for Croatia                             | 19.9                            | 49.3                        | 23.8                           | 7.0                                | 2.18     |
| 9. Better opportunities for travel and new friendships                | 36.2                            | 49.8                        | 10.8                           | 5.3                                | 1.85     |

**H3. Please estimate why and to what extent Croatia's accession to the EU is not desirable.**

| <b>Croatia's accession to the EU is not desirable because it:</b>                                        | <b>I completely agree<br/>1</b> | <b>I mostly agree<br/>2</b> | <b>I mostly disagree<br/>3</b> | <b>I completely disagree<br/>4</b> | <b>M</b> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Threatens national identity of Croats                                                                 | 19.1                            | 33.3                        | 39.8                           | 7.8                                | 2.36     |
| 2. Threatens Croatia's sovereignty                                                                       | 18.6                            | 34.4                        | 39.0                           | 8.0                                | 2.36     |
| 3. Increases the possibility of economic exploitation of Croatia                                         | 22.8                            | 41.9                        | 30.2                           | 5.1                                | 2.18     |
| 4. Makes Croatia dependent on developed European countries (culturally, politically, economically, etc.) | 25.7                            | 41.6                        | 27.6                           | 5.1                                | 2.12     |
| 5. Restricts Croatia's economic growth through economic standards and measures                           | 20.3                            | 39.8                        | 33.0                           | 6.9                                | 2.27     |

**H4. Please indicate to what extent the following circumstances make Croatia's accession to the EU more difficult:**

| Croatia's accession to the EU is not desirable because of:                                | Very much<br>1 | Mostly<br>2 | Mostly not<br>3 | Not at all<br>4 | M    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|------|
| 1. Insufficient economic development of Croatia                                           | 17.7           | 54.2        | 22.6            | 5.5             | 2.16 |
| 2. Insufficient democratization of the Croatian political system                          | 13.8           | 52.9        | 27.8            | 5.5             | 2.25 |
| 3. Too strict EU criteria for future MSs                                                  | 23.1           | 51.8        | 20.8            | 4.4             | 2.06 |
| 4. Unjustly imposed conditions for Croatia's accession to the EU                          | 23.1           | 50.5        | 22.1            | 4.3             | 2.08 |
| 5. Insufficient observance of human and minority rights in Croatia                        | 11.7           | 48.7        | 31.1            | 8.5             | 2.36 |
| 6. Interests of some ruling groups in Croatia in preventing Croatia's accession to the EU | 16.0           | 47.1        | 30.0            | 6.8             | 2.28 |
| 7. Inability of the government to comply with the EU requirements and standards           | 17.1           | 53.6        | 23.6            | 5.7             | 2.18 |
| 8. Dissatisfaction of the EU with Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY                     | 14.2           | 54.0        | 25.0            | 6.8             | 2.24 |

**H5. How much do you trust the EU institutions?**

|                               |      |
|-------------------------------|------|
| 1. Completely                 | 3.2  |
| 2. Mostly                     | 24.7 |
| 3. Neither trust nor distrust | 46.0 |
| 4. Mostly distrust            | 10.9 |
| 5. Completely distrust        | 9.6  |
| 6. Don't know /No answer      | 5.6  |

## DEMOGRAPHIC MODULE

**iDIPLOM. What is your highest educational qualification? And the highest educational qualification of your mother and father?**

|                   | (Non)completed primary school | Three-year secondary school | Four-year secondary school | University / (Bologna) Undergraduate degree | Master's or doctoral degree / (Bologna) Graduate or postgraduate degree |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Respondent</b> | 24.8                          | 16.2                        | 45.3                       | 9.8                                         | 3.9                                                                     |
| <b>Mother</b>     | 7.6                           | 17.0                        | 56.4                       | 14.1                                        | 4.9                                                                     |
| <b>Father</b>     | 4.7                           | 20.8                        | 55.7                       | 13.4                                        | 5.5                                                                     |

## Additional information – economic status

**M1. How many computers do you have (desktop PC)? (M=0.94)**

|                             |      |
|-----------------------------|------|
| 1. Does not have a computer | 18.2 |
| 2. 1                        | 71.8 |
| 3. 2 or more                | 10.0 |

**M2. How many laptops do you have? (M=0.67)**

|                           |      |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Does not have a laptop | 44.6 |
| 2. 1                      | 46.1 |
| 3. 2 or more              | 9.3  |

**M3. How many cars do you have (personal, other)? (M=1.23)**

|                        |      |
|------------------------|------|
| 1. Does not have a car | 8.5  |
| 2. 1                   | 64.6 |
| 3. 2 or more           | 27.0 |

**M4. How many rooms are there in your apartment/house? (M=3.17)**

|               |      |
|---------------|------|
| 1. 1          | 4.8  |
| 2. 2          | 27.2 |
| 3. 3          | 33.9 |
| 4. 4          | 19.8 |
| 5. 5 and more | 14.3 |

**M5. How many books do you have in the apartment/house? (M=75.0)**

|                            |      |
|----------------------------|------|
| 1. 0                       | 14.6 |
| 2. Up to 10                | 12.9 |
| 3. 10-20                   | 11.8 |
| 4. 21-30                   | 7.6  |
| 5. 31-50                   | 15.3 |
| 6. 51-100                  | 16.2 |
| 7. Over 100                | 16.2 |
| 8. Do not know / No answer | 5.5  |

**M6. Do you live in a rented apartment/house?**

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| 1. No  | 90.0 |
| 2. Yes | 10.0 |

**M7. Do you live in your own apartment/house?**

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| 1. No  | 10.7 |
| 2. Yes | 89.3 |

**M8. Do you have your own room?**

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| 1. No  | 8.9  |
| 2. Yes | 91.1 |

**M9. Do you have Internet connection?**

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| 1. No  | 7.5  |
| 2. Yes | 92.5 |

**M9. Please indicate on the following scale which of the following categories would the monthly expenses of your household fall into? Under monthly expenses we mean everyday expenses for e.g. food, clothes, communications, utility bills, entertainment etc.**

|                        |      |
|------------------------|------|
| 1. Up to 1000 HRK      | 1.8  |
| 2. 1001 to 1500 HRK    | 2.0  |
| 3. 1501 to 2000 HRK    | 3.9  |
| 4. 2001 to 2500 HRK    | 6.4  |
| 5. 2501 to 3000 HRK    | 9.7  |
| 6. 3001 to 4000 HRK    | 9.3  |
| 7. 4001 to 5000 HRK    | 11.9 |
| 8. 5001 to 7000 HRK    | 13.4 |
| 9. 7001 to 10000 HRK   | 4.5  |
| 10. Over 10000 HRK     | 7.4  |
| (98) Refused to answer | 10.9 |
| (99) Does not know     | 18.9 |

**OCUP1. What do you do at the moment? Are you:**

|                                   |      |                       |      |
|-----------------------------------|------|-----------------------|------|
| Full-time employed                | 26.3 | Student               | 21.5 |
| Part-time / Occasionally employed | 3.5  | Agricultural worker   | 0.1  |
| Self-employed / Freelancer        | 0.7  | Tradesman / Craftsman | 0.1  |
| Unemployed                        | 24.4 | Other                 | -    |
| Pupil                             | 23.3 |                       |      |

**If you are employed, what is your average monthly salary (in HRK)? (M=4.244)**

|                    |      |
|--------------------|------|
| 1. Up to 2,800 HRK | 19.9 |
| 2. 2,900-4,000 HRK | 44.2 |
| 3. 4,100-5,400 HRK | 21.8 |
| 4. 5,500-6,000 HRK | 13.1 |
| 5. Over 6,000 HRK  | 6.0  |

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